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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys opinions in maritime cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, and state and federal courts in Florida. The survey covers the
period from July 1993 through July 1994.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Forum Non Conveniens
In American Dredging Co. v. Miller,' the Supreme Court affirmed a
decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in which the state court ruled
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not available as a defense or
as a means of dismissing an action in lawsuits brought in Louisiana state
courts pursuant to the Jones Act.2 The state court's decision was based
upon a Louisiana statute which disallowed the defense in all cases arising
under maritime law or the Jones Act.' In American Dredging, the plaintiff,
a resident of Mississippi, was injured while serving as a seaman on board
a tugboat operated by the defendant in the Delaware River. The plaintiff
brought suit under the Jones Act against his employer in the district court
for the Parish of Orleans. Both the trial court and the intermediate appellate
court ruled that, notwithstanding the provisions of the Louisiana statute, the
1. 114 S. Ct. 981,990 (1994).
2. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
3. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 123(c) (West 1993).
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maritime doctrine of forum non conveniens applied in the case. After
establishing in its opinion that the doctrine of forum non conveniens has
"been given its earliest and most frequent expression in admiralty cases,"
the Court proceeded to hold that the refusal of a state to apply the maritime
doctrine in a maritime lawsuit, brought pursuant to the savings to suitors
clause,5 does not significantly affect a fundamental feature of general
maritime law.
The Court conceded that its decision would create "disuniformity,
6
but nevertheless held that the Louisiana statute prohibiting the application
of forum non conveniens in maritime cases does not impede or impact 'the
proper harmony and uniformity"' 7 of admiralty law because the doctrine is
nothing more than a "supervening venue provision."8  Being a venue
provision, forum non conveniens is procedural and therefore has no effect
on substantive maritime law. According to the Supreme Court, the doctrine
is neither a legal principle nor a rule of law upon which those involved in
maritime endeavors consider or rely upon in managing their enterprises.9
Thus, all state courts are now free to ignore the concept of forum non
conveniens and the jurisprudence developing that doctrine in numerous
maritime cases, and instead apply local concepts of the doctrine, if such
concepts exist. Due deference to the wisdom of the Supreme Court
notwithstanding, it is submitted that there are many in the maritime
community (shipowners, protection and indemnity clubs, and insurance
companies, to name but three) who indeed give due consideration to where
they may be sued in the conduct of their national and international maritime
affairs. It is believed that American Dredging will be read with surprise and
puzzlement by maritime practitioners.
B. Settling Multi-Party Maritime Actions
Two decisions by the United States Supreme Court will have a very
significant impact upon settlements made in multi-party maritime actions.
In McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 0 the Court held that at trial the non-
settling defendants would receive a credit representing the proportionate
4. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 986.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1988).
6. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 987.
7. Id. (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)).
8. Id. at 988.
9. Id. at 988-89.
10. 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).
1994]
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fault of the settling defendants." Where there is a partial settlement, the
proportional fault of the settling defendants will be determined at trial. The
remaining defendants will receive a credit against the total liability. The
credit will represent the proportional fault of the settling defendants and not
the amount of the settlement. For example, suppose that one of two
defendants settles with the plaintiff for $100,000. At trial, it is determined
that the loss sustained by the plaintiff was $1,000,000, and that the settling
defendant was 50% at fault for the plaintiffs damages. The remaining
defendant would receive a credit of $500,000 against the total liability of
$1,000,000. In this example, one would say that the plaintiff made a poor
settlement. But it works the other way around. If the plaintiff had received
a $500,000 settlement, and the settling defendant had been found to be 10%
at fault, the remaining defendant is liable for 90% of the total liability after
deducting the 10% proportional fault of the settling defendant.
In Boca Grande Club, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,12 the
Supreme Court held that a settlement by one of several defendants
extinguished actions for contribution maintained by the non-settling
defendants against the settling defendant. Because the remaining defendants
receive a credit for the proportional fault of the settling defendant and will
thus never pay more than their own share of the loss, actions for contribu-
tion against settling parties are terminated by the settlement.
It is beyond the pale of this article to discuss the conflicts that existed
in maritime decisions which led to the Court accepting certiorari in
McDermott and Boca Grande Club. Nor does space permit a lengthy and
detailed discussion of the ramifications of the Court's ruling in these two
cases. Several obvious questions arise from the Court's rulings which
deserve brief comment. What if all of the defendants settle with the
plaintiff? The fundamental rationale of McDermott and Boca Grande Club,
that settlement extinguishes the proportional share of the liability of the
settling defendant, supports the conclusion that in such a situation the
settling defendants would be protected from contribution claims by other
settling defendants; thus, settling defendants would be prohibited from
prosecuting claims for contribution. What happens to contribution claims
between non-settling defendants? This question was not addressed in either
McDermott or Boca Grande Club. However, given the fact that the
decisions in those cases were based upon the concept of proportional fault,
and in light of the Court's holdings in United States v. Reliable Transfer
11. Id. at 1471-72.
12. 114 S. Ct. 1472 (1994).
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Co.'3 and in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,'4 one may
reasonably conclude that contribution claims between remaining defendants
remain viable. This would certainly be the case if the concept of joint and
several liability remains viable.
Was joint and several liability affected by the McDermott and Boca
Grande Club decisions? This issue was directly considered by the Court in
McDermott when the Court pointed out that accepting a proportional share
credit to deal with the settling defendants was not inconsistent with the
application of the rule of joint and several liability as between the non-
settling defendants.'" Thus, a plaintiff will be able to utilize the rule of
joint and several liability against the non-settling defendants.' 6
Do the principles announced in McDermott and Boca Grande Club
apply in maritime cases brought in state courts? The manner in which
partial settlements are treated directly affects the ultimate liability of the
parties and, in this writer's view is substantive, not procedural. Therefore,
the rules of McDermott and Boca Grande Club will surely apply to maritime
cases brought in state court. It is entirely possible that these two decisions
may not be limited to maritime actions. 7 While the conflict resolved by
the Supreme Court in McDermott and Boca Grande Club emerged from
maritime cases, the question of how to deal with partial settlements is not
peculiarly a maritime problem. The proportional credit rule is practical. It
promotes partial settlements, and by extinguishing claims for contribution,
cuts down on litigation. There is no reason the rule should not be applied
in non-maritime cases.
C. Shipowners Turnover Duty
In Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 8 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict existing in the courts of appeals
with respect to the scope of a shipowner's turnover duty and obligation to
warn of latent defects in the stow of cargo. The plaintiff longshoreman was
injured when he slipped on a clear sheet of plastic that had been placed
beneath a stow of bagged cocoa beans which he was helping discharge in
Philadelphia, The sheet of plastic had been placed in the ship by the
13. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
14. 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
15. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1471.
16. Id.
17. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. m (1990)
(explaining the competing theories as to how partial settlements were previously handled).
18. 114 S. Ct. 2057, 2062 (1994).
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loading stevedore in Guayaquil, Ecuador. 9 The lower court relied upon
Derr v. KawasakiKisen K.K,2 which held that a shipowner is not required
to supervise a loading stevedore or inspect a loading stevedore's work.2'
By contrast, in Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.,22 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a shipowner is under a duty to supervise loading
operations conducted by a foreign stevedore.23
The plaintiff longshoreman argued that the shipowner was under a duty
to make an inspection when the loading stevedore completed his cargo
operations. The inspection was for the purpose of ascertaining whether any
hazards existed in the stow following the completion of loading. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court held that the ship's
turnover duty to warn of latent defects in the cargo stow and the cargo area
is a narrow one.24 The shipowner's duty to warn of latent defects is
limited to defects not known to a stevedore and which would not be
"obvious to nor anticipated by a skilled stevedore in the competent
performance of its work." '25 The Court further stated that the shipowner's
duty to exercise reasonable care does not require him or her to supervise
cargo operations of a loading stevedore.26
D. Emotional Distress
In a detailed opinion, the United States Supreme Court held in
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshal[27 that the Federal Employers'
Liability Act 28 ("FELA") encompasses an action for emotional distress. As
the Court put it, the duty of employers to use due care to furnish a safe
place for their employees to work includes the "duty under FELA to avoid
subjecting its employees to negligently inflicted emotional injury."29 The
Court discussed at length the test or restrictions to adopt to limit the scope
of this duty and concluded that the zone of danger test best reconciles the
concerns of the common law with the principles underlying our FELA
19. Id. at 2061.
20. 835 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988).
21. Id. at 495.
22. 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982).
23. Id. at 1304.
24. Howlett, 114 S. Ct. at 2067.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2407 (1994).
28. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
29. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. at 2399.
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jurisprudence."0 Under this concept, workers who are within the zone of
physical danger may recover for emotional injury without sustaining
physical trauma or impact.
This decision will certainly impact maritime law inasmuch as the FELA
is incorporated into the Jones Act. In Gaston v. Flowers Transportation,3
the court held that a seaman could not recover for emotional distress without
physical injury.32 The court specifically rejected the zone of danger test
based on the circumstances of this particular case.33 Obviously, Gaston,
as well as many other decisions, will be outdated by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Gottshall.
III. OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided
few cases dealing with maritime matters during the period of this survey.
Generally, such decisions applied established law.
A. Jurisdiction-Limitation of Liability
In Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes,34 the court reversed the dismissal of a
petition for limitation of liability and held that a vessel in dry dock "was in
or on navigable waters at the time of the fire."'35 The district judge, based
upon the recommendation of a magistrate judge, held that because the vessel
was in dry dock at the time of the fire which gave rise to the injury that led
to the filing of the limitation action, it was not on navigable waters and
therefore, it was not within the court's admiralty jurisdiction. 6 The court
of appeals ruled to the contrary and relied upon the decisions by the United
States Supreme Court in The Robert W. Parsons37 and Simmons v. The
Steamship Jefferson.38 In its opinion, the Sea Vessel court also noted that
the Limitation of Liability Act does not furnish an independent ground for
30. Id. at 2400.
31. 866 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1989).
32. Id. at 821.
33. Id. at 820.
34. 23 F.3d 345 (11th Cir. 1994).
35. Id. at 349.
36. Id. at 347.
37. 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
38. 215 U.S. 130 (1909).
1994]
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maritime jurisdiction." The court also held, contrary to the conclusion of
the district judge, that the repair of a vessel on a dry dock "is a crucial
maritime activity." 0 Thus, the court found that both the "nexus" test of
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland4 and the "substantial
relationship to traditional maritime activity" test applied by Sisson v.
Ruby42 had been fulfilled.
B. Personal Jurisdiction-Minimum Contacts
In Francosteel Corp. v. M V Charm,43 the purchaser of a shipload of
steel, a New York company, joined with the seller of the steel, a French
company, to sue the carrying ship in rem, and both the vessel's owner and
manager, which were Danish corporations, for the failure to deliver the steel
in Savannah, Georgia. The ship sank in the Atlantic after loading the steel
in France. The court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the shipowner and ship manager.44 The plaintiffs relied
upon the Georgia long arm statute which the court found conferred personal
jurisdiction to constitutional limits.4" The plaintiff, who was the shipper
of the cargo of steel, subchartered M.V. CHARM from a Dutch company
that in tum had chartered the ship from the defendant shipowner. After the
cargo was loaded in France, bills of lading were issued calling for delivery
of the steel in Savannah, Georgia. The bills of lading were signed by the
master of the ship.46 Both the district judge and the appellate court
assumed that the bills of lading created a contract between the plaintiff
shipper and the defendant shipowner for delivery of the cargo in Georgia.47
However, none of the arrangements which led to the shipload of steel being
dispatched toward Savannah occurred in Georgia. All events giving rise to
the contractual arrangements took place outside of Georgia and, as
mentioned, the ship never reached Savannah. The court found the
shipowner and ship manager's agreement to deliver the cargo of steel in
Savannah was "an isolated and sporadic contact with Georgia ... ,
39. Sea Vessel, 23 F.3d at 348.
40. Id. at 351.
41. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
42. 497 U.S. 358, 362 (1990).
43. 19 F.3d 624 (11th Cir. 1994).
44. Id. at 629.
45. Id. at 627.
46. Id. at 626.
47. Id. at 627.
48. Francosteel, 19 F.3d at 628.
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Accordingly, the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction
was affirmed. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz49 and United Rope Distributors, Inc. v.
Seatriumph Marine Corp." The facts in United Rope Distributors were
basically identical to the facts in Francosteel with the exception of the
destination of the ships.
C. Bills of Lading-Package Limitation
In Marine Transportation Services Sea-Barge Group, Inc. v. Python
High Performance Marine Corp.,"' a carrier issued its bill of lading to a
shipper covering the transportation of a boat mold from Miami to San Juan,
Puerto Rico. The bill of lading named Python High Performance Marine
Corporation as the shipper and also identified the consignee in San Juan
who was to receive the mold. The bill of lading was stamped to the effect
that freight was to be collected from the consignee. The boat mold never
arrived in San Juan. The carrier brought suit against the shipper for
nonpayment of freight earned on other goods shipped by the owner of the
boat mold. The shipper, Python High Performance, counterclaimed for loss
of the boat mold. The bill of lading contained a $500 package limitation
identical to the limitation in The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
("COGSA").52 The district court awarded $40,000 to the shipper for loss
of the boat mold, and held that the shipper had satisfied the bill of lading
provision declaring a higher value for the goods and payment of additional
freight in order to avoid the $500 package limitation. 3 The court of
appeals reversed. 4 It pointed out that the declaration made by the shipper
was not on the face of the bill of lading, as required by law.55 Rather, the
shipper had declared a $100,000 value in the booking notice to the carrier.
The shipper had paid a $50 charge for insurance and the district court held
that this charge satisfied the requirement that additional freight be paid. The
court of appeals disagreed. It pointed out that to comply with the require-
ment to pay additional freight, it is necessary to pay an additional amount
49. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
50. 930 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1991).
51. 16 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 1994).
52. Id. at 1140-41; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5) (1988).
53. Marine Transp. Servs., 16 F.3d at 1141.
54. Id.
55. Id.
19941
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based upon filed tariff rates. 6 In the case in question, the additional
freight would have been $200 and not $50."'
In Marine Transportation Services, the district court also held that the
carrier was guilty of conversion when it refused to deliver other boat molds
shipped by a separate bill of lading to the shipper." The shipper attempted
to pay the freight to the carrier's agent in San Juan, but was told that the
cargo could not be delivered until the carrier heard from the carrier's
lawyer. The district court's holding that the carrier was guilty of conversion
was affirmed. 9 The conversion count was based on Florida law. The
carrier argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for
such a land-based claim. The court of appeals held that the district court
had ancillary jurisdiction to determine the compulsory counterclaim of the
shipper.6
D. Statute of Limitations-Equitable Tolling
In two decisions involving the Suits in Admiralty Act6 and the Public
Vessels Act,6" the Eleventh Circuit held that the doctrine of equitable
tolling did not operate to toll a statute of limitations. In Justice v. United
States,63 the plaintiff filed a timely action under the Public Vessels Act and
the Suits in Admiralty Act. The action was later dismissed without
prejudice and the plaintiff did not appeal. Thereafter, the plaintiff started
another lawsuit which in turn was subsequently dismissed because of his
failure to comply with sundry pre-trial proceedings and a court order dealing
with discovery. Unfortunately, since the second lawsuit was brought after
the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations under the Public Vessels
Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act, it was dismissed with prejudice.64 In
its opinion, the court pointed out that the doctrine of equitable tolling "is
potentially available" in cases brought under the Public Vessels Act and
Suits in Admiralty Act.65 Nevertheless, the court held that the dismissal
of the earlier lawsuit without prejudice did not permit a later action to be
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 16 F.3d at 1140.
59. Id. at 1137.
60. Id. at 1139.
61. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988).
62. Id. §§ 781-790.
63. 6 F.3d 1474 (11th Cir. 1993).
64. Id. at 1477-78; 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1988).
65. Justice, 6 F.3d at 1478.
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filed after the limitation period expired.66 Although the court was sympa-
thetic to the plaintiffs plight, it noted in some detail the various avenues
that were open to the plaintiff and his counsel which would have prevented
the action from being time barred.67
In the second case, Raziano v. United States,68 the parents of a
pleasure boater, who died as a result of a collision between his vessel and
an unlit navigational mark, brought suit under the Suits in Admiralty Act
two months after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The parents
had made the United States Coast Guard aware of their claim, and were
negotiating with the Coast Guard prior to filing suit. The district court held
that the Coast Guard had knowledge of the claim and that the statute of
limitations had been equitably tolled.69 The court of appeals reversed.7"
It pointed out that there is a strong public interest in limiting the period of
time in which actions can be brought and negotiations prior to filing suit
will not operate to toll a statute of limitations.7' Moreover, the court found
nothing extraordinary in the circumstances surrounding the negotiations
which would warrant application of equitable relief.72
E. Loss of Society-Loss of Consortium
In a per curiam opinion, the court in Lollie v. Brown Marine Service,
Inc.73 held that neither the Jones Act nor general maritime law permit
recovery for loss of society or loss of consortium in personal injury cases.74
The court relied upon Michel v. Total Transportation, Inc.75 and Murray
v. Anthony J. Bertucci Construction Co.76
F. Jones Act-Seaman's Status
In O'Boyle v. United States,77 the court affirmed the dismissal of a
Jones Act lawsuit brought by a marine biologist serving on board a Japanese
66. Id. at 1478-79.
67. Id.
68. 999 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 1540.
70. Id. at 1542.
71. Id. at 1541.
72. Id. at 1541-42.
73. 995 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1993).
74. Id.
75. 957 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992).
76. 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 190 (1992).
77. 993 F.2d 211 (1lth Cir. 1993).
1994]
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fishing vessel in international waters.7" The plaintiff biologist was on
board the vessel pursuant to a treaty and federal law79 to compile informa-
tion relating to drift net fishing operations. The plaintiff was not a member
of the crew, had nothing to do with navigation of the fishing boat, was not
paid by the boat owner, owed no duty to the vessel, and had no means of
communicating with the ship's master because the plaintiff spoke English
and the master spoke Japanese. The court was clearly of the opinion that
the biologist was not a seaman and noted that only one who has the status
of a seaman can recover under the Jones Act."° The court cited its earlier
decision in Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc."1 and the United States
Supreme Court decision in McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander,82
and held an essential ingredient to seaman status is performance of the work
of the ship.83 Since the biologist contributed nothing to the function of the
fishing vessel, he was not a seaman. 4
G. False SOS
United States v. James5 presented an unusual fact situation. A boat
owner radioed the Miami Coast Guard advising the Coast Guard that his
vessel was being boarded by foreign-speaking individuals from a capsized
boat. The Coast Guard dispatched a vessel and a helicopter toward the
offshore position which was some 200 miles from Miami. The Coast Guard
vessel monitored additional radio messages from James, the boat owner, and
concluded that the boat appeared to be in the Miami area and not at sea.
The Coast Guard dispatched a second vessel which also monitored the boat
owner's radio transmissions by direction-finding gear and pinpointed James'
position in the Miami River. 6 At that point the Coast Guard realized it
was dealing with a hoax and went into its "law enforcement" mode.87
78. Id. at 214.
79. Id. at 212. The Shima-Asselein treaty authorized the plaintiff to serve as an
observer on a japanese fishing vessel, as did the Driftnet Monitoring, Assessment, and
Control Act of 1987. Id.
80. Id. at 213-14.
81. 896 F.2d 504 (11th Cir. 1990).
82. 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
83. O'Boyle, 993 F.2d at 214.
84. Id.
85. 986 F.2d 441 (11th Cir. 1993).
86. Id. at 442.
87. Id. at 442 n.3.
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James was arrested and convicted of sending a false distress message
in violation of 14 U.S.C. § 88(c). The United States asked that the costs
incurred by the Coast Guard in dispatching vessels and a helicopter,
approximately $5800, be assessed against James pursuant to statute which
provides that one who sends a false distress message is "liable for all costs
the Coast Guard incurs. . . ."" James argued that the statutory provision
was contained in the statutes dealing with rescue operations, not within the
statutes dealing with the law enforcement duties of the Coast Guard.
Therefore, the Coast Guard could recover only its costs incurred during the
rescue phase, which was far less than the total expenses. The district judge
agreed and permitted recovery of only $1000. The court of appeals reversed
and stated the statute meant exactly what it said, that James was liable for
all of the costs incurred in responding to his false distress message.8 9
H. Approved Tariff-Not Subject to Discount
In American Transport Lines, Inc. v. Wrves,9 ° the defendant sought to
avoid paying the plaintiff's bill toward shipping charges by arguing that
there was an oral agreement with the plaintiff not to pay full tariff rates.
The district judge found that the tariff was approved by the federal maritime
commission, and the plaintiff was required to charge the full tariff rates.
The court held the defendants liable for all unpaid freight charges. The
court of appeals affirmed.9 Relying upon Gilbert Imported Hardwoods,
Inc. v. 245 Packages of Guatambu Squares92 and Allstate Insurance Co.
v. International Shipping Corp., the court held that irrespective of any
oral agreement between the carrier and the shipper, the carrier was required
to charge the full approved tariff rate.94
I. Jones Act-Continuing Tort Theory
In Santiago v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.,9' the plaintiff sought to
avoid a statute of limitations defense to his Jones Act suit by arguing that
under the theory of continuing tort, the statute of limitations did not begin
88. 14 U.S.C. § 88(c)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
89. James, 986 F.2d at 444.
90. 985 F.2d 1065 (1lth Cir. 1993).
91. Id. at 1067.
92. 508 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1975).
93. 703 F.2d 497 (11 th Cir. 1983).
94. American Transp., 985 F.2d at 1067.
95. 986 F.2d 423 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
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to run until the plaintiff ceased working in the environment involving
exposure to the condition which caused his injury; in this case, loud engine
room noises. It was established that the plaintiff was employed by the
defendant in a vessel's engine room up until the time of trial. The district
court accepted the plaintiff's argument, took the statute of limitations'
defense from the jury, and charged the jury that if they awarded damages
to the plaintiff, they need not be concemed when the damages occurred.96
On appeal, the court suggested that the continuing tort theory might
apply in the Eleventh Circuit, but refused to rule on the question.97 Instead
of deciding the question, the court held that the jury charge was an
inaccurate statement of the continuing tort theory and reversed the district
court's decision because it gave an incorrect statement of law.98 This
seems to be a strange result. Since the court decided that the trial judge
gave an erroneous statement to the jury as to the continuing tort theory, and
reversed for that reason, why did it fail to also decide whether the theory
was applicable to the case?
J. Collision-Pennsylvania Rule-Sovereign Immunity
In Pelican Marine Carriers, Inc. v. City of Tampa,99 the court of
appeals affirmed, without opinion, the decision of a magistrate judge in a
case where a seagoing ship struck a sewer cap maintained by the City of
Tampa.'00 The shipowner sued for the cost of repairs and incidental
expenses.
The magistrate judge divided the damages seventy percent against the
shipowner and thirty percent against the city. The judge applied the Penn-
sylvania Rule'0 ' under which a vessel guilty of violating a statute that was
intended to prevent collisions bears the burden of "showing not merely that
her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not,
but that it could not have been."'02 The statutory fault of the ship was
excessive speed and the shipowner failed to carry its Pennsylvania Rule
burden.' 3
96. Id. at 425-26.
97. Id. at 427.
98. Id. at 427-28.
99. 4 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1993).
100. Pelican Marine Carriers, Inc. v. City of Tampa, 791 F. Supp. 845 (M.D. Fla.
1992), aft'd, 4 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1993).
101. See The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
102. Id. at 136.
103. Pelican Marine, 791 F. Supp. at 853.
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The Pennsylvania Rule was also applied to the City of Tampa because
it had violated the permit issued by the United States Corp of Army
Engineers which permitted construction of the sewer cap.' The court
found the city failed to carry its Pennsylvania Rule burden."0 5
The judge apportioned liability on the basis of comparative fault as
required by United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., °6 and as noted, found
both the ship and the city at fault. It is very difficult to predict with any
significant degree of accuracy the apportionment that a court may make in
any given collision case. The reasons stated by courts for the selected
allocation of fault often appear to be arbitrary. In this case, the judge said
the ship was "substantially more at fault than the City.. ,,.0" So, in this
particular case, where the allocation was 70/30, "substantially more" meant
more than twice as much. However, the same facts could have supported
a 50/50, 60/40 or 80/20 allocation without any real fear of being altered by
an appellate court.
Another interesting feature of this case was the city's claim that section
768.28 of the Florida Statutes barred recovery against it of any sum in
excess of $100,000.'08 The judge noted that while the statute indeed
includes municipalities within its scope, 10 9 the statute is not applicable
because general maritime law, and not state law, must be applied to the
collision case, otherwise the uniform application of maritime law would be
affected. 110
K. Unauthorized Law Practice-Tortious Interference With
Contracts
Yanakakis v. Chandris, S.A."' involved the appeal of a jury verdict
of approximately $3.2 million (of which $2.6 million were punitive
damages) in favor of attorneys who represented an injured seaman on a
contingent fee basis. The action against the defendant shipowner and its
insurer was based on tortious interference with the contingent fee agreement
between counsel and the seaman."' The seaman signed a contingent fee
104. Id. at 853-54.
105. Id. at 853.
106. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
107. Pelican Marine, 791 F. Supp. at 855.
108. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1993).
109. Pelican Marine, 791 F. Supp. at 856.
110. Id.
111. 9 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 1510.
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contract with an out-of-state lawyer who was residing in Florida, but was
not authorized to practice in Florida. The out-of-state lawyer then entered
into another fee arrangement with a Florida law firm. Defendants argued
at trial that the initial fee contract between the out-of-state lawyer and the
seaman was void because it constituted unauthorized practice of law in
violation of section 454.23 of the Florida Statutes."3 Further, because the
initial contract was unauthorized, it was void and could not support a later
agreement with Florida lawyers. The district court held that, under Florida
law, a fee agreement is not void simply because it springs from a void fee
agreement. 1 4 The court of appeals considered the issue to be one of first
impression under Florida law."5 The court certified two questions to the
Florida Supreme Court. First, whether an out-of-state lawyer that enters into
a contingency fee agreement in Florida has engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law which renders the fee agreement void, and second, if such
a contract is void, will a fee agreement with a Florida law firm based
thereon also be void?" 
6
IV. DECISIONS BY UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS IN FLORIDA
There were relatively few admiralty decisions coming from the United
States District Courts in Florida during the period covered by this article.
Indeed, during the first half of 1993, which precedes the starting point for
this survey, there were almost as many cases decided by the district courts
as in the following twelve months. Most of the district court opinions deal
with maritime personal injuries.
A. Bankruptcy-Preferred Mortgages
In the bankruptcy case In re McCoy,"7 a creditor made several loans
to the owners of a fishing vessel. As collateral, the creditor took back
mortgages on real estate and a preferred ship mortgage on the shrimp vessel.
The debtor defaulted, and the creditor brought an admiralty action to
foreclose the preferred ship mortgage in federal court. Thereafter, the
debtor filed for bankruptcy and the foreclosure action was stayed. The court
permitted the creditor to proceed with its foreclosure action on the
113. FLA. STAT. § 454.23 (1993).
114. Chandris, 9 F.3d at 1511.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1513.
117. 163 B.R. 206 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
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understanding that the action would be limited to obtaining an in rem
judgment against the vessel and that the creditor could not seek an in
personam judgment against the debtor."' The district court proceeded to
enter judgment in rem against the vessel for a sum far less than the total
indebtedness. The creditor purchased the vessel at the marshall's sale,
crediting its in rem judgment for the purchase price." 9
The creditor then filed a claim in the pending bankruptcy action for the
balance of the debt. The debtor sought to dismiss the claim on the grounds
of res judicata, arguing that the judgment entered in district court foreclosed
the entire debt. The bankruptcy court rejected the argument. 2 ' It found
only three of the four elements required to establish res judicata were met;
the fourth element was lacking in that there was no identity of causes of
action.'' The bankruptcy court pointed out that the judgment in the
admiralty case was limited to an in rem judgment against the shrimp boat
and that the creditor had been precluded by order of the bankruptcy court
from obtaining an in personam judgment in the ship mortgage foreclosure
action." The bankruptcy judge further noted that even if all of the
elements for applying resjudicata had existed, it would not operate to defeat
the claimant's claim." The court reasoned that the debtor was 'estopped
from asserting the application of res judicata as a defense against the claim
in the bankruptcy proceeding because it had taken the position in the
foreclosure suit that foreclosure had to be limited to an in rem judgment
against the vessel itself.'24
B. Joint and Several Liability-Absent Parties
In Groff v. Chandris, Inc.," 5 a passenger sued for injuries sustained
during a cruise. The defendants sought to have the jury consider the
118. Id. at 208.
119. Id.
120. Id, at 210.
12 1. There are four requirements for a prior judgment to bar a subsequent action: I)
the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 2) a final
judgment on the merits must have been rendered; 3) the parties, or those in privity with them
must be identical in both actions; and 4) the same cause of action must be involved in both
actions. Id, (citing to Ray v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 677 F.2d 818 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983)).
122. McCoy, 163 B.R. at 210.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 835 F. Supp. 1408 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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proportional fault of the Grand Cayman Port Authority, which was not a
party to the action. The defendants argued that the Florida Supreme Court
decision of Fabre v. Marin26 mandated such an allocation. The district
judge rejected the argument and held that in the Eleventh Circuit, a
defendant is not permitted to have the trier of fact ascertain the proportional
fault of an entity that is not a party to the lawsuit.'
The district judge relied upon Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique"2 and Ebanks v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.'
The court relied upon Edmonds for the proposition that joint tortfeasors are
liable to a plaintiff jointly and severally for full damages. 30 In Ebanks,
the court held that it was error for a district court to allocate fault between
one defendant and another company that was not a party to the lawsuit. 3 '
However, the decisions in McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde'32 and Boca
Grande Club, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co. " effectively overruled
Ebanks. In Ebanks, seamen employed on a dredge owned by Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Company sustained injuries when that vessel was struck by
a tank ship owned by Chevron Oil Company. 3 The seamen settled their
claims with the owner of the tank ship and proceeded with an action against
the dredge owner. At trial, the district court found that the tank ship was
100% at fault and although there was negligence involved on the part of the
dredge owner, that negligence did not contribute to the casualty. 3 On
appeal, the dredge owner sought to uphold the jury verdict by arguing that
the result was sanctioned by Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc.,'36 which
held that a settlement extinguishes the proportional fault of the settling
tortfeasor.' To avoid Leger, the seamen argued that the decision in
Edmonds reaffirmed the proposition that maritime plaintiffs enjoy the benefit
of joint and several liability and, accordingly, Edmonds required that the
judgment be reversed."' The court of appeals accepted the argument and
126. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
127. Groff, 835 F. Supp. at 1410.
128. 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
129. 688 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983).
130. Groff, 835 F. Supp. at 1410.
131. Ebanks, 688 F.2d at 722.
132. 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).
133. 114 S. Ct. 1472 (1994).
134. Ebanks, 688 F.2d at 717.
135. Id. at 718.
136. 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979).
137. Id. at 1249-50.
138. Ebanks, 688 F.2d at 720.
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held that Leger did not apply in face of Edmonds, stating "[w]e also agree
that if the mere language of the Leger case could be construed to authorize
the proceedings conducted here by the trial court, then its effect as precedent
has been weakened by Edmonds."'39  The adverse verdict against the
seaman was reversed. 4 ' In sum, Ebanks has been effectively overturned
by Boca Grande Club"' in which the Supreme Court adopted the rule in
McDermott. Thus, Ebanks is no bar to the application of Fabre v. Marin
in a maritime case. Further, Boca Grande Club arguably supports such
application.
C. Limitation of Liability
In re Complaint of Nobles'42 involved a limitation of liability action
that was filed by the owners and the liability insurer of a sixteen foot motor
boat following a collision between the boat and a boathouse. The boat was
operated by the owner's son at the time of the accident. One of the
passengers of the boat died and all other occupants of the boat were
injured. 4
The district court ruled on a number of outstanding motions in the case.
One of the motions granted by the court was to dismiss the boat owner's
liability insurer as a limitation plaintiff. The district court pointed out that
the Limitation of Liability Act" does not give insurers the right to limit
liability. 4
5
The claimants also moved to dismiss the limitation complaint on the
grounds that the court lacked general maritime jurisdiction and that the
limitation statutes do not extend to pleasure boats.' 41 In ruling that there
was maritime jurisdiction, the court relied on Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays,147
in which the court of appeals made it clear that the owners of pleasure
vessels are entitled to seek limitation.44 However, the district court was
139. Id.
140. Id. at 723.
141. 114 S. Ct. at 1472.
142. 842 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
143. Id. at 1432.
144. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
145. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1433. It has long been established that only a vessel
owner or a bare boat charterer considered to be an owner pro hoc vice is entitled to claim
the benefits of the limitation statute.
146. Id. at 1434.
147. 893 F.2d 1225 (1lth Cir. 1990).
148. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1435.
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clearly not enamored of the rule of law which it enforced when it stated:
"Allowing the owners of pleasure craft to limit their liability pursuant to the
Act defies the express purpose of that statute, and provides an unintended
and unjust windfall for the owner of a pleasure craft.' 4 9
In denying the motion to dismiss for lack of maritime jurisdiction, the
court also relied upon Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson5 ' and Sisson
v. Ruby. 5' The Court in Foremost held that maritime jurisdiction is
available only "when [a] ... potential hazard to maritime commerce arises
out of activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity .. ,, "" In Sisson, the Court ruled that actual disruption of
maritime commerce is not necessary to support admiralty jurisdiction.'53
Such jurisdiction exists if the casualty in question "is likely to disrupt
commercial activity.' 54 The district court then proceeded to apply these
principles to the collision between the pleasure boat and houseboat and ruled
that the operation of a pleasure boat does bear a substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity, and that the casualty in question was one that
could potentially impact maritime commerce.55
The interesting aspect of this case was the manner in which the district
court treated the plaintiff's motion to strike various items in the claim filed
by the parents of the passenger killed in the collision. The plaintiff sought
to strike the claim for recovery of losses based on net accumulations of the
expected estate of the decedent. The motion to strike was denied.'56 The
district court supported its denial upon Sea-land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet,'57 a case which permitted a survival action for a longshoreman's
lost future earnings. The court expressly rejected the case of Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., S in which the United States Supreme Court held that the
representatives of a deceased seaman could not recover for his lost future
earnings. 59 The district court stated that Miles did not apply because the
149. Id.
150. 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
151. 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
152. 457 U.S. at 675 n.5.
153. 497 U.S. at 363.
154. Id.
155. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1436.
156. Id. at 1434.
157. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
158. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
159. Id. at 37.
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claimants did not base their action on the Jones Act. 6" In other words,
the decedent in the limitation action was not a seaman.
There are two difficulties with the court's conclusion. First, in Miles,
the Supreme Court explicitly limited its holding in Gaudet to the facts of
that case and ruled that Gaudet applies only to longshoremen.' 6' Second,
the rejection of Miles leads to the anomalous result that the representatives
of a non-seaman will recover more and different benefits than will the
representatives of a deceased seaman. This raises obvious questions about
the uniform application of maritime law and seemingly contradicts the
proposition that seamen are wards of the admiralty court.'62 It seems
strange that a seaman whose rights have been jealously protected by
maritime courts for decades is now entitled to a less beneficial remedy than
a passenger killed in a motor boat accident.
The district court's rejection of Miles conflicts with decisions by
Florida courts which have held that damages can be limited in maritime
wrongful death actions brought by parents of deceased recr6ational
boaters.'63
D. Carriage of Goods-Real Party in Interest
A shipper and its cargo insurer brought an action against the carrier for
damage sustained by a shipment of pears transported from Jacksonville to
Santos, Brazil. In Im Ex Trading Co. v. Vessell, Beate Oldendorff, 4 the
court held that neither the shipper nor its insurer had standing to bring the
action because they were not real parties in interest. 65  The terms of
shipment were "FAS Jacksonville."' 66  The court stated, relying upon
York-Shipley, Inc. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 67 that title and risk
160. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1434 n.9.
161. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 (citing Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 573).
162. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
163. See Lipworth v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 592 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 465 (1992); Perlman v. Valdes, 575 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
164. 841 F. Supp. 1151 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
165. Id. at 1153.
166. Id. at 1152.
167. 474 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1973).
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of loss passed to the consignee of the pears once the shipment was delivered
to the carrier in Jacksonville. 6 ' The consignee was not a party to the law-
suit. 1
69
E. Release by Seaman
Antoniou v. Thiokol Corp. Group Long Term Disability Plan
70
involved the construction and effect of a release given by a seaman to settle
a Jones Act lawsuit against his employer. Antoniou was employed as a
cook on board a missile recovery vessel operated by Thiokol Corpora-
tion. '7 He brought an action against his employer under the Jones Act,
which was ultimately settled through mediation. In connection with the
settlement, Antoniou executed a release in favor of the vessel, its underwrit-
ers, and his employer.77 At the time the release was given, Antoniou was
receiving long-term disability benefits from the defendant, and eight months
after he signed the release, those benefits were terminated.1
73
Antoniou sued the disability plan (the "Plan") and the Plan moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the release of Thiokol Corporation also
operated to release the defendant Plan. 174 The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the defendant's release defense. 75
The court pointed out that the defendant Plan was a separate legal entity
from Antoniou's employer and that the release made no mention whatsoever
of the benefit plan. 176 The court further noted that under maritime law,
a seaman's release should be construed to be effective only as to those
parties intended to be released.
77
Neither the court nor the plaintiff referred to the heavy burden that
rests with a party who seeks to establish a release given by a seaman. It is
necessary to prove not only that the release was "executed freely" and
"without deception or coercion," but "that it was made by the seaman with
168. Im Ex Trading, 841 F. Supp. at 1152.
169. Id.
170. 849 F. Supp. 1531 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
171. Id. at 1532.
172. Id. at 1534.
173. Id. at 1532-33.
174. Id. at 1534.
175. Antoniou, 849 F. Supp. at 1535.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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full understanding of his rights.' ' 78  It is submitted that to carry this
burden, it would have been necessary for the defendant Plan to prove that
at the time the release was given, Antoniou was informed that he was giving
up all rights to benefits presently being received, as well as any and all
future rights to benefits that he might be entitled to receive.'79
F. Suits in Admiralty Act--Service of Complaint
The complaint of a seaman alleging injury while serving on board a
public vessel of the United States was dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in Jayne v. United States Department of Navy, Military Sealift
Conimand.80  The court held that the plaintiff failed to serve his com-
plaint "forthwith" as required by the Suits in Admiralty Act.'' The Act
requires service on both the United States Attorney in the district in which
the complaint is filed and upon the Attorney General of the United
States. 2 Relying upon Libby v. United States,"3 the district court held
that the service requirements were conditions placed by the United States
upon its consent to be sued, and were therefore jurisdictional.8 4  The
court also ruled that the "good cause" exception in Rule 40) of Civil Proce-
dure, "'85 which permits a party to avoid dismissal of an action if it can
show good cause as to why service was not effected within 120 days, was
not relevant in determining whether the conditions of 42 U.S.C. § 742 had
been met.8 6
G. Maritime Liens-Assignment-Laches
Galehead, Inc. v. M'V Fratzis M.1'7 presented the ever recurring
situation in which a vessel incurs liens for supplies and necessaries ordered
by a charterer. The charterer goes out of business leaving the bills unpaid
and the lienholders, if fortunate, are able to bring an in rem action against
178. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 248; see also HERBERT BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE
SUPREME COURT § 3-1 (3d ed. 1979).
179. Antoniou, 849 F. Supp. at 1535.
180. 1994 A.M.C. 1003 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
181. Id. at 1010 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (1988)).
182. Id.
183. 840 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1988).
184. Jayne, 1994 A.M.C. at 1005-06.
185. FED. R. Civ. P. 40).
186. Jayne, 1994 A.M.C. at 1009 (citing 42 U.S.C. app. § 742 (1988)).
187. 1994 A.M.C. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
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the ship to foreclose their liens. Galehead presented one interesting
difference. Galehead, one of the plaintiffs, sued as the assignee of several
claims giving rise to maritime liens. Galehead is apparently in the business
of enforcing maritime lien claims on a contingency basis. The shipowner
argued that the assignment of maritime liens on a contingency basis was
contrary to law and to the policy of the Federal Maritime Lien Act.S'
The court quickly rejected the shipowner's argument and pointed out that
it is well established that maritime liens can be assigned and that the method
of payment of the consideration for the assignment has no effect on the
validity of such assignments."'
The shipowner also argued that the doctrine of laches made it
inequitable for the liens to be enforced against his ship. The basis for this
claim was the fact that the owner had purchased the ship shortly after the
liens were incurred and the lienholders waited for over two years to enforce
the claims by an action against the ship. The court noted that the law
requires the holder of a maritime lien to exercise a "high degree of
diligence" in enforcing the liens against a purchaser of the vessel who has
no knowledge of the liens.19
Because the plaintiffs in fact arrested the vessel at the first opportunity
following the vessel's return to the United States after the liens were
incurred, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had fulfilled their burden and
rejected the laches defense.' 9'
H. COGSA-Fire Statute
In Banana Services, Inc. v. M/V Tasman Star,'92 a shipload of
bananas and plantains were delivered in a rotting condition at Port Manatee
on board the motor vessel TASMAN STAR. The plaintiff, the shipper of
the cargo, sued for all losses sustained as a result of the cargo being
unmarketable.' 93 The shipowner and charterer raised the fire statute as a
defense.' 94 The district court rejected the rule followed in the Ninth
188. Id. at 1161.
189. Id. at 1161-62.
190. Id. at 1165 (quoting Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. M/V Andino,
1983 A.M.C. 1166 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (citation omitted)).
191. Id. at 1165.
192. 1994 A.M.C. 1617 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
193. Id. at 1621.
194. 46 U.S.C. app. § 182 (1988). Section 1304(2)(b) of COGSA incorporates the fire
statute which specifies that neither a vessel nor its owner is liable for damage to cargos
caused by a fire on board the ship unless the fire was caused by the "actual fault or privity"
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Circuit which requires a carrier to demonstrate that it exercised due
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel before it can invoke the fire
statute. 195 The court applied the cases from the Second and Fifth Circuits
which permit a carrier to invoke the fire statute without an initial showing
of seaworthiness.' 96 If the vessel interests establish that damage was
caused by fire, the burden of proof then goes back to the cargo interests to
prove that the fire was caused by the "design or neglect" of the carrier. 9'
The court found that the vessel proved that the damage was caused by
fire. 9 The plaintiff failed to prove that the fire was caused by the actual
design or neglect of the vessel and carrier.'99
V. FLORIDA DECISIONS
Relatively few decisions involving maritime actions were reported from
the Florida circuit courts during the past year. Moreover, most of the
Florida cases dealt with personal injury claims brought by seamen.
A. Strict Liability--Sailboat Rentals
In Samuel Friedland Family Enterprises v. Amoroso,"' the Florida
Supreme Court held that the concept of strict liability as set out in section
402(A) of the Restatement 0' applied to the renting of sailboats. A hotel
guest was injured as the result of the breaking of a crossbar on the sailboat
she rented at a hotel. The guest brought an action in strict liability against
both the hotel and its tenant who was the owner and renter of the sail-
boat.20 2 In its opinion, the court pointed out that the concept of strict
liability as stated by section 402A of the Restatement °3 was adopted in
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.2 4 The court held that the doctrine applied
to commercial lessors such as the hotel and its tenant.20 5 In the Amoroso
opinion, no mention was made of maritime law or its applicability and the
of the owner. Id. § 1304(2)(b).
195. Banana Servs., 1994 A.M.C. at 1623.
196. Id. at 1623-24.
197. Id. at 1622-24.
198. Id. at 1625.
199. Id.
200. 630 So. 2d 1067, 1071 (Fla. 1994).
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
202. Amoroso, 630 So. 2d at 1067.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
204. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Amoroso, 630 So. 2d at 1068.
205. Amoroso, 630 So. 2d at 1071.
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exact nature and location of the accident giving rise to the claim was not
discussed. It seems quite possible that the accident could have occurred
while the guest was sailing the boat on navigable waters of the United States
which could lead to the application of maritime law.2"6
B. Jurisdiction-Insufficient Contacts
In American Overseas Marine Corp. v. Patterson,27 a seaman's
personal injury claim was dismissed because the seaman failed to establish
sufficient contacts between the vessel, its owner, its employer, and the State
of Florida to establish general jurisdiction. The plaintiff was injured while
serving as a crew member on board a vessel in the harbor at Saipan.0 8
Although it is not clear from the court's opinion, the description of the case
assumes that the plaintiff was a United States citizen and probably a resident
of Florida, that the vessel flew the United States flag, and that the defendant
companies were United States corporations headquartered outside of Florida.
Evidently, the vessel was owned by a bank and bareboat chartered. The
bareboat charterer in turn entered into time charters with the United States
and into an operating contract with defendant American Overseas Marine
Corporation. In its opinion, the court describes what appeared to the writer
to be fairly significant contacts between the defendants and the State of
Florida. However, the court held that such contacts were not sufficient to
establish general jurisdiction over the defendant and that it could not
exercise specific jurisdiction in the case because the cause of action arose
outside of the state. 2 9 Although the point was not discussed, one must
assume that the defendant corporation would be subject to general jurisdic-
tion in whatever state they were headquartered and that plaintiff could
pursue them in that venue.
In Waterman Qy v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,21° the court held that
there were insufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction over a
Finnish company. A crew member on one of defendant's cruise ships was
206. A discussion of the application of products liability and the doctrine of strict
liability in maritime law is beyond the scope of this article. A good starting point is the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). Restatement section 402A has also been applied by a
maritime court. See Goldenrod Showboat, Inc. v. Waterways Winona, Inc., 1988 A.M.C. 806
(E.D. Mo. 1986).
207. 632 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
208. Id. at 1125.
209. Id. at 1127-29.
210. 632 So. 2d 724, 727 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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injured in the Bahamas when a lifeboat on which he was working fell
without warning. The lifeboat had been built and supplied by Waterman
Oy, a Finnish company.2 ' The court rejected Carnival's argument that
Waterman's advertising in European trade publications which had reached
Florida, coupled with the fact that the Finnish company supplied lifeboats,
rescue boats, and tenders to other passenger cruise ships operated routinely
from Florida ports, sufficed to support jurisdiction.2 ' 2 The fact that the
Finnish company knew that its tenders were used on cruise ships operating
out of Florida ports was not determinative. Citing World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. V. Woodson,213 the court pointed out that the significant question is
whether the relationships the Finnish company had with Florida were such
that it should reasonably anticipate being sued in Florida.21 4 Finding that
the relationships were insufficient, the case was reversed and remanded with
instructions to grant the motion to dismiss."
C. Jurisdiction-Sufficient Contacts
A Delaware corporation owned and operated a pleasure yacht which it
acquired in Fort Lauderdale in 1990 and which was based thereafter in
Miami. The purpose of the yacht was to provide pleasure trips to guests of
the parent corporation of the yacht owner. In Morley v. Lady Allison,
Inc.,216 the court ruled that the yacht owner was engaged in substantial and
continuous business activity in the State of Florida within the meaning of
section 48.193(2) of the Florida Statutes."7 The court held that there was
jurisdiction over a claim by one of the seamen of the yacht who was injured
when the vessel was in the Virgin Islands."'
D. Jurisdiction-Foreign Seamen
In Haave v. Tor Husfjord Shipping,219 the court had little trouble
sustaining jurisdiction over a Jones Act suit brought by a foreign seaman.
Although the injury to the seaman occurred in Puerto Limon, Costa Rica,
211. Id. at 725.
212. Id. at 725, 727.
213. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
214. Waterman, 632 So. 2d at 727.
215. Id.
216. 633 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
217. Id. at 1174; FLA. STAT. § 48.193(2) (1991).
218. Morley, 633 So. 2d at 1174.
219. 630 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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the defendant shipowner had an office in the United States and used United
States ports, including ports in Florida for its business operations.22 The
court determined that the defendant had a base of operations in Florida
within the meaning of Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,22' and that the
multiple factors laid down by the Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen222
favored the exercise of jurisdiction by a Florida court.223
E. Passengers-Breach of Contract of Carriage
In Nadeau v. Costley,224 the court dealt with an action by a passenger
against Carnival Cruise Lines, and a member of it's crew. The plaintiff and
her roommate were assigned a small stateroom aboard the cruise ship
CARNIVALE. During the night, the plaintiff was awakened by her
roommate's screams. The roommate was being sexually assaulted by
Costley, a crew member. When the roommate screamed, Costley ran out of
the stateroom, shutting the door behind him. The women attempted to
telephone for help but the phone in their room was not operating. Costley
returned at intervals throughout the night and verbally assaulted the women
and made efforts to gain entrance to the stateroom. The women remained
in their stateroom throughout the night until they heard other passengers
moving in the passageways in the morning. The incident was immediately
reported to the ship's purser. From the opinion, it appears that the
roommate recovered in her action against the cruise line. However, a
motion to dismiss was entered against plaintiff Nadeau because she was not
physically injured in any way. The trial court ruled that she could not
recover compensatory damages lacking any physical injury and that she
could not sue for emotional injuries without some physical impact.225
The appellate court reversed and held that plaintiff had a cause of
action for breach of contract based "upon a wrongful intentional act by a
member of the ship's crew." '226 The court also held that the trial court
erred by dismissing the plaintiff's claim that the shipowner was vicariously
220. Id. at 623-24.
221. 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
222. 345 U.S. 571 (1953). The factors enunciated by the Court were: place of the
wrongful act; law of the flag; allegiance or domicile of the injured; allegiance of the
defendant shipowner; place of contract; inaccessibility of foreign forum; and the law of the
forum. Id. at 582-92.
223. Haave, 630 So. 2d at 624.
224. 634 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
225. Id. at 650.
226. Id. at 651.
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liable for the crew member's intentional infliction of emotional distress.227
The court stated, contrary to the shipowner's argument, that physical injury
is not necessary before a shipowner can be held vicariously liable for the
intentional actions of a crew member.228
F. Jones Act-Seaman's Status
Juneau Tanker Corp. v. Sims229 involved a Jones Act suit by an
unskilled laborer injured on board a tank ship in San Francisco. The
plaintiff was furnished to the shipowner by a Tampa company. The court
concluded that Sims met the seamen's status test established in McDermott
International, Inc. v. Wilander23 ° and Offshore Co. v. Robison,23' and
affirmed summary judgment on the question of seaman status in favor of the
plaintiff. 2 In McDermott International the Supreme Court ruled that one
who is either assigned permanently to a vessel or does a significant part of
his work on board a ship which contributes to the function of the ship or the
fulfillment of its mission is entitled to the status of a Jones Act seaman.233
The Juneau Tanker court noted that the evidence on the issue of seaman's
status did not raise any inference from which the jury could have concluded
that plaintiff was not a seaman.234
In McCann v. SeaEscape Ltd., Inc.,235 a passenger sued claiming she
was injured when the leg of a male dancer hit her in the nose. The dancer
was employed by a company which contracted with the defendant to provide
entertainment on board its cruise ships. The plaintiff alleged that the vessel
owner was responsible for the male dancer because he was an individual
working on board the ship. Summary judgment for the shipowner was
affirmed by the appellate court which held that the male dancer could not
be considered to be a seaman or a member of the crew, relying upon the test
announced in Offshore Co. v. Robison,236 and, therefore, the shipowner
was not liable for his actions.237
227. Id. at 653.
228. Id.
229. 627 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
230. 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
231. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
232. Juneau Tanker, 627 So. 2d at 1232.
233. McDermott, Intl, 498 U.S. at 357.
234. Juneau Tanker, 627 So. 2d at 1231.
235. 641 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
236. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
237. McCann, 641 So. 2d at 873.
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G. Unearned Wages-Attorney's Fees
In Moran Towing of Florida, Inc. v. Mays,238 the court reversed a
trial court order that had awarded a seaman in a Jones Act case unearned
wages and attorney's fees based upon the recovery of earned wages.239
The seaman received wages from the date of his injury through the date of
termination of a collective bargaining agreement between the seaman and
his employer. The appellate court found no basis in law for such an award
and held that plaintiff, having been paid wages for the day on which he was
injured, and having no additional obligation of service to the vessel, had no
claim for further unearned wages.24 The attorney's fees award was not
discussed in the court's opinion. Generally, attorney's fees are not awarded
as part of a recovery in a Jones Act case, with the exception of cases where
the employer refuses to pay maintenance and cure.24'
Attorney's fees were also discussed in the case of Royal Caribbean
Corp. v. Modesto,242 although in a different context. In Modesto, the
plaintiff made a demand for judgment pursuant to section 768.79 of the
Florida Statutes.243 The defendant did not respond. At trial, the plaintiff
recovered far more than the amount of the demand, but the trial court
refused to award attomey's fees.244 On appeal, the court held that there
was no conflict between maritime law and Florida's rules dealing with
award of attorney's fees following demands for judgment and, accordingly,
reversed the trial court order denying an award of attorney's fees.245
H. Release-Negligence Per Se
A participant in a motorboat race was injured and brought suit against
the race promoter. In Torres v. Offshore Professional Tour, Inc.,246 the
court noted that Florida law required that promoters of events such as races
are required to obtain a permit from the United States Coast Guard. The
238. 620 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
239. Id. at 1092.
240. Id. In a subsequent per curiarn opinion the court again reversed the attorney fee
order. Moran Towing of Florida, Inc. v. Mays, 623 So. 2d 850 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
241. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). See generallyBAER, supra note 177,
§ 1-7.
242. 614 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
243. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1989).
244. Royal Caribbean, 614 So. 2d at 518.
245. Id. at 520.
246. 629 So. 2d 192, 193 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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defendant failed to obtain such a permit and the court pointed out that such
failure could be construed to be negligence per se.247 The court held that
the enforcement of a release given by Torres to the promoter which relieved
the promoter from liability for breach of a positive statutory duty would be
against public policy.
2 48
I. Arbitration-Waiver of Right
In Morex Consolidators Corp. v. Industry Shipping & Commerce,
Inc.,249 the plaintiff chartered a ship pursuant to a charter party that
contained a typical arbitration provision. The plaintiff failed to make
scheduled hire payments to the defendant shipowner. The shipowner and
the plaintiff thereafter entered into a stipulation regarding the amount owed
and it contained provisions for entry of judgment thereon if the charterer
further defaulted in making hire payments. The charterer defaulted and the
owner brought suit on the stipulation. The charterer sought to stay the
action pending arbitration.25 The court held that the charterer waived its
right to arbitrate by entering into the stipulation calling for resolution by
litigation.25
1
J. Passenger Ticket-One-Year Suit Clause
In Collins v. Dolphin Cruise Line, Inc.,252 the court affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs personal injury claim which was filed eighteen
months after she was injured on board ship. The passenger ticket specified
that actions must be commenced within one year from date of occurrence.
Moreover, the ticket, on its cover, gave ample notice and warning of the fact
that there were limitations on the period in which suits could be brought for
injuries.253 The court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that her action
should not have been time barred because the ticket was issued to her
travelling companion and not to her.25 4 The thrust of the court's ruling
247. Id. at 193.
248. Id. at 194.
249. 626 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
250. Id. at 990.
251. Id. at 990-91.
252. 625 So. 2d 1308, 1310 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
253. Id. at 1309.
254. Id. at 1309-10.
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is that a passenger who fails to read a copy of her contract of passage, either
before, during, or after the trip, accepts all risk of such failure.255
VI. CONCLUSION
The cases surveyed in this article give rise to several questions which
only future developments may answer. For example, will the principles
decided by the Supreme Court in McDermott and Boca Grande Club be
applied in non-maritime cases? Will the emotional distress remedy which
the Supreme Court laid out in Gottshall be extended to individuals injured
in a maritime environment who are not seamen? Finally, will the limitations
set by the Supreme Court in McDermott International on recoveries by the
estate of a deceased seaman be equally applied in cases involving the
maritime wrongful deaths of non-seamen? Not surprisingly, a survey of
recent developments in any area of the law gives rise to more questions than
are answered.
255. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of alternative dispute resolution to settle disputes outside the
confines of the formal legal system is gaining increasing popularity.
Although there are several forms of alternative dispute resolution now
available in Florida, this article will focus on two of the more common
means of dispute resolution: arbitration and mediation. In particular, this
article will address recent developments in the area of commercial
arbitration, which is governed by chapter 682 of the Florida Statutes, better
known as the Florida Arbitration Code. Additionally, this article will
address court-annexed dispute resolution in the Florida state court system
which includes mediation as well as binding and nonbinding arbitration.
Unlike other procedural and substantive areas of the law, there are
relatively few reported decisions addressing alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. This is a laudable result, however, since one of the principle
objectives of alternative dispute resolution is the minimization of judicial
intervention. If parties to arbitration or mediation were concerned that the
alternative dispute resolution they had chosen (be it in the form of
arbitration or mediation) was subject to unbridled judicial review, it would
nullify many of the incentives which prompted them to steer away from the
traditional court system in the first instance. Finally, this article will
highlight significant cases in the area of alternative dispute resolution which,
albeit not all occurring within the past year, nonetheless serve as the most
meaningful and significant pronouncements in this area of the law.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF ARBITRATION
The Florida Arbitration Code ("FAC") is codified at chapter 682 of the
Florida Statutes.' The FAC applies to written agreements to arbitrate that
are controlled by Florida law, unless the agreements specifically provide
otherwise. Arbitration proceedings begin with a demand for arbitration.
This demand serves as notice to the other party of the claimant's intent to
arbitrate and a statement of the claim. Because the FAC contains no
specific provisions concerning the commencement of arbitration, contract
I. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-.22 (1993).
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provisions for arbitration typically incorporate by reference a set of rules to
govern the procedure. The most common reference is to the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.2 Under rule 6
of the Commercial Arbitration Rules, the demand must contain a statement
setting forth: 1) the nature of the dispute; 2) the amount involved, if any;
3) the remedy sought; and 4) the hearing locale Three copies of the
notice are filed with the American Arbitration Association's ("AAA")
regional office, along with copies of the arbitration provisions of the
contract, and the appropriate administrative fee charged by the AAA.4 The
respondent may file an answer within ten days after notice from the AAA
of the initial demand.5
The demand does not have to comply with the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure. There is no provision, for instance, for a motion to dismiss or
any other preliminary challenge to the legal sufficiency of the claim. The
arbitrator has the right, however, to require a party to state a claim more
precisely. 6 The degree of detail set forth is a matter of judgment by the
claimant or the claimant's attorney. If the dispute is simple, very little
detail is needed. Because there are few or no pretrial proceedings, the
arbitrator usually comes to the hearing with little advance information about
the nature of the claim except for having reviewed the demand.
A. Determination of Right to Arbitration
The threshold issue of whether there is a right to arbitration usually
arises in one of two situations: 1) when one of the parties has refused to
participate and denies the right to arbitration; or 2) when a party has
initiated litigation concerning a dispute which the defending party believes
is subject to an enforceable arbitration agreement. This issue is governed
by section 682.03 of the Florida Statutes, which provides that if a party to
an agreement refuses arbitration, application may be made to the court for
an order directing the party to proceed with arbitration.7 The question to
be decided by the court is whether any substantial issue exists regarding the
making of the arbitration agreement. If the court finds there is no issue
involved in the making of the agreement, it will compel arbitration. If,
2. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (1993) (effective
Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL ARBH'RATION RULES].
3. See id. r. 6.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See id. r. 29.
7. FLA. STAT. § 682.03(1) (1993).
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however, the court finds there is a substantial issue concerning the parties'
agreement to arbitrate, "it shall summarily hear and determine the issue and,
according to its determination, shall grant or deny the application."' Courts
will generally "resolve all doubts about the scope of an arbitration
agreement as well as any questions about waivers thereof in favor of
arbitration, rather than against it."9
When an arbitration proceeding has started or is about to start, the party
challenging the right to arbitrate may obtain a stay by applying to the court
as provided by section 682.03(4).'o If the arbitrators find there is a valid
agreement to arbitrate, the challenging party may appeal to the circuit court,
after the arbitration, to challenge the arbitration award. This procedure is
not available, however, if the court has already determined the issue under
section 682.03."
If the application to compel arbitration is denied, an appeal may be
taken by petition for writ of certiorari.' 2 An order that grants an applica-
tion to stay arbitration may also be appealed.' 3 An order that grants a
motion to compel arbitration, however, is non-appealable.' 4 Thus, if the
court compels arbitration of the dispute, the arbitration process must be
completed. If it is later determined that the court erred and the matter was
not properly the subject of an arbitration agreement, then the award is
subject to being vacated under section 682.13(1)(c), which provides that
"[u]pon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award when ...
[t]he arbitrators or the umpire in the course of his jurisdiction exceeded their
powers."' 5  The reason for only allowing an appeal of orders denying
arbitration is that the arbitrators should have the first opportunity to
determine the scope of the agreement. The court should step in only if the
arbitrators have exceeded that power. To hold otherwise would present the
parties with the right to appeal every order compelling arbitration, thereby
clearly frustrating the purpose of arbitration.
8. Id.
9. Ronbeck Constr. Co. v. Savanna Club Corp., 592 So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
10. FLA. STAT. § 682.03(4) (1993).
11. Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So. 2d 1041, 1043 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
12. See FLA. STAT. § 682.20(1)(a) (1993); see also FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100; Manalili v.
Commercial Mowing & Grading, 442 So. 2d 411, 413 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
13. See FLA. STAT. § 682.20(1)(b) (1993).
14. Harris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 283 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1973).
15. FLA. STAT. § 682.13(1)(c) (1993).
Vol. 19
39
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Blank / Scriven
The right to arbitration provided in an agreement may be waived by
taking actions inconsistent with the arbitration provision. In Breckenridge
v. Farber,6 the Fourth District Court of Appeal enunciated a two-prong
test for determining when a party has waived its right to arbitration: 1) the
party must have knowledge of an existing right to arbitrate; and 2) there
must be active participation in litigation or other acts inconsistent with the
right to arbitrate. 7 Thus, a party who files an action in court for relief that
would be the subject matter of an arbitration agreement waives the right to
subsequent arbitration of that claim or related claims. Similarly, when a
defendant answers a complaint without demanding arbitration, that party
waives the right to arbitration even if the failure to arbitrate is asserted as
an affirmative defense. 8 The same applies to a defendant who files a
counterclaim with the court that raises an issue that would be the subject of
an arbitration agreement. 9 A party who desires arbitration should demand
it before seeking relief in court. Upon being made a defendant to a
proceeding, a party wishing to enforce an arbitration clause should file a
motion to compel arbitration before seeking any affirmative relief.
Otherwise, that party runs the risk of having waived the right to arbitration.
B. Determination of Validity and Scope of Arbitration
Agreement
As soon as a demand for arbitration is filed or a court action is
commenced, arising out of a contract containing an arbitration provision, the
threshold question becomes whether the arbitration agreement is valid and,
if so, whether the particular dispute falls within the scope of the provision.
Generally speaking, the issue of whether an arbitration agreement is valid
is a matter for the court to decide. For instance, in Thomas W. Ward &
Associates, Inc. v. Spinks,2° the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
the trial court erred by compelling arbitration prior to making a determina-
tion that the parties intended to be bound by the arbitration clause in their
16. 640 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
17. Id. at 211.
18. Hansen v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 408 So. 2d 658, 659 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1981), review denied, 417 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1982). But see Breckenridge,640 So. 2d at 212
(implying that raising failure to arbitrate as an affirmative defense may be sufficient to
prevent waiver).
19. Ojus Indus., Inc. v. Mann, 221 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
20. 574 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), reviewdenied, 583 So. 2d 1037 (Fla.
1991).
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written contract after the contract had expired.2 The court emphatically
stated that "[w]hether or not a dispute should be submitted to arbitration is
a question for the court to determine from the contract of the parties. 22
Even assuming arguendo that there is a valid and binding agreement to
arbitrate, the court must also decide whether the particular dispute at issue
is properly the subject of arbitration. The parties may agree to arbitrate all
disputes arising out of their contractual relationship or, alternatively, they
may specify only particular disputes which may be arbitrated. In Paineweb-
ber, Inc. v. Hess,23 the Third District Court of Appeal refused to disturb
the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration on a particular issue
because of the policy of not forcing a party to submit to arbitration on a
question outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.24 More recently,
in Katzin v. Mansdorf,25 the court reversed a trial court's order compelling
arbitration of a dispute involving a promissory note where the promissory
note sued upon "contain[ed] no express terms requiring the parties to
arbitrate any dispute arising from the notes ....
III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The hallmark of the arbitration hearing is its informality. The FAC
provides no specific direction as to the conduct of the hearing other than
that "[t]he parties are entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to
the controversy and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing. '27
The Commercial Arbitration Rules provide in rule 29 that the complaining
party must first "present evidence to support its claim" and that "[w]itnesses
for each party shall submit to questions or other examination." '8  The
defending party then does likewise. Rule 29 specifically provides that the
"arbitrator has the discretion to vary this procedure but shall afford full and
equal opportunity to all parties for the presentation of any material and
relevant evidence. 29
21. Id. at 169.
22. Id. at 170; see also Eugene W. Kelsey & Son, Inc. v. Architectural Openings, Inc.,
484 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 1986).
23. 497 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
24. Id. at 1323.
25. 624 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
26. Id. at 811.
27. See FLA. STAT. § 682.06(2) (1993).
28. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 2, r. 29.
29. Id.
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Consistent with the notion that arbitration is to be less formal than a
judicial proceeding, the rules of evidence applicable to court proceedings do
not apply to arbitration hearings. Therefore, hearsay evidence is admissible,
leading questions may be asked, documents may be admitted without the
testimony of a records custodian, and skilled witnesses may testify without
being qualified as experts.3" The reasoning is twofold. First, the arbitra-
tors may not be lawyers trained in the rules of evidence. Second, because
arbitrators presumably have some special skill or background in the subject
matter, they are capable of determining how much weight to give the
evidence. The situation is not unlike that encountered in nonjury court
proceedings. Rule 31 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules provides in part
that the arbitrator "shall be the judge of the relevance and materiality of the
evidence offered, and conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be
necessary."' The FAC contains no corresponding provision.
Evidentiary rulings by arbitrators generally are not subject to court
review. Courts have expressed little empathy for parties who have agreed
to submit a dispute to arbitration, only to later complain that the arbitrator
disregarded evidentiary considerations. In reinstating an arbitration award
that had been vacated by the trial court, the First District Court of Appeal
stated:
The court may well have been correct in concluding that in a court of
law the evidence presented to the arbitrator would have been insufficient
to support the award. The point is that the parties were not in a court
of law. When the parties agreed to arbitration, they gave up some of
the safeguards which are traditionally afforded to those who go to court.
One of these safeguards is the right to have the evidence weighed in
accordance with legal principles.32
The FAC also contains no provisions relating to the weight to be given
evidence nor does it provide any grounds for review of an arbitration
decision based on issues relating to the admissibility of evidence. The
arbitrator in Florida has been said to be the "sole and final judge of the
evidence and the weight to be given to it."33
30. Id. r. 31.
31. Id.
32. Affiliated Mktg., Inc. v. Dyco Chems. & Coatings, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1240, 1243 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1977).
33. Id. at 1242.
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IV. AWARD AND SCOPE OF RELIEF
A. Form of Award
The FAC provides that the award must be in writing and signed by the
arbitrators joining in the award.34 Although an award is not required to
take any particular form, it should resolve and determine all matters that
have been submitted.35 Otherwise, the award will generally be considered
invalid, and not eligible for confirmation.36 An exception to this rule ex-
ists "where the omitted matters are found to be severable and are sufficiently
independent of the matters determined in the order [under review] . . .. "
If the arbitration award is incomplete in the relief afforded, at a minimum,
the award should contain an "objective formula" for adequately disposing
of any unresolved issues.38
In keeping with the informal nature of arbitration,. there is no require-
ment that the arbitrator's decision be supported by written findings of fact.
In Affiliated Marketing, the court noted that "[t]he proceedings before an
arbitrator are not generally to be examined by the court for the purpose of
determining how the arbitrator arrived at his award."39  From a policy
perspective, at least two considerations may be advanced for the court's
rationale in Affiliated Marketing. First, although detailed findings may
prove useful for future business relationships, detailed written findings may
expose the award to a myriad of court challenges, thereby jeopardizing both
the speed and finality of the arbitration process. Second, and more
pragmatic, arbitrators, who often serve for limited pay, may be reluctant to
serve as arbitrators if they are required to prepare detailed findings
underlying the reasons for their decisions.
34. See FLA. STAT. § 682.09(1) (1993).
35. Air Conditioning Equip., Inc. v. Rogers, 551 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1989).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Affiliated Mktg., 340 So. 2d at 1242; see also Schmidt v. Finberg, 942 F.2d 1571,
1575 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); In re Arbitration Between Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc. & Depew, 814 F. Supp. 1081, 1082 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Annotation, Necessity
that Arbitrators, in Making Award, Make Specific or Detailed Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law, 82 A.L.R.2D 969, 971 (1962).
Vol. 19
43
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Blank / Scriven
B. Types of Relief
The parties may contractually provide for the types of relief that the
arbitrator may grant. Thus, the parties may specify.that: 1) specific perfor-
mance will be available; 2) the arbitrator may conduct an accounting; or 3)
the arbitrator may grant any relief the parties deem appropriate under the
circumstances. To the extent that the arbitration award compels affirmative
action on the part of a party, the right to this relief should be spelled out in
the agreement. Although the parties will be bound by their agreement, they
are not bound by arbitration awards in which the arbitrators exceed the
powers expressly conferred on them.
1. Specific Performance
Unless it is expressly provided for in the agreement, generally speaking,
specific performance is not available as a remedy in arbitration." Notwith-
standing this general prohibition, the Commercial Arbitration Rules do
provide that an arbitrator may grant specific performance of a contract.4'
This being the case, a party's incorporation by reference of the Commercial
Arbitration Rules will provide the arbitrator with the authority to grant
specific performance even in situations where that remedy would not
necessarily have been available had the matter been litigated in court. In
arbitration, therefore, the parties may provide for remedies that would
extend beyond those normally available in a court proceeding.
2. Punitive Damages
In Richardson Greenshields Securities, Inc. v. McFadden,42 the
Second District Court of Appeal, relying upon Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed,43 implicitly held that punitive damages
are available as a remedy in arbitration. Lacking in-depth analysis, the court
seemed to rest its decision on the simple premise that because "[a]ctions
sounding in tort are proper subjects for arbitration," punitive damages were
likewise an appropriate remedy in arbitration. 4 In Complete Interiors, Inc.
40. See MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 30.01, at 441
(Wilner ed., rev. ed. 1993).
41. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 2, r. 43.
42. 509 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. 1987).
43. 453 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
44. McFadden, 509 So. 2d at 1213.
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v. Behan,45 however, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that "punitive
damages may not be awarded by an arbitrator absent an express provision
authorizing such relief in the arbitration agreement or pursuant to a
stipulated submission."'46
3. Interest
Interest may be awarded by an arbitration panel in the absence of a
provision to the contrary.47 Florida courts generally have no authority to
award prejudgment interest predating an arbitration award where the
arbitration award itself does not include pre-award interest, particularly
where the award states it is in "full settlement of 'all claims.""'4 Under
such circumstances, the Fourth District Court held that "[a]ny claim . . . to
interest predating the award [is] extinguished by the award." '49 Courts
generally have the authority to add interest from the date of the award.5"
4. Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Expenses
Section 682.11 provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided in the
agreement or provision for arbitration, the arbitrators' and umpire's expenses
and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred
in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award."'"
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Acousti Engineering Co. of Flori-
da,52 the Florida Supreme Court held that section 682.11 does not pro-
scribe an award of attorney's fees with arbitration; rather, it merely prohibits
arbitrators from awarding such fees.53 Such fees may only be awarded by
45. 558 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 570 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 1990).
46. Id. at 51. For a related discussion, see Karen Ruga, Note, An ArgumentAgainst the
Availability of Punitive Damages in Commercial Arbitration, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 270
(1988).
47. See Complete Interiors, 558 So. 2d at 49 n.2; see also DOMKE, supra note 40,
§ 30.03, at 447-48.
48. See Pharmacy Management Servs., Inc. v. Perschon, 622 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
49. Id.; see also McDaniel v. Berhalter, 405 So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
50. DOMKE, supra note 40, § 30.03, at 447-48.
51. FLA. STAT. § 682.11 (1993).
52. 579 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1991).
53. Id. at 79-80.
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the trial court upon confirmation of the award.54 An exception to this rule
was carved out in Pierce v. J. W. Charles-Bush Securities, Inc.,5 wherein
the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that an arbitrator may award
attorney's fees where the parties have mutually agreed to "confer jurisdiction
on the arbitration panel to decide entitlement to attorney's fees and assess
the agreed fee."'56 In so holding, the court stated:
The essential reason for preferring arbitration over litigation in a court
is that arbitration is faster and cheaper. Limiting the determination of
attorney's fees for arbitration to ajudicial forum, however, simply adds
time and expense to the chosen remedy. If the parties have expressly
decided for themselves to have arbitrators determine entitlement and the
amount of such fees, they have thereby manifested an intention in the
clearest way possible that they desire to avoid that very additional time
and expense. To deny them that savings, especially because of some
now discredited notion about the inviolability ofjudicial turf, is-well,
certainly not unambiguously required by anything in the arbitration
law.
5 7
Finally, practitioners should be aware that where an arbitrator is
presented with one or more legal theories, one or more of which would
permit an award of attorney's fees, the arbitrator should specify whether his
award was based on a theory which would support an award of attorney's
fees.58 Otherwise, the trial judge has no authority upon which to award
attorney's fees.59
By comparison, rule 49 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules provides
that the expenses of witnesses must be borne by the party producing
them.6" Rule 49 further provides that:
All other expenses of the arbitration, including required travel and other
expenses of the arbitrator, AAA representatives, and any witness and the
cost of any proof produced at the direct request of the arbitrator, shall
be borne equally by the parties, unless they agree otherwise or unless
54. See id. As in litigation, "[a]ttomey's fees for services performed in arbitration
proceedings are recoverable only when authorized by statute or by specific agreement." Par
Four, Inc. v. Gottlieb, 602 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
55. 603 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
56. Id. at 631.
57. Id. at 630.
58. Perschon, 622 So. 2d at 76.
59. Id.
60. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 2, r. 49.
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the arbitrator in the award assesses such expenses or any part thereof
against any specified party or parties."
The arbitrator, therefore, can allocate the expenses of the arbitration among
the various parties. Fees for the parties' attorneys generally are not
considered expenses under rule 49 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules.
V. CONFIRMATION AND REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
A. In General
One of the distinguishing features of the arbitration process is the
limited review of the arbitrators' actions. Unlike formal court proceedings
where there is a right to broad appellate review of the trial court's
actions-measured against the standards of statutory and case law-in
arbitration, the grounds on which an award can be challenged are much
more narrowly circumscribed. Generally, absent misconduct by the
arbitrator or an award outside the jurisdictional powers conferred on the
arbitrator, there is little opportunity to challenge the arbitrator's award. The
FAC provides mechanisms for modification of an arbitration award by the
arbitrator or the court. Additionally, the FAC contains provisions for
vacating an arbitration award.62
B. Change of Award by Arbitrator
Following the rendition of an arbitration award, section 682.10 of the
Florida Statutes provides that the parties may petition the arbitrators to
modify the award for the purpose of clarification. 3 Alternatively, the
parties may also petition the court to modify an award under certain
circumstances."
The application for modification to the arbitrators must be made within
twenty days after delivery of the award to the applicant.6 5 The applicant
must give written notice of his application for modification to the other
party to the arbitration.6 This notice shall state that the other party has ten
61. Id.
62. See FLA. STAT. § 682.13 (1993).
63. Id. § 682.10.
64. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
65. FLA. STAT. § 682.10 (1993).
66. Id.
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days within which to serve any objections.67 There is no provision under
section 682.10 for the substance of the award itself to be altered based on
the merits of the controversy.
C. Court Challenge to Award
1. Vacation of Award
After an arbitration award has been rendered, the parties have ninety
days in which to move the court to vacate the award.68 Each of the
grounds upon which an award may be vacated relates either to a fundamen-
tal unfairness in the conduct of the proceedings or conduct taken by the
arbitrator outside the authority granted to him.69 "[T]he fact that the relief
was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or
equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award."7 The
high degree of conclusiveness attached to arbitration awards is consistent
with the notion that the parties chose "to utilize arbitration in order to avoid
67. Id.
68. Id. § 682.13. The grounds upon which an arbitration award may be vacated are as
follows:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means.
(b) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or umpire or misconduct prejudicing
the rights of any party.
(c) The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of his jurisdiction exceeded
their powers.
(d) The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of his jurisdiction refused to
postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the
hearing, contrary to the provisions of s. 682.06, as to prejudice substantial-
ly the rights of a party.
(e) There was no agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this law,
unless the matter was determined in proceedings under s. 682.03 and
unless the party participated in the arbitration hearing without raising the
objection.
Id. § 682.13(1)(a)-(e). An exception to the 90-day requirement exists if the application is
based upon fraud, corruption, or other undue means, in which case it "shall be made within
90 days after such grounds are known or should have been known." FLA. STAT. § 682.13(2)
(1993).
69. See id. § 682.13(1).
70. Id.; see also City of Miami Beach v. Turchin/CRS, 641 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994); Applewhite v. Sheen Fin. Resources, Inc., 608 So. 2d 80, 83 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
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the expense and delay of litigation."'" In Fridman v. Citicorp Real Estate,
Inc.,72 the court held that "[i]t [was] error for a circuit court to enter an
order vacating an arbitration award without directing a rehearing."73
Although there are several grounds upon which an arbitration award
may be vacated, recent Florida cases have focused on the propriety of
vacating an arbitration award where the arbitrator has exceeded his
authority. It has been held that "[a]n arbitrator exceeds his or her power
under section 682.13(1)(c) when he or she goes beyond the authority
granted by the parties or the operative documents and decides an issue not
pertinent to the resolution of the issue submitted to arbitration."74 Thus,
in Applewhite, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that an arbitrator did
not exceed the authority granted him in an employment agreement by
enjoining former employees from conducting business with their employer's
clients where a noncompete provision in their employment agreements
provided that leads and clients remained the property of the employer
regardless of the reason for termination of future employment.75 Converse-
ly, in Hymowitz v. Drath,76 the court held that the arbitrators exceeded the
scope of their authority in a dispute over a stock purchase agreement where
they treated the purchaser as a full stockholder but canceled her stock
purchase obligation, thereby extinguishing the stockholder's agreement
which contained the arbitration clause.7 7 The court reasoned that "where
the parties arbitrate, the arbitrators exceed their powers if their award
rescinds the very obligation which is the foundation of the contract from
which they derive their authority."78
2. Modification or Correction of Award
According to section 682.14 of the Florida Statutes, upon application
made within ninety days after delivery of the arbitrator's award, a party may
also move to correct or modify the award when:
71. Applewhite, 608 So. 2d at 83 (citation omitted).
72. 596 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
73. Id. at 1129 (citation omitted).
74. Applewhite, 608 So. 2d at 83 (citing Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542
So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 1989)).
75. Id.
76. 567 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
77. Id. at 542.
78. Id.
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(a) There is an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake
in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in
the award.
(b) The arbitrators or umpire have awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them or him and the award may be corrected without
affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted.
(c) The award is imperfect as a matter of form, not affecting the
merits of the controversy.79
Florida courts have narrowly construed this provision. In Glen Johnson,
Inc. v. Ruzicka,80 the Second District Court of Appeal held that the trial
court properly confirmed the arbitrator's award where the motion to modify
or vacate the award "did not involve an alleged evident miscalculation of
figures and was actually based upon the contention that the arbitrator's
mathematics had been improperly affected by the consideration of certain
evidence."8
D. Procedure for Confirmation
In most cases, because the parties voluntarily comply with the
arbitrator's decision, there is no need for the circuit court to confirm the
award. However, if the award is not complied with, or if one or both of the
parties deem it advisable to reduce the award to the form of a judgment,
section 682.12 states that "[u]pon application of a party to the arbitration,
the court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits hereinafter
imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the
award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in ss. 682.13 and
682.14."82 If the arbitration arose out of an application to the court to
compel arbitration or out of a motion to stay legal proceedings and compel
arbitration, confirmation should be applied for in the court that previously
dealt with the dispute." When there has been no pending litigation
79. FLA. STAT. § 682.14(1)(a)-(c) (1993). Section 682.14(3) of the Florida Statutes
provides that "[a]n application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative
with an application to vacate the award." Id. § 682.14(3).
80. 517 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
81. Id. at 763; see also Applewhite, 608 So. 2d at 83 ("Remand from this court for
justification of the arbitrators' calculations when no miscalculation is evident would serve
only to defeat the high degree of conclusiveness that accompanies review of an arbitration
award.").
82. FLA. STAT. § 682.12 (1993).
83. Id. § 682.19.
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concerning the dispute or the arbitration, a separate civil action for
confirmation of the award should be filed in the circuit court.
Once an order has been entered confirming, modifying, or correcting
an award, the judgment must be entered by the court in conformity with the
order and may be enforced as any other judgment. 4 Section 682.16 of the
Florida Statutes sets forth the method to be used by the clerk in preparing
the judgment roll.85 The clerk must include the agreement or provision for
arbitration, the award, a copy of the order confirming, modifying, or
correcting the award, and a copy of the judgment.8 6 The judgment may
then be docketed as if rendered in a civil action." Once the judgment has
been entered, it is enforceable regardless of the time when the arbitration
award was made.88
E. Appellate Review
In keeping with the policy of minimizing judicial intervention in the
arbitration process, appellate review under the FAC is accordingly limited.
An appeal may be taken from the following:
(a) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made under
s. 682.03.
(b) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under s.
682.03(2)-(4).
(c) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award.
(d) An order modifying or correcting an award.
(e) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing.
(f) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this
law.89
Furthermore, "[t]he appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same
extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action." '9  There are no
provisions under the FAC for interlocutory review during the arbitration
process itself.
84. Id. § 682.15.
85. Id. § 682.16(2).
86. Id. § 682.16.
87. FLA. STAT. § 682.16(2) (1993).
88. Id. § 682.18(2).
89. Id. § 682.20(1)(a)-(f).
90. Id. § 682.20(2).
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VI. COURT-ANNEXED ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In 1987, the Florida Legislature passed legislation entitled "Mediation
Alternatives to Judicial Action," which was codified as sections 44.301-
44.306 of the Florida Statutes, effective January 1, 1988. 91 These sections
were subsequently amended by the legislature in 1990 and renumbered as
sections 44.1011-44.108.92 Among the procedures covered by this legisla-
tion are court-ordered mediation, court-ordered nonbinding arbitration, and
voluntary binding arbitration.
A. Court-Ordered Mediation
Section 44.102 of the Florida Statutes provides for court-ordered
mediation and allows a court to refer to mediation all or any part of a
contested civil action filed in circuit or county court.93 Mediation is
defined as "a process whereby a neutral third person called a mediator acts
to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute between two or more
parties." 4 Any communications made during the course of mediation are
deemed privileged.9 Specifically, section 44.102(3) provides that:
Each party involved in a court-ordered mediation proceeding has a
privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any person present at the
proceeding from disclosing, communications made during such
proceeding. Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 119.14 [The Public
Records Act], all oral or written communications in a mediation
proceeding, other than an executed settlement agreement, shall be
exempt from the requirements of chapter 119 and shall be confidential
and inadmissible as evidence in any subsequent legal proceeding, unless
all parties agree otherwise.96
The Florida Supreme Court has likewise underscored the confidentiality of
mediation proceedings by mandating that "[i]f the parties do not reach an
agreement as to any matter as a result of mediation, the mediator shall
report the lack of an agreement to the court without comment or recommen-
91. Act of June 30, 1987, ch. 87-173, §§ 1-7, 1987 Fla. Laws 1202, 1202-05 (originally
codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 44.301-.306 (1989)).
92. Act of June 25, 1990, ch. 90-188, §§ 1-11, 1990 Fla. Laws 850, 850-56 (codified
at FLA. STAT. §§ 44.1011-.108 (Supp. 1990)).
93. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(2)(a) (1993).
94. Id. § 44.1011(2).
95. See id. § 44.102(3).
96. Id.
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dation."97 The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure also provide that "[i]f an
agreement is reached, it shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties
and their counsel, if any.""8 In Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,
the Third District Court of Appeal held that "an attorney's signature alone,
albeit in the presence of the client, is wholly insufficient under [rule
1.730(b)]." 99
Indisputably, the aspect of mediation most zealously guarded by the
courts has been the privilege of confidentiality which attaches to mediation
proceedings. For instance, in Hudson v. Hudson,' involving a dissolu-
tion of marriage proceeding, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
the wife's presentation at trial of negotiations which occurred during
mediation violated section 44.102(3) of the Florida Statutes.'0 In that
case, the trial court allowed the wife to testify concerning an agreement
allegedly reached by her and her husband during mediation. Reasoning that
this testimonial evidence violated "the spirit and letter of the mediation
statute," the court held that "the well was poisoned by the admission of the
... evidence of the 'agreement' and so infected the judgment reached that
it should be vacated and the matter tried anew.
Likewise, in Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto,0 3 the Third District
Court of Appeal addressed a similar issue. At issue in Modesto was whether
the confidentiality provisions of section 44.302(2) were preempted by the
Jones Act. 4 In Modesto, the plaintiff sued Royal Caribbean and other
defendants for personal injuries he sustained at sea. Although the parties'
attempt at mediation resulted in an impasse, the defendants moved to
enforce an oral agreement which was allegedly reached during mediation,
and subpoenaed the mediator to testify at a hearing on the motion.' °5 The
mediator moved to quash the subpoena, invoking the confidentiality
provisions codified in section 44.302 of the Florida Statutes. The trial court
granted the mediator's motion to quash the subpoena, and did not permit the
defendants to present any testimony regarding the agreement allegedly
97. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(a).
98. Id. at 1.730(b).
99. 641 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
100. 600 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
101. Id. at 8-9.
102. Id. at 9.
103. 614 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), reviewdenied, 626 So. 2d 207 (Fla.
1993).
104. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
105. Modesto, 614 So. 2d at 518.
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reached during mediation."°6 Judgment was later entered in favor of the
plaintiff.
In addressing the trial court's decision to quash the subpoena, the Third
District reasoned that states are free to "apply their own neutral procedural
rules to federal claims, unless those rules are preempted by federal
law."'0 7 Florida's privilege afforded to parties in mediation proceedings,
the court concluded, "contravenes no federal rule of substance or procedure
and plays a central role in Florida's mediation scheme by preserving the
neutrality of the mediator."'0 8  Thus, the court held that the trial court
properly quashed the subpoena directed at the mediator, and declined to take
any testimony arising out of the mediation proceedings.0 9
B. Court-Ordered Nonbinding Arbitration
A second method of alternative dispute resolution provided in chapter
44 of the Florida Statutes is court-ordered "nonbinding" arbitration.
Arbitration is defined as "a process whereby a neutral third person or panel,
called an arbitrator or arbitration panel, considers the facts and arguments
presented by the parties and renders a decision which may be binding or
nonbinding . . . .""0 Pursuant to rules of procedure adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court, certain types of matters may not be referred to
arbitration, except upon petition of all parties, including bond validation
actions, condemnation actions, mortgage foreclosures, and declaratory
judgment actions, to name a few."' A court, pursuant to rules adopted by
the supreme court, may refer any contested civil action in circuit or county
court to nonbinding arbitration. Arbitrators have the power to administer
oaths, issue subpoenas, and compel attendance by witnesses. The procedural
rules adopted by the supreme court clearly contemplate that the arbitration
hearing be conducted informally, with the presentation of testimony kept to
a minimum.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 519 (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990)).
108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. Id.; see also Fabber v. Wessel, 604 So. 2d 533, 554 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992),
reviewdenied, 617 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1993); Chabad House-Lubavitch of Palm Beach County,
Inc. v. Banks, 602 So. 2d 670, 672 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the trial court
erred by admitting a site plan into evidence "because it was a direct product of mediation
between the parties, and appellant objected to its introduction").
110. FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(1) (1993).
111. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.800.
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The only reported decision under section 44.103 pertains to the time
within which a party must request a trial de novo if it is dissatisfied with the
arbitrator's decision. Pursuant to rule 1.820(h), any party may file a request
for a trial de novo within twenty days of the arbitrator's service of his
decision on the parties. 2 In Klein v. J.L. Howard, Inc.,"3 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that upon a party's failure to timely request
a trial de novo, the trial court is required to enforce the arbitration award
and lacks the discretion to do otherwise." 4 In so holding, the court
reasoned that "[i]t does not matter that the award itself was untimely
rendered beyond the period provided by rule 1.820(g)(3), Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, because, in contrast to section 44.303(4) and rule 1.820(h),
this clause is merely directory."
'
"
5
C. Voluntary Binding Arbitration
Section 44.104 of the Florida Statutes provides for voluntary binding
arbitration and recognizes that two or more parties involved in a civil
dispute may voluntarily agree in writing to submit the dispute to binding
arbitration, either before or after a lawsuit has been filed, if there are no
constitutional issues involved in the controversy." 6 Unlike court-ordered
nonbinding arbitration where the rules of evidence are relaxed, the Florida
Evidence Code applies in voluntary binding arbitration." 7 A decision
rendered after voluntary arbitration may be appealed within thirty days after
service of the arbitrators' decision on the parties and is limited to the
following grounds:
(a) Any alleged failure of the arbitrators to comply with the applicable
rules of procedure or evidence.
(b) Any alleged partiality or misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing
the rights of any party.
112. Id. at 1.820(h). This rule provides, in its entirety, as follows:
Any party may file a motion for trial de novo. If a motion for a trial de novo
is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision, the decision
shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and
judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided
by section 44.303(4), Florida Statutes (1987).
Id.
113. 600 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
114. Id. at 512.
115. Id. (citations omitted).
116. See FLA. STAT. § 44.104(1) (1993).
117. See id. § 44.104(9).
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(c) Whether the decision reaches a result contrary to the Constitution
of the United States or of the State of Florida."8
Appellate review is limited to the circuit court unless a constitutional issue
is involved." 9 If no appeal is taken within the prescribed period, the
arbitration decision shall then be "referred to the presiding judge in the case
... who shall enter such orders and judgments as are required to carry out
the terms of the decision. . . "as provided under section 44.104(11) of the
Florida Statutes. 0 Thus far, there have been no reported decisions
construing Florida's court-ordered binding arbitration provisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although its roots are of ancient lineage, alternative dispute resolution
has only recently become a favored means of dispute resolution. These
alternative methods of resolving conflicts offer parties a quick means of
settling differences where often times they can define their own rules,
procedures, and even delineate the available remedies. Alternative dispute
resolution offers all of the advantages of the formal judicial process without
the attendant drawbacks.
118. Id. § 44.104(10); see also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.830(3).
119. See FLA. STAT. § 44.104(10) (1993).
120. Id. § 44.104(11).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the period of July 1, 1993 through July 1, 1994 was not as
eventful as the prior year in Florida construction law, there were several
decisions worthy of discussion which affect construction practitioners.
II. MINORITY AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
In Advanced Barricades & Signing, Inc. v. State, Department of
Transportation,' the First District Court of Appeal held that the State
Department of Transportation ("DOT") has no obligation under statute or
rule to ensure that contractors do not wrongfully terminate their subcontrac-
tors.2  Approval by DOT of a substituted subcontractor is merely a
ministerial act.' As long as the subcontractor is a certified disadvantaged
business enterprise ("DBE") or, alternatively, that the contractor has made
a good faith effort to subcontract with another DBE, the DOT must approve
the substitution.4 Only where the subcontractor sought to prove that the
DOT acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly, might the
subcontractor have standing to seek administrative relief.'
In Charles E. Burkett & Associates, Inc. v. State, Department of
Transportation,6 the court upheld the validity of the DOT rules requiring
a minority or a woman business owner to have "technical capability, knowl-
edge, training, education, or experience required to make decisions in the
critical areas of operation[s]" in addition to being an owner, before a
business may be certified as a DBE.7 Given the social purpose of the
1. 632 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
2. Id. at 706.
3. Id. at 705.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 637 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
7. Id. at 48.
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program, it would seem that the minority business owner is placed at the
disadvantage of being required to have the expertise, rather than being able
to simply hire others with expertise. However, the rules were determined
to be neither arbitrary nor capricious!s
III. PERMITS: DUE PROCESS-PROPERTY RIGHT
In Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key,9 the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held that it was not a violation of procedural due process for the
town to revoke a building permit which was issued subject to a provision of
the Longboat Key Code which stated that a permit would be revoked if no
"substantial work" was accomplished in any thirty day period after
construction commenced.' The court concluded that the substantial work
standard was not unconstitutionally vague." The court further stated that
there is a constitutionally protected interest in a building permit where funds
had been expended in reliance upon the permit."
IV. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT PROVISIONS
A. Indemnity (Hold Harmless) Clauses
In Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. D & J Construction Co., 3 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal upheld an indemnity agreement where the language
of the agreement clearly covered* the claim made.'4 In this case, a con-
struction company employee was injured while working on Winn Dixie's
premises. The construction worker slipped and fell in a puddle caused by
a leaking roof. The roof was not part of the construction company's work,
and the company was not at fault for the leak. However, the construction
company did have an indemnity agreement with Winn Dixie which covered:
[A]ny claim or loss arising in any manner out of the presence or
activity of [D & J] or any of our servants, agents, or employees or
representatives or out of the presence of such equipment when such
persons or equipment are on your premises for the purposes of
8. Id.
9. 17 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 1994).
10. Id. at 1378.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1380.
13. 633 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
14. Id. at 65.
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performing services... notwithstanding such accident or damage may
have been caused in whole or in part [by] negligence of you [Winn
Dixie] or any of your servants, agents or employees. 15
Based on this agreement, the court held that Winn Dixie was entitled to
indemnification from the contractor for the loss.' 6
B. Conditions Precedent
In HRS v. E.D.S. Federal Corp.,7 the First District Court of Appeal
held that where there is express agreement that the parties will pursue
disputes through administrative remedy, a suit for breach of contract before
pursuing the administrative remedy is subject to dismissal.' The contract
required claims to be submitted to the contracting officer for resolution.
Absent a showing of bias on the part of the contracting officer, suit before
submission to the contracting officer for decision was premature.' 9
C. Arbitration
In Medident Construction, Inc. v. Chappell,2" the question arose as to
whether the validity of a contract which contained an arbitration clause was
an arbitrable issue. The Third District Court of Appeal held that it was.2'
A contractor and a homeowner entered into a contract which contained an
arbitration clause providing that all disputes between the parties would be
submitted to arbitration before the American Arbitration Association. The
homeowner filed a complaint against the construction company seeking a
declaration of the parties' rights under the contract, compensatory and
punitive damages, and fees. The contractor's motion to compel arbitration,
under the contract clause, was denied by the trial court, and the contractor
appealed.22 The appellate court held that because an arbitration clause is
considered separate from the rest of the contract, it must be specifically and
15. Id. at 66.
16. Id.
17. 631 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
18. Id. at 357.
19. See id. at 356-57 (explaining that HRS was not biased); see also HRS v. Maximus,
Inc., 633 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (granting a motion to dismiss for breach
of contract because the contract's dispute resolution clause was the same as in E.D.S.).
20. 632 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
21. Id. at 195.
22. Id.
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exclusively attacked in order for the court to try the issue.23 In this case,
the appellee/homeowner challenged the contract as a whole, not specifically
the arbitration clause. Therefore, the relief sought fell within the scope of
the arbitration clause and was determined to be arbitrable.24 Other cases
have held that the issue of the validity of the agreement containing the
arbitration clause was to be determined by the court prior to compelling
arbitration.25  One such case is Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Clarke,26
where the court held that a limitation of actions defense must be arbitrat-
ed.27 Where the arbitration award said that it was in full settlement of all
claims and counterclaims submitted, and the award did not include
prejudgment interest, the court in Nitram, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers"
would not award prejudgment interest on the arbitration award from the time
of the award to the time of entry of judgment upon confirming the award.29
D. Scheduling/No Damage for Delay
In a rather definitive opinion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
determined that language in a contract allowing the contractee to modify the
progress schedule at its discretion makes delay and lost efficiency claims
extremely difficult for the contractor to establish.3" In Marriott v. Dasta
Construction Co., the owner had "complete discretion to adjust the schedule
as well as to demand that Dasta comply with such adjustments without
additionally compensating Dasta."3' In the face of such clauses as: 1) the
right to adjust the schedule; 2) time is of the essence; and 3) no damage for
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Bardinella Designs, Inc. v. Spirit Constr., Inc., 524 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that arbitration should not be compelled where a party is
seeking declaratory judgment and the validity of a contract has not been determined); seealso
Caltagirone v School Bd. of Hemando County, 355 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (affirming a restraining order halting arbitration until the court determined the contract
was valid).
26. 617 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1993).
27. Id. at 402; see also Wylie v. Investment Management & Research, Inc., 629 So. 2d
898 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a statute of limitations defense should be
determined by the arbitrators, not the courts).
28. 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D257 (M.D. July 7, 1994).
29. Id. at D258.
30. Marriott Corp. v. Dasta Constr. Co., 26 F.3d 1057 (11 th Cir. 1994).
31. Id. at 1066.
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delay, the court doomed the contractor's claims as being without merit under
the language of the contract.32
In discussing the contractor's attempt to avoid the no damage for delay
clause on the basis of active interference, the court determined that the
contractor's failure to request time extensions, a right to which it was
entitled under the contract, precluded the contractor's claims for delay,
impact, and lost efficiency. The court suggested that if the contractor had
requested extensions which were the result of the owner's fraud, active
interference, or concealment, the contractor would have had an arguable
position. Not having requested the time extensions was fatal to the
contractor's claims.
33
V. CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS
A. Licensing
In Alfred Karram I, Inc. v. Cantor,34 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal held that an architect who was not licensed was not entitled to a
construction lien, but could maintain an action for breach of contract due to
the nature of the work performed.35 In this case, the architectural firm
performed architectural and related services in designing a single-family
home, although the firm did not hold a certificate of authorization required
by section 481.219 of the Florida Statutes.36 None of the principals of the
firm were registered architects. The architectural firm filed a claim of lien
for the amount of its fees. When the firm tried to enforce its lien and
maintain a breach of contract action, the prospective home owner argued
that because the firm was unlicensed it had no right to a lien nor to enforce
a contract for architectural services.37
The appellate court held that the architectural firm could maintain the
breach of contract action, although it was unlicensed, because there is an
exemption to the licensing requirement for the type of work performed
under section 481.229(1) of the Florida Statutes.38 No person is required
to qualify as an architect in order to make plans and specifications for single
32. Id. at 1065.
33. Id. at 1069.
34. 634 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
35. Id. at 211-12.
36. Id. at 211; see FLA. STAT. § 481.219 (1993).
37. Cantor, 634 So. 2d at 211.
38. Id. at 212; see FLA. STAT. § 481.229(l) (1993).
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family residences. However, with respect to the construction lien claim, the
court held that section 713.03 of the Florida Statutes specifically limits the
right to claim a lien to "architects" authorized under chapter 481, or general
contractors who provide architectural services under design-build contracts
authorized by section 481.229(3). 3' This does not include those who
perform architectural services where no professional license is required.
Thus, the unlicensed architectural firm had no lien rights under the law.40
In Best Pool & Spa Service Co. v. Romanik,"' the court held that the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies not only to
criminal matters but also to administrative proceedings such as licensing.42
In Best Pool, a contractor was permitted to invoke the Fifth Amendment and
not respond to questions about his certifying to the county that there was
liability insurance.43 It is a crime to make false public records or certifi-
cates.44
B. Measure of Damages
In Mall v. Pawelski,45 the buyers of a seventeen-year old house
discovered, shortly after moving into the house, that the roof was leaking.
They replaced the entire roof and brought an action to recover their
expenses. The trial court awarded the buyers full cost of the new roof, even
though the roof which was replaced was as old as the house. The sellers of
the house appealed and the case came before the Fourth District Court of
Appeal.46
The appellate court agreed that the buyers were entitled to damages for
replacing the leaky roof, but the court disagreed as to the amount of those
damages. It reasoned that the buyers did not bargain for a new roof when
they bought a seventeen year old house. Allowing full recovery for a new
roof would unjustly enrich them. The proper measure of damages,
therefore, should be the replacement cost of the roof prorated to account for
39. Cantor, 634 So. 2d at 212; see FLA. STAT. § 481.229(3) (1993).
40. Cantor, 634 So. 2d at 212.
41. 622 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
42. Id. at 66; see also State ex reL Vining v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d
487, 491 (Fla. 1973) (extending the right to remain silent to administrative proceedings which
"tend to degrade the individual's professional standing, professional reputation, or
livelihood").
43. Best Pool, 622 So. 2d at 66.
44. FLA. STAT. § 831.01 (1993).
45. 626 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
46. Id. at 291-92.
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the increased life expectancy of the new roof.47 Although this principle
was applied between a home buyer and seller, it would be equally applicable
in a construction defect case where a failed component was replaced after
an extended period of use.
It is incredible that there are multiple cases over several years dealing
with the measure of damages for recovery of a partially completed contract.
In Robinson v. Albanese,48 the Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed this
old issue and denied a contractor recovery based on insufficient evidence.49
There are two permissible measures of damages on behalf of a contractor
for a partially completed contract which is breached by the owner. The
contractor may recover the reasonable value of the labor performed and
materials furnished, or the contractor may recover the reasonable costs
incurred plus the lost profit under the contract.5
In Robinson, there was no evidence of the reasonable value of the work
when the contractor left the job.5 ' There was, likewise, no showing of
costs and lost profit. Accordingly, the judgment in favor of the contractor
was reversed. 2
C. Unjust Enrichment
In Hillman Construction Corp. v. Wainer,53 a general contractor hired
by a tenant of commercial premises to make improvements sued the landlord
of the rental property after the tenant failed to pay for those improvements
and later filed bankruptcy.5 4 The contractor argued that by allowing the
owner to reap the benefit of the improvements by renting the premises at in-
creased rent, the owner had been unjustly enriched. The trial court ruled
47. Id. at 292.
48. 636 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
49. Id. at 834.
50. Id.; see also Marshall Constr., Ltd. v. Coastal Sheet Metal & Roofing, Inc., 569 So.
2d 845 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
"[T]he proper measure of damages in a breach of contract action by a
subcontractor against the contractor, where the contract has not been fully
performed, is either quantum meruit, or the subcontractor's lost profit in addition
to an amount representing the reasonable cost of labor and materials incurred in
good faith and in the partial performance of the contract."
Marshall Constr., 569 So. 2d at 847.
51. Robinson, 636 So. 2d at 834.
52. Id. at 835.
53. 636 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
54. Id. at 577.
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that the contractor did not state a cause of action for unjust enrichment. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, and opined that the complaint was
valid. 5
The appellate court stated the elements of unjust enrichment as: 1)
plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge
thereof; 2) defendant voluntarily accepts and retains the benefit conferred;
and 3) the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying the value thereof to the
plaintiff. 6 In this case, the court thought that the contractor had sufficient-
ly pleaded a claim for unjust enrichment. 7
In Maloney v. Therm Alum Industries,8 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal held that before pursuing an equitable claim against an owner with
whom the subcontractor did not have a contract, the subcontractor must first
exhaust his legal remedies against the contractor. 9 This case arose out of
a construction contract which provided that construction was to be
substantially completed no later than nine months from commencement.
Due to problems with ordering and installing materials, the certificate of
occupancy was issued nearly ten months late. In addition to these delays,
the owner claimed that the material was defective and therefore refused to
make final payment. The contractor and subcontractor filed claims 9 f lien.
The subcontractor sought to foreclose its lien and also sought damages
against the contractor. The contractor and subcontractor agreed to submit
their disputes with each other to arbitration. Meanwhile, the lender
foreclosed its mortgage and extinguished the construction liens. The
subcontractor then amended its complaint to add a claim against the owner
for equitable relief on the basis of unjust enrichment.6° A jury awarded the
subcontractor damages on its claim against the owner and the owner
appealed."
Under these circumstances, the appellate court questioned the award of
damages to the subcontractor against the owner. The subcontractor had no
contract with the owner. The court pointed out that the subcontractor was
entitled to receive payment from the contractor for work performed.
However, because the dispute between the contractor and subcontractor was
55. Id. at 578.
56. Id. at 577.
57. Id. at 577-78.
58. 636 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
59. Id. at 770.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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in arbitration, the court could not determine whether the subcontractor
would ultimately receive its payment from the contractor. Therefore, the
court disapproved the award against the owner and ruled that the subcon-
tractor could not show that there was no adequate legal remedy. 2 Absence
of an adequate legal remedy is an element of unjust enrichment against the
owner.
63
D. Negligence/Economic Loss Rule
In Brass v. NCR Corp.,64 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that the economic loss rule does not bar
claims of fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation .0 The
court distinguished claims of fraud in the performance, which would be
barred by the rule, from claims of fraud in the inducement, which would not
be barred. 6 If the law were otherwise, the economic loss rule would have
the effect of abolishing the tort of fraud in the inducement altogether.67
In Southland Construction, Inc. v. Richeson Corp.,68 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal had an opportunity to discuss a key exception to the
economic loss rule,69 first discussed in A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham,7"
when the Florida Supreme Court decided Casa Clara Condominium Ass 'n
v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.7" The court retained an exception to this
doctrine for instances of negligence by a supervising architect,72 upholding
its earlier decision in A.R. Moyer.73
Southland Construction sued Richeson Corporation and Thomas E.
Richeson, individually, for breach of contract in the faulty design of a
retaining wall and for negligence. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of both defendants with respect to the negligence claim
62. Id.
63. Maloney, 636 So. 2d at 770.
64. 826 F. Supp. 1427 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
65. Id. at 1428.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 642 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
69. Id. at 7.
70. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).
71. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
72. Id. at 1247.
73. A.R. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 403.
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based on the economic loss rule. Southland appealed this decision to the
Fifth District Court of Appeal.74
The appellate court reversed on the negligence claim, citing A.R.
Moyer.7 The court reasoned that Southland, as user of the plans, would
be injured if the designs were professionally below acceptable standards, and
caused damages. Richeson, as an individual professional, owed Southland
a duty to perform his professional duties in a professional, competent
manner. Thus, Moyer is authority for allowing a tort suit against Richeson,
individually, for professional malpractice.76
The appellate court, in Southland, however, did not rely only on the
Moyer exception to the economic loss rule, but noted that there was
evidence that other property had been damaged by the failure of the
retaining wall.77  The Moyer exception, while valid, is narrow. The
supreme court in Casa Clara strictly limited Moyer to the facts of a general
contractor damaged by a supervising architect.7"
In Tillman v. Howell,79 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
"one who breaches a contract is answerable only for damages that were or
reasonably should have been in the contemplation of the contracting
parties." One who is liable for the tort of negligence, on the other hand,
"must answer for all of the natural, direct, and proximate consequences of
his tortious conduct. . . ." These consequences generally include personal
injury and property damage, but not economic loss.8"
This case arose when the purchasers of a home refused to pay the
balance on a promissory note after they began to encounter problems which
they attributed to construction defects. The homeowners brought a breach
of contract claim after a faulty pipe caused a flood which damaged their
wood floors and cabinets. Additionally, they claimed damages for further
flooding when a carpenter, hired by the homeowners to repair the original
flood damage, put a nail through another water pipe. Additional damages
were incurred due to this flooding, and the homeowners sought compensa-
tion from the contractor. In support of this additional claim, the homeown-
74. Southland Constr. Inc., 642 So. 2d at 7.
75. Id.
76. See A.A. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 403.
77. Southland Constr. Inc., 642 So. 2d at 9.
78. Id.; see Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246 (explaining the distinction between contract
law, which protects expectations, and tort law, in which the plaintiff must prove the duty
-owed by the other party).
79. 634 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1994).
80. Id. at 270.
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ers argued that the carpenter's negligence was foreseeable and that the
contractor was not absolved of liability because his conduct had set in
motion the chain of events which caused the second flooding and related
damage.8"
The court rejected the homeowner's arguments and reasoned that
actions in negligence are unlike actions based upon breach of contract. In
contract, the parties are limited to damages which "were or reasonably
should have been in [their] contemplation," at the time they made the
contract.12  The second flooding occurred due to "an unforeseeable
independent intervening cause," and, therefore, damages were not recover-
able under the contract for the carpenter's negligence.83
On September 8, 1994, the Florida Supreme Court decided Murthy v.
N. Sinha Corp.84 In that case, the court held that while there may be
negligence of a qualifying agent under principles of common law, there is
no statutory duty created by-sections 489.119 or 489.1195 of the Florida
Statutes which would support a private cause of action. 5
E. Products Liability
In Square D Co. v. Hayson,86 the court held that in products liability
cases, "[w]hen the manufacturer of an article involving an inherently
dangerous instrumentality (which includes electricity) places that product in
the stream of commerce, the manufacturer assumes the duty of conveying
to those who might use the product a fair and adequate warning of [the
products'] dangerous potentialities."87
VI. CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION
A. Settlement Agreements
In Crosby Forrest Products, Inc. v. Byers,8 the Fifth District Court
of Appeal held enforceable a stipulation agreement which provided that in
the event of a default, a stipulated sum in excess of the agreed settlement
81. Id. at 269.
82. Id. at 270.
83. Id. at 269.
84. 19 Fla. L. Weekly S429 (Sept. 8, 1994).
85. Id. at S430.
86. 621 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
87. Id. at 1377.
88. 623 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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would become due. 9 While "[a] contract term which provides that a party
must pay a penalty for breaching a contract is unenforceable,"9 in this
case, the parties stipulated that a settlement amount was payable, but in the
event of default of payment of the settlement amount when agreed, the
higher amount related to the sum originally sought in the suit would be the
amount owed.9' The court reasoned that, where the larger amount payable
upon default represents a legitimate amount, courts may consider the parties'
right of freedom of contract as a basis for upholding the agreement to pay
the higher sum. 92
A per curiam decision in Suggs v. Defranco's, Inc.,93 held that where
a settlement letter left "a number of essential terms . . . open for future
negotiation[,]" there was no enforceable settlement agreement. 94 The letter
was only an agreement in concept.95
B. Condominiums
The Florida Supreme Court, in Rogers & Ford Construction Corp. v.
Carlandia Corp.,96 held that "a condominium unit owner [has] standing to
sue the developer or general contractor to recover damages for construction
defects or deficiencies in the common elements or common areas of the
condominium."97
C. Attorney's Fees
The United States Supreme Court, in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.9'
considered the interpretation of the attorney's fee provision of the Copyright
Act of 1976, 9' which provides for the recovery of the prevailing party's
attorney's fees. The Court settled a split among the circuits, abolishing the
so-called "dual standard" of awarding fees, which treated plaintiffs. and
defendants differently.' Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[p]revailing
89. Id. at 567.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 568.
92. Id.
93. 626 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
94. Id. at 1101.
95. Id. (citing Williams v. Ingram, 605 So. 2d 890, 894 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
96. 626 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1993).
97. Id. at 1351.
98. 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
100. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1033.
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plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike [under § 505 of
the Copyright Act]," and that any award of attorney's fees is at the
discretion of the court. 01
In Heidle v. S & S Drywall & Tile, Inc., °2 a contractor sued a
homeowner to foreclose a construction lien for labor and materials provided
in the construction of her home. Heidle, the homeowner, filed an answer
and counterclaim alleging that the contractor's lien was fraudulent, and
sought damages and attorney's fees for discharging the lien.1
0 3
"[A] year passed [ ] with no action in the case, [and] Heidle moved to
dismiss the entire case for lack of prosecution pursuant to Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.420(e)."'0 4 The complaint, answer, and counterclaim
were duly dismissed by the trial court, and Heidle sought attorney's fees
under section 713.29.
The trial court denied the homeowner's motion for attorney's fees,
citing the case of Stockman v. Downs, °5 which held that a claim for
attorney's fees, whether based on statute or contract, must be pled.0 6
Once the pleadings were dismissed, the court reasoned, the statute no longer
applied. Heidle appealed.
The appellate court reversed, and instructed the lower court to award
Heidle attorney's fees and costs.0 7 The court noted that the purpose for
requiring a claim for attorney's fees to be pled is to afford the opposing
party notice that attorney's fees would be sought.' In this case, S & S
received appropriate notice of the claim for attorney's fees in Heidle's
answer and counterclaim. Dismissing the suit for lack of prosecution did
not mean the claim was not made.
Where the statutory requirements of an offer ofjudgment are met under
section 768.69 of the Florida Statutes, an award of attorney's fees is
mandatory, unless the offer was not made in good faith.'0 9
101. Id.
102. 639 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
103. Id. at 1105.
104. Id. at 1105-06; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1420(e).
105. 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991).
106. Id. at 837.
107. Heidle, 639 So. 2d at 1106.
108. Id. (quoting Stockman, 573 So. 2d at 837).
109. Stunkel v. Hanley Landscape, Inc., 633 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(citing Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
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D. Prejudgment Interest
In Interamerican Engineers & Constructors Corp. v. Palm Beach
County Housing Authority,"' the Fourth District found no error when the
trial court disallowed prejudgment interest in light of the law which holds
that "prejudgment interest is not absolute and may depend upon equitable
considerations.""'
E. Limitation of Actions
In the case of Stokes v. Huggins Construction Co.," 2 a property
owner built a new beach house. The house was placed on pilings. After the
house was built, the adjoining property owner excavated between six and
seven feet of soil from a portion of his property adjacent to the east side of
the new house. Sand and soil from the beach house lot then began to shift
into the excavation. The beach house contractor warned the property owner
of the dangerous condition, and recommended immediate action to prevent
major problems from occurring. The owner took no action. After a
summer storm, the beach house fell and was destroyed. More than four
years passed before the owner sued his neighbor and his neighbor's
excavating contractor. The neighbor and excavating contractor contend that
the claim is past the four year statute of limitations for negligence action,
and should therefore be barred."'
The issue for the First District Court of Appeal to decide was: when
does the limitation period begin to run in an action for negligent removal of
lateral support? Section 95.031 of the Florida Statutes states that "[a] cause
of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action
occurs."" 4 The neighbor and excavating contractor argued that the cause
of action accrued when the owner was put on notice of the problem by his
contractor. At that time the owner knew or should have known of the
negligent acts which caused the loss of lateral support." 5 The appellate
court disagreed. It reasoned that the beach house owners "did not have
knowledge of the permanency of their injury until their house fell down,
110. 629 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
111. Id. at 882 (citing Broward County v. Finlayson, 555 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1990)).
112. 626 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
113. Id. at 328.
114. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(1) (1993).
115. Stokes, 626 So. 2d at 329.
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even though they may have been on notice of probable or possible injury"
when their contractor informed them of the serious condition."
6
In Palm Beach County v. Savage Construction Corp., 7 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that an error in the naming of the surety in a
complaint was a misnomer which entitled the plaintiff to have its amended
complaint relate back to the date of original filing, thus avoiding the statute
of limitations defense."
8
In Wylie v. Investment Management & Research, Inc.,"9 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that "[n]onclaim statutes differ from statutes
of limitations in that the former are jurisdictional provisions which the
parties may not ordinarily waive, while the latter are procedural bars which
may be waived by the failure to plead or assert them.' 20
F. Expert Witnesses
There were several important decisions regarding the use of expert
witness testimony, beginning with the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1' The Court
held that the test for admissibility of expert scientific evidence established
in Frye v. United States2 2 was superseded by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.'23 According to Frye, "expert opinion based on a
scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique used is 'generally
accepted' as reliable in the relevant scientific community."'2 4 However,
nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony gives
any indication that "general acceptance" is a prerequisite to the admissibility
of scientific evidence.'25 Under the rules, a trial judge, faced with a
proffer of expert scientific testimony, must determine whether the expert is
proposing to testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact
to understand or determine a fact in issue.
2 6
116. Id. at 330.
117. 627 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
118. Id. at 1333.
119. 629 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
120. Id. at 902.
121. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
122. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
123. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793. Specifically, Rule 702 supersedes the "Frye Test."
Id.
124. Id. at 2792 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014).
125. Id. at 2794.
126. Id. at 2796.
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In Square D Co.,'27 the First District held it was not an error to
permit the testimony of a mechanical engineer as to inadequate design, even
though the witness had no specific training in labels and warnings, and in
spite of the fact that he had not been qualified as an expert in electrical
power distribution equipment. 2 The court accepted the expert based on
his prior design experience.29
It has been determined that there must be "substantial competent
evidence of the [expert] services performed and the reasonable value of
those services," in order to recover expert witness fees as taxable costs in
state court. 3  In Powell v. Barnes,' a trial attorney, who was not
shown to have expertise in the same field as the expert whose fees were
sought to be taxed as costs, testified as to the expert witness fee. The court
determined that this was not substantial competent proof of the expert
witness fee. The court stated that the expert, or another qualified expert in
the same field, should provide the requisite proof.'
G. Piercing the Corporate Veil
In Walton v. Tomax Corp.,'33 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed a directed verdict for the president and chief executive officer of
a construction corporation whom the homeowner claimed had acted as the
alter ego of the corporation. The court considered the factors discussed in
Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes'34 and concluded that there was
enough evidence for the jury to find the construction company president
depleted corporate assets for his personal benefit so that the corporate veil
should be pierced. 5
127. Square D Co., 621 So. 2d at 1373.
128. Id. at 1379.
129. Id.
130. Powell v. Barnes, 629 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing In re
Estate of Lopez, 410 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 632 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
134. 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984).
135. Walton, 632 So. 2d at 180-81.
1994]
73
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
H. Class Actions
The Second District Court of Appeal in Barton-Malow Co. v.
Bauer'36 reversed an order granting class certification to parties who
claimed injury as a result of environmental problems within the Polk County
Courthouse. The plaintiffs claimed to have health problems caused by the
negligence of the building's general contractor and architect. The court held
that an evidentiary hearing, while not necessary in all cases, was necessary
here.
When it is not clear from the pleadings that common issues predominate
or that the proposed class representatives provide a superior method for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy .... If the defen-
dants contest the plaintiff s allegations, it will be necessary for the trial
court to determine whether the facts actually support the allegations.'"
VII. BANKRUPTCY
In In re American Ship Building Co., 3' a debtor sought to assume its
executory contract which the Department of the Navy had terminated. The
United States Bankruptcy Court of the Middle District of Florida held that
the bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction to determine the issue of
wrongful termination of the government contract. That issue is controlled
by the Contract Disputes Act, 139 and the Bankruptcy Court should yield
jurisdiction to the United States Court of Federal Claims. 4'
VIII. LIENS
A. Lien Priorities
In Carteret Savings Bank v. Citibank Mortgage Corp., the Florida
Supreme Court, on a certified question from the Fourth District Court of
Appeal, held "that only the portion- of a mortgage loan extended for the
purpose of purchasing property and existing improvements is entitled to
priority as a purchase money mortgage; priority in favor of a purchase
136. 627 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
137. Id. at 1235.
138. 164 B.R. 358 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
139. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
140. American Ship, 164 B.R. at 362.
141. 632 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1994).
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money mortgage does not extend to sums advanced for the improvement of
real property."'42
B. Notice to Owner
In 1992, the Florida Supreme Court held, in the case of Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Buck, 4 1 that where a common identity exists between the
owner and the contractor, privity of contract is established. Where privity
of contract with the owner exists, service of a Notice to Owner is not
required. 4 4 However, whether privity exists depends on the facts of each
case. In C.L. Whiteside & Associates Construction Co. v. Landings Joint
Venture,'45 the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of
whether there was common identity between an owner and an ostensible
general contractor.
In Whiteside, the owner of the property was a joint venturer. The
managing partner of the joint venture was a corporation whose president
also happened to be the president of the construction company which
entered into the subcontract with Whiteside. The construction company
president personally signed the subcontract. The subcontractor did not serve
a notice to the owner relying on the fact that it dealt with the president of
the managing joint venture partner. Several months later, after a dispute
occurred between the general contractor and the subcontractor, the subcon-
tractor served its Notice to Owner. The subcontractor then suspended
performance and recorded a claim of lien. The trial court concluded that
there was not enough commonality of ownership between the owner and the
general contractor and dismissed the action to enforce the lien on summary
judgment due to lack of notice to the owner. The subcontractor appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the subcontractor that
"the issue of common identity is not synonymous with common ownership,"
for purposes of determining privity.'46 It reversed the summary judgment
and remanded the case for trial, noting that questions of privity will depend
on the facts of each case. Proof of common identity can establish
privity.147
142. Id. at 599 (emphasis omitted).
143. 594 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1992).
144. Id. at 281.
145. 626 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
146. Id. at 1052.
147. Id. at 1053.
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The issue of when the forty-five days for serving a Notice to Owner
begins to run was addressed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Gazebo Landscape Design, Inc. v. Bill Free Custom Homes, Inc.148
Gazebo, a landscaping contractor, sought to enforce a construction lien
against a homeowner. After traveling with the homeowner to a tree supplier
to choose specific trees in November and making a deposit for same,
Gazebo began digging holes on the owner's property for planting the trees
on December 5, 1990. Gazebo timely served its Notice to Owner, utilizing
the December 5th date, not the date of the November tree buying trip. The
trial court refused to enforce the lien on the grounds that Gazebo did not
serve its Notice to Owner within forty-five days after commencing to
furnish service or materials.
The appellate court disagreed with this interpretation and suggested that
the trial court look at all of the circumstances surrounding the particular job
or transaction in determining when the furnishing of services or materials
begins. While Gazebo did receive a deposit for the trees, the court
determined "there were no affirmative acts taken by Gazebo which establish
that Gazebo actually began to furnish materials" to the homeowner until it
dug the holes on the owner's property. Based upon the testimony of
Gazebo's representative, the Court determined it was reasonable to believe
that the trip to Sarasota was merely a sales trip, and that there was no deal
until "the job was in the ground."
The court pointed out that, for purposes of determining when materials
and services were furnished, the test which may be utilized is "whether the
contractor had actually suffered any economic detriment, or whether he
simply engaged in certain activities on a gratuitous basis, in hopes of
'landing' a job."' 9
C. Jurisdiction
Two district courts of appeal have held that proper jurisdiction for an
action to enforce a lien under $15,000 is the county court. 50 However,
the Florida Supreme Court recently determined that there is concurrent
jurisdiction in both the county and circuit courts for the enforcement of liens
not in excess of $15,000.'5' The court disagreed with the reasoning of the
148. 638 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
149. Id. at 89.
150. Blackton, Inc. v. Young, 629 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Brooks v.
Ocean Village Condominium Ass'n, 625 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
151. Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enters., Inc., 641 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 1994).
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Third District Court of Appeal when the lower court declared that an action
to enforce a lien does not involve title and boundaries to property. 5
2
D. Legislative Changes
There were a few changes to the construction lien law enacted by the
legislature in 1994, the most significant being a change to section 713.16,
with respect to requests for sworn statements of account.'53 In order for
the failure of the lienor to respond to the request to act as a complete
defense to the lien, the request for sworn statement must be served on the
lienor to the attention of the lienor's designee at the address specified in the
Notice to Owner. The change in the law does not make clear what happens
when the party serving the Notice to Owner does not designate a person or
address for service of the request for sworn statement in the Notice to
Owner.
The same is true for the request for sworn statement served by a
contractor on a job with an exemptory payment bond. 54 In order for the
failure to respond to the request to act as a defense to the bond claim, the
request for sworn statement must be served on the lienor to the attention of
the person designated in the preliminary notice, at the address designated.
If the owner, or the contractor on a job with a payment bond, serves
a request for sworn statement of account after having received a responsive
sworn statement of account, and if there has been no change in the
information between the time of giving of the sworn statement and the time
of the next request for sworn statement, then the failure to respond to the
second request for sworn statement does not act as a defense.'55
If a request for a sworn statement served after suit is filed to enforce
the lien, or after suit is filed to recover against a payment bond claim, that
request for sworn statement will not act as a defense.
Failing to furnish a response, or the furnishing of a false or fraudulent
statement, has always acted as a complete defense to the lien claim. After
July 1, 1994, the negligent inclusion or omission of any information in the
requested sworn statement will act as a defense to the extent that the owner
(or contractor with the payment bond) can demonstrate prejudice from the
negligent inclusion or omission.
152. Id.
153. See Act effective July 1, 1994, ch. 94-1 19, § 319, 1994 Fla. Laws 437, 633 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 713.16).
154. FLA. STAT. § 713.23 (1993).
155. See ch. 94-119, § 319, 1994 Fla. Laws at 635.
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The warning at the top of the request for sworn statement has been
changed to add the words "signed under oath." There has been other
language added to the request which simply underscores the concept that the
response to the request for sworn statement is not required to include
information which is not known as to future work on the job. That was
already the state of the law.
IX. LEGISLATION AFFECTING CONTRACTORS
In response to the problems encountered in the aftermath of Hurricane
Andrew, the 1994 Florida Legislature created a statute dealing with
restrictions on the use a contractor may make of funds received in payment
for the repair, restoration, improvement, or construction of residential real
property during the term of an executive order or proclamation declaring an
emergency.5 6 This new law went into effect April 14, 1994.
There has been a Federal False Claims Act for many years.'57
However, in 1994, the Florida Legislature created the Florida False Claims
Act, '5 which provides a civil cause of action, including treble damages
for persons who present false claims, including any request or demand under
a contract for money, property, or services against the state.
X. CONCLUSION
This year saw several significant decisions effecting the construction
industry, most notably the recent Florida Supreme Court decisions in Murthy
and Nachon. Although two years have passed since Hurricane Andrew, its
effect on construction law continues to be felt from code changes and new
legislation concerning emergency management, to increased litigation
involving defective design and faulty construction. The consequences of
these many changes will undoubtedly find expression in the evolving case
law.
156. See Act effective Apr. 14, 1994, ch. 94-110, §§ 1-2, 1994 Fla. Laws 360, 360-62
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 252.361).
157. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
158. See Florida False Claims Act, ch. 94-316, §§ 1-17, 1994 Fla. Laws 2204, 2205-14
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 68.081-.092).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida is a place on a collision course with itself, dependent both on
its unique natural resources and the pell-mell growth that is strangling
those resources.
Over the last thirty years, Florida has experienced staggering growth.
"The decades of the 1960s, 70s and 80s were times of unprecedented
[economic and] population growth in South Florida, when almost 1,000
people per day moved into the area."2 Presently, more than 4.5 million
people call southern Florida home. By the year 2010 it is projected that
1. Lieutenant Governor Buddy McKay, Remarks at the Inaugural Meeting of the
Governor's Commission for a Sustainable South Florida (Apr. 27, 1994).
2. SouTH FLA. WATER MANAGEMENT DIST., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE 1990'S, PART-
NERSHIP IN WATER MANAGEMENT: THE VISION FOR THE FuTuRE 11 (1994).
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South Florida's population alone will increase another 2.5 million.3
Effective and efficient natural resource protection and management is
therefore more critical now than ever before.
This article provides an overview of environmental legislation which
passed during the 1993 and 1994 state legislative sessions. The primary
focus is on the Florida Environmental Reorganization Act of 19934 ("1993
Act") and the Wetlands Act of 1994' ("1994 Act"). Taken together, these
two pieces of legislation represent some of the most comprehensive and
innovative environmental legislation ever to pass in Florida. This article
will also touch upon related natural resource planning and regulatory
developments that are mandated by other 1993-94 state legislation.
II. STREAMLINING AND CONSOLIDATION OF WETLANDS
REGULATION
Wetlands and related upland resources play a critical role in Florida's
complex and delicate ecosystems. They provide year-round habitats for fish
and wildlife.6 Numerous threatened and endangered animal species in the
United States depend on wetlands for survival.7 Further, two-thirds of the
commercial fish and shellfish harvested along the Atlantic coast and in the
Gulf of Mexico depend on coastal estuaries and their wetlands for food
sources, spawning grounds, or nurseries for their young.' Wetlands also
perform important water cleansing functions by holding nutrients, recycling
pollutants, and preventing lake eutrophication.9 Wetlands reduce shoreline
erosion and help protect water tables from saltwater intrusion and urbanized
3. SouTH FLA. WATER MANAGEMENT DIST., LOWER WEST COAST WATER SUPPLY
PLAN 6 (1994).
4. Ch. 93-213, 1993 Fla. Laws 2129 (codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. chs.
253, 259, 367, 370, 373, 403 (1993)).
5. Ch. 94-122, 1994 Fla. Laws 661 (to be codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.
chs. 193, 373, 380, 403).
6. RALPH W. TINER, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS 13 (1984).
7. Id. at 14.
8. Id. at 13.
9. WILLIAM J. MITSCH & JAMES GOSSELINK, WETLANDS 404-05 (1986). Eutrophication
is a natural aging process accelerated by pollution; sewage, fertilizer, and other pollutants
increase the nutrients entering the lake. As the growth of algae and other plants increases,
oxygen levels decrease. Resulting sedimentation allows growth of aquatic plants and the lake
becomes a wetland.
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areas from flood." They also moderate local temperatures" and maintain
regional precipitation.'
Under Florida's current environmental regulatory framework, a person
engaging in water or land altering activity is likely required to secure
separate permits from the Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP"),"' a Water Management District ("WMD"), 4 and local govern-
ment. Wetland impacts are regulated by these state, regional, and local
entities through wetland resource, 5 surface water management, 6 sover-
eign submerged lands,'7 coastal construction, 8 mangrove alteration, 9
and in some cases, city or county permitting programs. At the federal level,
there is also a requirement to obtain a permit from the United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") for the same development activities that
impact wetlands.2"
10. Id. at 402. Only recently have wetlands been recognized as flood control buffers.
A flood may be less destructive when marshes and swamps slow water velocity and
desynchronize peaks of tributary streams as the waters flow through impeding vegetation and
into the main channel.
11. Id. at 66. Wetlands have a moderating effect on temperature because water warms
and cools slowly in comparison to land temperatures.
12. Id. at 72-76. Wetlands contribute to rainfall through evapotranspiration-a loss of
water from soil by evaporation and from plants by transpiration. Wetland drainage can result
in regional rainfall deficits.
13. See ch. 93-213, § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2133 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.255
(1993)). Effective July 1, 1993, the Department of Environmental Regulation and the
Department of Natural Resources were merged, becoming the DEP. See also discussion infra
part V.
14. The five WMDs are political subdivisions of the State of Florida, existing by virtue
of chapter 49-25270 of the Laws of Florida, and operating pursuant to the Florida Water
Resources Act of 1972. Act of June 10, 1949, ch. 49-25270, Laws of Fla. 629 (1949).
15. FLA. STAT. § 403.913 (1991) (renumbered FLA. STAT. § 403.939), repealedby 93-
213, § 46, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2157.
16. Id. §§ 373.413-.416 (1993).
17. Id. § 253.002.
18. Id. §§ 161.52-.58.
19. Id. § 403.931. The regulation of mangrove alteration (formerly §§ 403.931-.938 of
the Florida Statutes) and stormwater is also consolidated into the ERP program.
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. V 1993). The § 404 permit program minimizes adverse
impacts on wetlands by prohibiting discharge of solid materials into wetlands. The Corps
requires a permit for the discharge of dredge or fill material unless the activity qualifies as
an exemption. Dredge material is material excavated or dredged from waters of the United
States. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1993). Fill material is "any material used for the primary
purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a
waterbody." Id. § 323.2(e). The authority to regulate dredge or fill material controls
activities affecting water quality, including deposits of material excavated from lake, river,
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Given the multitude of wetlands regulatory programs, efforts began as
early as 1986 to streamline the permitting process in Florida. One such
effort was the creation of the Environmental Efficiency Study Commis-
sion2' to identify duplicative environmental programs, make recommenda-
tions to eliminate such duplication, and promote efficient administration of
the applicable regulations. The commission's report,22 including recom-
mendations, was presented to the 1987 Legislature, but no statutory changes
were enacted.
Criticism of the present overlapping, and often duplicative regulatory
structure has been widespread in recent years, 3 leading to efforts by the
DEP and the three largest WMDs" to streamline the permitting process
administratively through the establishment of interagency operating
agreements. These agreements distribute permitting responsibility between
the DEP and the pertinent WMD based on the type of regulated activity.25
or stream beds (dredged material) and upland soil and structures placed in waters (fill
material). See United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 622 (E.D. Va. 1983), affd, 769 F.2d
182 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that fill material composed of sand and debris is an offending
pollutant within the meaning of the Clean Water Act), and rev'd in part, 481 U.S. 412
(1987); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 532 (W.D. La.
1979) (finding that sheared trees, vegetation, scraped soil, and leaf litter from landclearing
within wetlands constitutes "dredge or fill material" for purposes of § 404's permit require-
ments).
The following activities, however, are exempted from compliance with § 404: 1)
normal farming, forestry, and ranching activities; 2) maintaining currently serviceable
structures; 3) constructing or maintaining farm or stock ponds, irrigation ditches, or
maintaining drainage ditches; 4) constructing upland temporary sedimentation basins; 5)
constructing or maintaining farm or forest roads, or temporary mining roads, if done in
accordance with best management practices; and 6) activities regulated under a state-approved
program under 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b), to control minor discharges through best management
practices. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1987).
21. Environmental Efficiency Act of 1986, chs. 86-138, 186, 191, 1986 Fla. Laws 413,
1340, 1404 (codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. chs. 20, 161, 163, 186, 258, 315,
373, 380, 403 (1986)). The Environmental Efficiency Study Commission, created by the
1986 Regular Session of the Florida Legislature, was composed of fifteen members,
appointed equally by the Governor, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
House.
22. NORTHWEST FLA. WATER MANAGEMENT DIST. ET AL., A REPORT TO THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL EFFICIENCY STUDY COMMISSION 20 (1986).
23. See STAFF OF FLA. SENATE COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES & CONSERVATION,
REPORT ON WETLANDS REGULATIONS IN FLORIDA 6 (1991).
24. The three largest WMDs are the Southwest Florida, St. Johns River, and South
Florida Water Management Districts. FLA. STAT. § 373.069 (1988).
25. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-101.040(12)(a)(3)-(5), 40C-4.091(l)(b), 40D-
4.091(2), 40E-4.091(l)(c) (1994) (incorporating operating agreements by reference); seealso
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These interagency agreements increased the efficiency of the wetlands
regulatory process by allowing one agency to process both wetland resource
and surface water management permit applications for a given development
activity. However, since two separate legislatively created permitting
programs, with differing criteria and standards, remained in place, the
agency had to issue two separate permits for the same activity.26
During 1992, the Partners for a Better Florida Advisory Council,27
with a renewed legislative charge in hand, considered permit streamlining
issues in a series of public meetings around the state. These deliberations
provided, in part, the impetus for the passage of the 1993 Act.2"
In its "Declaration of Policy," the 1993 Act succinctly embodies the
guiding principles driving modem natural resource protection initiatives as
follows:
(a) To develop a consistent state policy for the protection and manage-
ment of the environment and natural resources.
(b) To provide efficient governmental services to the public.
(c) To protect the functions of entire ecological systems through
enhanced coordination of public land acquisition, regulatory, and
planning programs.
(d) To maintain and enhance the powers, duties, and responsibilities of
the environmental agencies of the state in the most efficient and
effective manner.
OPERATING AGREEMENT CONCERNING MANAGEMENT & STORAGE OF SURFACE WATERS
REGULATION AND WETLAND RESOURCE REGULATION BETWEEN ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER
MANAGEMENT DIsT. & DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 25 (1992), adopted by
reference in FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-4.091 (1994); OPERATING AGREEMENT
CONCERNING MANAGEMENT & STORAGE OF SURFACE WATERS REGULATION AND WETLAND
RESOURCE REGULATION BETWEEN SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT
& DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 2 (1992), adopted by reference in FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40D-4.091 (1994); OPERATING AGREEMENT CONCERNING MANAGE-
MENT AND STORAGE OF SURFACE WATERS REGULATION AND WETLAND RESOURCE REGULA-
TION BETWEEN THE SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT & DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 2 (1992), adopted by reference in FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.
r. 40E-4.091 (1994); Kathryn L. Mennella et al., Activity-BasedConsolidation of Dredge and
Fill and Surface Water Management Permitting between DER and the St. Johns, Southwest
and South Florida Water Management Districts 15 ENVTL. & LAND USE L. SEC. RPTR. 20,
20 (1993).
26. Mennella, supra note 25, at 20; see also John J. Fumero, Permit Streamlining: A
New Age for Environmental Regulation in Florida, 67 FLA. B.J. 62, 62 (1993).
27. FLA. STAT. § 403.0612 (Supp. 1992). Partners for a Better Florida Advisory
Council was established by legislation passed during the 1992 legislative session.
28. Fumero, supra note 26, at 62.
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(e) To streamline governmental services, providing for delivery of such
services to the public in a timely, cost-efficient manner.29
A. Environmental Resource Permit
Broadly stated, the 1993 Act?0 consolidates wetland resource, man-
grove alteration, and surface water management permits into a single
regulatory approval referred to as an "environmental resource permit"
("ERP").3' Once the rules implementing this legislation become effec-
tive," a single permit issued by a single agency will be required for
development activities that, under the present regulatory structure, might
require permits from more than one agency. This was accomplished by
repealing most of the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act,33
29. Ch. 93-213, § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2132-33.
30. See generally id. §§ 19-47, at 2137-57 (codified at FLA. STAT. chs. 373, 403
(1993)). Although the 1993 Act deals with a number of topics, such as WMD accountability
and federal National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System delegation to the state, this
article focuses on the regulatory permit streamlining component of the Act. The provisions
relevant to wetlands regulation are found in §§ 19 through 47 of the Act.
Continuing efforts to expand permit streamlining and environmental protection, the
1993 Act directed The Partners For A Better Florida Advisory Council and the DEP to
submit a report to the 1994 Legislature that included recommendations for: improving or
expanding the siting acts; techniques other than permitting to improve environmental quality;
the feasibility of linking tax credits to compliance with environmental policies and programs;
and enhancing natural systems protection. As directed by the 1993 Act, the DEP submitted
a report to the legislature with findings regarding: the efficiency of the operating agreement
procedures and division of permitting responsibilities between the DEP and the WMDs;
progress toward execution of further interagency agreements; integration of permitting with
sovereign submerged lands approval; and the feasibility of improving the protection of the
environment through comprehensive criteria for protection of natural systems.
31. See supra notes 15, 16, 18.
32. After publication of the proposed ERP rules in the Florida Administrative Weekly
in May 1994, several legal challenges to the proposed rules implementing the ERP program
followed. The challenges were filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings
("DOAH"), pursuant to § 120.54(4) of the Florida Statutes. At the time this article was
submitted for publication, DOAH had not yet issued a final order. The ERP program will
not be in effect within the Northwest Florida Water Management District ("NWFWMD")
until July 1, 1999. Within the geographical jurisdiction of the NWFWMD, the DEP will be
implementing a stormwater management permitting program (currently administered by
NWFWMD to a limited extent due to funding constraints), in addition to its existing wetland
resource permitting program. If the NWFWMD millage cap is revised, or if Florida
"assumes" delegation of § 404 of the federal Clean Water Act program, the ERP program
will be implemented before the 1999 deadline. See discussion infra part VII.A.
33. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.91-.938 (1991), repealedby ch. 93-213, § 45, 1993 Fla. Laws
at 2157.
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while reenacting and codifying its key provisions, with some amendments,
in Part IV of chapter 373 of the Florida Statutes.34 Some have referred to
this legislative consolidation of wetlands regulatory programs as "vertical
integration."
The most comprehensive rulemaking mandate contained in the 1993
Act required, by July 1, 1994," consolidation of the existing regulatory
programs developed by the DEP, pursuant to the Warren S. Henderson
Wetlands Protection Act, and the WMDs, pursuant to the Florida Water
Resources Act.36 Setting general parameters, the 1993 Act provides that
the DEP and the WMIDs
adopt rules to incorporate the provisions of this section [373.414],
relying primarily on the existing rules of the department and the water
management districts, into the rules governing the management and
storage of surface waters. Such rules shall seek to achieve a statewide,
coordinated and consistent permitting approach to activities regulated
under this part [part IV of chapter 373].37
One of the more significant provisions in the 1993 Act calls for
incorporation of the seven-part public interest test38 and the water quality
34. Ch. 93-213, § 45, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2157 (repealing scattered sections of FLA.
STAT. ch. 403 (1993)). Repeal of those sections dealing with "landward extent of waters of
the State" was affected when the wetland delineation rule was ratified by the 1994
Legislature.
35. See supra note 32.
36. Ch. 93-213, § 22, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2138-39 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.046(4)
(1993)).
37. Id. § 30, at 2147 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414 (1993)).
38. Id. at 2144-45. In determining whether a project is not contrary to the public
interest, or is clearly in the public interest, the DEP and the WMDs will be considering and
balancing the following criteria contained in § 373.414(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes:
1. Whether the activity will adversely affect the public health, safety, or
welfare or the property of others;
2. Whether the activity will adversely affect the conservation of fish and
wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats;
3. Whether the activity will adversely affect navigation or the flow of
water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling;
4. Whether the activity will adversely affect the fishing or recreational
values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the activity;
5. Whether the activity will be of a temporary or permanent nature;
6. Whether the activity will adversely affect or will enhance significant
historical and archaeological resources under the provisions of s. 267.061; and
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tese9 currently applied by the DEP in its wetland resource regulatory
program. These tests will be considered as part of the existing "harm to the
water resources and objectives" of the WMD test, 40 and applied in present
surface water management regulatory programs. Thus, the above statutory
tests will be concurrently applied whenever a permit is required for the
construction, alteration, maintenance, operation, removal, or abandonment
of a surface water management system4' in, on, or over wetlands or other
surface waters. 2
Encompassing a key, yet controversial statutory criterion, the 1993 Act
provides criteria for considering the cumulative impacts43 of a project.
This statutory criterion is similar to a version previously set forth in chapter
7. The current condition and relative value of functions being performed
by areas affected by the proposed activity.
FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1)(a) (1993); see also Mary F. Smallwood et al., The Warren S.
Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984. A Primer, I J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 211
(1985).
39. Ch. 93-213, § 30, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2144-45 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414
(1993)).
40. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.413-.416 (1993). Proposed projects cannot be inconsistent with
the overall objectives of a WMD or harmful to the water resources of a WMD.
41. 20 Fla. Admin. Weekly (May 6, 1994) (to be codified at FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN.
r. 40C-4.021, 40D-4.021, 40E-4.021) (proposed May 6, 1994). A surface water management
system is defined as a stormwater management system, dam, impoundment, reservoir,
appurtenant work or works, or any combination thereof and includes areas of dredging or
filling, as defined by §§ 373.403(13) and 373.403(14) of the Florida Statutes. See FLA.
STAT. § 373.403(13)-(14) (1993).
42. Ch. 93-213, § 21, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2137-38 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.019(17)
(1993)); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-340 (1994).
43. The term "cumulative impacts" has actually been used to describe several distinct
types of situations. However, the application that best explains the concept involves a
situation in which surrounding circumstances suggest a number of permit applications for
similar kinds of activities in the same geographical area will be filed. A classic example of
this situation is where an agency denies an application for the dredging of an access channel
adjacent to an existing dock, even though the single project would have only a small adverse
impact on the water body. However, if there are many private docks in the area, and the
permitting agency anticipates requests from other property owners for dredging channels or
boat basins, the application can be denied on the basis of expected cumulative impacts of
dredging several boat basins in the same part of the water body. See, e.g., Florida Power
Corp. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 92 Envtl. & Land Use Admin. L. Rep. 56 (1992);
J.T. McCormick v. City of Jacksonville, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 960, 980 (1990); Caloosa
Property Owners' Ass'n v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 462 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
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403 of the Florida Statutes," but with certain changes. The amended
provision in the 1993 Act specifies that the cumulative impacts from
development activities to be considered are those in the same drainage
basin45 as the project under review, and adds that the local government
comprehensive plan, or applicable land use restrictions and regulations,46
are to be used, at least in part, for determining reasonable expected future
activities. 7 Simply put, under a cumulative impacts analysis, a permit
applicant must provide reasonable assurances that reasonably expected future
permit applications with like resource impacts will not result in violations
of state water quality standards48 or have significant adverse impacts to
functions of wetlands or other surface waters. Consequently, the regulatory
agency is empowered to consider not only the activity or project proposal
for which the permit is being sought, but also any other projects or activities
which may reasonably be anticipated to follow. 9
To ensure statewide consistency in the development of ERP criteria,
statements in the 1993 Act like "[s]uch rules shall seek to achieve a
44. See FLA. STAT. § 403.919 (1991), repealed by ch. 93-213, § 45, 1993 Fla. Laws at
2157.
45. Id. § 373.403(9) (1993).
46. Id. § 163.3177.
47. Ch. 93-213, § 30, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2144 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414
(1993)).
48. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 17-3, 17-4, 17-520 (1992); id. r. 17-302 (1993); id. r.
17-522, 17-550 (1994).
49. See id. r. 40C-4.091 (incorporating by reference ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER
MANAGEMENT DIST., APPLICANTS HANDBOOK (1994)); id. r. 40E-4.091 (incorporating by
reference SOUTH FLA. WATER MANAGEMENT DIST., BASIS OF REVIEW FOR SURFACE WATER
MANAGEMENT PERMIT APPLICATIONS WITHIN THE SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT (1994)), FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40D-4.091 (1994) (incorporating by reference
SOUTHWEST FLA. WATER MANAGEMENT DIST., BASIS OF REVIEW FOR SURFACE WATER
MANAGEMENT PERMIT APPLICATIONS WITHIN THE SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT (1994)). Under the proposed ERP rules, an applicant must provide
reasonable assurances that the proposed surface water management system, when considered
with the following activities, will not result in unacceptable cumulative impacts to water
quality or the functions of wetlands and other surface waters, within the same drainage basin:
projects which are existing or activities regulated under part IV, chapter 373 of the Florida
Statutes, which are under construction; projects for which permits or determinations pursuant
to § § 373.421 or 403.914 of the Florida Statutes have been sought; activities which are under
review, approved, or vested pursuant to § 380.06 of the Florida Statutes; or other activities
regulated under part IV, chapter 373, which may reasonably be expected to be located within
wetlands or other surface waters, in the same drainage basin, based upon the comprehensive
plans adopted by local governments having jurisdiction over the activities, or applicable land
use restrictions and regulations, pursuant to chapter 163 of the Florida Statutes.
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statewide, coordinated and consistent permitting approach" have encouraged
the DEP and the WMDs to coordinate their separate rulemaking efforts to
implement the 1993 Act.5 This is not to say, however, that all permit
review criteria must be identical statewide. Natural resource concerns and
the diverse ecosystems in which they occur vary widely throughout Florida.
Recognizing these differences, the 1993 Act allows for variations in
permitting standards and criteria in the regulatory programs administered by
the DEP and individual WMDs, as long as they are based on "differing
physical or natural characteristics."'"
Finally, as with the implementation of any new regulatory program,
several provisions in both the 1993 and 1994 Acts grandfather certain
projects or activities from the application of specified ERP rules52 as well
50. Ch. 93-213, § 30, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2147 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414
(1993)).
51. See Fumero, supranote 26, at 63; seealso ch. 93-213, § 30, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2144
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414 (1993)); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 40E-41. (1994).
52. Ch. 94-122, § 4, 1994 Fla. Laws at 670-74 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
373.414(1 1)). This category exempts dredge and fill activity from the new ERP rules if the
dredge and fill activity was issued a wetland resource permit or was exempted from such
rules, and the dredge and fill activity did not require a surface water management permit
(based upon the rules existing immediately prior to the effective date of the new ERP rules).
This grandfathering is also extended to any modification of the wetland resource permit as
long as the modification is not considered to be a "substantial modification." Id. at 671-72
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414(12)).
Activities which are covered by a conceptual, individual, or general surface water
management permit, and which were either exempt or permitted under wetland resource
permitting rules (all of which occurred prior to the effective date of ERP rules), are
grandfathered from the new ERP rules. This grandfathering provision is for the "plans,
terms, and conditions" approved in the surface water management permit and/or wetland
resource permit and is valid for the term of such permits. This provision also applies to any
modification of "the plans, terms and conditions" of a surface water management permit,
including new activities that must obtain a permit, within the geographical area to which the
permit applies. But this provision is not applicable if the modification would either extend
the permitted time limit for consideration, or is expected to lead to "substantially different
and greater water resource impacts." Id. at 672 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414(13)).
Under this category, any DEP or WMD formal wetland delineations issued in response to a
petition that was filed on or before June 1, 1994, will continue to be valid for the duration
of the determination. Additionally, for those projects that have received a formal wetland
determination or that have a pending petition as of June 1, the existing wetland delineation
methodology will continue to apply.
If a valid pre-Henderson formal wetland delineation encompasses lands that are a part
of a project for which a master development order has been issued, pursuant to § 380.06(2 1)
of the Florida Statutes, the delineation will remain valid for the "buildout period." Proof of
validation must be submitted by the applicant prior to January 1995. Any jurisdictional
1994]
89
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
as conditional exemptions from specified rules for those areas used
exclusively for water treatment or disposal.53 Due to the uncertainty
determination validated by the DEP pursuant to rule 17-301.400(8) of the Florida
Administrative Code, as it existed in rule 17-4.022 of the code on April 1, 1985, will remain
in effect until July 1, 1998. If the DEP wetland delineation has been revalidated by the DEP,
and either a development order was issued pursuant to § 380.06(15) of the Florida Statutes,
a final development order issued pursuant to § 163.3167(8) of the Florida Statutes, or a
vested rights determination has been issued pursuant to § 380.06(20) of the Florida Statutes,
the wetland delineation shall remain valid until "completion of the project," if "proof of such
validation and documentation" submitted to the DEP establishes that the project meets the
requirements of this category. The window to take advantage of the above provision closes
on January 1, 1995.
As well as vesting the wetland lines, activities proposed within valid or revalidated
delineations must be reviewed under wetland resource and surface water management
permitting rules in existence immediately prior to the effective date of the ERP rules.
However, this grandfathering provision states that the applicant can elect to have such
activities reviewed under the new ERP rules. Id. at 673 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
373.414(14)). Any wetland resource or surface water management permit application which
is pending on June 15, 1994, or which is complete prior to the effective date of the ERP
rules, will not be subject to the new ERP rules or the new statewide wetland delineation
methodology. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414(15)). There is a separate
provision for phosphate and attapulgite mining activities (defined by and subject to §§
378.201-.212 & 378.701-.703). Ch. 94-122, § 4, 1994 Fla. Laws at 673-74 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 373.414(16)). Until October 1, 1997, surface water management and
wetland resource permitting of sand, limerock, or limestone mines located within specified
areas of Dade County must be conducted under the rules in existence prior to the effective
date of the new ERP rules.
53. During the 1994 legislative session, several regulated interest groups raised serious
concerns over the impact of the new ERP program on areas used exclusively for water
treatment or disposal, especially with regard to the application of state water quality standards
in those areas. As a result, rules 17-340.700 and 17-340.750 of the Florida Administrative
Code set out the following conditional exemptions from specified review criteria for
stormwater or wastewater treatment ponds, and for wetlands created by mosquito control
activities.
Where there is alteration or maintenance of works constructed and operated solely for
wastewater treatment or disposal, and pursuant to a valid permit or regulatory exemption, the
works are exempt from the application of state water quality standards, the statutory seven-
part public interest test and cumulative impacts reviews, except for authority to protect
threatened and endangered species in isolated wetlands. Similarly, the alteration or
maintenance of works constructed and operated solely for stormwater treatment in accordance
with a valid permit or regulatory exemption, with some exceptions, is exempt from the
application of state water quality standards, the public interest test, and cumulative impact
reviews. As with wastewater treatment works, this exemption does not apply to protection
of threatened and endangered species that may be using these areas for foraging or habitat.
There is also a conditional exemption from the specified permit review criteria for the
construction, alteration, operation, removal, and abandonment for systems or works in, on,
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associated with the new ERP program, regulated interest groups fought very
hard for these grandfathering provisions. The intent behind the grandfather-
ing provisions is that projects and development activities which have
previously been permitted, or those with established wetland jurisdictional
determinations issued by the DEP or a WMD, have relied upon such
regulatory determinations and undertaken a course of action based upon such
reliance. Therefore, exceptions are needed for that class of projects or
activities, since changes to regulatory requirements may unreasonably and
detrimentally impact them. 4
B. Coastal Construction Permits and Sovereign Submerged Land
Authorizations
Considered to be another implementation step in wetlands regulation
streamlining and consolidation, the basic intent of chapter 94-356 of the
Laws of Florida is to merge, under certain circumstances, environmental
resource, sovereign submerged lands, and coastal construction permit
reviews through a single agency, utilizing a combined permit application
review proceeding and appeals process. Similar to that of the ERP program,
the goal here is to eliminate duplicative and conflicting criteria between
programs, while enhancing the effectiveness of natural resource protection.
Amendments to several chapters of the Florida Statutes were made to
accomplish the procedural meshing of these permitting programs.5
In terms of the sovereign submerged lands program, it is important to
recognize that the governor and cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board of Trustees"), hold title to all
sovereign submerged lands within the State of Florida. 6  Sovereign
submerged lands consist of submerged lands up to the mean high water line
or over lands that have become wetlands solely because of "mosquito control activities
undertaken as part of a governmental mosquito control program." These lands must not have
been considered wetlands before the subject mosquito control activities were undertaken.
Moreover, these are not exemptions from the existing water quality (design based) and
water quantity (flood protection) criteria developed by the WMDs pursuant to §§ 373.413 and
373.416 of the Florida Statutes. FLA. ADMrN. CODE ANN. r. 17-340.700, 17-340.750 (1994).
54. Interview with Janet Llewellyn, Deputy Director of the Division of Environmental
Resource Permitting of the DEP, in Tallahassee, FL (July 11, 1994).
55. Act effective July 1, 1994, ch. 94-356, §§ 17-33, 64-88, 268-275, 1994 Fla. Laws
2620,2632-40,2657-72, 2765-69 (amending FLA. STAT. chs. 161,253 and §§ 373.403-.4596
(1993)).
56. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; FLA. STAT. §§ 253.001-.83 (1993). For a detailed
discussion of the program, see Steve Lewis et al., State Sovereign Lands and Aquatic
Preserves, in EIGHTH ANNUAL ENvTh. PERMrrrING SUMMER SCHOOL 401 (1994).
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of tidal waterbodies, and up to the ordinary high water line of nontidal
waterbodies. In nontidal waterbodies which historically have experienced
declining water levels, sovereign submerged lands include any lands
waterward of the ordinary high water line, even though these lands may no
longer be "submerged."57 The Board of Trustees is charged with managing
sovereign submerged lands in a manner that will provide the greatest
combination of benefits to the people of Florida. The Division of State
Lands (formerly within the Department of Natural Resources), which falls
within the DEP, acts as the designated agent for the Board of Trustees in
this resource management role.58
Activities on sovereign submerged lands require consent from the
Board of Trustees. The type of consent required depends upon the nature
and scope of the activity, and generally falls into one of the following five
categories: consent of uses, lease, easement, use agreement, or management
agreements.59
Regulating some of the same development activities and projects as the
sovereign submerged lands and ERP programs, is the coastal construction
permitting program. Established pursuant to chapter 161 of the Florida
Statutes, the coastal construction permitting program provides comprehen-
sive regulations relating to coastal construction, excavation, and beach
alteration. The major objectives of the program are the protection of the
natural environment (the beach dune or coastal system) and the protection
of human life and property. These programs establish design and siting
policy, criteria, and standards aimed at protecting the coastal system and
marine turtles from unpermitted construction or other development activities,
and ensure that certain structures survive in a high hazard zone.6"
57. FLA. STAT. §§ 253.001-.83 (1993).
58. Id.
59. Id. Single family docks and minor shoreline stabilization projects normally require
a consent of use. A lease is required for commercial facilities and multifamily docking
facilities located within an aquatic preserve, or which preempt more than ten square feet of
sovereign land per foot of shoreline if located outside of an aquatic preserve. A management
agreement is typically required for nonrevenue uses of sovereign land. Use agreements are
required for activities within existing easements, for geophysical testing, and for salvage
operations. Bridge and utility crossings, navigation and flushing channels, borrow and spoil
sites, and major shoreline stabilization or beach nourishment projects normally require an
easement. A more detailed description of the types of consent and associated information is
found in chapter 18-21 of the Florida Administrative Code.
60. Id. §§ 161.041, .053, .052 (1993). For a more detailed discussion, see David Levine
et al., Regulation of Coastal Development, in TENTH ANNUAL ENvTL. PERmITrNG SHORT
COURSE 373 (1994). There are four major components of the coastal construction program:
§ 161.53 of the Florida Statutes regulates activities from the seasonal high water line to a
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By virtue of chapter 94-35661 of the Laws of Florida, the DEP now
has the authority to promulgate rules to implement joint processing of
permit applications for two or more of the following permit applications:
environmental resource permits issued under part IV of chapter 373 of the
Florida Statutes;2 proprietary authorizations issued under chapters 253 and
258 of the Florida Statutes;63 use of sovereign submerged lands owned by
the Board of Trustees; or coastal construction permits issued under chapter
161 of the Florida Statutes." A major policy step established by this
legislation is the authorization given the Board of Trustees to delegate action
on applications to use sovereign submerged lands to the WMDs and the
DEP. Upon delegation, the WMDs must review applications for lease of
sovereign submerged lands when they have permitting responsibility,
pursuant to the activity-based split of permitting responsibilities set forth in
an interagency operating agreement.6 5 The delegated permitting authority
remains subject to DEP supervisory authority. Delegations of authority to
issue sovereign submerged lands or coastal construction permits to the DEP
and the WMDs must be done by rule in order to be effective.6
Although the WMDs will have authority to recommend issuance of
permits based upon sovereign submerged lands lease applications, the DEP,
the Board of Trustees, and the Department of Legal Affairs retain concurrent
authority to defend title to sovereign submerged lands.6 ' Notably, the Act
prohibits the approval of regulatory permits (ERP and coastal construction)
point 1500 feet landward of the coastal construction control line and is administered by local
governments; § 161.053 regulates activities from the mean high water line landward to the
coastal construction control line; § 161.052 regulates activities within 50 feet of mean high
water in coastal areas with sandy beaches and no established coastal construction control line;
and § 161.041 regulates activities seaward of mean high water on sovereign lands.
61. Ch. 94-356, §§ 493, 501, 502, 1994 Fla. Laws at 2891, 2896-98, 2898-99 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 253.52, 373.427, .4275).
62. See FLA. STAT. §§ 373.403-.4596 (1993).
63. Id. chs. 253, 258.
64. Id. ch. 161.
65. Ch. 94-356, §§ 485, 501, 1994 Fla. Laws at 2885-86, 2896-98 (to be codified at
FLA. STAT. §§ 161.055, 373.427). WMDs are allowed to keep chapter 253 application fees
if they process the joint application. However, lease revenues are retained by the DEP. See
also discussion infra part II.C.
66. Ch. 94-356, § 488, 1994 Fla. Laws at 2887-88 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
253.002). The DEP is not authorized to delegate its authority to assert or defend title to
sovereign submerged lands. This means any challenge to a sovereign submerged lands
decision, whether made by the DEP or WMDs, as delegatees, must be handled by the DEP.
67. Id. §§ 493, 501, 502, at 2891, 2896-98, 2898-99 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§
253.52, 373.427, .4275).
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where proprietary authorizations to use sovereign submerged lands have
been denied.68
Implementing the joint processing and decision making provisions,
chapter 94-356 spells out in some detail a consolidated process for those
decisions involving sovereign submerged lands that are both retained by the
Board of Trustees and delegated to either the DEP or the WMDs. 69 To
maintain the streamlined features for those actions retained by the Board of
Trustees, the legislation requires that a consolidated notice of proposed
agency action be provided within a ninety-day time frame, but extends the
time frame for final agency action so that the Board of Trustees can make
the decision on the sovereign submerged lands portion of the application and
can direct the secretary of the DEP or the WMD Governing Board to take
action."0 The Board of Trustees must consider the sovereign submerged
lands issues at its next regularly scheduled meeting for which notice may be
properly given."
In order to put into play the procedural streamlining, review for those
permits to be jointly processed will include several notable features. For
instance, information for all the permits will have to be submitted in order
for any one of the permits to be considered complete, and for the ninety-day
clock 2 to begin; criteria for all permits being jointly processed must be
met before any one permit can be issued; a single, consolidated order will
be issued, but it will include separate findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and rulings conceming each of the permit applications reviewed; and public
noticing requirements for receipt of permit applications and for proposed
agency action are revised to provide consistency among the different
agencies and permitting programs. 3
When an ERP and a coastal construction permit are jointly processed,
the permit authorization will be called a "Joint Coastal Permit."'74 Again,
68. Id. §§ 485, 501, 502, at 2885-86, 2896-98, 2898-99 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§§ 161.055, 373.427, .4275).
69. See id. §§ 495-503, at 2892-2900 (to be codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.
chs. 253, 258, 270, 373).
70. Id. §§ 493, 501, 502, at 2891, 2896-98, 2898-99 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§
253.52, 373.427, .4755).
71. Ch. 94-356, §§ 493, 501, 502, 1994 Fla. Laws at 2891, 2896-98, 2898-99 (to be
codified at Fla. Stat. §§ 253.52, 373.427, .4755).
72. See FLA. STAT. § 120.60 (1993) (regarding the statutory time clock for review of
permit applications).
73. Ch. 94-356, §§ 501, 502, 1994 Fla. Laws at 2896-99 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§§ 373.427, .4275).
74. Id. § 485, at 2885-86 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 161.055).
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the denial of a permit under either program would now result in the denial
of the Joint Coastal Permit.75
C. Activity-Based Split of Permitting Responsibilities
With the consolidation of wetlands permitting under chapter 373 of the
Florida Statutes, the question turns to which regulatory agency will exercise
this authority. The 1993 Act addressed this question by ratifying the
activity-based division of permitting responsibilities currently established in
pilot interagency operating agreements between the DEP and the WMDs.76
Affirming the division of permitting responsibilities between the DEP
and the WMDs, as set forth in the existing 1992 pilot agreements, the 1993
Act recognized that further changes would be forthcoming, and therefore
authorized the DEP and WMIDs to modify the existing division of permitting
responsibilities to achieve "greater efficiency" and to "avoid duplication."77
With certain minor changes, the new operating agreements78 divide the
permitting responsibilities79 of the agencies along the lines of the existing
agreements between the DEP and the WMDs. s° Under the new agree-
ments, the DEP will issue environmental resource permits for the following
activities: solid waste management facilities;"' hazardous waste facili-
75. Id. § 501, at 2896-98 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.427).
76. Ch. 93-213, § 22, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2138-39 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.046
(1993)). Under the existing interagency operating agreements executed in 1992, DEP
generally handles permitting of solid waste, hazardous waste, wastewater treatment, mining,
and power plant facilities. WMDs conduct permitting for all other projects, including
residential and commercial development. Mennella et al., supra note 25, at 20.
77. Ch. 93-213, § 22, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2138-39 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.046
(1993)).
78. The new operating agreements, entitled "Operating Agreement Between the
Department of Environmental Protection and the South Florida Water Management District
Concerning Regulation Under Part IV of Chapter 373, Florida Statutes," are available upon
request from the regulation department of the South Florida Water Management District.
79. Responsibilities include the permitting ofmitigation banks and the issuance offormal
wetland determinations. Ch. 93-213, §§ 29, 31, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2143-44, 2149-50
(codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 373.4135, .421 (1993)).
80. However, permit-by-permit oversight by the DEP, previously established in the
operating agreements, was legislatively rescinded. The oversight provision in essence
conveyed absolute veto authority over any WMD decisions concerning wetland resource
permits. Mennella et al., supra note 25, at 20.
81. The DEP will not, however, issue permits for those facilities that qualify for
specified general permits set forth in rule 17-701.801 of the Florida Administrative Code.
See FLA. ADMrN. CODE ANN. r. 17-701.801 (1994).
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ties; 2 domestic wastewater treatment facilities;83 industrial wastewater
treatment facilities; 4 mining projects; 5 power plants;86 docking facili-
ties;87 water management district projects;88 public works projects; 9
82. These are facilities required to obtain a permit pursuant to rule 17-730 of the Florida
Administrative Code, unless the facilities are incidental components of certain larger projects
for which a WMD has permitting responsibility under the operating agreement. Id. r. 17-730
(1994).
83. The DEP will not issue permits under certain circumstances involving irrigation with
reclaimed water and facilities which are part of certain larger projects. From the standpoint
of exceptions to permitting of domestic wastewater treatment facilities, the agreement
provides that a WMD must review permit applications for: 1) that part of a facility which
constitutes the application of reclaimed water to irrigate crops, golf courses, or other
landscapes; 2) that part of a facility which constitutes the application of reclaimed water to
rehydrate wetlands or to provide artificial recharge to reduce or mitigate drawdown impacts
due to well withdrawals; and 3) those facilities which address any of the requirements of
surface water management permitting criteria adopted pursuant to part IV of chapter 373 of
the Florida Statutes, through a system or activity which is not fully contained on the
domestic wastewater facility site, but which is part of a larger project for which the DEP
does not review and take final action on permit applications under the agreement.
84. These are facilities required to obtain a permit pursuant to rule 17-660 or 17-670 of
the Florida Administrative Code, except for facilities which are incidental components of
certain larger projects or that qualify for specified general permits. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.
r. 17-660 (1990); id. r. 17-670 (1994). From the standpoint of exceptions to permitting of
industrial wastewater treatment facilities, the agreement provides that a WMD must review
permit applications for: facilities in which the industrial wastewater component is merely a
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning ("HVAC") cooling tower discharge, or other
industrial wastewater treatment facility, which is merely an incidental component of a project
for which the DEP does not review and take final action on permit applications under the
agreement; that part of a facility which constitutes the application of treated industrial
wastewater to irrigate crops or landscapes; and freshwater aquaculture facilities in which
alligators are not grown or held.
85. Projects include natural gas or petroleum exploration activities and facilities, and
product pipelines, except for borrow pits without on-site grading or sorting facilities.
86. Electrical distribution" and transmission lines, and other facilities related to the
production, transmission, or distribution of electricity which are not certified under §§
403.501-.539 the Florida Electrical Power Plant and Transmission Line Siting Act.
87. Docking facilities involving no associated adjacent development. These are
considered to be "stand alone" docking facilities. Otherwise, if associated with residential
or commercial development, the WMDs will have permitting authority.
88. In order to qualify, the project must either be constructed, operated, or maintained
by a water management district.
89. The state Public Works Program contains projects carried out by the Corps which
must be specifically authorized by congressional resolution or act, and funded as a separable
line item by Congress. All of the projects remain subject to permits required under part IV
of chapter 373, and chapters 253 and 403 of the Florida Statutes. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.
r. 17-26.001 (1990).
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coastal projects, proposed in whole or in part, seaward of the coastal
construction control lines, including beach nourishment projects and artificial
reefs ("joint coastal permit"); 9 navigational dredging conducted by govern-
mental agencies, seaports, and single family dwelling units;9' and "open
water" projects such as ski jumps, navigational aids, boat ramps, ski slalom
courses, fish attractors, marine aquaculture, communication cables and lines,
temporary systems for commercial film production, high speed rail facilities,
and magnetic levitation demonstration projects. 92
Conversely, the WMVDs will conduct environmental resource permitting
for all other projects, which include virtually all residential, commercial, and
agricultural projects.93 Additionally, the WMDs are given authority to act
on any petitions for variances from the provisions of rules associated with
any environmental resource permitting conducted by the WMDs.94
The rationale underlying the division of permitting responsibilities is
simple. A project should be able to secure all necessary permits from one
agency in one proceeding. Thus, rather than have one agency review a
proposed marina project, and another the associated residential development,
the agreements allow for one comprehensive, integrated permit review
process. The rationale explains why the DEP will be permitting most
industrial activities, since these activities usually require other types of
permits, such as air quality or hazardous waste, that are issued by the DEP.
From the standpoint of ecosystem protection, activity-based permitting
allows agencies to comprehensively review the potential impact of a project
90. Ch. 94-356, §§ 485, 501, 1994 Fla. Laws at 2885-86, 2896-98 (to be codified at
FLA. STAT. §§ 161.055, 373.427).
91. These include associated works such as piers, seawalls, and docks. Ch. 93-213, §
30, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2146 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414 (1993)).
92. FLA. STAT. §§ 341.321-.386, 341.401-.422 (1993); ch. 93-213, 1993 Fla. Laws at
2129 (codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. chs. 253, 259,288, 367, 373,403 (1993)).
93. Modifications to existing permits will be processed by the agency that issued the
original permit. If a permit has been modified, the agency which issued the last modification
will issue future modification requests. However, modifications to surface water management
permits for solid waste management facilities, and for the expansion of existing mines, will
be processed by DEP regardless of whether a WMD issued the original permit. Ch. 93-213,
1993 Fla. Laws at 2129 (codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. chs. 253, 259, 367, 370,
373, 404 (1993)).
94. Id. § 30, at 2144-49 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414 (1993)). The applicable
variance provisions are set forth in section 403.201 of the Florida Statutes. FLA. STAT. §
403.201 (1993).
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on upland and wetland resources (contiguous and isolated), including
consideration of both water quality and quantity impacts.9"
D. Local Government Delegation
Local governments, which in many instances implement their own
regulatory programs, are provided an avenue in which to involve themselves
in statewide efforts to avoid regulatory duplication. To set the stage, the
1993 Act directs the DEP to adopt rules by no later than December 1, 1994,
to guide the participation of the counties, municipalities, and local pollution
control programs in a streamlined permitting system. A principle objective
of this delegation rulemaking effort is the development of procedures and
standards upon which DEP or WMD ERP program delegation determina-
tions can be made. Other matters addressed by this rulemaking effort
include promulgation of provisions under which a delegated program may
have stricter environmental standards than the ERP program itself, and
provisions for the applicability of chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes to
local regulatory programs when the ERP program is delegated.96
Realizing that not all local governments may have the wherewithal to
implement the ERP program, the 1993 Act requires codification of
minimum standards concerning the financial, technical, and administrative
capabilities necessary for local governments to implement the ERP program,
as well as special provisions under which the ERP program may be
delegated to local programs serving populations of 50,000 or less. 7
For those local governments currently implementing their own wetland
regulatory program, the 1993 Act creates certain preemptive authority for
the ERP program. In two statutorily defined instances, an ERP can preempt
a local government permit. One instance is if mitigation required by a local
government cannot be "reconciled" with that required in the ERP. In such
a case, the ERP criteria will govern. Similarly, where activities for a project
occur in more than one local jurisdiction, and permitting conditions or
regulatory requirements imposed by a local government cannot be reconciled
with that of the ERP, the ERP again controls.9"
95. See FLA. STAT. § 403.913 (1993) (transferred to FLA. STAT. § 403.939), repealed
by ch. 93-213, § 46, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2157; id. §§ 373.413-.416 (1993).
96. Ch. 93-213, § 34, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2152 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.441
(1993)).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 30, at 2145 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.414 (1993)).
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Looking to address any remaining streamlining issues between state and
local agencies, the 1993 Act "demands that areas of regulatory duplication
between state and local permitting programs be identified and reconciled by
January 1, 1995." 99
III. STATEWIDE WETLAND DEFINITION AND DELINEATION
METHODOLOGY
Viewed as a major accomplishment, the 1993 Act provides a statutory
definition of wetlands to be used statewide by the DEP, WMDs, local
governments, and any other state, regional, or local governmental authority
needing to define wetlands or to develop a delineation methodology to
implement the definition.00 Wetlands are defined by the 1993 Act as
those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface water or ground
water at a frequency and a duration sufficient to support, and under
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soils. Soils present in wetlands generally
are classified as hydric or alluvial, or possess characteristics that are
associated with reducing soil conditions. The prevalent vegetation in
wetlands generally consists of facultative or obligate hydrophytic
macrophytes that are typically adapted to areas having soil conditions
described above. These species, due to morphological, physiological,
or reproductive adaptations, have the ability to grow, reproduce or
persist in aquatic environments or anaerobic soil conditions. Florida
wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bayheads, bogs, cypress
domes and strands, sloughs, wet prairies, riverine swamps and marshes,
hydric seepage slopes, tidal marshes, mangrove swamps and other
similar areas. Florida wetlands generally do not include longleaf or
slash pine flatwoods with an understory dominated by saw palmet-
to.10'
A. Development of the Methodology
Initially, the statutory wetland definition was used for the sole purpose
of rulemaking by the Environmental Regulation Commission ("ERC") 2
99. Id. § 34, at 2152-53 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.441 (1993)).
100. Id. § 31, at 2149-50 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.421 (1993)).
101. Ch. 93-213, § 21, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2138 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.019(17)
(1993)).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 20.225(7) (1993). The Environmental Regulation Commission
was created as part of the DEP. The Commission is composed of seven citizens of the state,
19941
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to develop a statewide wetland delineation methodology. The delineation
methodology is the process by which agency staff demarcate the limit of
wetlands and other surface waters subject to regulation under the ERP
program." 3  Led by a status quo principle, the intent was to neither
expand nor restrict the geographic extent of surface water and wetland areas
currently regulated by the DEP and the WMDs.' 4
Before passage of the 1993 and 1994 Acts, each agency involved in the
business of wetlands regulation was left to its own devices in the develop-
ment of a wetland definition and delineation methodology. This resulted in
each of the WMDs and the DEP utilizing their own methodologies.
Consequently, it was not uncommon for a piece of property under permit
review to have several differing wetland boundaries staked out by agencies,
depending on the agency making such determinations."0 5
Throughout 1993, the DEP and the WMDs met on numerous occasions
in an attempt to develop a proposed wetland delineation rule which
satisfactorily encompassed all of the existing agency wetland delineation
methodologies. This interagency work product became the basis of the
wetland delineation rule presented to the ERC. Regulated interest groups,
operating under a newly formed coalition, proposed a comprehensive rewrite
of the proposed agency draft rules. Most, but not all, of the changes
proposed by the coalition were not considered or adopted by the ERC.
Those rule provisions not considered or adopted by the ERC were later
proposed by this same group to the legislature for its consideration. 0 6
The new delineation rule, developed in cooperation with the WMDs,
was adopted by the ERC on January 13, 1994. Based upon the ERC
adopted rule, the House Natural Resources Committee crafted a committee
bill that ultimately resulted in ratification of the rule.'0 7  However,
appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate.
103. Ch. 93-213, § 31, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2149-50 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.421
(1993)).
104. Interview with Janet Llewellyn, supra note 54.
105. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 403.817 (1993) (the wetland vegetative index ratified by FLA.
STAT. § 403.8171 (Supp. 1984)); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40E-4.091 (1994) (incorporat-
ing by reference SOUTH FLA. WATER MANAGEMENT DIST., BASIS OF REVIEW FOR SURFACE
WATER MANAGEMENT PERMIT APPLICATIONS 7 app. (1994)).
106. See Memorandum from Terrie Bates, Director ofthe Natural Resource Management
Division, South Florida Water Management District, to Cathy Vogel, Director, Office of
Government & Public Affairs I (Jan. 21, 1994) [hereinafter Bates Memorandum] (on file
with author) (discussing the proposed wetland delineation rule).
107. Ch. 94-122, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws at 662-69 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
373.4211).
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regulated interest groups exhibited concerns over the proposed delineation
rule. Considerable debate ensued during the 1994 legislative session
between the agencies, environmental organizations, and regulated interest
groups.
Once the legislature began consideration of the bill, another series of
interagency meetings ensued, and this time included representatives of the
business coalition. With House Natural Resources Committee staff
assistance, a "consensus" rule was ultimately adopted by the legislature." 8
The 1994 Act served as the vehicle for legislative ratification of the wetland
delineation methodology jointly developed by the DEP and the WMDs. °9
Among other things, the 1994 Act modified, deleted, and added language
to the wetland delineation methodology rule,"0 which was adopted by the
ERC in January 1994."' It should be noted that future amendments to the
wetland methodology rule must be referred to the legislature "for their
consideration and referral to the appropriate committees.1' 12 Accordingly,
future rule amendments will not become effective until "approval by act of
the legislature......
B. The Rules
The ratified rule provides for five mutually exclusive methodologies or
"tests" that agencies are permitted to utilize when asserting wetland
jurisdiction. It also deletes or reclassifies approximately 125 plant species
from the vegetative index previously utilized by the DEP." 4 Failing any
one of the tests will result in the land under consideration being classified
as a wetland.
The first test under the 1994 Act is the application of the definition of
"wetland" prescribed by rule 17-340.200(19) of the Florida Administrative
Code. If the application of the definition does not determine the boundaries,
then the regulating agency may use the other tests. The definition refers to
characteristics which are visible without significant on-site work. It will be
108. Ch. 93-213, § 31, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2149-50 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.4211
(1993)).
109. Ch. 94-122, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws at 662-69 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
373.4211).
110. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 17-340 (1994).
111. Id.
112. Ch. 94-122, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws at 669 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.4211).
113. Id.
114. Ch. 93-213, § 31, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2149-50 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.421
(1993)).
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helpful only where a distinct wetland/upland line is readily apparent, or if
there is any dispute as to the classification.'15
The second and third tests deal with the percentage of vegetative cover
constituted by certain types of listed species.' 6 If the appropriate mix is
found, then the regulating agency need only demonstrate the presence of
certain soils, or that one or more "hydrologic indicators" are present, which
indicate inundation and saturation (or indications of a mechanical distur-
bance, where an agency can show that, but for the mixing, hydrologic
indicators would have been associated with the site). Hydrologic indicators
are defined by the 1994 Act as thirteen separate physical characteristics,
such as elevated lichen lines or water marks, which may indicate saturation
or inundation. Under this third test, agencies will be permitted to use aerial
photography, remnant vegetation, topographical information, and other
reliable data to assert where the wetland delineation should be made, on the
presumption that the disturbance did not occur. However, wetland
jurisdiction cannot be asserted where regional or site specific hydrologic
alterations have occurred so as to render the property no longer subject to
inundation or saturation frequencies, or duration, as required by the statutory
wetland definition."
7
The fourth test provides that in areas which exhibit "undrained hydric
soils,""' and which are not pine flatwoods or improved pastures,"19 the
presence of certain named soil types is enough evidence to designate the
115. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-340.300(2)(e) (1994); see also FLA. STAT. §
373.019(17) (1993).
116. The tests are set out in rules 17-340.300(2) and 17-340.300(3) of the Florida
Administrative Code. One test requires a finding that the areal extent of obligate species
exceed that of upland species. The other requires the areal extent of obligate and facultative
wet species in combination, or separately, comprise more than 80% of all plants, excluding
facultative plants altogether. The danger here is that facultative wet plants (which may be
found on uplands one-third of the time) and facultative plants (which are equally likely to
be found on both uplands and wetlands) may dominate an area, such as a disturbed area,
resulting in an unjustified wetland classification.
117. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17.340.300(2)(e) (1994); see also FLA. STAT. §
373.019(17) (1993).
118. As defined by the Soil Conservation Service, "undrained hydric soils" are all hydric
soils which are not artificially drained. The definition is broad enough to include situations
in which the water table has been lowered by off-site pumping.
119. "Pine flatwoods" and "improved pastures" are defined in rule 17-340.300(c)(4) of
the Florida Administrative Code, by a short narrative which includes some characteristics of
each type of plant community. Given the definitions, the boundaries of these communities
are subject to interpretation and will be difficult to locate.
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area as a wetland. 2' The soil types are defined by the United States
Department of Agriculture-Soil Conservation Service. Obviously, this is
a single factor test, based solely upon soils. Soils are subject to interpreta-
tion, and may exhibit characteristics of more than one type.
The fifth test prescribes that an area is a wetland if one or more of the
hydrologic indicators is present, the area has hydric soil, and "reasonable
scientific judgment" indicates that inundation and saturation are present such
that it meets the definition of a wetland.
12 1
The 1994 rule abandons a long time evidentiary test and creates a new
standard: "reasonable scientific judgment." The new phrase is used
throughout the Act as a description of the required standard of proof, but is
not defined. The legislature substituted this phrase every time the ERC rule
required a "preponderance of the evidence." It is unclear what new level of
proof, if any, this new standard will require.
Creating preemptive powers for the methodology rule, the 1994 Act
establishes that a wetland delineation, established pursuant to either a formal
wetland determination or a permit (where the delineation is field-
verified and specifically approved) issued by either the DEP or a WMD,
"shall be binding on all other governmental entities for the duration of the
formal determination or permit.'
23
IV. MITIGATION BANKING
Concurrent with the development of wetlands regulatory programs has
been the evolution of the concept of wetland mitigation. While the federal
use of the term "mitigation" also includes avoiding the impact altogether, or
minimizing the impact, mitigation is most commonly defined as the
restoration, creation, or enhancement of wetlands to compensate for
permitted wetland losses. 24 The use of uplands as part of a comprehen-
sive mitigation plan to offset wetland impacts, particularly impacts to
120. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-340.300(c) (1994).
121. Id. r. 17-340.300(f).
122. Ch. 94-122, § 6, 1994 Fla. Laws at 676-78 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
373.421).
123. Id. at 676.
124. Roy R. Lewis III, Creation and Restoration of Coastal Plain Wetlands in Florida,
in WETLANDS AND RESTORATION: THE STATUS OF THE SCIENCE 73 (Jon A. Kusler & Mary
E. Kentula eds., 1990).
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previously degraded wetland systems, is a newly emerging mitigation
trend. 25
State agencies in Florida have issued permits requiring mitigation since
1979; however, it was not until the passage of the Warren S. Henderson Act
in 1984 that mitigation became a routinely used regulatory tool. 2 6 Both
internal and independent evaluations of permitted mitigation within the state
reveal that substantial percentages of required mitigation projects have never
been constructed or are not in compliance with permit requirements.
27
Where mitigation was implemented, reported ecological success rates for
wetland creation range from 12% in freshwater systems to 45% in tidal
systems."' One study reported that 59% of the wetland creation projects
demonstrated the potential to succeed as functioning wetlands with at least
moderate wildlife value, even though less than 20% of the projects met the
success criteria specified in the permit.2 9  Summaries of mitigation
evaluation studies conducted elsewhere confirm that the relatively poor
success rates reported in Florida are indicative of those found throughout the
country. 1
30
The reasons for the frequent failure of wetland mitigation projects vary.
However, some common themes have arisen. First, mitigation efforts in the
past have been more art than science, with permittees attempting to recreate
the landscape of a wetland rather than the ecological functions of a wetland.
Permittees who are required to implement mitigation may be experts at
building residential subdivisions, highways, or shopping centers, yet do not
know how to successfully mitigate the wetland impacts associated with those
developments. Furthermore, environmental agencies have lacked both the
necessary staff and expertise to adequately monitor the design, construction,
125. Ch. 93-213, § 29, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2143-44 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.4135
(1993)); see also id. §§ 21, 31, at 2137-38, 2149-50 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 373.019-.421
(1993)); Bates Memorandum, supra note 106, at 1.
126. FLORIDA DEP'T OF ENVTL. REGULATION, REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
PERMITTED MITIGATION 1 (1991) [hereinafter DEP'T OF ENVTL. REGULATION REPORT].
127. KEVIN ERWIN, SOUTH FLA. WATER MANAGEMENT DIST., I AN EVALUATION OF
WETLAND MITIGATION IN THE SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT 3-4 (1991);
ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DIST., STATUS REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF
WETLAND CREATION FOR MITIGATION IN THE SJRWMD 12 (1992) [hereinafter ST. JOHNS
RIVER STATUS REPORT]; DEP'T OF ENVTL. REGULATION REPORT, supra note 126, at 1-3.
128. Ann Redmond, How Successful is Mitigation?, 14 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL.
(Envtl. L. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 5.
129. ST. JOHNS RIVER STATUS REPORT, supra note 127, at 18-19.
130. Millicent Quammen, Measuring the Success of Wetlands Mitigation, 8 NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. L. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept./Oct. 1986, at 6.
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and maintenance of these wetlands mitigation projects. Finally, once the
mitigation project is completed by the developer, care of the project is
usually turned over to a property owners association, which lacks both the
technical know-how and motivation to manage and protect the wetland
area. 13'
Mitigation banking is an idea first developed in the early 1980s by the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service as a measure to make wetland
mitigation more successful, while reducing costs to the developers.
Although the merits of mitigation banking are still being debated, it is
increasing in popularity. In the report, Wetland Mitigation Banking,
prepared by the Environmental Law Institute, the concept behind mitigation
banking is aptly described as being
based upon the possibility that it [mitigation banking] may provide
greater ecological benefits than onsite, project-specific mitigation.
Because banking mitigates for numerous individual wetland conversions,
compensation sites are likely to be larger and more likely to be viable
hydrologically and biologically. In addition, banked compensation
wetlands can achieve functional success in advance of the wetland
conversions for which they are to mitigate; and they can be continuous-
ly monitored and managed to assure the production of the wetland
functions at issue. Wetland mitigation banking offers potential
efficiencies and economies of scale, and may offer continuing profes-
sional wetland management rather than ad hoc management by the
development entity.'
Even though the concept of mitigation banking has been examined in
the past, there has been no adoption of a comprehensive policy or rules on
the subject in Florida.' Needless to say, there existed no regulatory
framework to ensure consistency among the agencies. Each agency handled
mitigation banking proposals on a case-by-case basis.
131. ERWIN, supra note 127, at 81; see ch. 93-213, § 29, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2143-44
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.4135 (1993)).
132. ENVIRONMENTAL L. INST., WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 1 (1993) [hereinafter
MITIGATION BANKING REPORT].
133. See ch. 93-213, § 29, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2143-44 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
373.4135 (1993)). In 1990, the ERC established the Mitigation Banking Task Force to
consider mitigation banking concepts and provide recommendations to the ERC to establish
such a program in Florida.
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A. Statutory Mandate
Responding to the call for mitigation banking, section 29 of the 1993
Act directed the DEP and the WMDs to participate in and encourage the
establishment of private and public regional mitigation banks.'34 This
directive manifested itself through the promulgation of rules by the DEP and
the St. Johns River, Southwest Florida, and South Florida Water Manage-
ment Districts. 35 Mitigation banking is not defined in the 1993 Act, but
has been generally described as a system in which the creation, enhance-
ment, restoration, or preservation of wetlands is recognized by a regulatory
agency as generating compensation credits allowing for future development
of other wetland sites.1
36
In January 1994, the DEP and the three largest WMDs adopted final
rules governing the establishment and use of mitigation banks in confor-
mance with the statutory mandate. Among other things, the banking rules
address circumstances in which mitigation banking is appropriate or
desirable; a framework for determining the value of a mitigation bank
through issuance of credits; measures required to ensure the long-term
management and protection of mitigation banks; criteria for the withdrawal
of mitigation credits by projects within or outside the regional watershed
where the bank is located; and criteria governing the contribution of funds
or land to an approved mitigation bank.
37
Envisioning both public and private entrepreneurial mitigation banks,
the 1993 Act called for, and the adopted mitigation banking rule establishes,
provisions concerning the establishment of mitigation banks by governmen-
tal, nonprofit, or for profit private entities. Requirements to ensure the
financial responsibility of nongovernmental entities proposing to develop
mitigation banks and criteria allowing the withdrawal of credits by parties
other than the party creating the bank are also addressed. 31
134. See id. § 29, at 2143-44 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.4135 (1993)).
135. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-342 (1994); see also sources cited infra note 138.
136. MITIGATION BANKING REPORT, supra note 132, at 3.
137. Fumero, supra note 26, at 64 (citing ch. 93-213, § 29, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2143-44
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.4135 (1993))).
138. Ch. 93-213, § 29, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2143-44 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.4135
(1993)).
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B. The Rules
At the outset, it is important to note that the rules provide that use of
a mitigation bank is not always appropriate. Only when on-site mitigation
is determined not to have comparable long-term viability and the bank itself
would improve "ecological value" more than on-site mitigation, will a
person be entitled to utilize a mitigation bank to satisfy regulatory mitigation
requirements. These criteria are expressed in more detail in the rule with
the goal of ensuring that the feasibility of using on-site mitigation is fully
explored prior to use of a mitigation bank.'39
Two new types of permits are created by the rule: mitigation bank
permits and mitigation bank conceptual approvals. 4 The mitigation bank
permit will authorize the construction, establishment, perpetual operation,
and sale of mitigation credits by private and public entities, including the
DEP and the WMDs. The mitigation bank conceptual approval, while not
authorizing any construction or issuance of credits, estimates the legal and
financial requirements necessary for the mitigation bank, as well as potential
mitigation credits to be awarded based on a particular proposal.'4 '
Any person or entity proposing to establish and operate a mitigation
bank in Florida must apply for a mitigation bank permit from either the
DEP or the appropriate WMD. Like other regulatory permits, mitigation
bank permit applications are processed in accordance with the time frames
139. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-342 (1994). The mitigation banking rules adopted
by the DEP and the five WMDs are substantially similar. Therefore, citation shall be to the
DEP rules only. For further reference, the mitigation banking rules of the South Florida
Water Management District can be found in FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40E-4.091 (1994)
(incorporating by reference SOUTH FLA. WATER MANAGEMENT DIST., BASIS OF REVIEW FOR
SURFACE WATER MANAGEMENT PERMIT APPLICATIONS 8 app. (1994)); those of the
Southwest Florida Water Management District in FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40D-4.091
(1994) (incorporating by reference SOUTHWEST FLA. WATER MANAGEMENT DIST., BASIS OF
REVIEW FOR SURFACE WATER MANAGEMENT PERMIT APPLICATIONS 6 app. (1994)); those
of the St. Johns River Water Management District in FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-4.091
(1994) (incorporating by reference ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DIST.,
APPLICANT'S HANDBOOK: MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE OF SURFACE WATERS § 16.1.6
(1994)); those of the Suwannee River Water Management District in FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. r. 40B-1.106 (1994); and those of the Northwest Water Management District in FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40A-1.003 (1991).
140. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-342 (1994).
141. Id. r. 17-342.750.
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and procedures set forth in chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes.4 ' Criteria
objectives set forth in the rule specify that a proposed mitigation bank must
(a) improve ecological conditions of the regional watershed;
(b) provide viable and sustainable ecological and hydrological functions
for the proposed mitigation service area;
(c) be effectively managed in the long term;
(d) not destroy areas with high ecological value;
(e) achieve mitigation success; and
(f) be adjacent to lands which will not adversely affect the long-term
viability of the Mitigation Bank due to unsuitable land uses or condi-
tions.'43
The basic informational requirements include: a description of the
location of the proposed mitigation bank, including aerial photography; a
description of the "ecological significance" of the mitigation bank to the
regional watershed; an assessment of current site conditions, including
hydrologic, topographic, and vegetative information; construction plans for
the proposed restoration, enhancement or creation activities, including
monitoring and long term management plans; and a detailed assessment of
the anticipated improvement to ambient ecological conditions.' This
includes a description of anticipated fish and wildlife habitat improvement;
"[e]vidence of sufficient legal or equitable interest in the property;" and
documentation of financial responsibility mechanisms.'45
1. Mitigation Credit System
As defined by the rule, a mitigation credit is "a unit of measure which
represents the increase in ecological value [of wetlands] resulting from
restoration, enhancement, preservation, or creation activities.' 46  A
significant piece of the application review process involves assignment of
the number of mitigation credits which can be realized through successful
establishment and operation of the proposed mitigation bank. In some cases,
the number of credits assigned by the permit is determinative of the
financial viability of the mitigation bank. 147 Generally, mitigation credits
142. Id. r. 17-342.450.
143. Id. r. 17-342.400.
144. Id. r. 17-342.450.
145. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-342.450 (1994).
146. Id. r. 17-342.200(5).
147. Id. r. 17-342.470.
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may be withdrawn prior to a mitigation bank meeting all the performance
criteria specified in the permit. The number of mitigation credits which can
be withdrawn at various times during the establishment and operation of the
mitigation bank, along with the schedule for release of such credits, is set
forth in the mitigation bank permit. It should be noted that a mitigation
bank will be credited with its maximum number of mitigation credits only
after meeting the mitigation success criteria specified in the permit.'
48
However, in most instances, once a conservation easement is rendered over
the property, a certain percentage of credits will be able to be released at
that time and thereafter sold by the banker.'49
If at any time the banker is not in "material compliance" with the terms
and conditions of the mitigation bank permit, no mitigation credits may be
withdrawn and sold to third parties. Upon compliance with the permit,
mitigation credits can again be available for withdrawal and sale. 50
2. Mitigation Service Area
Another significant aspect of the permit review process involves the
establishment of a mitigation service area ("MSA") for the proposed
mitigation bank. An MSA is the geographic area within which mitigation
credits from a mitigation bank may be used to offset adverse resource
impacts from activities or projects regulated by statute. 5 I Credits may
only be withdrawn to offset adverse impacts in a designated MSA. 52 For
the most part, the extent of the MSA will depend on whether adverse
impacts within the MSA can be "adequately" offset by the mitigation bank.
The rule recognizes that the MSA of different mitigation banks may overlap,
especially when such banks are in geographic proximity to each other.
53
At times, this rule allows for competition in the sale of credits among
mitigation banks.
3. Financial Responsibility
To ensure a mitigation bank is constructed and operated in confor-
mance with the permit, the rule specifies several financial responsibility
mechanisms to be provided by a banker. Financial responsibility has two
148. Id. r. 17-342.470(4).
149. Id. r. 17-342.470(5).
150. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-342.470(6) (1994).
151. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.403-.4596 (1993).
152. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-342.600(1) (1994).
153. See id. r. 17-342.600(3).
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distinct components. A banker must provide financial responsibility for the
construction phase and the operation/long-term maintenance phase of the life
of a mitigation bank. Broadly stated, financial responsibility for the
construction phase of the mitigation bank may be established through
"guarantee bonds, performance bonds, insurance certificates, irrevocable
letters of credit, trust fund agreements, or securities."' 54 For the operation
phase, a banker must establish a trust fund agreement specifically geared
towards long term, and in some cases, perpetual management of the
mitigation bank.'55
4. DEP and WMD Mitigation Banks
The DEP or a WMD may construct, operate, manage, and maintain a
mitigation bank after obtaining a mitigation bank permit. DEP mitigation
banks are permitted by the appropriate WMD, while WMD mitigation banks
are permitted by the DEP. Banks proposed by the DEP or a WMD must
meet the same technical review criteria as any other permit applicant.
However, in the areas of land acquisition and financial responsibility, the
rule imposes different requirements on DEP and WMD mitigation banks for
the purpose of allowing greater flexibility.'56
In order to establish a mitigation bank, the DEP or WMD must either
submit a mitigation bank plan, identifying one or more parcels of land to be
acquired as a mitigation site, or a plan identifying one or more parcels of
land in which the DEP or WMD already has a legal or equitable inter-
est.'57 As to financial responsibility, a portion of funds contributed to a
DEP or WMD mitigation bank from the sale of credits must be dedicated,
in some binding fashion, for the construction and implementation of the
mitigation bank itself. A portion of the funds must also be dedicated for the
long-term management of the bank. Funds derived from the sale of
mitigation credits, which are not necessary for the construction, establish-
ment, and long-term management of a DEP or WMD mitigation bank, can
be utilized for the establishment of other DEP or WMD mitigation banks,
or for expansion of other DEP or WMD land acquisition or environmental
restoration projects. 58
154. Id. r. 17-342.700(4)(b).
155. See id. r. 17-342.700.
156. Id.
157. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-342.700 (1994).
158. Id.
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V. MERGER OF THE FORMER DEPARTMENTS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
In 1975, the last major state environmental agency reorganization
occurred when the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund was
dissolved as an agency and selected functions were transferred to the
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"), or to the then-new Department
of Environmental Regulation ("DER"). At the time, the DER was to be the
state's environmental permitting agency, while the DNR's major function
would be aimed at natural resources and land management. In practice, this
organizational restructuring did not create an absolute distinction between
the missions of the two agencies, especially as it related to the permitting
or authorization for use of wetlands and submerged lands. "Because of
overlap between several program areas, [both] authorization from the DNR
and a permit from the DER often were required for the same project."' 59
After the 1975 reorganization, the DNR continued to operate several
programs that were somewhat regulatory, or that combined various aspects
of management, research, and regulation. The programs included, for
example, management of sovereign submerged lands and aquatic preserves,
research regarding marine resources and aquatic plant management, as well
as management of protected species, such as the manatee, or of marine
habitats such as for shellfish. 60
During this same period, the DER functioned as Florida's primary
environmental permitting agency. With the creation and full operation of
the WMDs,"6 ' as well as the transfer of the coastal management program
to the Department of Community Affairs ("DCA"), a DEP report to the
legislature found that
the DER was generally divested of management-oriented programs and
was set up as primarily a regulatory agency.
Over time, however, the functional lines between [the] two
agencies became increasingly blurred. DER was assigned management
responsibilities, and DNR increasingly picked up regulatory functions.
This blurring of the lines led to confusion on the part of [both] the
159. DEPARTMENT OF ENvTL. PROTECTION, REPORTTO TIE LEGISLATURE OF 1993 ON
THE CREATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 6 (1993) [hereinafter
DEP REPORT TO LEGISLATURE].
160. Id. at 7.
161. See supra note 14.
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general public and regulated interests, and increased [the level of]
inefficiency, due to the inherent duplication and overlapping jurisdiction
between [the] agencies. This confusion has increased as program
responsibilities have improved.'62
According to the report, the 1993 Act's "creation of the Department of
Environmental Protection brought about a merger of all the major environ-
mental management and permitting functions in Florida-a move that will
result in . . . [improved intergovernmental] coordination and increased
resource protection. In 1994, the legislature revisited the 1993 Act' 6
by establishing the organizational structure of the DEP. 65 It provided for
appointment by the secretary of two deputy secretaries and an executive
coordinator for ecosystems management. The executive coordinator is
responsible for coordinating ecosystem management policy for the DEP.
The legislature further established nine divisions within the DEP: the
Division of Administrative and Technical Services; the Division of Air
Resource Management; the Division of Water Facilities; the Division of Law
Enforcement; the Division of Marine Resources; the Division of Waste
Management; the Division of Recreation and Parks; the Division of State
Lands; and the Division of Environmental Resource Permitting (formerly
Division of Water Management)) 66 The newly aligned divisions within
the DEP not only mirror developing programs, such as the ERP program,
but also reflect emerging priorities for the DEP. Formation of a division
devoted entirely to law enforcement signals growing emphasis in Florida,
and nationwide, on criminal prosecution of environmental crimes.
VI. APPEALS TO THE GOVERNOR AND CABINET
A. The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission
Unique in many respects, the governor and cabinet in Florida wear
many hats. As the holder of title to all sovereign lands in Florida, the
governor and cabinet sit as the Board of Trustees. Under certain circum-
162. DEP REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 159, at 7.
163. Id.
164. Ch. 93-213, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2129 (codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT.
chs. 253, 259, 367, 370, 373, 403 (1993)).
165. Ch. 94-356, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws at 2625-28 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
20.255). The DEP encompasses six administrative districts that carry out regulatory matters
of waste management, water facilities, wetlands, and air resources.
166. Id.
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stances, the governor and cabinet sit as an appellate tribunal of sorts in
reviewing appeals taken of agency action. One manifestation of this
involves the governor and cabinet sitting as the Florida Land and Water
Adjudicatory Commission ("FLWAC"). Recent history has shown that
FLWAC can have a significant and far-reaching impact on environmental
regulatory policy in Florida.167 At present, FLWAC has the authority to
review1 68 any order, including permit decisions or rules of a WMD.
16 9
DEP permit decisions, however, are not currently subject to FLWAC's re-
view. 70 The 1993 Act, while expanding the FLWAC jurisdiction to
include DEP permit decisions, also narrows both standing to appeal and the
criteria for a project to qualify for review.'
To appeal a permit decision to FLWAC, one must have been a "party
to the proceeding below" as defined by the 1993 Act.172 Simply put,
under the 1993 Act, a person cannot gain standing to appeal unless he
submitted testimony addressing substantive concerns to the permitting
agency prior to issuance of the permit. Although this limitation is viewed
as a narrowing of standing, it does not apply to the DEP if it decides to
appeal a WMD decision to FLWAC. 73
The 1993 Act limits the criteria by which a project may qualify for
review by providing that four members. of FLWAC must affirmatively
determine that the activity authorized by the agency order would "substan-
tially affect natural resources of statewide or regional significance."'
74
Review may also be accepted if four members of FLWAC determine that
the agency order "raises issues of policy, statutory interpretation, or rule
interpretation that have regional or statewide significance from the
standpoint of agency precedent.' 7  With the legislative ratification of the
statewide wetland delineation methodology required by the 1993 Act,
FLWAC appellate jurisdiction now includes DEP and local government
167. Sierra Club v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 92 Envtl. & Land Use
Admin. L. Rep. 131 (FLWAC 1992).
168. FLA. STAT. § 373.114(1) (1993).
169. For purposes of FLWAC review, the terms "permit" and "order" are used
interchangeably.
170. Coastal Envtl. Soc'y, Inc. v. Trail Ridge Landfill, Inc., 14 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
129, 131 (1992).
171. Ch. 93-213, § 26, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2141-42 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.114(1)
(1993)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2142.
175. Id. at 2141.
1994]
113
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
permit decisions, pursuant to the ERP program.'76 Such an expanded
jurisdiction may pave the way for consistent, statewide policy setting.
B. Consolidated Appeals Process
Pursuant to chapter 94-356 of the Laws of Florida, review of consoli-
dated orders rendered by the governor and cabinet will also be consolidated,
and the standard of review will be expanded to include the legal authorities
and technical requirements of all the programs being concurrently pro-
cessed.' 77 For applications that include delegated sovereign submerged
lands activities, the governor and cabinet review procedures, set forth in
section 373.114(1) of the Florida Statutes, are broadened to include
additional provisions and exceptions associated with the programs under
review. 17 1 In those instances where an appeal is taken of an application
involving a sovereign submerged lands and, either an ERP or coastal
construction authorization, the governor and cabinet sit concurrently as the
FLWAC and the Board of Trustees. 179 Review may also be initiated by
the governor or any member of the cabinet, and only one member's
approval is required to accept review. However, the development activity
subject to review will not have to meet the regional or statewide significance
criteria which currently exists in chapter 373.180
The scope of remedies available to the governor and cabinet are
expansive. If the governor and cabinet determine that approval to use
sovereign submerged lands is not consistent with the provisions of chapters
253 or 258 of the Florida Statutes, any other permit authorization granted
by the consolidated order can be rescinded or modified, or the proceeding
can be remanded to the agency which reviewed the applications, for further
action. For example, if a multi-use residential/marina project fails to qualify
for its sovereign submerged lands authorization, such as that needed for
placement of docking facilities over sovereign submerged lands, the
associated upland residential portion of the project, which would require an
ERP, could be denied.''
176. Ch. 93-213, § 26, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2141-42 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.114
(1993)).
177. Ch. 94-356, § 502, 1994 Fla. Laws at 2898-99 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
373.4275).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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VII. STATE ASSUMPTION OF FEDERAL WETLANDS PROGRAM
A. Scope of Federal Regulation
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") is a comprehensive water quality statute
that represents Congress's effort to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the nation's waters."'8 2 The CWA's
section 404 permit program regulates the discharge of dredged or fill
material into navigable waters of the United States and their adjacent
wetlands. It does not regulate "nondischarge-related" activities such as
draining, dredging, or clearing of vegetation unless such activities also
involve the placement of fill material into navigable waters and adjacent
wetlands.
The program is jointly administered and enforced by the Corps and the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). Under this joint
administration, the Corps issues permits by applying the EPA's detailed
environmental criteria known as the section 404(b)(1) guidelines. Under
section 404(c), the EPA may potentially exercise veto authority over
"unacceptable adverse effects" on certain specified resource uses. The
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries
Service, and other federal agencies concerned with various natural resources
also play significant roles in the section 404 permit program, as do the
states, all of which must issue certifications that proposed discharges will
not violate state water quality standards. 3  In order to simplify the
permitting process, without diminishing the level of protection, the DEP
began a process in 1992 to assume the state 404 Program. 4 The CWA
spells out the process for assumption.'85
182. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988); see also supra note 20.
183. Clean Water Act, ch. 404, 86 Stat. 816 (1987) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1988)).
184. PHOENIX ENVTL. GROUP, INC. ET AL., PROPOSAL FOR ASSUMPTION OF THE CORPS
OF ENGINEERS PERMITTING PROGRAM UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT BY
THE STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 8-9 (1992)
[hereinafter PHOENIX ENVTL. GROUP] (on file with author).
185.
Section 404(g)(1) of the CWA outlines the general proposition that states may
assume the Section 404 program. However, this ability to assume has a
significant limitation. The explicit language of Section 404(g)(1) prohibits the
assumption of the program for: waters which are presently used, or are
susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a
means to transport interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary
high water mark, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of
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B. The Next Step
The next significant step toward vertical integration of wetland
permitting in Florida involves "assumption" of the federal section 404
regulatory program administered by the Corps.'86 Assumption is the
process by which the EPA reviews state programs to determine whether they
meet certain minimum standards. If accepted by the EPA, assumption
allows for use of the federally approved state procedures and regula-
tions.""
Through the 1994 Act, the legislature expressly found
it to be in the best interests of the citizens of Florida to continue the
streamlining of wetlands and surface water permitting in Florida by
eliminating the duplication of the regulatory programs under Part IV of
chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and s. 404 of the Clean Water Act, as
amended ... .88
In keeping with this legislative finding, the 1994 Act requests that the
governor, in consultation with the Florida Congressional Delegation,
"pursue" assumption by the DEP and the WMDs of the section 404 federal
dredge and fill permitting program. On a separate track, the DEP has been
working on this project since 1992. To crystallize its efforts, the DEP
the tide shoreward to their high water mark, or mean higher high water mark on
the west coast, including wetlands adjacent thereto. These waters correspond to
most of those in which the Corps has the authority to issue permits for structures
in navigable waters pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899 (33 U.S.C. § 403) (Section 10). Section 10 waters cover three types of
navigable waters: (1) waters that were historically navigable (2) waters that are
currently navigable in fact and (3) waters that can be made navigable with
reasonable improvement. Only the first of these is assumable by a state
program.
Under Section 10, a permit is required to construct "any wharf, pier, dolphin,
boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures" . . . or to "excavate
or fill or in any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition or
capacity of," navigable waters of the United States. Presumably the restriction
in the CWA on 404 assumption was included because the Corps will retain
permitting authority for structures under Section 10. However, the exclusion of
Section 10 waters presents several problems to Florida in creating a workable
wetland regulatory program.
Id. at 4-5.
186. Id. at 9; supra note 23.
187. PHOENIX ENvTL. GROUP, supra note 184, at 9.
188. Ch. 94-122, § 9, 1994 Fla. Laws at 680-81.
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obtained funding and retained an outside consultant to compile an "assump-
tion application" for Florida to submit to the EPA.'89 Early on in its
consideration, however, the DEP concluded that assumption is not
practicable given the current federal regulations regarding the scope of
section 404 assumption. Instead, a report commissioned by the DEP
recommended establishment of statewide programmatic permits 90 through
the Corps.' 9 '
Turning to the federal level, the prospect for efforts to allow states to
implement the federal wetlands regulatory program seem positive. The
Clinton administration, in 1993, established five principles as the framework
for its package of wetland reform initiatives. Principle number two, entitled
Fair, Flexible, and Predictable Regulatory Programs, calls for wetlands
regulatory programs to be "administered in a manner that avoids unneces-
sary impacts upon private property and the regulated public, and minimizes
those effects that cannot be avoided, while providing effective protection for
wetlands."'92 More to the point, this wetlands reform initiative goes on
to state that "[d]uplication among regulatory agencies must be avoided and
the public must have a clear understanding of regulatory requirements and
various agency roles . . . .""' This principle bodes well for enhanced
cooperation by the federal agencies administering the section 404 assump-
tion process and might set the stage for needed changes to simplify what are
widely considered to be unnecessarily complex federal assumption regula-
tions.
VIII. ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE
As discussed earlier in this article, lawmakers merged the Departments
of Natural Resources and Environmental Regulation during the 1993
legislative session to create the DEP. 94 Part of the merger legislation
mandated that the DEP, with its expanded areas of responsibility, focus on
managing entire ecosystems, rather than piecemeal regulation on a project-
189. Fumero, supra note 26, at 65; see also Martin R. Dix & Scott Denson, Florida's
Assumption of Federal Dredge-and-Fill Jurisdiction: Clearing the Permitting Stream Bed
or Muddying Administrative Waters?, 67 FLA. B.J. 56 (Apr. 1993).
190. See 33 C.F.R. § 330 (1993)
191. PHOENIX ENvTL. GROUP, supra note 184, at 9-10.
192. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF ENVTL. POLICY, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WET-
LANDS: A FAIR, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH 4 (1993).
193. Id.
194. See supra note 13.
1994]
117
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
by-project basis. Florida is the first state to make ecosystem management
the cornerstone of its environmental policy.'95
Formed to develop and implement the concept of ecosystem manage-
ment, the Ecosystems Management Work Group ("Work Group") is charged
to review exactly how ecosystem management can be implemented. The
Work Group has defined ecosystem management as "an integrated, flexible
approach to management of Florida's biological and physical environments,
conducted through the use of tools such as planning, land acquisition,
environmental education, regulation, and pollution prevention, and designed
to maintain, protect, and improve the state's natural, managed, and human
communities."' 
96
Beginning Ecosystem Management, a report issued by the DEP,
describes how the DEP intends to implement ecosystem management in
Florida. 97 The report summarizes the DEP's ecosystem management
goals and implementation strategy. These include "better protection and
management of Florida's environment; development of an agency structure
and culture based on a systems approach to environmental protection and
management; and [fostering] an ethic within the citizenry of shared
responsibility and participation in the protection of the environment." 9"
In December 1993, the Work Group submitted their recommendations
to the governor, cabinet, and the legislature, and with that the DEP began
the actual planning process. Twelve committees have been established to
address the various ecosystem management issues. These committees will
produce an Ecosystem Management Implementation Strategy ("EMIS") and
draft reports containing issues analyses and recommendations by October,
1994. The committees will be responsible for analyzing the many issues
relating to ecosystem management and recommending a preferred course of
action.' "99 The committees formed include: the EMIS Committee;2 0 the
195. See oh. 93-213, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2129 (codified in scattered sections of FLA.
STAT. chs. 253, 259, 367, 370, 373, 403, (1993)). The preamble to this Act finds that
Florida's ecological systems need to be protected and managed in their entirety.
196. FLORIDA DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, BEGINNING EcosysTEM MANAGEMENT
3 (1994) [hereinafter DEP BEGINNING ECOsYsTEM MANAGEMENT].
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 10.
200.
The charge of this committee is to develop a strategy to guide ecosystem
management, including the desired relationships between existing and needed
DEP programs, and between DEP and other agencies, interest groups, and the
general public. From the document this committee will produce, any employee,
Vol. 19
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External Steering Committee;2°  the Land Acquisition/Greenways Commit-
tee;2"2 the Education Committee;2. 3 the Incentive-Based Regulatory
Alternatives Committee;20 4 the Pollution Prevention Committee;0 5 the
or any member of the public should be able to understand the role of DEP
programs, and how those programs link to groups outside the agency in
implementing ecosystem management.
Id. at 11.
201.
A primary purpose of this committee is to obtain the thoughts, ideas, and
concerns of as large a cross section of the citizenry as possible. It should be
comprised of people who represent a wide range of interests, including those
who manage land and run factories, citizens who do not represent any particular
interest group, and ecology experts from the universities [within Florida].
DEP BEGINNING ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, supra note 196, at 14.
202. A major effort of this committee "will involve data collection and sharing between
land purchasing entities and between the acquisition program and other parts of the agency.
The committee will look into what improvements are needed in this regard." The committee
will inventory "existing state-owned lands, develop [ ] criteria for determining the types and
location of lands needed to complete the state public lands system, and us[e] that criteria to
identify specific lands which need to be acquired." Id. at 17.
203.
This committee will address environmental education needs within the
department and develop strategies and materials to convey the ecosystem
management philosophy. It will evaluate how internal and external education
programs can be better coordinated. It will produce a quarterly ecosystem
management newsletter to keep interested parties aware of the agency's
activities. It will also make recommendations relative to the department library.
The committee will address both short and long-term education needs, and will
recommend a budget to meet those needs.
Id. at 19.
204.
The primary function of this committee is to develop the concept of net
environmental benefit, incentives for its use, and criteria for its application. This
is to be an alternative to the existing regulatory program. Important to this task
is to identify which regulatory aspects will not be subject to the alternative
regulatory approach.
Id. at 21.
205.
This committee is charged with developing strategies to increase pollution
prevention. It should look at all existing programs both inside and outside the
agency for ideas, but should not be constrained by what is currently being done.
Prevention is a concept that has not been implemented to its full potential. The
committee should address prevention activities for govemment, business,
industry, and the general public.
Id. at 23.
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Science and Technology Committee;. 6 the Public Land Management
Committee; °7 and the Intergovernmental Coordination Committee.2"'
During 1995, these committees, made up of DEP staff, business
interests, environmental leaders, other environmental agency staff, and
private interests, such as land developers, will recommend ways to
effectively and efficiently integrate development and conservation efforts in
a "holistic manner." 20 9
As stated above, the DEP's initial effort in this area will be developing
an EMIS. The EMIS will be the agency's principle ecosystem management
guidance document and will set ecosystem management direction for the
DEP. In order to gain experience in ecosystem management, the DEP, in
cooperation with the WMDs, has begun implementing ecosystem manage-
ment in particular areas throughout the state, including the Apalachicola
River and Bay, the Suwannee, Wekiva, Lower St. Johns, and Hillsborough
Rivers, and the Florida Bay/Southern Everglades.
The final step in the process of effecting a "systems approach" to
management of Florida's environment will be to implement the EMIS
through the development of site-specific Area Implementation Strategies
206. "This committee will evaluate all aspects of DEP's data management and
technology, and recommend improvements to achieve [ecosystem management] goals. These
types of evaluations are needed on a periodic basis, so the committee will make recommen-
dations on the composition of a permanent Science and Technology Committee."
DEP BEGINNING ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, supra note 196, at 25.
207.
Ecosystem management is already occurring on some public lands. For
example, the Division of Recreation and Parks uses "greenlines" to map
managed lands within the context of surrounding land uses. Managers use these
maps to identify outside threats to park lands. Then, through coordination with
other levels of government and adjacent landowners, they try to reduce those
threats by encouraging land use decisions that are sensitive to the needs of the
park. This committee will identify and evaluate other existing programs which
embody [ecosystem management] principles, and suggest improvements, as
needed, to agency land management programs.
Id. at 28.
208.
This committee is to look at how to integrate the DEP's ecosystem management
program with other agency programs that are important to achieving ecosystem
management goals. Of particular importance will be the WMD planning
activities, the local government comprehensive planning process, and federal
programs and activities. The committee will, at a minimum, have subcommit-
tees to address these three issues.
Id. at 33.
209. See, e.g., id. at 35.
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("AIS"). AISs will be prepared in cooperation with local, state, and federal
government agencies, environmental groups, the business community, and
the general public. The AIS will guide on-the-ground management activities
and will include a schedule, if needed, for establishing minimum flows and
levels, and protection areas for priority water bodies.21 °
IX. ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE LAND ACQUISITIONS AND
MANAGEMENT
Florida has the largest environmentally sensitive land acquisition
program in the nation. Since 1981, state-funded programs have acquired
more than 350,000 acres of wetlands and floodplains, pine flatwoods, and
xeric scrub, at an investment of $500 million. In addition, local taxpayers
across the state have passed bond issues to raise an additional $650 million
for land acquisition in individual counties2
Chapter 94-240 of the Laws of Florida streamlines the Conservation
and Recreation Lands ("CARL") program land acquisitions and the state's
process for acquiring lands with Preservation 2000 funds.21 2 In so doing,
it consolidates in chapter 259 of the Florida Statutes the statutory provisions
that are currently housed in chapter 253 of the Florida Statutes. Those
provisions relate specifically to the acquisition and management of lands
acquired through the CARL program, and lands acquired with Preservation
2000 funds where title vests in the Board of Trustees.2 3 This consolida-
tion makes consistent, in one chapter, all statutory provisions relating to the
acquisition of, and general policy considerations relating to, lands held for
environmental preservation, conservation, and recreational purposes.
Current laws were also streamlined to remove obstacles to Florida's
land buying program. Now, the Board of Trustees is vested with broad
authority to waive most of the acquisition procedure provisions of the new
section 259.041, if it is in the "public's interest." However, this waiver
authority does not extend to acquisitions through condemnation, or to
emergency purchases.1 4
210. Id. at 38.
211. Ecosystem Management and Restoration for the 21st Century, 21st Annual Natural
Areas Conference, Oct. 19, 1994.
212. These funds were authorized by § 373.045 of the Florida Statutes and are generated
by the sale of revenue bonds. See FLA. STAT. § 375.045 (1993).
213. Act of May 25, 1994, ch. 94-240, § 4, 1994 Fla. Laws 1792, 1805-10 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 259.041).
214. Id.
1994]
121
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
The DEP should also benefit from more flexibility in the land
acquisition process, and is directed to write new rules to implement the
statutory changes. Such rules are to address, among other issues, the terms
and conditions of land purchases, including procedures for determining the
value of parcels which the state has an interest in acquiring."' With an
eye toward expanding intergovernmental partnerships, the Florida Game and
Freshwater Fish Commission is empowered to use the Fish and Wildlife
Habitat Trust Fund to acquire and manage mitigation lands in concert with
other state and local entities.216
Just as important as acquisition is how the agency thereafter manages
the lands. In this regard, the impact of chapter 94-240 of the Laws of
Florida is likely to result in earlier and more focused policy and decision
making. It requires the Land Acquisition Advisory Council to develop a
management policy statement for each new project on the CARL list. The
agency assigned management responsibility for a particular project must
develop a management prospectus that includes the management goals for
the land, a timetable for implementing management objectives, and an
estimate of how much funding and personnel will be needed to adequately
manage the property.
Moreover, agencies involved in the business of acquiring and managing
lands through CARL will be required to develop comprehensive long-term
land management plans. Formal management plans are due within one year
after the acquisition of individual parcels or, in the case of multi-parcel
projects, within a year of the acquisition of the essential parcel or par-
cels.2" 7 Added to the list of items a land management plan must address
are management activities necessary to restore native species habitats,
methods for controlling the spread of nonnative plants and animals, and
prescribed fire and other appropriate resource management activities. A
specific description of how the managing agency plans to identify, locate,
protect, and preserve, or otherwise use "fragile, nonrenewable natural and
cultural resources" is also required by the new law.2"' Once adopted, the
managing agency must update the plan at least every five years.219
Finally, chapter 94-240 makes payment in lieu of taxes to small counties a
direct deduction from CARL rather than a deduction from monies earmarked
215. Id.
216. Id. § 20, at 1817-18 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 372.074).
217. Id. § 1, at 1793-99 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 259.032).
218. Ch. 94-240, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws at 1793-99 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
259.032).
219. Id. at 1796.
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for land management, potentially providing an additional $2 million each
year for land management purposes.220
X. GOVERNOR'S LAND USE AND WATER PLANNING TASK FORCE
Chapter 93-206 of the Laws of Florida,22' relating to planning and
growth management in Florida, provided that the governor establish a task
force with public sector representatives, including local government officials,
to formulate recommendations for legislative action on the most appropriate
legal relationship between district water management plans, 222 on the one
hand, and the growth management portion of the state comprehensive
plan,223 strategic regional policy plans, and local comprehensive plans, on
the other. The task force was required to consider the future role and scope,
if any, of the state water plan following legislative adoption of the growth
management portion of the state comprehensive plan.22 Recommenda-
tions to senate and house leadership are to be submitted by the task force by
October 1994.225
In addition to those responsibilities initially placed on the task force in
1993, the task force is required by the 1994 Act to make a recommendation
to the 1995 Legislature on "the mechanisms and procedures" for establishing
state water policy ("SWP") 226 in Florida. In order to allow time for the
task force to carry out this initiative, recently adopted amendments to the
SWP will not become effective until January 1, 1995. Providing legislative
220. Id. at 1798-99.
221. Act of May 11, 1993, ch. 93-206, 1993 Fla. Laws 1887 (codified in scattered
sections of FLA. STAT. chs. 163, 171, 186, 193, 235, 240, 253, 259, 288, 336, 380, 403, 408,
419, 704, 823 (1993)).
222. FLA. STAT. § 373.036 (1993).
223. Id. § 187.201.
224. Ch. 93-206, § 77, 1993 Fla. Laws at 1974. The State Water Plan is set forth in §§
373.036 and 373.039 of the Florida Statutes, with a cross-reference contained in § 186.021
of the Florida Statutes.
225. Id.
226. Ch. 94-122, § 15, 1994 Fla. Laws at 687-88 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
373.019). The SWP is expressed as such waters which should be managed to conserve and
protect natural resources and scenic beauty and to realize the full beneficial use of the
resource. Recognizing the importance of water to the state, the legislature passed the Water
Resources Act, chapter 373 of the Florida Statutes, and the Air and Water Pollution Control
Act, chapter 403 of the Florida Statutes. Additionally, numerous goals and policies within
the State Comprehensive Plan address water resources and natural systems protection. FLA.
STAT. ch. 187 (1993); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-40 (1994) (containing the State
Water Policy rules).
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direction, the definition of SWP was amended by adding the following
language:
The waters of the state are among its most basic resources. Such waters
shall be managed to conserve and protect water resources and to realize
the full beneficial use of these resources .... In order to provide for
consistency between growth management policy and water management
policy the task force shall make recommendations to the 1995 legisla-
ture on the mechanisms and procedures for establishing and amending
[Florida's] water policy. In an attempt to consider these recommenda-
tions and receive the benefit of a review by House and Senate Natural
Resource Committees, the amendments to chapter 17-40, F.A.C., [state
water policy] adopted by the Environmental Regulation Commission on
December 1, 1993, shall not become effective until July 1, 1995.227
Task force membership is also increased by the 1994 Act to include one
member of the ERC, one representative of "environmental interests," and
one representative of "regulated interests. 228
Another governor-appointed body, equally important in its charge, is
examining ecosystem approaches to land and water planning issues in part
of the state. Established by executive order of the governor, the Commis-
sion for a Sustainable South Florida is examining the Everglades ecosystem
as a whole, while also considering pertinent growth management issues.2 9
227. Ch. 94-122, § 13, 1994 Fla. Laws at 687 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
403.031(14).
228. Id. § 16, at 688 (amending ch. 93-206, § 77(2), 1993 Fla. Laws at 1974).
229. Fla. Exec. Order No. 94-54 (Mar. 3, 1994). On March 3, 1994, Governor Lawton
Chiles signed Executive Order 94-54, creating the Governor's Commission for a Sustainable
South Florida. This Commission was created to assure a healthy Everglades ecosystem which
can coexist and be mutually supportive of a sustainable South Florida economy.
Fundamental premises of the Executive Order recognize that the Everglades ecosystem
is known as a unique area, both nationally and internationally, and that it is home to a
significant number of threatened and endangered wildlife species. The area also contains the
only living coral reef in the United States. South Floridians currently depend on this system
as their major source of freshwater, and it provides the foundation for the region as an
international commercial, agricultural, and tourist center.
The Executive Order further recognizes that rapid population growth, including land
development, water management activities and land conversion have negatively impacted the
Everglades ecosystem; its water quality has been degraded and the associated natural systems
no longer adequately perform the functions they once performed. See generally id.
Vol. 19
124
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/1
Fumero
XI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAND MANAGEMENT STUDY
COMMITTEE III
Florida began comprehensive efforts to manage its growth coincident
with the increasing strength of the environmental movement in the nation
and in this state. Two sets of legislative initiatives, the first in the early
1970s and the second in the mid-1980s, moved Florida to the forefront of
state efforts to manage growth and associated environmental implications.
The set of laws adopted in 1972 focused on giving the state and regional
levels a role in land and water management. Earlier, this had been largely
the domain of local governments and special districts. In 1985, the
legislature adopted the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and
Land Development Regulation Act, mandating that all local governments
prepare a comprehensive plan. 3°
Taking another significant step in 1993, the Florida Legislature
substantially amended the growth management provisions. This was
accomplished by amending the state and regional planning provisions of
chapter 186 of the Florida Statutes"" and the land development regulation
requirements of chapter 163 of the Florida Statutes.232 The process
leading to passage of the growth management amendments began in 1991,
when the Environmental Land Management Study Committee III ("ELMS
III") was created. 33 ELMS III, consisting of forty members, held numer-
ous meetings throughout the state from December 1991, through December
1992, to review the state's planning and growth management laws.
The ELMS III legislation 234 is the legislative response to the 124
recommendations in the ELMS III Final Report. Incorporating many, but
not all, of the committee's recommendations, the ELMS III legislation is
largely process-oriented; it establishes more than seventy-five new processes,
procedures, rules, and plan amendments. The Department of Community
230. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3161-.3243 (1993).
231. FLA. STAT. § 186.501 (1993). Regional Planning Councils were established. Each
Council was required to adopt a Comprehensive Regional Policy Plan that is consistent with,
and furthers, the state Comprehensive Plan.
232. Id. § 163.3161. This Act mandates the adoption of comprehensive plans by all
local governments. Chapter 9J of the Florida Administrative Code establishes the time
frames for the adoption of these local plans. Each plan must be consistent with the state Plan
and the applicable Regional Policy Plan. Local government plans must also be both
internally consistent and economically feasible.
233. See FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3243 (1993).
234. Ch. 93-206, 1993 Fla. Laws at 1887 (codified at FLA. STAT. chs. 163, 186(1993)).
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Affairs will bear most of the initial burden for implementing these
requirements.235
The ELMS III legislation makes statewide consistency a priority by
making numerous amendments to the intent section of chapter 186 of the
Florida Statutes, emphasizing the need for intergovernmental coordination
and the requirement that the state comprehensive plan provide basic policy
direction to all levels of government regarding "the orderly social,
economic, and physical growth of the State." '236 The legislation also
created a new section in chapter 186237 which requires that the executive
office of the governor amend the state comprehensive plan, a specific
growth management section including, inter alia, provisions to identify areas
of state and regional environmental significance, and establish strategies to
protect them; establish integrated state policies for land development, air
quality, transportation and water resources; recommend how to integrate the
state water use plan, the state land development plan, and state transporta-
tion plans; and promote land acquisition programs.238
Following this legislative directive, the governor's office, through an
executive order, formed the Growth Management Plan Advisory Committee
("Advisory Committee"). In October 1993, a report containing findings and
recommendations was presented to the governor's office.239 Overall, the
235. Id.
236. FLA. STAT. § 186.002 (1993).
237. Ch. 93-206, § 31, 1993 Fla. Laws at 1921 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 186.506(4)
(1993)). The legislature mandated that the governor's office and the Department of
Community Affairs, along with applicable regional and local governments and citizens
cooperatively prepare a proposed growth management portion of the state comprehensive
plan. The plan was required to include such provisions as the identification of metropolitan
and urban growth areas; guidelines for transportation corridors, new interchanges on limited
access facilities, and new airports of state or regional significance; coordinated state planning
of road, rail, and waterborne transportation facilities to provide for transportation of
agricultural products and supplies; establishment of priorities regarding coastal planning;
establishment of statewide policy to enhance the multi-use waterfront development of existing
deepwater port; policies to establish state and regional solutions to the need for affordable
housing; and recommendations as to when and to what degree local plans and strategic
regional policy plans must be consistent with the growth management portion of the state
plan. The legislature must establish these consistency requirements. Id. §§ 31, 32, 34 at
1921-23, 1925-26.
238. Id.
239. GOVERNOR'S GROWTH MANAGEMENT PLAN ADVISORY COMM., FINDINGS &
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNOR'S GROWTH MANAGEMENT PLAN ADVISORY
COMMITTEE FOR THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT PORTION OF THE STATE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
1 (1993) [hereinafter GROWTH MANAGEMENT PLAN].
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report set forth broad principles, such as achieving the protection of
environmentally significant natural resources through requiring that the
"growth be compatible with ecosystem approaches to protection."
Avoidance of duplicative governmental resource regulation, as dealt with
earlier in this article,24° and development of a state transportation system
that supports land use decisions and environmental protection are also cited
in the Advisory Committee report as guiding principles.2 1
All in all, the ELMS III legislation encourages growth management
agencies to develop a vision through collaborative planning initiatives,
which should assist in the realization of effective land use planning that is
cognizant of impacts to the natural resources of the state. The Advisory
Committee report may ultimately result in implementing legislation.
XI. CONCLUSION
Florida is at a crossroads. Activities which have historically resulted
in strengthening our economy are now likely to be considered harmful to
our environment if not properly managed. At the same time, it has become
widely recognized by agencies and regulated interests alike, that environ-
mental sustainability can only be reached by taking a holistic approach to
natural resource protection and management, an ecosystem approach.
The legislative reforms discussed in this article provide a much needed
basis for greater coordination between, and among, government and the
privafe sector concerning natural resource planning and regulation programs.
Although the actual impact of these reforms will not be known until the
ambitious rulemaking and other implementation vehicles mandated by the
legislation are completed, there is now a framework that should allow
agencies to focus and coordinate their collective regulatory, planning, and
land management efforts. This should increase the overall effectiveness and
efficiency of natural resource protection and management in Florida.
240. See supra part II.
241. GROWTH MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 239, at 6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This year's accumulation of evidentiary cases demonstrates some of the
same similarities as in previous years. Criminal evidentiary cases outnum-
bered civil evidentiary cases almost two to one. Relevance and hearsay
issues alone outnumbered all other evidentiary issues. However, with the
exception of a few cases, there were a scant number of noteworthy cases.
Additionally, few legislative changes in the Florida Evidence Code'
occurred during this survey period.2
* J.D. with honors, Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center, 1987; B.A.,
University of Florida, 1978; Assistant County Attorney, Broward County, Florida, 1992-
present; Bruschi, Eng & Koemer, P.A., 1990-1992; Assistant State Attorney, Broward
County, Florida, 1987-1990.
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 90 (1993).
2. Some interesting developments occurred in the last survey period. However, they are
not discussed in full here. Some of the legislative changes in the Florida Evidence Code
during the last survey period included: providing interpreters for deaf jurors, changing the
provisions authorizing the use of closed circuit television and videotaped testimony of child
witnesses, and allowing a limited exemption from the Sunshine Act for a governmental
agency to consult with the agency's attorney to discuss pending litigation.
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II. RELEVANCE
A. Character Evidence
The use of character evidence is probably one of the most widely used,
yet misunderstood, sections in the Florida Evidence Code.3 In criminal
cases, the use of similar fact evidence4 to prove other crimes, wrongs, or
acts continues to be the leading area for appellate decisions. Although this
area is a powerful tool for the prosecution of criminal defendants, its
improper usage during trial almost invariably leads to reversed convictions.
During the survey period, numerous similar fact cases-commonly
known as Williams rule5 cases by criminal law practitioners-reached the
appellate courts. Very few broke any new ground in this area. However,
one case does merit discussion. In Williams v. State,6 the Florida Supreme
Court settled an apparent conflict on the issue of whether similar fact
evidence is admissible to rebut a defense of consent in a sexual battery case.
The prevailing case law indicates that consent is unique to the individual,
and therefore, cannot be proven by evidence of other sexual encounters
because the lack of consent of one person is not proof of the lack of consent
of another.7
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of sexual battery, kidnapping,
robbery, and possession of cocaine.' At trial, the state presented the
testimony of two women who stated that the defendant had attacked them
under similar circumstances.9 The defendant objected that the testimony
was intended to prove his bad character and propensity to assault women
and was, therefore, inadmissible."
The attack on the victim and the attack on the two other women all
occurred in the same general area in Miami. The defendant had engaged all
3. FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (1993).
4. Id. § 90.404(2).
5. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959)
(effectively codified as FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (1993)). The supreme court held that
similar fact evidence is admissible if it is relevant for the purpose of demonstrating something
other than character or propensity. Id. at 663.
6. 621 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1993). Coincidentally, the name "Williams" in the case sub
judice is the same as the famous case wherein the term "Williams rule" originated.
7. See Hodges v. State, 403 So. 2d 1375, 1378-79 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review
denied, 413 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1982); Helton v. State, 365 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1979).
8. Williams, 621 So. 2d at 413-14.
9. Id. at 414.
10. Id.
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three women in casual conversation regarding purchasing cocaine or having
sex for drugs." With each woman, the defendant followed the same
pattern. The defendant grabbed them with a tight choke hold from behind
and took them to a secluded spot. There, while holding the women by the
neck, he masturbated with one hand prior to raping them. After having
sexual intercourse with the women, he told them not to complain or he
would kill them. He then calmly walked away."
The defendant was apprehended soon after the attack on the victim in
this case. The defendant told the police that he had helped the victim
purchase cocaine and had sex with her in exchange for the drugs. The
defendant explained that the victim became angry when he refused to give
her the drugs."
In analyzing the use of similar fact evidence, the Florida Supreme
Court stated:
Evidence of other crimes or acts may be admissible if, because of its
similarity to the charged crime, it is relevant to prove a material fact in
issue. But it may also be admissible, even if not similar, if it is
probative of a material fact in issue. Although similarity is not a
requirement for admission of other crime evidence, when the fact to be
proven is, for example, identity or common plan or scheme [sic] it is
generally the similarity between the charged offense and the other crime
or act that gives the evidence probative value. Thus, evidence of other
crimes, whether factually similar or dissimilar to the charged crime, is
admissible if the evidence is relevant to prove a matter of consequence
other than bad character or propensity. 4
In the present case, the supreme court concluded that the testimony of
the prior victims was relevant to rebut the defendant's defense that the
present victim had consensual sex with the defendant in exchange for drugs.
The similar fact evidence rebutted the defendant's defense by demonstrating
"a common plan or scheme to seek out and isolate victims likely not to
complain or to complain unsuccessfully because of the circumstances
surrounding the assaults and the victims [sic] involvement with drugs."' 5
11. Id.
12. Id. One of the witnesses stated that she lost consciousness for a moment after the
defendant had grabbed her by the throat. She woke up to find her pants pulled down as the
defendant was confronted by another man. Williams, 621 So. 2d at 414.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citations omitted).
15. Id. at 417.
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Since this testimony was relevant to a material fact in issue and its probative
value clearly outweighed any undue prejudice, its admission was permissi-
ble.'
6
B. Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses
In one of the few cases to arise under section 90.409 of the Florida
Statutes, the First District Court of Appeal examined whether offers of
payment for medical or hospital bills apply to criminal cases. In Johnson
v. State,7 the defendant arrived at the victim's home in search of several
men. The defendant spotted one of the men, pulled a gun, and gave chase.
During this episode, the victim exited the home and ran outside. As the
defendant fired at a parked car, the bullet ricocheted and struck the victim,
an eleven-year-old boy. 8 The defendant was charged with possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon. 9 Prior to trial, the defense attempted to
exclude testimony by the victim's mother that the defendant had visited the
victim and offered to pay his medical bills. The trial court denied the
objection and the testimony was received into evidence.2"
The district court recognized this case as one of first impression since
section 90.409 of the Florida Statutes had never been applied to a criminal
case to exclude an offer to pay medical bills. The district court looked to
the Law Revision Council Notes for guidance. The council notes for section
90.409 state that the California Evidence Code has a similar provision which
Florida law has followed.2 The issue of whether California's analogous
provision is applicable in criminal cases was squarely addressed in the
California case of People v. Muniz.22 The court in Muniz indicated that
California's evidence code, like Florida's, only speaks to "liability." The
code does not mention criminal liability. 3
16. Id. The supreme court reiterated its adherence to the findings of the district courts
in Hodges and Helton. It stated that because consent is unique to the individual, evidence
that the victim of an unrelated assault did not consent cannot serve as evidence of nonconsent
by the victim of the charged offense. However, the supreme court did not agree that similar
fact evidence is never relevant to the issue of consent, and disapproved Hodges and Helton
to the extent that they are read in that context. Williams, 621 So. 2d at 415-16.
17. 625 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
18. Id. at 1298.
19. The record does not indicate why the defendant was not charged with numerous
other criminal counts.
20. Johnson, 625 So. 2d at 1298.
21. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.409 Law Revision Council Notes-1976 (West 1988).
22. 262 Cal. Rptr. 743 (4th Ct. App. 1989).
23. See id. at 746.
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Additionally, the council notes indicate that the policy considerations
underlying section 90.408 of the Florida Evidence Code are the same for
section 90.409.24 Furthermore, the exclusion of compromises or offers to
compromise under section 90.408 is based upon two grounds:
(1) The evidence is irrelevant, since "such an offer does not ordinarily
proceed from and imply a belief that the adversary's claim is well
founded, but rather that the further prosecution of the claim, whether
well founded or not, would in any event cause such an annoyance as is
preferably avoided by the payment of the sum offered. (2) The public
policy of this state favors amicable settlement of disputes and the
avoidance of litigation. 25
In criminal cases, the decision to prosecute rests with the state, not the
victim. Therefore, neither of the rationales stated in the council notes apply.
Accordingly, the district court found that the provisions of section 90.409
should be confined to civil cases only and have no application in criminal
cases.
26
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Scientific Evidence
In Flanagan v. State,27 the Florida Supreme Court adhered to the
Frye28 standard in determining the admissibility of sexual offender
profiles.29 In Flanagan, the defendant was convicted of sexual battery on
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.409 Law Revision Council Notes-1976 (West 1988). This
section concerns compromises and offers to compromise.
25. Johnson, 625 So. 2d at 1299 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.408 Law Revision
Council Notes-1976 (West 1988) (citations omitted)).
26. Id.
27. 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
28. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under Frye, in order to
introduce expert testimony regarding a scientific principle, the principle "must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id.
at 1014.
29. The Florida Supreme Court specifically adhered to the Frye standard as the
appropriate test for the admissibility of scientific opinions. The Florida Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the United States Supreme Court's holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), where the Supreme Court construed Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence as superseding the Frye test. Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 829
n.2; see also Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989) (rejecting the balancing test of
section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence
1994]
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his nine-year-old daughter. At trial, a psychologist for the prosecution
testified regarding both the common characteristics of the home environment
where child sexual abuse occurs and the characteristics of sexual abusers.3"
The psychologist also examined the nine-year-old girl. The First District
Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, affirmed the conviction but certified
questions to the supreme court regarding whether a child sexual offender
profile is admissible at trial.3' The Florida Supreme Court examined the
academic literature and case law regarding sexual offender profiles and
found that these profiles are not generally accepted in the scientific
community and do not meet the Frye test for admissibility.32 Therefore,
under Florida law, sexual offender profiles are inadmissible.
The First District Court of Appeal had also concluded that even if the
sexual offender profile did not meet the Frye test, it was admissible as
background information. 3 The supreme court found this position to be
untenable and stated that "[i]f the evidence was not admitted as substantive
evidence of guilt, then it was irrelevant."34 However, evidence regarding
an expert's credentials or background evidence regarding relevant tests
which the expert conducted is still admissible.35 In this case, the expert's
entire testimony regarding the offender profile had been considered
background information by the district court.36 This was error, albeit
harmless, and beyond the scope of generally admissible background
information.37
and explicitly adopting the Frye test).
30. Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 829. However, evidence of the characteristics of a child
abuser violates rule 90.404(1) which excludes character evidence when it is used to show that
the defendant acted in confonnity with this character trait on a certain occasion. FLA. STAT.
§ 90.404(1) (1993).
31. Flanagan v. State, 586 So. 2d 1085, 1124-25 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (en
banc), affid in part, 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
32. Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 829. The prosecution did not demonstrate that the profile
was accepted in the scientific community. The prosecution merely elicited testimony that this
type of information is generally relied on by people working in the field of child sexual abuse
to determine what households may be at risk. The prosecution's own expert testified that the
profile could not be used to prove or disprove that a person is a child abuser. Id.
33. Flanagan, 586 So. 2d at 1100.
34. Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 829.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction because the evidence of guilt was
overwhelming and the admission of the sexual offender profile was harmless error based on
the brevity and lack of emphasis placed on this testimony by the prosecution. Id. at 827.
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B. Testimony by Experts
Expert testimony has been utilized in almost every aspect of trial
testimony. The gamut of testimony runs from expert opinions on valuation
of real property3 " to expert opinions on grief and bereavement.39 During
the survey period, the Third District Court of Appeal halted the plethora of
expert opinions and ruled that the grief endured by a family over the loss
of a loved one is within the common understanding of the jury.40 There-
fore, expert opinions on grief and bereavement are unnecessary.
In Key v. Angrand,4 the plaintiff utilized an expert to explain the
plaintiff's grief and bereavement over the loss of a loved one. The district
court found that the expert was properly qualified to render an expert
opinion, having a doctorate in sociology and extensive additional education
in the area of grief and bereavement.42 The Florida Evidence Code
specifically states that specialized knowledge may be utilized when it will
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact
in issue.4" However, the expert testimony must concern subjects which are
beyond the common understanding of average persons. In this case, the
district court found that the grief felt at the loss of a loved one is not
beyond the common understanding of the jury. Therefore, the district court
concluded that the expert could add nothing more than what was already in
evidence by the family members and their close friends.
Additionally, expert testimony cannot be used if there is a danger of
unfair prejudice outweighing its probative value." The added cumulative
effect of expert testimony on an area that is easily perceived by the jury
from other lay witnesses tends to give this testimony undue weight. In
essence, the expert testimony bolsters and magnifies the lay witness's
38. City of Gainesville v. Foster, 625 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
39. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct App.), appeal
dismissed, 589 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1991).
40. Key v. Angrand, 630 So. 2d 646, 650 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
41. Id. at 649-50. It just so happens that the expert utilized in Key for grief and
bereavement was the same expert used in Holiday Inns, which was decided by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal. Compare Key, 630 So. 2d at 650 (excluding expert testimony on
the matter of survivor's grief) with Holiday Inns, 576 So. 2d at 336 (allowing use of expert
witness's testimony on the subject of survivor's grief and bereavement).
42. Additionally, the expert had coauthored five books on the subject and numerous
articles and papers.
43. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1993).
44. See La Villarena, Inc. v. Acosta, 597 So. 2d 336, 339 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992);
see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1993).
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testimony in a very emotionally charged area. The chance of a prejudicial
effect is much greater when the expert lends his credentials to an already
emotional subject. Therefore, the district court disallowed the use of expert
testimony to explain survivor grief to members of a jury and expressed
direct conflict with the Fourth District's holding in Holiday Inns, which
allows the use of such testimony.
IV. HEARSAY
A. Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment
During the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court explicitly rejected
a liberal interpretation of section 90.803(4)41 which would allow testimony
by a sexually abused child as to the identity of her abuser.46 This expan-
sion of section 90.803(4) would have used the liberal interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence as interpreted in the case of United States v.
Renville.47
In State v. Jones,48 the defendant was convicted of sexual battery on
a child less than twelve years old.49 The child testified that the defendant
had sex with her when she was eight years old. Additionally, the testimony
of a doctor was admitted in evidence which indicated that the child had told
the doctor that the defendant had sexual relations with her.50 The district
court of appeal reversed the conviction, finding the doctor's testimony
inadmissible under section 90.803(4) as a statement for medical diagnosis
or treatment. 51 However, the district court of appeal certified conflict with
Flanagan v. State,5" which used a line of federal cases construing the
medical diagnosis exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 This line
of federal cases holds that statements of identity by child victims of sexual
45. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (1993).
46. See State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 824-25 (Fla. 1993).
47. 779 F.2d 430, 439 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that child abuse victim's statements to
physician identifying her stepfather as the perpetrator were admissible under the medical
records exception to hearsay rule).
48. 625 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1993).
49. Id. at 821.
50. Id. at 822.
51. Jonesv. State, 600 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, 625 So. 2d 821
(Fla. 1993).
52. 586 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc); see discussion supra part
III.A.
53. Jones, 600 So. 2d at 1140.
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abuse to medical personnel can be pertinent to diagnosis and are admissible
under this exception. 4
The Florida Supreme Court rejected the liberal interpretation used by
the federal courts regarding statements made for medical diagnosis or
treatment.5 This rejection was based in part on Florida's adoption of
section 90.803(23), the Child Victim Hearsay Exception, which employs
procedural safeguards in the admittance of child victim hearsay.56 The
Florida Supreme Court joined those few jurisdictions that have rejected an
expansion of the medical treatment and diagnosis exception,57 finding the
rationale which underlies the exception unworkable. The reliability and
trustworthiness of statements under this exception should not be distorted by
expanding its rationale to include the identity of an abuser when that
information, in reality, is not reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis.
B. Business Records
An important issue regarding the business records exception was
decided by the Florida Supreme Court during the survey period. In Love v.
Garcia,59 the Florida Supreme Court held that medical records are
admissible under section 90.803(6) of the Florida Evidence Code, through
54. The leading federal case in this area is United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th
Cir. 1985). In Renville, the trial court permitted a physician to testify regarding statements
by an eleven-year-old child identifying her stepfather as her abuser. In examining whether
the child's statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, the court stated:
"[F]irst, the declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes
of promoting treatment; and second, the content of the statement must be such as is
reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis." Id. at 436. However, in cases
involving statements by child abuse victims, the Renville court stated that the general
restraints regarding identity should not apply, and stated:
We believe that a statement by a child abuse victim that the abuser is a member
of the victim's immediate household presents a sufficiently different case from
that envisaged by the drafters of rule 803(4) that it should not fall under the
general rule. Statements by a child abuse victim to a physician during an exami-
nation that the abuser is a member of the victim's immediate household are
reasonably pertinent to treatment.
Id.
55. Jones, 625 So. 2d at 824-25.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Cassidy v. State, 536 A.2d 666 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 541
A.2d 965 (Md. 1988).
58. Jones, 625 So. 2d at 825.
59. 634 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1994).
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a records custodian, unless the opponent satisfies the burden of showing the
untrustworthy nature of the evidence."
On April 3, 1986, Ms. Garcia was struck by a passing motorist while
trying to cross an intersection.6 At trial, the defense attempted to enter
into evidence the results of Ms. Garcia's two blood alcohol tests as business
records." The plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude the results
based on: 1) the defendant's failure to list witnesses who could testify how
the tests were performed; 2) a lack of information regarding the type of test
conducted; 3) an absence of information regarding who took the samples;
and 4) a lack of evidence demonstrating that the samples were the
plaintiffs.6 3  The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and excluded the
medical reports regarding the plaintiff's blood alcohol level.64
Based on a fifty percent comparative negligence finding, the jury's two
million dollar verdict in favor of the plaintiff was reduced to one million
60. Id. at 160 (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1993)).
61. Id. at 159.
62. Id. The first test indicated a blood alcohol level of .23, almost three times the legal
limit of .08 allowed in Florida drunk driving cases. This test was analyzed by SmithKline,
an outside laboratory. The second test, taken several hours later, was analyzed by the
hospital and demonstrated a blood alcohol level of .14. Id. at 159 n.1.
63. Love, 634 So. 2d at 159. The third and fourth grounds essentially address the proper
chain of custody for the blood test. However, this issue is a red herring. Chain of custody
issues frequently arise in criminal cases and have been settled by the Florida Supreme Court.
An absence of testimony regarding the chain of custody will not exclude relevant evidence
unless there is an indication of probable tampering. Peek v. State, 395 So. 2d 492 (Fla.
1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 964 (1981); Beck v. State, 405 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Frederiksen v. State, 312 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). These
decisions are equally applicable to civil cases. In any event, the purpose of section 90.803(6)
is to allow a party to introduce relevant records at trial without having to produce all the
persons who had a part in preparing the records. See Southern Bakeries v. Florida
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 545 So. 2d 898, 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
Laying an elaborate chain of custody would defeat the purpose of the rule.
64. Love, 634 So. 2d at 159. It is sometimes hard to believe that the fundamental
precept of a trial is a search for the truth. The purpose of an evidence code is to guide the
trial court in excluding unreliable or untrustworthy evidence from the finder of fact. What
could be more enlightening than two blood tests from two different laboratories showing that
the plaintiffs faculties may have been impaired? It would seem that alcohol in a person's
bloodstream at the time of an accident would be relevant and probative on at least two
grounds: 1) the issue of comparative negligence and 2) the ability of the intoxicated person
to accurately relate the events occurring during the period of intoxication. See Edwards v.
State, 548 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1989) (allowing the testimony regarding the use of intoxicating
substances if it is relevant to the time of the incident, the time of testimony, or the ability of
the witness to observe, remember, or recount).
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dollars."5 The defendant appealed the jury verdict and the Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed, finding the blood tests admissible. However, the
appellate court, sitting en bane, withdrew this decision and affirmed the trial
court's exclusion of the blood tests.6
The Florida Supreme Court subsequently quashed the district court's
en bane ruling and held that medical records are admissible under the
business records exception of section 90.803(6) if a proper predicate has
been laid.67 Once the proper predicate is laid under section 90.803(6), the
burden shifts to the party opposing the introduction of the records to prove
untrustworthiness of the records. If the opposing party cannot carry this
burden, the records are allowed in evidence as business records. The
trustworthiness of the medical record is presumed if the predicate for the
business record is properly met.6
The supreme court noted that trustworthiness is based on the general
acceptance of the test in the medical field, and the fact that the test is relied
upon in the scientific field involved. 9 Since the entire rationale behind the
business records exception is based on "the reliability of business records
supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce
habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon
them,"'7 untrustworthy business records should be the exception rather than
the norm.
The district court's en bane opinion misconstrued the trustworthiness
aspect of the business records exception by basing its decision on whether
the health care providers, administering the tests to the plaintiff in this
particular case, relied on these specific blood tests. The supreme court
noted that "[a]ctual reliance on the test in each course of treatment is not
required."'" The trustworthiness of the test is based on its general
acceptance in the medical field and the fact that the test is relied on in the
general scientific community involved. Blood tests are routinely used and
65. Love, 634 So. 2d at 159.
66. Love v. Garcia, 611 So. 2d 1270, 1277 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc),
quashed by 634 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1994).
67. Love, 634 So. 2d at 159.
68. It goes without saying that if the parties agree that no records custodian is needed
for any business or medical record then the record should be admitted. Once the trustworthi-
ness of the records has been stipulated to, the predicate is presumed. Therefore, if the parties
stipulate that a records custodian is not necessary, then the records are admissible as business
records. Phillips v. Ficarra, 618 So. 2d 312, 314 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
69. Love, 634 So. 2d at 160.
70. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(6) Law Revision Council Notes-1976 (West 1988).
71. Love, 634 So. 2d at 160.
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relied on by hospitals in the normal course of business. Therefore, medical
records containing blood test results should be admissible even if the blood
tests are not relied on in that particular case.
V. CONCLUSION
Although this year's evidentiary cases were few in number, the Florida
Supreme Court resolved at least some of the more troublesome evidentiary
issues. However, more evidentiary cases will need to be resolved by the
Florida Supreme Court in the coming year. As always, criminal cases
involving similar fact evidence will keep the supreme court's attention.
Additionally, the conflict in the district courts of appeal, regarding expert
testimony on grief and bereavement in personal injury cases, is sure to merit
the supreme court's attention in the upcoming year.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prompted by the murder of an English tourist in North Florida in late
1993' and its longstanding unhappiness with the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services' ("HRS") efforts to carry out its juvenile justice
responsibilities, the Florida Legislature enacted a statute creating a new
Department of Juvenile Justice.2 The legislature also amended chapter 39
of Florida's Juvenile Code by expanding the contempt powers of the court;3
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, FL. The author thanks Elizabeth Zsakany and Marlo Powell-Robinson for their
assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Linda Kleindienst et al., English TouristSlain Woman Hurt; 3 Sought, SUN-SENTINEL,
Oct. 23, 1993, at A14; Bill Moss & Lucy Morgan, State Moves to Stop Killings, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1993, at Al; Pain Is Still Sharp for Slain Tourist's Lover the
Past Year Has Been a Nightmare for Margaret Jagger of Britain, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug.
21, 1994, at B 1; John C. Van Gieson, Death Penalty to be Sought for Youths in Tourist
Killing, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 1993, at A14.
2. All powers were transferred to the Department from HRS, effective October 1, 1994.
Act effective May 18, 1994, ch. 94-209, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 1183, 1192-94 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 20.316).
3. See id. § 14, at 1245-47 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.0145).
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expanding prehearing detention criteria;4 expanding the courts' power to
hold parents responsible for delinquent acts of their children;5 lowering the
age for transfer of children for prosecution as an adult;6 creating additional
commitment programs (specifically boot camps);7 changing the provisions
concerning publication of juvenile records;8 and establishing a new Juvenile
Justice Advisory Board.9 These substantial changes follow on the heels of
a massive rewriting of the Juvenile Code which went into effect in 1990.
During the Spring 1994 session, the legislature also changed several
significant provisions governing child welfare. Specifically, the legislature
amended part IV of chapter 39, concerning placement plans and permanency
planning, to create more precise documentation for reunification or
termination of parental rights.
At the same time, the supreme court and district courts of appeal were
active in deciding issues in both the delinquency and child welfare areas.
The appellate courts' tradition of holding the trial courts accountable for
strict compliance with the provisions of chapter 39 continues unabated. The
cases surveyed in this review cover the twelve month period from Septem-
ber 1, 1993, to August 31, 1994.
II. DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Since 1990, the law has required that an order adjudicating a child
dependent in Florida must state the facts upon which the finding of
dependency is made." Yet, the trial courts continually fail to comply with
this simple provision despite the decisions of In re T.S." and Williams v.
HRS,12 both of which were decided nearly four years ago. The same issue
regarding dependency findings was before the appellate courts three times
this past year, and in each case the failure of the trial court to properly
4. See id. § 31, at 1275-80 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.044 (1993)).
5. See id. § 39, at 1289-90 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.049 (1993)).
6. See, e.g., id. § 11, at 1237-40 (defining a "serious or habitual offender" as a child no
less than 14 years old).
7. See ch. 94-209, § 48, Fla. Laws at 1300 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.0584).
8. See id. § 33, at 1280-82 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.045 (1993)).
9. See id. § 4, at 1196-97.
10. See FLA. STAT. § 39.409(3) (1991).
11. 557 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
12. 568 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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adjudicate warranted reversal or remand. 3 It is hard to determine why this
rudimentary failure to comply with the statute continues to occur. Perhaps
stronger appellate supervision is needed.
According to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, evidence of a
parent's actions subsequent to a child's placement into HRS custody is
admissible for various purposes. In In re A.L.O.,14 the issue was the
admissibility of evidence offered to prove dependency after the children had
been placed into the custody of HRS. Upon discovering that the parent had
not been informed of the right to counsel prior to an initial dependency
adjudication, HRS amended its petitions for dependency and for termination
of parental rights by adding the new evidence. Relying on Belflower v.
HRS5 and HRS v. Zeigler,6 the court held that evidence related to the
best interests of the child is admissible even if it involves action subsequent
to the child's placement into HRS's custody. 7 The courts in Belfiower and
Zeigler recognized that the parents' rights could be protected, although
evidence of subsequent dependency behavior is admitted. Furthermore, a
parent's subsequent actions may be considered evidence of continuing
abandonment or neglect under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.310.
The court concluded that while parental rights may not be terminated based
upon defective dependency proceedings, the child's right to a safe and
healthy environment should not be put at risk for the same reasons.' 8
Incarceration of a parent is not an uncommon problem at the adjudica-
tion stages of dependency proceedings. In re C.M 9 raised the issue of
how the courts should handle the incarceration of the parent in terms of due
process rights. In C.M, a mother appealed from an order adjudicating her
child dependent. The basis for the petition was that the mother failed to
provide a stable environment due to her repeated incarceration. The mother
was not present at the adjudicatory hearing because she was incarcerated.
However, she was represented by counsel. Her lawyer orally stipulated to
dependency, stating that the mother authorized the stipulations and was
aware of the ramifications of a finding of dependency by the court. An
13. Anderson v. HRS, 635 So. 2d 162, 162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Ware v.
J.N.M., 632 So. 2d 716, 717 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); In re M.P., 632 So. 2d 1051,
1051 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gelrod v. HRS, 629 So. 2d 251, 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct
App. 1993).
14. 637 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1994).
15. 578 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
16. 587 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
17. A.L.O., 637 So. 2d at 16.
18. Id. at 17.
19. 632 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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order of adjudication followed. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, the
mother was present, but the court did not take the opportunity to inquire
whether the stipulation was knowingly and made voluntarily. The appellate
court reversed, applying Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.325(c), which
provides that the court shall determine whether any admission or consent to
a finding of dependency is made voluntarily and with a full understanding
of the nature of the allegations and the possible consequences of the
admission or consent.20 Mere presence at the dispositional hearing was not
enough to establish that the stipulation had been knowingly and voluntarily
made.
Publicity in dependency proceedings is an ongoing problem in
Florida.2 In Times Publishing Co. v. A.J.,22 the Florida Supreme Court
dealt with application of the public records law in the context of a
dependency proceeding. In that case, the St. Petersburg Times filed a public
records request for sheriff's department documents related to allegations of
abuse or neglect at the Church of Scientology's Cadet School. The
corporation operating the school filed an ex parte emergency motion to
impose confidentiality. The motion was premised upon an exemption from
public records disclosure concerning reports of child neglect or abuse under
Florida law.23 The supreme court held that the non-custodian of the public
records had standing to assert the statutory exception, provided the nonparty
was a member of a class the exception was intended to protect.24  The
court also held that the children had standing as well, and thus the court had
the power to impose a permanent injunction barring release of the public
records in question.25
The Florida courts have been quite specific about who may commence
dependency proceedings. Included are all "interested persons" and
20. Id. at 1094. Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.325(c) provides:
The parent or custodian may admit or consent to a finding of dependency. The
court shall determine that any admission or consent to a finding of dependency
is made voluntarily and with a full understanding of the nature of the allegations
and the possible consequences of such admission or consent, and that the parent
or custodian has been advised of the right to be represented by counsel.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.325(c).
21. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1993 Leading Cases and Significant Develop-
ments in Florida Law, 18 NOVA L. REV. 541, 543 (1993); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law:
1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV. 333, 360 (1991).
22. 626 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 1993).
23. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.411(4), 119.07(3)(a), 415.51(I)(a) (Supp. 1990).
24. Times Publishing Co., 626 So. 2d at 1315.
25. Id.
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guardians ad litem.26 Recently, however, the First District Court of Appeal
was faced with the question of limitations on the right to intervene in a
dependency proceeding. In In re S.S.J.," an organization known as
Valuing our Children and Laws ("VOCAL") of Jacksonville, Inc. sought to
intervene in a dependency proceeding allegedly at the request of the subject
child's natural father. VOCAL asked the trial court to order the mother to
submit to involuntary birth control. The appellate court held that chapter 39
provisions concerning parties to a dependency proceeding did not control
intervention." Rather, the generic test for intervention in a civil case, as
governed by Florida case law, provides that the interest must be in the
matter in litigation and of such a direct and immediate character that the
intervenor would either gain or lose by the legal operational effect of the
judgment. The appellate court concluded that VOCAL failed to demonstrate
this degree of interest in the case.29
Another ongoing issue is the power ofjuvenile courts to oversee HRS's
handling of dependency cases. For example, the appellate courts have
regularly limited the power of the trial courts to order HRS to pay for a
variety of services in dependency proceedings. The appellate courts have
relied upon the juvenile courts' lack of explicit legislative authority to act
and the lack of any constitutional right in a party on the basis of which the
juvenile court would be required to act. In HRS v. Ortiz,30 HRS appealed
an order requiring it to pay the cost of a psychological evaluation of the
mother of an allegedly dependant infant. The court held that in the absence
of legislative authorization or a demonstration that the recipient has a
constitutional right to the service, HRS cannot be required to pay for the
service.3' In HRS v. Jones,32 the Fifth District Court of Appeal followed
its holding in Ortiz.33 The sole distinction was that the order appealed
from in Jones required HRS to pay for an intelligence evaluation of a
natural mother in a dependency proceeding. 4
26. See Dale, 1993 Leading Cases and Developments, supra note 21, at 546; Michael
J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 NOVA L. REv. 1169, 1197-98
(1991).
27. 634 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
28. Id. at 199.
29. Id.
30. 627 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
31. Id.
32. 631 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
33. Id. at 349.
34. Id.
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B. Right to Counsel Issues
As reported in prior surveys, neither the United States Supreme Court
nor the Florida Supreme Court has ever ruled that a parent has an absolute
right to counsel in a dependency proceeding.35 In Florida, counsel is not
mandatory in a dependency proceeding if the parent is indigent.36
However, the parent must be notified of the right to counsel in such a
proceeding. Furthermore, in a limited context where termination of parental
rights is subsequently likely to occur, the parent is entitled to counsel free
of charge at the dependency proceeding.37
The two-part rule under Florida law-that a parent is not entitled to a
free lawyer in a dependency proceeding but must be notified of his or her
right to counsel, and if termination is likely, that a free lawyer shall be
appointed-has generated a substantial body of appellate cases which
reversed trial courts for failure to comply.3" The solution is simply to
amend the statute and provide free counsel to parents in dependency
proceedings, as is done in other states.39
The inadequacy of the Florida statute and the inability of the courts to
comply with the current standard is best evidenced in Palmateer v. HRS.4"
In that case, the trial court advised the parents of their right to counsel by
stating that the parents had "the right to have an attorney, and the right to
have an attorney appointed for you if you cannot afford one. If I see your
case in that posture I will advise you. Are there any questions?" ' The
appellate court held that this explanation violated Florida Rule of Juvenile
Procedure 8.320(a).42 The rule unequivocally states that courts shall advise
35. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Davis v. Page,
714 F.2d 512, 515-18 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1052 (1984); Dale, 1991 Survey,
supra note 21, at 355-56; Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note 26, at 1188-90; cf FLA. STAT. §
39.406; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320.
36. See Davis, 714 F.2d at 515-18; Dale, 1991 Survey, supra note 21, at 355.
37. See supra note 36.
38. See, e.g., In re J.B., 624 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
39. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-63 (1994); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(e)(2)
(West 1994); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(2)(e) (McKinney 1994); see also GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-11-30 (1994) (pertaining to juvenile delinquency proceedings).
40. 625 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
41. Id. at 118.
42. Id. Rule 8.320(a) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedures provides:
(a) Duty of the Court
(1) At each stage of the dependency proceeding the court shall advise the
parent, guardian, or custodian of the right to have counsel present.
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a parent of the right to counsel at each stage of the dependency proceed-
ing.43 Upon request, the court shall appoint counsel to an insolvent parent
if the parent is entitled by law. The court shall further determine whether
the right to counsel is understood. The appellate court vacated the trial
court's ruling and remanded."
In In re 4.L.O., 45 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reasserted the
doctrine that while a dependency adjudication may be void by failure to
advise a parent of the right to counsel, it is not void ab initio.46  Thus,
failure to appeal will leave the adjudication of dependency standing,
although it is defective as a basis for termination of parental rights.
Therefore, the trial court may look at the finding of dependency in making
a decision to retain custody with HRS as opposed to placing the child back
with the parent. In A.L.O., the appellate court made a decision that
protected the child. However, if there had been an absolute statutory right
to counsel at the dependency stage as this survey suggests, the entire issue
would never have arisen.
The distinction between providing counsel free of charge when
termination of parental rights is likely and when it is not, invites both
confusion and appeal. These are further reasons why the Florida law should
be changed. A recent case exemplifying the problem is In re D.F.47 In
that case, a father appealed a trial court's order of dependency due to
"egregious emotional abuse." 8 The appellate court held that under Florida
case law, not only must a parent be informed of the right to counsel at each
stage of the dependency proceeding, but presence of counsel will be
(2) The court may and upon request shall appoint counsel to insolvent
persons who are so entitled as provided by law.
(3) The court shall ascertain whether the right to counsel is understood.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320(a).
43. Id.
44. Palmateer, 625 So. 2d at 118.
45. 637 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
46. See Belfiower, 578 So. 2d at 828-29 (establishing the proposition that a dependency
adjudication is not void ab initio).
47. 622 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
48. Section 39.464(4) of the Florida Statutes defines "egregious conduct" and provides
in pertinent part:
The parent or parents have engaged in egregious conduct that endangers the life,
health, or safety of the child or sibling, or the parents have had the opportunity
and capability to prevent egregious conduct that threatened the life, health, or
safety of the child or sibling and have knowingly failed to do so.
FLA. STAT. § 39.464(4) (1993).
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required where permanent termination of parental rights might result.4 9
The First District Court of Appeal recognized that Rule 8.330(a) of the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides that the court has the option
of sustaining dependency by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has
committed egregious abuse." Moreover, such a finding may suffice to
support the termination of parental rights at the subsequent termination
proceeding." Therefore, the court held that whenever egregious abuse is
alleged as a basis for a petition for dependency, the parents should be
specifically placed on notice that facts have been alleged which, if found by
clear and convincing evidence, would serve as partial grounds for termina-
tion of parental rights. Further, the petition itself must apprise the parents
of the right to counsel and, if indigent, the right to court appointed
counsel.52
Other recent appellate cases amplify the inadequacy of the Florida law
in this area. In D.JM v. HRS,53 the trial court not only failed to adequate-
ly advise the parent of the right to counsel, but also failed to determine
whether the parent fully understood the right in the first place. In In re
MJ.S.,54 there was no evidence that the parent was informed of the right
to counsel at all. In Adoption Centre, Inc. v. Marshall,5 the trial court
error was even more basic. In that case, the appellate court held that the
trial court judge abused his discretion by denying one of the parties' request
for a continuance. 6 The purpose of the continuance was to secure a
lawyer to assist in the presentation of evidence and witnesses in the pending
proceeding for dependency and termination of parental rights. 7
Thus, it seems clear that the legislature ought to simply redraft chapter
39 to provide the absolute right to counsel free of charge for indigent
parents in both dependency, as well as termination of parental rights cases.
There are, of course, financial considerations in enacting such a statute. For
example, attorneys must be paid to represent indigent parents. However, it
remains to be seen how costly a change would be, given such considerations
as the appellate costs and resulting disruptions to parties' lives under the
49. D.F., 622 So. 2d at 1105.
50. Id. at 1104.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1104-05.
53. 634 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
54. 631 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
55. 627 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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current rule, the limits already set on attorneys' fees,5" and the practice in
some circuits of routinely appointing counsel in these cases.59
However, there are instances where the statutory provision of counsel
may not be enough. In In re D.M W.," the issue on appeal was whether,
in a termination of parental rights case, a father's due process rights were
violated by HRS's failure to notify his attorney when the department secured
the father's surrender of his parental rights. Without citation to any case
law, the appellate court upheld the termination, based upon the best interests
of the child.' The child had been living with his new adoptive parents for
approximately three and one half years while both proceedings in the lower
court and on appeal continued. 2 The appellate court stated that it was
deeply troubled by what HRS had done.63 The court recognized that the
father was represented by counsel at the time he executed the surrender, but
had failed to notify counsel regarding the surrender.' HRS did not
suggest to the father that he seek the benefit of talking to his lawyer before
executing the surrender.6 ' The court held that this "resulted in a lack of
meaningful assistance of counsel," but upheld the termination by stating that
"HRS may not have violated the letter of the law in circumventing the
statutory right to counsel by failing to file the petition for termination of
parental rights until after it secured Mr. Menendez's permanent surrender of
parental rights. 66 This statement is without citation. Perhaps recognizing
the inadequacy of its analysis, the court then commented that it did feel that
HRS violated "the spirit of the law."' 7 However, this rationale is patently
inadequate, if not completely erroneous. First, the right to counsel provision
of the Florida law in termination proceedings is clear and absolute. There
must be a showing to the court of a knowing and intelligent waiver of
counsel. However, in this case, there was none. Second, a line of United
58. Interview with Daniella Levine, Esq., HRS Counsel, in Fort Lauderdale, FL (Mar.
15, 1994).
59. See Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987).
60. 623 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
61. Id. at 635.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 636.
65. D.M.W., 623 So. 2d at 636.
66. Id.
67. Id.
Dale
148
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
States Supreme Court cases, commencing with Stanley v. Illinois,68
recognizes both the procedural and substantive due process rights of parents
in dependency related proceedings. Yet, the appellate court never addressed
these issues.
C. Abuse Reporting Issues
Florida, like most states,69 mandates the reporting of abuse and
neglect.70 Among other things, the Florida statute provides for what shall
be reported, a central abuse registry and tracking system, due process
protections for alleged perpetrators, and a list of who must report.7
Cases involving interpretation of the abuse reporting statute regularly
come before the appellate courts. 2 Recently, in R.S.M v. HRS,73 a father
appealed the denial of his request to expunge his name from the Central
Child Abuse Registry. Under the facts of the case, the appellate court
concluded that the mere presence of bruises resulting from corporal
punishment is not competent, substantial evidence of the excessive corporal
punishment or temporary disfigurement standards which the legislature
envisioned when it passed chapter 415, the controlling statute. 74
D. Termination of Parental Rights Issues
Application of the language within part VI of chapter 39, which
governs the grounds for terminating parental rights, has generated a
substantial body of case law over the years." In the fall of 1993, the
6.8. 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
69. See REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, $ 4.02[2], at 4-12 (Mark I. Soler, exec. dir.
1994).
70. FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1993).
71. Id. § 415.103.
72. See Dale, 1993 Leading Cases and Developments, supra note 21, at 551; Dale, 1991
Survey, supra note 21, at 366.
73. 640 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
74. Id. at 1126-27 (relying upon B.R. v. HRS, 558 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989)).
75. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV.
335, 375-83 (1992); Dale, 1991 Survey, supra note 21, at 368-74; Dale, 1990 Survey, supra
note 26, at 1199-1208; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1989 Survey of Florida Law, 14
NOVA L. REV. 859, 893-900 (1990); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1988 Survey of Florida
Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1159, 1185-90 (1989).
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Second District Court of Appeal recognized in In re F.A.C.76 that "[c]hap-
ter 39 is not well written [and] it is no wonder that litigants and trial judges
alike are confused in attempting to determine the requirements to terminate
parental rights."'  Fortunately, in the spring of 1994, the legislature re-
wrote part VI in an effort to clarify the grounds for termination. The
legislature substantially reworded section 39.464, which governs grounds for
termination of parental rights." It articulated four grounds: 1) execution
of a voluntary surrender of the child; 2) when identity or location of the
parent is unknown and cannot be ascertained; 3) conduct toward the child
or other children which demonstrates that continued involvement of the
parent threatens the life or well being of the child irrespective of the
provision of services; 4) the parent is engaged in egregious conduct that
endangers the life, health, or safety of the child or the child's siblings; and
5) the parent had the opportunity and capability to prevent such egregious
conduct and failed to do so." Section 39.467 of the Florida Statutes,
governing the adjudicatory hearing in termination cases, was substantially
shortened and now simply obligates the court to consider the specific
elements set forth for the termination of parental rights.8" The court must
also determine that each element is established by clear and convincing
evidence before granting the petition. The clear and convincing standard is
required by the United States Supreme Court decision in Santosky v.
Kramer.
1
Finally, the legislature enacted section 39.4611, entitled "Elements of
Petition for Termination of Parental Rights."82 This section requires that
at least one of the four grounds set forth in section 39.464 must be met.8
It further requires that the parents are advised of their right to counsel at all
hearings they attend; that a dispositional order adjudicating a child
dependent was entered in any prior dependency proceeding relied upon in
offering the parent a case plan; and that the manifest best interests of the
child would be served by the granting of the petition to terminate parental
76. 625 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 623 (Fla.
1994).
77. Id. at 910.
78. Act of May 12, 1994, ch. 94-164, § 35, 1994 Fla. Laws 963, 1007 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 39.464 (1993)).
79. Id.
80. Id. § 38, at 1009-11 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.467 (1993)).
81. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
82. Ch. 94-164, § 30, 1994 Fla. Laws at 1003 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.4611).
83. Id.
Dale
150
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
rights.8 4 The new statutory provision also provides that "a separate petition
for dependency need not be filed and the department need not offer the
parents a case plan with the goal of reunification, but may instead file with
the court a case plan with a goal of termination of parental rights." 5 The
fact that the child was adjudicated dependent previously may be proved by
the introduction of either a certified copy of the order of adjudication or the
order of disposition of dependency.86 Similarly, the fact that the parent
was notified of the right to counsel in a prior proceeding for dependency
may be proved by the introduction of a certified copy of the order of
adjudication or disposition." At first glance, the rewriting appears to
clarify the situation and will reduce appellate supervision in this area.
III. DELINQUENCY
A. Trial Issues
The appropriate use of secure detention in delinquency cases has been
before both the legislature and the state courts on numerous occasions in the
past.8 The issue reached the Florida Supreme Court again this year in
R. W. v. Soud.89 In that case, a juvenile petitioned the supreme court for
a writ of habeas corpus based upon the child's placement in secure detention
by the circuit court pending disposition in order that the child be available
for the preparation of a predispositional report ("PDR"). The trial court
concluded that the chapter 39 provisions relating to detention which prohibit
detention for the purpose of insuring access to juveniles are inapplicable
after a juvenile pleads guilty to an offense and the child is placed into
secure detention pending the dispositional hearing.9" Although R.W. had
been released, the supreme court issued its decision because the matter was
of great importance. The supreme court ultimately ruled that the statutory
requirements for secure detention contained in section 39.042 of the Florida
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Ch. 94-164, § 30, at 1003.
88. A.A. v. Rolle, 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992); Dale, 1992 Survey, supra note 75, at 342-
65; Dale, 1993 Leading Cases and Developments, supra note 21, at 552-58; Dale, 1991
Survey, supra note 21, at 335-55; Dale, 1990 Survey,supra note 26, at 1171-88; Dale, 1989
Survey, supra note 75, at 861-83; Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 75, at 1161-70; Fred Grimm,
Video Justice is Yet Another Unsettling Blip, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 25, 1994, at BRI.
89. 639 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1994).
90. Id. at 26.
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Statutes apply to a child who is awaiting disposition.9' Thus, the trial
court was obligated, but failed to conduct a risk assessment as required by
law and made no findings.
The court also concluded that when a child is on release status and has
not been previously detained, he or she may only be placed into detention
after a court hearing in which the original risk assessment instrument was
rescored based on newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances.92
There was no evidence that a risk assessment instrument was ever completed
in this case. Nor was there any evidence of rescoring by the judge. The
court next held that Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.110(g) contem-
plates detention pending disposition but does not eliminate the statutory
requirements that findings be made and a risk assessment be performed
before the child is placed into detention. 3
Finally, the supreme court explicitly disapproved the earlier district
court of appeal decision in H.L. v. Woolsey."4 The H.L. court had
concluded that section 39.044(5) of the Florida Statutes provided authority
to detain a juvenile pending a dispositional hearing without the statutory
procedures described here." The supreme court rejected that proposi-
tion. Justices Overton and McDonald dissented, finding language in
section 39.042 gave flexibility to the trial judge.97 The dissenting justices
also found that the legislature should address the issue.98
The use of closed circuit television for detention hearings in adult
criminal cases has become widespread across the country.99 Its use has
now been suggested in Florida at juvenile detention hearings. As a result
of an emergency petition by Broward County Juvenile Court judges in the
91. Id. at 26-27.
92. Id. at 27.
93. Id.
94. 618 So. 2d 268 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), disapproved, R. W., 639 So. 2d at 25.
95. Id. at 269.
96. R.W, 639 So. 2d at 27.
97. Id. at 28 (Overton & McDonald, JJ., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Robert Anderson et al., The Impact of Information Technology on Judicial
Administration: A ResearchAgendafor the Future, 66 S. CAL. L. REv' 1761 (1993); Mark
P. Brewster et al., An Overview of the Texas Bar Foundation Symposium on Cost Control At
the Courthouse Held September 30, 1987, Corpus Christi, Texas, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 507
(1987); Pat Raburn-Remfry, Expediting Arrest Processing, 2 CORNELL L.J. & PUB. POL'Y
121 (1992); Jeffrey M. Silbert et al., The Use of Closed Circuit Television for Conducting
Misdemeanor Arraignments in Dade County, Florida, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 657 (1984);
Ronnie Thaxton, Injustice Telecast: The Illegal Use of Closed-Circuit Television Arraign-
ments and Bail Bond Hearings in Federal Court, 79 IowA L. REv. 175 (1993).
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Seventeenth Judicial Circuit seeking amendment to Florida Rule of Juvenile
Procedure 8.100(a), the supreme court has asked for comment.' The
court's request for comment as a precursor to amending the Rules of
Juvenile Procedure to permit electronic audiovisual detention hearings comes
on the heels of the court of appeal's decision in R.R. v. Portesy.' ' In that
case, the First District Court of Appeal held that video telephone detention
hearings were impermissible in juvenile delinquency cases because the
procedure had not been authorized by rule or statute.' 2 In R.R., a
juvenile had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity
of a secure detention order which had been issued as a result of a video
telephone hearing as opposed to the child's presence in the courtroom. The
court noted that the supreme court had not authorized the procedure as a
pilot project. Nor had there been any critical review accorded by the
supreme court's rule making process. 3
The responsibility to charge children with acts of juvenile delinquency,
like charging adults with criminal offenses, rests with the prosecuting
attorney. The courts are not permitted to interfere in this process. In State
v. Everett,"4 the appellate court held that the adult court lacked the
authority to grant a motion to transfer a case back to the juvenile division
under the facts of the case. 05 The state had initially moved to transfer
from juvenile to adult court. The juvenile division denied the motion, and
thereafter the state direct-filed an information in the criminal division. The
appellate court held that "[t]he state attorney is not precluded from direct-
filing an information [in adult court] despite initially filing a delinquency
petition. ' '
Furthermore, the juvenile court may not interfere with the filing
responsibilities of a prosecuting attorney by sua sponte dismissing actions.
In State v. E.N., °7 the state appealed a dispositional order in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding on the ground that the trial court impermissibly
permitted the child to plead to an uncharged offense. The appellate court
recognized that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a juvenile
100. See In re Amendment to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a), No. 84,021
(Fla. July 19, 1994).
101. 629 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 637 So. 2d 236 (Fla.
1994).
102. Id. at 1062.
103. Id. at 1063.
104. 624 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
105. Id. at 854.
106. Id.
107. 624 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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delinquent based on an uncharged offense."° The court explained that
while the trial court has latitude and discretion in post-trial proceedings, the
state attorney is solely responsible to render a pretrial decision whether to
prosecute or to enter a nolle prosequi.0 9 Similarly, in State v. KL.,"O
the court held that once the prosecutor decides that a particular case will be
prosecuted, the responsibility of the trial court is to adjudicate only those
issues properly placed before the court."' In KL., the trial court had
dismissed the case sua sponte after a petition had been filed but no motion
to dismiss had been made by the juvenile under the Florida Rule of Juvenile
Procedure 8.085.12 The appeals court thus reversed the dismissal."'
B. Dispositional Issues
Chapter 39 provides for a number of dispositional alternatives including
restitution, community control, and commitment to a variety of facilities
characterized at least in part by increasing degrees of deprivation of
liberty. 14 In addition, when a juvenile is tried as an adult, Florida law
provides that he or she may nonetheless receive a disposition in the juvenile
corrections system if the court so finds based upon a statutorily defined
test."
5
In J.MG. v. State,"6 the appellate court was faced again with the
issue of the proper use of the restitution statute which provides that the court
may order a child to make restitution for any loss or damage caused by the
child's offense." 7 The court held, as had other courts of appeal on
various occasions,"' that "there must be a causal or significant relation-
ship between the offense for which the child was adjudicated delinquent and
the amount of damages or loss directed to be reimbursed to the victim."" 9
108. Id. at 807.
109. Id.
110. 626 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id
114. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054 (1993); Dale, 1991 Survey, supra note 21, at 348-52
(1991) (discussing the statute and prior case law); Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note 26, at
1181-87.
115. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.059 (1993).
116. 629 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
117. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)() (1991).
118. Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note 26, at 1183; Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 75, at
874-75.
119. J.M.G., 629 So. 2d at 1082.
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Where there is no relationship between the criminal act and the damage, the
restitution order is improper. 2 If the restitution order was part of a
negotiated plea, then the defendant may not argue on appeal that the order
was impermissible. 2 ' In the case at bar, it was not clear from the record
exactly what role restitution played in the plea agreement. Therefore, the
appeals court remanded for further determination.'
Community control is another dispositional alternative. In a one
paragraph opinion, the court in A. W. v. State' reversed that portion of a
trial court order which required the mother of the delinquent child to
perform community service, finding no authority for such an order in
chapter 39.124
In D. VS. v. State,"25 the question before the court was whether an
order placing a child on community control after a withholding of adjudica-
tion could exceed the maximum period of incarceration for an adult on the
same charge. The court held that the child could be ordered to a term of
community control beyond that to which an adult could be sentenced
because, in the case at bar, the youngster was not an adjudicated delinquent
child.'26 The court noted that chapter 39 provides that any commitment
of a delinquent child to the department may not exceed the maximum period
of imprisonment for an adult. 127 Further, a program of community control
ordered by the court may not exceed the term for which a sentence could
be imposed if the child were committed to HRS for the offense. 2 '
However, because this latter section applies only to adjudicated delinquent
children and the other provision only applies to committed children, they are
inapplicable and a period beyond that which may apply for an adult is
appropriate.129
In A.S. v. State, 30 the Fourth District Court of Appeal was faced with
a bizarre order from the trial court which required the appellant's mother to
pay $2500 of the total $4986.60 restitution ordered as a result of a school
yard fight in which the victim suffered a broken nose. Section 39.054(1)(f)
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1082-83.
122. Id. at 1083.
123. 634 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
124. Id. at 1136.
125. 632 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
126. Id. at 222.
127. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(4) (1991).
128. Id. § 39.054(I)(a)(1).
129. D.VS., 632 So. 2d at 222.
130. 627 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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of the Florida Statutes provides that the parent may be ordered to make
restitution for damages caused by the child. 3 ' However, liability should
not exceed $2500 for any one criminal episode and the court must make a
finding after a hearing that the parent failed to make diligent efforts to
prevent the child from engaging in delinquent acts.'32 Otherwise, the
parent is absolved of liability for restitution. 33 In the case at bar, the only
testimony on the record was that of the mother, effectively stating that she
had made diligent efforts. The court conceded that the trial court could
have chosen not to believe the mother's testimony. 34  However, the
argument on appeal by the state was that the mother 'had the burden to
establish a degree of effort above and beyond normal parenting tasks to
establish her diligence by the greater weight of the evidence.""1 35  The
court rejected this "strict liability" argument. 36 The mother's liability for
restitution was reversed. 37
In addition to providing for a number of dispositional alternatives,
including restitution, Florida law provides that the juvenile court may
impose a fifty dollar fee in juvenile cases for the Crimes Compensation
Trust Fund.' 38 In .A. v. State,139 the court was asked to reconcile the
apparent inconsistency between section 960.20 of the Florida Statutes which
authorizes imposition of a fifty dollar fee and section 39.073 which prohibits
the imposition of costs against juveniles in chapter 39 proceedings. 40
Applying the statutory construction rule that later statutes are favored over
earlier ones which are then repealed by implication, the court upheld the
fifty dollar fee so long as the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent.' 4' The
court struck the fee assessed against the juvenile whose adjudication was
withheld. 42
Prior surveys have reviewed the ongoing inability of the trial courts to
make specific written findings with reasons for the imposition of an adult
sentence rather than ajuvenile sentence provided by section 39.059(7)(b) of
131. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(f) (1991).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. A.S., 627 So. 2d at 1266.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. FLA. STAT. § 960.20 (1993).
139. 633 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 109.
142. Id.
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the Florida Statutes. 14 The statutory provision recently came before the
supreme court in Troutman v. State. 44 The issue was whether the trial
court must consider each of the statutory criteria required under sections
39.059(7)(c) and (d) at the time of sentencing of the juvenile as an adult,
and, if so, whether the resultant findings at the time of sentencing must be
contemporaneously reduced to writing. 45 In Troutman, a sixteen year old
charged with kidnapping to facilitate a felony, grand theft of an automobile,
and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, pleaded nolo contendere to
charges of false imprisonment and grand theft. The predisposition report
recommended sentencing as ajuvenile and placement on community control.
The trial court found the recommended sanctions inadequate despite the fact
that the youngster had no prior record. 46  The court announced its
intention to treat the juvenile as an adult, withheld adjudication of guilt, and
sentenced the child to three years of probation.1 47  A written order ex-
plaining the rationale was filed three days later.'4  The Florida Supreme
Court reversed, and held that the suitability or nonsuitability for adult
sanctions must be considered using the enumerated statutory criteria before
the determination of disposition.149 This is true both in cases where the
child is waived into adult court and where the direct-filing provision of
Florida law applies. 5  The court concluded that a trial court must
consider each of the criteria and give an individualized evaluation of how
a particular juvenile fits within the criteria. 5 ' Mere conclusory language
is insufficient.'52 Furthermore, the court held that the written findings and
reasons must be provided at the time of sentencing.'53
143. See Dale, 1993 Leading Cases and Developments, supra note 21, at 558.
144. 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993); cf Smith v. State, 638 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (applying Troutman); Clayton v. State, 636 So. 2d 596 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
145. Troutman, 630 So. 2d at 530.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 532.
150. Troutman, 630 So. 2d at 531.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 532; see also State v. Veach, 630 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1994) (required statutory
findings are necessary prior to imposing adult sanctions upon ajuvenile); Bryan v. State, 638
So. 2d 608 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding post-Troutman, that a transcript does not
satisfy requirement that the findings be in writing); McCoy v. State, 632 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (individual evaluation according to statutory criteria is necessary before
considering adult sanctions); Glidewell v. State, 630 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
Vol. 19
157
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
1994]
C. Appellate Issues
In two cases, State v. F.G.15 4 and State v. MG.,155 the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal was faced with the question of whether a claimed
procedural error leading to the entry of a final disposition order in ajuvenile
delinquency case renders the disposition "illegal" for purposes of the state's
appeal under chapter 39. The appellate court held that the order was not
appealable and certified the question to the supreme court.'56 The under-
lying claimed error was the failure of the trial court to order a predisposition
report as required by section 39.052(3) of the Florida Statutes. The state
had argued that the trial court should have deferred ruling pending receipt
of the report and should have scheduled a dispositional hearing thereafter in
order to dispose of the case.'57 Finding that the order was not illegal-the
dispositions were within the authority of the trial court to make under
chapter 39-the court of appeal dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction
in both cases. 5
The proper role of HRS (now the Department of Juvenile Justice)159
in challenging illegal orders of the juvenile court recently came before the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in HRS v. B.S. 160 In that case, HRS sought
certiorari review of an order adjudicating a minor delinquent for violating
community control and detaining him pending disposition.16' The child's
community control terminated after a successful period of supervision but
the court did not relinquish jurisdiction. The court unilaterally and without
taking any evidence sua sponte reinstated the community control after
receiving a letter from the minor's mother. The child waived counsel and
plead guilty to violating community control. HRS brought the writ,
claiming that the child's due process rights were violated by the court's
order. The appellate court did not reach the merits of the case because HRS
did not represent the minor. The minor neither appealed nor sought release
by habeas corpus. The court of appeal held that this case was similar to
1993) (written findings required when imposing adult sanctions on a child).
154. 630 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), approved, 638 So. 2d 515 (Fla.
1994).
155. 630 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
156. F.G., 630 So. 2d at 583.
157. Id. at 582.
158. Id. at 583; M.G., 630 So. 2d at 585.
159. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
160. 640 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
161. Id. at 1175.
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HRS v. State'6 2 where HRS had sought certiorari review of detention
orders arguing that the risk assessment instrument in each case did not call
for detention. 63 The B.S. court said HRS did not have standing by
certiorari to challenge the orders."6 The court then distinguished another
series of cases where it noted HRS's duties as legal custodian of minors
committed for placement were adversely effected by the orders being
appealed.' 65  In an interesting concurrence, Judge Thompson wrote
specially to describe what the trial judge did as egregious and resulting in
unlawful detention and added that a writ of prohibition would have been the
proper device for HRS to employ.'66 Judge Thompson noted first that
there was no basis for a violation of community control.'67 The court had
no jurisdiction over the child. Second, the detention was ordered without
a legally factual basis having been established as is required by the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure. 6 ' The juvenile court was neither presented
with an affidavit nor did it take sworn testimony prior to issuing the custody
order.'69
What is troubling about this decision as illuminated in Judge Thomp-
son's concurrence, is that the appellate court simply did not treat this writ
as one for prohibition. The Florida courts regularly reframe appeals or writs
so that they are procedurally correct. 70
IV. CONCLUSION
This past spring, the Florida Legislature made changes in the delin-
quency statute in an effort to get tougher on juveniles. Whether the
changes, based at least in part on a notorious tourist murder in North
Florida, will have the desired effect remains to be seen. In the child welfare
area, the legislature made changes which, hopefully, will clarify some
confusion in the appellate courts in the termination of parental rights area.
162. 599 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 606 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.
1992).
163. B.S., 640 So. 2d at 1175 (citing HRS v. State, 599 So. 2d at 127).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1176 (Thompson, J., concurring).
167. Id.
168. B.S., 640 So. 2d at 1177.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., HRS v. Schreiber, 561 So. 2d 1236, 1242-43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
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The appellate courts have almost uniformly remained true to their
tradition of applying chapter 39 as written and requiring the trial courts to
do so as well. The supreme court continues to arbitrate inconsistent
appellate rulings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this survey is to examine recent developments in labor
and employment law in Florida. However, unlike other substantive areas
surveyed in this volume, a survey of labor and employment law in the State
of Florida requires a broader analysis than just Florida cases, regulations and
statutes. Florida employment and labor law is a confluence of many streams
including federal statutes and case law, federal and state governmental regu-
lations, and written policies issued by various administrative agencies
responsible for administering labor statutes.
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A Florida employer or employee, whether public or private, faced with
an employment question, must examine decisions from the United States
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Florida Supreme
Court, Florida District Courts of Appeal, federal administrative agencies,
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Department of
Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, National Labor
Relations Board, and state agencies such as Florida Department of Labor
and Security, Florida Department of Unemployment Compensation, Florida
Commission on Human Relations, and the Florida Division of Workers'
Compensation. Additionally, labor and employment law not only encom-
passes the well-known area of discrimination, but also contract and
negligence actions.
Accordingly, to help the reader effectively navigate the headwaters of
these many and varied streams of law, this article will first provide an
overview of the law that defines what labor and employment practice is
today. It will then survey the recent developments that have added new
currents to the sometimes murky water within this confluence. This article
begins with this overview and survey, so that the reader will gain a clearer
insight into the myriad of sources that comprise the area of labor and
employment law. By discussing new developments, the hope is that the
waters at the point of convergence will be clearer through an understanding
of the many streams that make up "Florida" labor and employment practice.
II. NAVIGATING THE STREAMS: AN OVERVIEW
A. Federal Statutes and Regulations
One of the problems faced by employers in complying with the myriad
of statutes and regulations governing employer/employee relations is that
some overlap, some contradict each other on their faces, and some are
applicable to certain employers and not to others. The following summariz-
es federal statutes and regulations demonstrating the problems.
1. Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA")'
The ADEA prohibits age-based discrimination in various employment
practices. It covers both private and governmental employers (federal and
state), and affects employees or applicants for employment over forty years
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The Florida Civil Rights Act has
no minimum age for purposes of age discrimination. See FLA. STAT. § 760.10(I)(a) (1993).
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of age. The statute prohibits discrimination in all employment practices
including hiring, termination, terms and conditions of employment, and
reductions in force. The Act also prohibits an employer from retaliating
against an employee for enforcement of his or her rights under the statute.2
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 3
The ADA prohibits discrimination against any qualified individual with
a disability with regard to any term, condition, or privilege of employment.
This law sweeps very broadly. It covers both employees and applicants, and
affects them in recruiting, hiring, promotion, tenure, demotion, termination,
layoffs, pay rates, assignments, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.4
The Act simply is an extension of what began in 1973 with the Federal
Rehabilitation Act' and continued with the passage, in 1988, of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 The ADA's purpose, like other legisla-
tion, is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
3. Civil Rights Act of 18667
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 protects non-white citizens from
discriminatory treatment. Section 1981 is part of the civil rights legislation
enacted by Congress following passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and provides that all persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States shall have the right to make and enforce contracts,
sue, be parties, give evidence, and own property as is enjoyed by white
citizens.8
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (effective July 26, 1992). The
Act initially applied to all employers in industry affecting commerce who have 25 or more
employees. Id. § 1211 1(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992). Effective July 26, 1994, the statute applies
to all employers who have 15 or more employees. Id.
4. Id. § 12112(a).
5. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988). The Florida Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on
the basis of handicap. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(1)(a) (1993).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
8. Id.
19941
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4. Civil Rights Act of 1991'
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, expanding the rights of
employees and providing for additional damages that might be recovered in
a discrimination lawsuit. The Act provides for a jury trial and recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages. It also sets limits between $50,000
and $300,000 maximum, depending upon the size of the employer. °
The Act also effectively overturned the Supreme Court's rulings in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio," relating to disparate impact, and
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2 involving a mixed-motive case. Many
observers felt that these cases, along with others, limited employees' rights.
5. Federal Civil Service 3
Federal Civil Service employees are protected by this federal statute,
which permits their removal from employment only for such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service.
6. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act ("COBRA") 14
In 1985, Congress passed this Act requiring private and public
employers of twenty or more people to provide employees with the
opportunity to continue to receive, after the occurrence of certain events, the
9. Id. § 1981(a) (Supp. III 1991).
10. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) (Supp. IV 1992).
11. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Section 2(2) of public law 102-166, entitled "Congressional
Findings" states that the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove has weakened the
scope and effectiveness of Federal Civil Rights protection. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 (1991).
12. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Civil Rights Act departs from the reasoning set forth in
Price Waterhouse, which held that a defendant could avoid liability if it was capable of
demonstrating that it would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of
any illegal discriminatory motives. Under section 107(b) of the Act, a defendant cannot
escape liability even if demonstrated, through clear and convincing evidence, that other non-
discriminatory reasons would have resulted in the adverse employment decision.
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7543 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986). COBRA is contained in both the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 4980(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and in title 1, part VI of
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992). Pertinent sections of COBRA are codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 26 U.S.C. §§ 162(k), 4980(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); and 42
U.S.C. § 300bb-I (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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same group health coverage they received before the event.'5 COBRA
amended Title 1 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERI-
SA")"6 and placed certain requirements on a plan administrator to notify
each covered employee of the availability of such coverage. 7
7. Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 8
ERISA applies to private employers who maintain employment benefit
plans. It prohibits an employer from engaging in certain discriminatory
practices against an employee when that person exercises any right to which
he or she is entitled under ERISA. Covered employees generally have the
right to fair and nondiscriminatory treatment under the benefit plans.
8. Equal Pay Act 9
The Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963 to prohibit sex-based
discrimination in wages paid to employees, whether male or female.
9. Executive Order 1124620
Executive Order 11246 added certain protection for federal employees.
The Order prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin and also applies to government contractors. 2'
10. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA")22
FLSA sets minimum wage, overtime pay, equal pay, record keeping,
and child labor standards for employees who are covered by the Act and
who are not exempt from specific provisions. Congress originally enacted
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
17. Id. § 1166.
18. Id. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 510 of ERISA prohibits an
employer from discharging an employee because the employee makes a claim for benefits
under a plan covered by title 1 of ERISA. Id. § 1140.
19. Id. § 206(a)-(f) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This Act is part of a section of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C § 201 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
20. Guidelines are promulgated by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance with
respect to the implementation and administration of Executive Order 11246. See Exec. Order
No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
21. Id.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
1994]
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FLSA to facilitate economic recovery from the Great Depression. FLSA
was designed to provide a maximum number of jobs and to ensure that all
covered employees were paid a minimum, liveable wage. The Act was not
intended to preempt state legislation providing additional benefits to employ-
ees.
11. Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA")23
Recent Federal legislation affording protection to employees came into
effect on February 5, 1993, when President Clinton signed FMLA. The
law requires employers of fifty or more employees to provide up to twelve
weeks of leave to eligible employees for their own serious illnesses, to care
for newborn or newly adopted children, or to care for seriously ill, close
family members.24
12. Immigration Reform and Control Act25
This Act prohibits discrimination on account of national origin or
citizenship status.
13. Labor Management Relations Act 26
This Act addresses suits by and against labor organizations. Section
185(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.27
23. Pub. L. No. 103-03, § 405(b)(2), 107 Stat. 26 (1993) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612).
24. Id. § 102(a)(1)(A)-(D).
25. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988 & Supp. V 1992).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
27. Id. § 185(a).
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14. National Labor Relations Act?8
The National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935 and is adminis-
tered by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). This statute
prohibits discrimination based upon union membership, union activity, or
other protected concerted activity. 29 Additionally, it protects employees
from employer retaliation for filing charges or giving testimony under the
Act.30
15. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA")31
OSHA prohibits the discharge of employees in reprisal for exercising
rights under the Act.
16. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
of 1990 ("OWBPA") 3 2
The Age Discrimination and Employment Act was amended to provide
protection for older workers. OWBPA applies to all employers covered by
the ADEA and protects against age discrimination for early retirement
incentive programs and severance pay set-offs meeting OWBPA's re-
quirements. It also addresses waivers and releases, affording older workers
certain minimum criteria for their retirement or settlement of any claim.33
17. Rail Safety and Improvement Act
34
This Act prohibits railroad companies from discharging employees with
respect to certain employment conditions, including retaliation, for making
claims, testifying, or refusing to work under conditions reasonably believed
to be dangerous.
28. Id. §§ 151-169.
29. Id. § 157. Additionally, the Act prohibits employers from questioning applicants or
employees concerning their union and/or concerted activity. Id.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1988).
31. Id. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
32. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626, 630
(1988)).
33. Id. § 201, 104 Stat. 983.
34. 45 U.S.C. § 441(a) (1988).
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18. Rehabilitation Act of 19733"
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits federal contractors, and any
program or activity receiving financial assistance, from discriminating
against handicapped persons. Prior to the passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act was the primary civil rights act for
the disabled.
19. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196436
In a comprehensive piece of legislation, Congress passed Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This statute applies to employers with fifteen
or more employees, and prohibits discrimination in all employment
practices, including hiring, job reductions, terminations, and retaliations,
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
20. Vietnam Era Veteran's Readjustment Assistance
Act of 197417
The Vietnam Era Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974
applies to all federal contractors and subcontractors, on contracts in excess
of $10,000, and prohibits discrimination in employment practices.
21. Worker Adjustment Retraining Notification Act ("WARN")3"
In WARN, Congress provided certain protection for employees, with
respect to plant closings and mass layoffs. It applies to employers with 100
or more employees, and requires that an employer provide sixty days ad-
vance notice, subject to certain exceptions. 39
35. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified at 29 U.S.C §§ 701-796(f) (1988)).
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 changed sections of the Act by inserting the
provision that disability does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the
illegal use of drugs. 29 U.S.C. § 706(c)(i) (Supp. H 1990).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000n (1988). Title VII is administered and enforced by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. § 2000e. Some courts have
held that a no-cause determination by the EEOC may be admitted into evidence in a trial on
the merits of the individual claim of discrimination. See Eason v. Fleming Co., 4 F.3d 989
(5th Cir. 1993).
37. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2014 (1988).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
39. Id. § 2102(a)-(b).
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22. Federal Retaliation Statutes
In addition to the statutes above, there are a number of statutes dealing
specifically with individual aspects of discrimination. Primarily, these
statutes prohibit retaliation for either filing charges, testifying at proceed-
ings, or complaining about certain working conditions.4"
B. Florida Legislation
The following Florida statutes and regulations govern an employ-
er/employee relationship and affect decision making.
1. AIDS Legislation
In 1988, Florida passed a comprehensive AIDS statute4' prohibiting
employers and co-employees from harassing or discriminating against an
AIDS infected employee. Employers must allow employees with AIDS, or
any of its related conditions, to continue to work and to reasonably
40. The Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980,20 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3611 (Supp. III 1991), prohibits retaliation against employees who bring school asbestos
problems to the public's attention; the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992), prohibits the discharge of employees who commence, cause to commence, or testify
at proceedings against an employer for violation of the Act; the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988), prohibits the discharge of employees who assist,
participate, or testify in any proceeding to carry out the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954; the Federal Employee's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988), prohibits
retaliation for providing information regarding injury or death of employees; the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992),
prohibits retaliation for commencing, testifying, or assisting in enforcement proceedings; the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992), prohibit retaliation for commencing, testifying, or assisting in enforcement
proceedings; the Hazardous Substances Release Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610(a) (1988), prohibits
retaliation for assisting in enforcement proceedings; the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988), prohibits retaliation for seeking workers'
compensation or for testifying in proceedings; the Migrant, Seasonal and Agricultural Worker
Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), prohibits retaliation against
migrant workers who exercise their rights under the Act; and the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1988), prohibits discharge of employees because of garnishment
of wages for anyone's indebtedness. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1988) (protecting against
discharge of permanent employees for serving on a federal jury); 38 U.S.C § 2021 (1988)
(protecting against discharge or discrimination based upon military service); 45 U.S.C. § 41
(1988) (protecting employees who refuse to work under conditions reasonably believed to be
unsafe).
41. FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (1993).
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accommodate these employees as long as they are medically able to perform
and do not pose a danger to their own health and safety, or the health and
safety of others.
2. Florida Constitution Article 11142
Article III, paragraph 14, of the Florida Constitution authorizes the
creation of local civil service law, affording public employees rights in
employment.
3. Florida Civil Rights Act43
In 1992, Florida passed the Civil Rights Act, expanding the state's
Human Relations Act of 1977, which prohibited employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or
marital status. The Civil Rights Act expanded the types of discriminatory
practices that may be addressed by the Human Relations Act and the types
of damages that can be awarded.
4. Equal Pay Act"
4
Florida also has enacted an Equal Pay Act which is strikingly similar
to the federal statute. It differs in the time frames allowed for filing claims
for unpaid wages, and it is not applicable to any employer that is subject to
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act.45
5. Florida Jury Service Exemption
Employees who are called for jury service are protected by Florida
statutes prohibiting discharge or discrimination based upon jury service.46
42. FLA. CoNST. art. III, § 14.
43. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01-.11 (1993).
44. Id. § 448.07. Section 725.07 of the Florida Statutes also prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sex, marital status, or race in the areas of loaning money, granting credit, or
providing equal pay for equal services performed. Id. § 725.07.
45. Id. § 448.07(4).
46. Id. § 40.271. Florida also prohibits the discharge of individuals who are called to
active service in the Florida National Guard. FLA. STAT. § 250.482 (1993).
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6. Public Employees Relations Act47
Public employees are protected in Florida under the Public Employees
Relations Act. The Act protects the right of organization and representation,
creates a Public Employees Relations Commission to assist in resolving
disputes, and provides remedies against public employees who interrupt the
operation and functions of the government. This policy provides:
(1) Granting to public employees the right of organization and represen-
tation;
(2) Requiring the state, local governments, and other political subdivi-
sions to negotiate with bargaining agents duly certified to represent
public employees;
(3) Creating a Public Employees Relations Commission to assist in
resolving disputes between public employees and public employers; and
(4) Recognizing the constitutional prohibition against strikes by public
employees and providing remedies for violations of such prohibition.48
7. Sickle Cell Trait Discrimination Statute'
This statute prohibits any denial or refusal to employ a person solely
because he or she has the sickle cell trait.
8. Florida Toxic Substances Legislation 0
Florida employees are also protected by statutes which prohibit
discharge, discipline, or discrimination against employees who exercise their
rights under the toxic substances law, including the requesting of informa-
tion, testifying, planning to testify, or exercising any other right.
9. Voting Discrimination
Florida prohibits employers from discharging or threatening to
discharge an employee based upon whether the individual votes or does not
vote."'
47. Id. § 447.201.
48. Id. § 447.201(l)-(4).
49. Id. § 448.075.
50. Id. § 442.116.
51. FLA. STAT. § 104.081 (1993).
19941
173
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
10. Whistle-blower's Act52
The Florida Whistle-blower's Act prohibits employers from taking
retaliatory action against an employee who reports violations of law by
prohibiting discharge, dismissal, discipline, suspension, transfer, demotion,
withholding bonuses, and reduction in salary or benefits.
11. Florida Workers' Compensation Statute53
The Florida Workers' Compensation Statute prohibits the discharge of
or retaliation against an employee based upon a valid claim or attempt to
claim workers' compensation benefits. The Workers' Compensation Statute
was significantly amended as of January 1, 1994.
III. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
Historically, Florida has been known as an "at will" state. An "at will"
employee is one who is employed, literally, at the will of the employer and
who works without fixed employment. Absent a fixed contract for employ-
ment, an employee will not have an action for wrongful termination.
However, once an employer and employee do enter into an employment
contract, the issues that arise involve arbitration provisions, compensation,
breaches of contract, fraud, and the applicability and enforceability of non-
compete agreements.
A. Arbitrations
The United States Supreme Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 54 upheld an employer's right to compel arbitration of a statutory age
discrimination claim where the employee had executed a security registration
application requiring arbitration of employment related disputes. Since the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, various courts,5 5 including Florida
52. FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3187-.31895 (1993). The Act was amended by the Government
Efficiency Act of 1992. Subsection (3) and (4) of § 112.3187 describe the conduct which
is prohibited by the Act. In the 1991 legislative session, the Whistle Blower protection was
extended to private sector employees. See Act of June 7, 1991, 91-285, §§ 1, 4, 1991 Fla.
Laws 2747, 2748, 2749 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 448.101 (1993)).
53. FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1993).
54. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
55. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a discrimination claim is subject to an arbitration agreement); Boogher v. Stifel,
Nicholaus & Co., 764 F. Supp. 574, 576 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that an age discrimination
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courts, have continued to expand the Gilmer rationale to require arbitration
of other causes of action such as Title VII and state law claims. 6
Following the ruling in Gilmer, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida issued an order requiring an employee to pursue
arbitration based upon an agreement signed by the employee with her
employer. In Nazon v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., a stockbroker with
Shearson Lehman filed a lawsuit based upon a Florida Human Rights Act
and certain state law claims. Shearson Lehman filed a Motion to Compel
Arbitration relying upon an agreement the employee had signed with
Shearson Lehman entitled "Uniform Application for Securities Industry
Registration or Transfer." The employee claimed that the arbitration was
not applicable because Florida law claims are not subject to arbitration. The
court rejected this argument and, following the Supreme Court's decision in
Gilmer, compelled arbitration. The Southern District was following the lead
of a number of state and federal courts around the country upholding
agreements that require employees to submit employment disputes to
arbitration. 8 Though most of the litigation in this area has been with stock
brokerage firms, it would be expected that employers in other industries
would start including arbitration provisions in their employment agreements.
In Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,59 the Eleventh Circuit held that
the state law claims were subject to arbitration in cases of battery, intention-
al infliction of emotional distress, and negligent retention, and that the Title
VII claim was also subject to compulsory arbitration with the plaintiffs
employer (relying on Gilmer rationales).
In Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. v. United Steelworkers of Ameri-
ca,60 an employee was terminated because of the results of a drug test.
The case was sent to arbitration, and the arbitrator, in response to the union
grievance, found that the employee had in fact violated his contract with the
employer by a second positive drug test. However, the arbitrator reduced
the discipline to a suspension because of the agreement's "just cause" provi-
sions, which require the company to use just and equitable procedures in
claim is subject to an arbitration clause).
56. Id. at 23. Gilmer left several issues unresolved, including whether arbitration
agreements located in documents other than security registration applications are enforceable
and whether employment claims under statutes other than the ADEA are arbitrable.
57. 832 F. Supp. 1540, 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
58. See, e.g., Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992);
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
59. 971 F.2d 698, 700 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
60. 996 F.2d 279, 280 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1834 (1994).
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termination decisions. The arbitrator found that the company had changed
the rules of the game by requiring the second drug test."' The district
court and the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the arbitrator's finding and,
based upon the clear language of the contract, found that the employer had
the discretion to terminate an employee for a second positive drug test; thus,
the arbitrator's remedy contradicted the express language of the agree-
ment.62
At the state court level, in Bachus & Stratton, Inc. v. Mann,63 an
employee argued that her claims against the defendant alleging sexual dis-
crimination, assault and battery, breach of contract, and a number of other
tort claims, were not subject to arbitration. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal disagreed and found that both her Title VII claims and her state tort
claims were subject to arbitration.64
B. At Will
Under the common law rule, when a term of employment is for an
indefinite period of time, either party may terminate the employment
relationship for any cause, or for no cause at all, without incurring liability.
While many other jurisdictions have carved out exceptions to the "at will"
doctrine, Florida has essentially resisted any changes. For example, in Ross
v. Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. ,65 an employee filed an action for breach
of a written contract. The court held that the breach of contract claim was
not actionable as a matter of law because it was based on a contract of
employment that did not provide for a definite term of employment and
was, therefore, terminable at will.66
In Lozano v. Marriott Corp.,67 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida upheld the principle that a contract for employ-
ment of indefinite duration is terminable at the will of either party and as
such, an action for wrongful termination will not lie. In Lozano, an
employee alleged that his discharge was in violation of the progressive
discipline policy in the employer's handbook.68 The court rejected this
theory and dismissed the case based on applicable Florida law. It is
61. Id.
62. Id. at 281.
63. 639 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
64. Id. at 37.
65. 617 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
66. Id. at 428.
67. 844 F. Supp. 740, 742 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
68. Id.
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doubtful that these attempts to make inroads into this doctrine will meet
with much success in the near future. Yet, the theory in Lozano is not
without merit.
C. Contract Action
In Weisfeld v. Peterseil School Corp.,69 the Third District Cgurt of
Appeal reversed ajudgment entered in favor of a private school on a breach
of employment contract claim brought by a former teacher. The teacher,
Ms. Weisfeld, signed an employment contract and subsequently received an
offer to teach in the Dade County school system. She discussed the matter
with the headmaster of the private school, who, following the discussion,
called the Dade County School. As a result, the Dade County job offer was
withdrawn. The headmaster then interviewed and hired a replacement art
teacher and fired Ms. Weisfeld. Dade County filled the position it had
offered Weisfeld and, as a result, she had no job.7"
The Third District held that the headmaster, by contacting Dade
County, had acted within proper grounds to protect the school's contract.
However, once the headmaster caused Dade County to withdraw its job
offer, the school was obligated to allow Ms. Weisfeld to perform her
original contract. Thus, because the private school was estopped from
terminating Ms. Weisfeld, the school breached its contract.7'
In Warshall v. Price,72 a cardiologist, employed by a fellow doctor,
brought an action against the doctor for bonuses. The doctor counterclaimed
for conversion and civil theft of his patient list. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal held that the doctor was denied the benefit of this confidential
patient list when the cardiologist took a copy from the doctor's computer
and thus, an action for conversion was appropriate.73
D. Fraud
Florida's Second District Court, in Wilson v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States,74 was faced with the issue of whether an em-
69. 623 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct App. 1993).
70. Id. at 516.
71. Id. at 517.
72. 629 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
73. Id. at 905. The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that there was no applicable
Florida case law and relied upon the case of Conant v. Karris, 520 N.E.2d 757 (II. App. Ct.
1987). Id. at 905 n.4.
74. 622 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. 1993).
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ployee can allege fraud when there is a merger clause in an employment
contract. An insurance agent brought suit against an insurance company and
its regional manager, claiming they fraudulently induced him into resigning
from his employment as a public school teacher to become an insurance
agent. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant because
it found a merger clause in the employment contract. The court reasoned
that the employee could not justifiably rely on any promises because of the
merger agreement.75
The Second District reversed and remanded, finding that allegations of
fraud may be introduced into evidence to prove fraud, notwithstanding the
presence of a merger clause in a related contract. The court found that the
case of Nobles v. Citizens Mortgage Corp.76 was the controlling authority
and that the trial court had improperly applied the case of Saunders Leasing
System, Inc. v. Gulf Central Distribution Center, Inc.77
E. Non-Compete Agreements
One of the main issues relating to contracts between an employer and
an employee that is litigated extensively in Florida is non-compete agree-
ments. In 1953, Florida enacted section 542.33 of the Florida Statutes,
which basically prohibits an employee from engaging in a similar business
or soliciting his or her own customers if the employment contract contains
a specific non-compete clause.78 In 1990, the Florida Legislature amended
the statute, requiring evidence of irreparable injury and made available a
defense of unreasonableness in a general sense, rather than the heretofore
limited defenses of unreasonableness as to time and area.79
75. Id. at 28.
76. 479 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985). In Nobles, the court applied the rule
that alleged fraudulent misrepresentations may be introduced into evidence to prove fraud
notwithstanding a merger clause in a related contract. Id. at 822.
77. 513 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 520 So. 2d 584
(1988).
78. See FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1993). Common law contracts and restraint of trade
(including non-competes) were not favored and Florida, in derogation of the common law,
enacted § 542.33, entitled "Contracts in restraint of trade valid." Id. § 542.33(2)(a) (effective
June 28, 1990). The 1990 amendment made a substantial change in the law by requiring
evidence of irreparable injury. Id.
79. Id. § 542.33. For a discussion of the statute concerning non-compete agreements,
see Kendall B. Coffey, Non compete Agreements by the Former Employee: A Florida Law
Survey and Analysis, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 727 (1980). For discussion of the 1990 statutory
amendment, see Kendall B. Coffey & Thomas F. Nealon III, Non compete Agreements Under
Florida Law: A Retrospective and a Requiem?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1105 (1992).
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed the new amendment in
Jewett Orthopaedic Clinic, P.A. v. White."0 Jewett Orthopaedic Clinic ap-
pealed a final declaratory judgment that held that a covenant not to compete
executed by one of its physician's shareholders is unenforceable. The trial
court apparently grounded its decision whether Dr. White's opening a
competing practice would be unfair."'
The Fifth District reversed and held that the controlling question was
not whether allowing the competing practice would be unfair, but rather,
how the provisions of section 542.33 applied. The court stated that the
amended statute did not prohibit all agreements restricting subsequent
employment by physicians, and that the clinic had necessary legitimate
business interests to be protected by enforcement of the covenant. The court
reversed the trial court's finding, and remanded the case.
8 2
In analyzing the 1990 amendment, the Jewett court found that an
employer would have to offer evidence of actual harm not readily,
accurately calculated or compensated by money damages. The employer
would also have to establish that the covenant he or she seeks to enforce
does not threaten the health, safety, or welfare of the public, and under all
relevant circumstances is reasonable.
In Coastal Computer Corp. v. Team Management Systems, Inc.,83 the
court held that an employment agreement providing that a violation of a
non-compete clause could result in forfeiture of remaining settlement
benefits. This, however, was not an exclusive remedy. In the absence of
an exclusive, stipulated remedy set forth in the agreement, the court found
a party may elect to pursue any remedy that the law affords, which includes
enjoining the enforcement of a non-compete agreement.8 4
IV. EMPLOYER LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
In addition to responsibilities and resulting liabilities to its own
employees, an employer may also face liability to third parties as a result of
an employee's actions or inactions. In order to find a deep pocket in terms
of contract or tort actions, many attorneys file claims not only against an
employee, but also against the employer. An employer may face claims by
80. 629 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
81. Id. at 924.
82. Id. at 925.
83. 624 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
84. Id.
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both employees and third parties with respect to negligent hiring, retention,
and supervision.
A. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision
An employer may face liability for injuries or damages to a third party
as a result of the actions of an employee. Plaintiffs may bring claims of
negligence for the hiring, retention, and supervision of an employee. Both
employees and third parties are asserting negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision claims in an attempt to hold employers liable for the assaults
and sexual harassment by employees in the work place (i.e. finding the deep
pocket).
In Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 5 the Florida
Supreme Court recognized that a female plaintiff, who alleged repeated
touching and verbal sexual advances by her supervisor, had stated a viable
case for liability in negligent supervision, hiring, or retention.
In Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc.,86 the theory was that the employer
knew of the particular employee's propensity to engage in conduct that
could endanger co-employees and yet failed to address this conduct. The
court recognized the basic rule that an employer is liable for the willful torts
of his employee committed against third persons if the employer knew or
should have known that the employee was a threat to others. 7
Likewise, in Nuta v. Genders,"8 the plaintiff sued a boatyard owner for
injuries he received when a security guard struck him in the head with an
iron bar. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support a
jury's finding of negligent hiring or retaining of the security guard. The
evidence apparently showed that the security guard had threatened the
plaintiff two months earlier and had been investigated for his involvement
in another earlier assault. It is clear in this case that there was sufficient
evidence indicating that the employer knew of the employee's prior conduct
or propensity to engage in certain actions, and the employer could therefore
be held liable. 9
In Spancrete, Inc. v. Ronald E. Frazier & Associates, P.A.,90 a
subcontractor on a community college construction project brought an action
85. 552 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 1989).
86. 386 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1374
(1981).
87. Id. at 1239-40.
88. 617 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
89. Id. at 331.
90. 630 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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against a consultant architect for injuries incurred as a result of negligent
supervision. The court found that a supervising architect has no liability to
a subcontractor and that a duty of care is only owed by a supervising
architect to a general contractor.9
The Fifth District, in Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Harris,92 considered
a claim that Winn Dixie was negligent in instructing one of its employees
on how to deal with a suspected trespasser. Winn Dixie had a policy of
hiring only trained police officers and the court found that it could not "be
faulted for assuming such an officer would know how to detain trespass-
ers."93 The court also noted that there was no evidence in the case of any
prior misconduct by his officer. The court said that the test is one of
reasonableness, and it is simply unreasonable, as a matter of law, to require
Winn-Dixie to retrain already trained police officers in the law of arrest and
detention.
This author expects that employers will see more and more cases
dealing with negligent hiring, retention, and supervision as attorneys are
looking more and more for the deep pocket.
B. Liability to Employees of Independent Contractors
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in St. Lucie Harvesting &
Caretaking Corp. v. Cervantes,94 considered the issue of whether or not a
grove owner was liable to the employee of an independent contractor hired
to harvest the grove owner's fruit. The employee was injured while
allegedly using his employer's defective equipment. The plaintiff charged
that the grove owners, in exercising direction and control over the manner
in which they performed their job, were negligent, thus causing the injuries.
The court noted, as a general rule, that a person who hires an indepen-
dent contractor is not liable for injuries sustained by employees of the
independent contractor. The court cited an exception, however, in Conklin
v. Cohen,9" which held that if an "owner actively participates 'to the extent
that he directly influences the manner in which the work is performed' and
negligently creates or allows a dangerous condition to exist resulting in
injury to the employee of the independent contractor[,]" the employer may
91. Id. at 1198.
92. 620 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
93. Id. at 1032.
94. 639 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
95. 287 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1973).
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be liable. 6  In this particular case, the Fourth District did not find the
employers within the Conklin exception.
C. Punitive Damages
Employers constantly fear vicarious liability for an employee's
outrageous conduct since a jury could award punitive damages for that
employee's actions. In one of the more interesting and noteworthy decisions
of the last year, the Fourth District in CarrollAir Systems, Inc. v. Greenbau-
m9 7 affirmed a judgment against an employer for $85,000 in compensatory
damages and $800,000 in punitive damages for the wrongful death of the
plaintiff's son, caused by the drunk driving of a Carroll Air employee.98
The court found it significant that the employee became drunk while on the
job. He was at a meeting, where he paid for the drinks from an expense
account. There was evidence that the employee was slurring his words
while company officers were present.
The court noted there were cogent policy reasons for fixing liability on
the employer for injuries to third persons in cases like CarrollAir and noted
that "[t]he law now recognizes that the entire subject of torts is a reflection
of social policies which fix financial responsibility for harm done."99 The
Carroll court further noted that "the underlying philosophy which allows a
plaintiff to hold an employer liable for an employee's negligent acts is a
deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise should not be able to
disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be the
result of its activity."' °
In Crown Eurocars, Inc. v. Schropp,'' a customer who was dissatis-
fied with his new automobile brought an action in fraud against the automo-
bile dealer and the dealer's employee. The Second District held that there
96. St. Lucie, 639 So. 2d at 39 (quoting Conklin, 287 So. 2d at 60).
97. 629 So. 2d 914, 917 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The court in CarrollAir noted
that "[c]ourts across the country are divided on the issue of whether an employer is liable for
injuries to third parties under similar circumstances." Id. at 916.
98. Id. at 917.
99. Id. at 916 (quoting Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 452 (Ct. App.
1981)).
100. Id. at 916-17.
101. 636 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The court in Crown Eurocars
analyzed the case under Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Robinson, 472 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1985)
(discussing managing agent) and Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545
(Fla. 1981), and concluded that under any analysis there were no grounds for punitive
damages against the employer. Crown Eurocars, 636 So. 2d at 35.
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was sufficient evidence to support a compensatory damage award on the
fraud claim, but the dealer could not be held liable for punitive damages.
The court found the exoneration of the employee from an award of punitive
damages precluded the assessment of punitive damages against the employer
absent any evidence that the employer itself behaved outrageously." 2
V. FEDERAL STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND CASE LAW
Federal statutes, regulations, and case law have a major impact on
employer/employee relations in Florida. Cases decided by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals for states other than Florida, and decisions of the
United States Supreme Court may have as much impact on employ-
er/employee relations as a decision by either a Florida state or federal court.
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA ")
In one of the more recent significant decisions, the United States
Supreme Court in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins °3 addressed the issue of
the standard of proof in a disparate treatment case. In Hazen, the plaintiff
was fired a few weeks before reaching the ten-year vesting level in a
pension plan. The Court first reviewed conflicting lower court cases
concerning whether firing someone to avoid a pension, to save salary costs,
or because of seniority, violates the ADEA. The Court then stated:
We now clarify that there is no disparate treatment under the ADEA
when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the
employee's age ... [w]hatever the employer's decision making process,
a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's
protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determi-
native influence on the outcome .... It is the very essence of age
discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer
believes that productivity and competence decline with old age.0 4
102. Id. at 36.
103. 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1703 (1993). In Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d
1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1994), the court adopted the reasoning of Hazen and found that
discharging an employee solely to reduce salary cost is not age discrimination under the
ADEA.
104. Hazen Paper Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1705-06. The Court noted that it did not mean to
suggest that an employer could lawfully fire an employee in order to prevent his pension
benefits from vesting. This would be a violation under § 510 of ERISA. Id. at 1707.
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In Hazen, the Court also reemphasized the distinction between willful
and non-willful violations of the ADEA. In order to show willfulness, there
is no requirement that the conduct be outrageous. The Court stated that an
employer would not be liable for liquidated damages if it incorrectly, but in
good faith, believed that its age-based decision was permitted by the ADEA.
The Eleventh Circuit in Sturniolo v. Sheaffer, Eaton, Inc."5 addressed
the issue of whether a complaint under the ADEA was barred as being
untimely. The employee was told, at the time of the discharge, that his
position was being eliminated to obtain financial savings. He later learned
that it was a discharge and he was replaced by a younger person. The
Eleventh Circuit held that the time period for filing an age discrimination
charge with the EEOC was tolled until the terminated individual learned or
should have learned of the fact that he was being replaced by a younger
person. 6 Mere suspicion of age discrimination is not sufficient to start
the running of the statute.
In Perkie v. Group Technologies, Inc., ' 7 Judge Kovachevich of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, discussed the
various burdens of proof required in a reduction of force case where the
plaintiffs allege age and sex discrimination. The defendant in Perkie
claimed that the ADEA did not allow for punitive damages. Judge
Kovachevich noted that the Eleventh Circuit, as well as a number of other
jurisdictions, allows plaintiffs to claim appropriate punitive damages under
the ADEA.'08
One interesting state court case also addressed issues under the ADEA.
In Bolves v. Hullinger,'0 9 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal ad-
dressed a malpractice claim alleging that the plaintiff's former attorneys
negligently failed to timely file a federal age discrimination suit against the
plaintiffs former employer. The court looked at the merits of the ADEA
claim to determine whether or not there was any malpractice. The jury had
found that there was negligence in failing to timely file the ADEA claim,
but the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed."0
The employee's evidence showed that the violation was willful.
However, it also showed that the decision to fire him was made quickly, and
105. 15 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 1994).
106. Id. at 1026.
107. 845 F. Supp. 852, 856-58 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
108. Id. at 858; see also Wilson v. S & L Acquisition Co., L.P., 940 F.2d 1429 (11th
Cir. 1991).
109. 629 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
110. Id. at 200.
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one of the employers admitted that the procedures in the personnel manual
for termination were not followed. Additionally, the personnel office was
not contacted and neither of the employee's supervisors ever considered the
ADEA when terminating the employee. The court noted the fact that the
supervisor made a pure business decision, necessitated by corporate organi-
zation, was never rebutted. Citing federal case law, the Fifth District Court
found that "[r]eorganization of a business and the elimination of an older
employee based on the employee's poor performance relative to younger
peers is a nondiscriminatory basis for discharge. . . ."'" In this case, the
court found that any alleged negligence in allowing the statute of limitations
to expire in the federal claim did not result in damage to Hullinger."2
In Maleszewski v. United States,"3 a taxpayer sued the United States
seeking a refund of income taxes paid on money received in settlement of
an employment discrimination lawsuit. The district court held that the
settlement was not damages received on account of-personal injuries and,
under the Internal Revenue Code, it was not excluded from gross income.
The ADEA does not redress tort-like personal injuries for purposes of
exclusion. Judge Vinson, the United States district judge, noted in his
decision that the result was contrary to that reached by three circuit courts
of appeals." 4
B. Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA ')"5
The ADA is an attempt to impose an all-inclusive ban on discrimina-
tion against disabled individuals in every sector of society, including:
employment, public services, public accommodations, and services operated
by private entities. Title I of the ADA became effective on July 26, 1992
for employers of twenty-five or more employees and was amended on July
26, 1994 to bring employers with fifteen to twenty-four employees within
its purview." 6 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC-
") has enacted regulations interpreting the ADA." 7
111. Id. at 201.
112. Id.
113. 827 F. Supp. 1553, 1554 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
114. Id. at 1557. See, e.g., Rickel v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 900 F.2d 655 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding that ADEA action is excusable under § 104(b)(2)); Pistillo v. Comm'r
of Internal Revenue, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940
F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
116. Id. § 12111(5).
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1-.16 (1993).
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The EEOC recently issued an informative guide to the field of pre-
employment disability related inquiries and medical examinations under the
ADA."' The guide lists common acceptable and unacceptable pre-offer
inquiries and examinations." 9
In one of the more interesting decisions affecting disabled individuals,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether obesity is
a disability. In Cook v. State of Rhode Island Department of Mental Health,
Retardation and Hospitals,' the court held that discrimination based on
an employer's determination that the job applicant is morbidly obese violates
the Rehabilitation Act. The court endorsed the view stated by the EEOC in
its amicus brief that obesity qualifies as a disability if it constitutes an
impairment, and if it is of such a duration that it substantially limits a life
activity, or is regard as so limiting. The EEOC's interpretive guidelines on
the ADA state that excess weight may be classified as an impairment if it
either falls outside the normal raqge (for example, morbid obesity) or falls
within a normal range, but is a pioduct of a physiological disorder. Thus,
obesity could be a disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
118. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment Inquiries Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act, No. 187 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) N: 2321 (May 19, 1994)
[hereinafter EEOC Compliance Manual].
119. The following examples are inquiries which are not disability-related:
1. Can you perform the functions of this job (essential and/or marginal), with
or without reasonable accommodation?
2. Please describe/demonstrate how you would perform these functions
(essential and/or marginal).
3. Do you have a cold? Have you ever tried Tylenol for fever? How did
you break your leg?
4. Can you meet the attendance requirements of this job? How many days
did you take leave last year?
5. Do you illegally use drugs? Have you used illegal drugs in the last two
years?
6. Do you have the required licenses to perform this job?
7. How much do you weigh? How tall are you? Do you regularly eat three
meals per day?
The following examples are disability-related inquiries:
1. Do you have AIDS? Do you have asthma?
2. Do you have a disability which would interfere with your ability to
perform the job?
3. How many days were you sick last year?
4. Have you ever filed for workers' compensation?
5. Have you ever been injured on the job?
See id.
120. 10 F.3d 17, 28 (1st Cir. 1993).
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In Kelsey v. University Club of Orlando, Inc.,' Judge G. Kendall
Sharp reversed a summary judgment for the plaintiff. A Florida man was
fired from his job as a barber for the University Club of Orlando. Judge
Sharp determined that he could not recover under the ADA because the
University Club is a bona fide private club and thus exempt from the Act.
The judge noted that the Orlando club did not allow guests unfettered use
of its facilities, nor did the Orlando Club advertise its facilities to non-
members or allow members to hold private parties during regular club hours.
Judge Sharp noted that given the limited guest policy, the Orlando club is
a private club.122
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991123
In 1991, Congress passed a compromise version of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Section 3 of the Act outlines the purposes of the new Act,
including the following:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination
and unlawful harassment in the work place;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related"
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and in
other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio;
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines
for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expand-
ing the scope of relevant civil right statutes in order to provide adequate
protection to victims of discrimination.'24
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, an employer could avoid
liability for intentional discrimination if he or she established that he or she
would have made the same decision without taking gender into account.
However, the Act reversed the Supreme Court's holding in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins'25 and now, once the complaining party demonstrates
121. 845 F. Supp. 1526, 1531 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
122. Id. at 1529-30.
123. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
124. Id. § 3, at 1071 (citations omitted).
125. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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that sex was a motivating factor, the employer will lose even though he or
she would have taken the same action without considering the unlawful
factor.
Section 105 of the Act also rejected the Supreme Court's decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.126 Under section 105(a)(i)-(ii), a
plaintiff can now establish disparate impact if:
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes a demonstration... [of an alter-
native employment practice] and the respondent refuses to adopt such
alternative employment practice.127
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also rejects the Supreme Court's holding
in EEOC v. Arabian-American Oil Co., 21 which held that Title VII does
not apply to United States citizens employed by the United States outside
the United States. Section 109 of the Act, however, specifically provides
that, "[w]ith respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes
an individual who is a citizen of the United States."'
129
In West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,3' the United
States Supreme Court considered the inclusion of expert fees within the
definition of "reasonable attorney's fees" as contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The Court held that fees for services rendered by experts in civil rights
litigation may not be shifted to the losing party as part of a "reasonable
attorney's fees" under § 1988, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, section 118 specifically modifies
section 1988 to include expert fees within the definition of attorney's fees
in civil rights litigation.'
Possibly the most important change brought by the Civil Rights Act of
1991 is an individual's right to punitive and compensatory damages in cases
of sex, religion, or disability discrimination. Section 102 of the new Act
126. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071; see also supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
127. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a)(i)-(ii), 105 Stat. at 1071 (1991).
128. 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991).
129. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. at 1077.
130. 499 U.S. 83, 85 (1991).
131. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 103, 105 Stat. at 1077.
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entitled "Damages in Cases of Intentional Discrimination in Employment"
specifically allows compensatory and punitive damages to victims of sex,
religion, and disability discrimination under Title VII, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and section 501 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. Previously,
compensatory and punitive damages were available only to victims of race,
national origin, or ethnic discrimination within the parameters of § 1981.
Additionally, the Act places certain limits upon the total amount of
compensatory and punitive damages. Compensatory and punitive damages
are allowed only in cases of intentional discrimination under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. In addition, the Act places certain limits upon the total
amount of compensatory and punitive damages an individual may recover.
The limitation includes a $50,000 ceiling for employers of 100 or fewer
employees; a ceiling of $100,000 for employers of more than 100 but fewer
than 201 employees; a ceiling of $200,000 for employers of more than 200
but fewer than 501 employees; and a ceiling of $300,000 for employers of
more than 500 employees. These caps, however, do not apply to claims of
race discrimination. In addition, the Act explicitly states that courts will be
unable to inform juries of the monetary limitations during their deliberations
on punitive and compensatory damages. 32
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,'33 and Rivers v. Roadway Express,
Inc., ' the United States Supreme Court ruled that sections 101 and 102
of the Act do not apply retroactively to cases based on conduct occurring
before enactment on November 21, 1991. The Court noted that where
Congress fails to clearly indicate whether the key provisions of the Act
should be retroactive, fundamental concerns about fairness and notice to
defendants dictate prospective application only.
Section 102 provides for jury trial, and compensatory and punitive
damages for claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In Landgraf, the Court held that provisions for punitive damages are not
retroactive because such damages have features that are similar to criminal
statutes and, therefore, raise serious constitutional questions about applying
the law retroactively.'35 Similarly, the Court found that compensatory
damages should not be retroactively applied because they increase liability
for past conduct and affect employers' planning. The jury trial provision,
alone, might have been retroactively applied, but since it was enacted in
132. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. at 1071.
133. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
134. 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
135. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1497.
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conjunction with the new damages provisions, the Court found that it should
be applied prospectively as well.'36
In Rivers, the Court also held that section 101 of the Act does not
apply to cases based on conduct that occurred prior to enactment.
137
Section 101 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to permit plaintiffs to sue for
discrimination occurring during all phases of the employment relationship,
including termination. This section was added specifically to reverse the
1989 United States Supreme Court decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union.138 The Court rejected the argument that section 101 of the Act
merely restored a long-accepted interpretation of § 1981 and, therefore, was
intended to be retroactive.1 3
9
D. The Equal Pay Act ("EPA ')14'
The EPA prohibits the payment of different wages to employees of
opposite sexes when they perform equal work or hold jobs whose perfor-
mance requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which are
performed under similar working conditions.
In Meeks v. Computer Associates International,14' the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a claim brought under the EPA for
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The jury found that the
defendant had violated the EPA and the district court held that it was bound
by that jury finding. The Eleventh Circuit, however, found that the jury's
finding of the EPA liability did not support a finding of Title VII discrimi-
nation liability absent the additional finding of intentional discrimina-
tion. 142
E. Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA ")
Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales 43 is a case which addressed whether
a salesperson's termination was actionable under ERISA in the Eleventh
Circuit. In Seaman, the court held that a real estate company violated
section 510 of ERISA when it terminated a salesperson in order to eliminate
136. Id. at 1483.
137. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1519-20.
138. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
139. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1521-22.
140. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1990).
141. 15 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 1994).
142. Id. at 1019.
143. 985 F.2d 543 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 308 (1993).
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the cost of certain plan benefits, despite the fact that such benefits were not
yet vested under the plan.1 44 In this case, Patricia Seaman was entitled to
health insurance coverage and to participate in a 401(k) plan under her
employment contract. She was offered a new contract which did not
provide for such benefits. When she refused the offer, she was terminated.
At the time of her discharge, her rights in the plan benefits had not vested.
She alleged in her suit that the employer had violated section 510 of ERISA
because she was terminated in order to eliminate the costs of providing
health insurance coverage and contributions under the 401(k) plan. 45
The district court dismissed the suit, but the Eleventh Circuit found that
the employer had violated section 510 of ERISA and that its determination
did not depend on whether or not the benefits were vested or contingent.
Instead, the court noted that the proper inquiry is the purpose of the
discharge. 146
F. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA )147
FMLA became effective on August 5, 1993, and covers private or
public employers who employ fifty or more employees within a seventy-five
mile radius of the employer's facility. The Act requires covered employers
to provide eligible employees with an unpaid leave of up to twelve weeks
in any twelve month period for a number of circumstances. These include
birth, adoption, foster care of a child, care of a spouse, son, daughter or
parent of the employee with a serious health condition, and a serious health
condition of the employee which prevents the employee from performing the
functions of his or her position. Upon return from leave, an employee is
entitled to reinstatement to his or her previous position or a position with the
equivalent pay and benefits. The Act also works in conjunction with
existing federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination.1
48
One of the interesting issues raised by FMLA is its interrelationship
with the ADA. There are certain differences between the two statutes,
including who is a covered employer and employee. An employee may be
144. Id. at 544.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1990). On February 5, 1993, President Clinton signed the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. The ADA applies to all private employees with 15
or more employees, while the FMLA applies to employers with 50 or more employees within
a 75 mile radius of the work site. Florida's workers' compensation law, with limited excep-
tions, applies to all public and private employees. See FLA. STAT. §§ 440.01-.60 (1993).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1990).
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covered by the ADA, but not by the FMLA. The Department of Labor is
responsible for interpreting and enforcing FMLA, and is in the process of
issuing regulations.
G. Procedural Issues
In Griffin v. Singletaiy,4 9 the court addressed the issue of the timely
filing of charges of discrimination with the EEOC and held that individuals
who had not filed timely charges of discrimination with the EEOC were not
entitled to intervene as class representatives in a Title VII action.
H. Rehabilitation Act
50
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that a qualified
handicapped employee cannot be excluded from derived benefits under any
program or activity that receives federal financial assistance. The Eleventh
Circuit in Jackson v. Veteran's Administration' held that to prove
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act,5 2 the plaintiff must show that
he or she: 1) is handicapped within the meaning of the Act and relevant
regulations; 2) is otherwise qualified for the position in question; 3) worked
for a program or activity that received federal financial assistance; and 4)
was treated adversely solely because of his or her handicap.' 3 In Jackson,
the plaintiff claimed he had a disability caused by rheumatoid arthritis. The
VA hospital fired him for excessive absences. The court held that he was
not otherwise qualified because he failed to satisfy the presence requirement
of the job, and the VA did not have a duty to accommodate his unpre-
dictable absences. 1
54
In Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, Inc.,'5s the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that, when requested, a jury trial is constitutionally
required under the Act." 6
149. 17 F.3d 356, 359-61 (11th Cir. 1994).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
151. 22 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1994).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
153. Jackson, 22 F.3d at 278.
154. Id.
155. 24 F.3d 152 (11 th Cir. 1994).
156. Id. at 156.
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I. Title VII--Sexual Harassment
In one of the more significant decisions in the last year, the United
States Supreme Court spoke for only the second time in ten years on the
issue of sexual harassment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.'57 In this
case, Teresa Harris, a female employee claimed that the president of the
company insulted her because of her gender and made her the target of
unwanted sexual innuendos. When she complained of his behavior, he
expressed surprise and apologized. Within a month after she had closed a
major deal with a customer, the president asked her, in front of her co-
workers, whether or not she had promised sex to close the deal. Ms. Harris
quit her employment that next day.
5 1
The Supreme Court held that federal law with regard to sexual
harassment does not require the establishment of any psychological
harm. "'59 The Court further stated that there was no single factor that
makes a working environment hostile or abusive, rather the nature of the
environment must be determined by looking at all of the circumstances,
including such things as the frequency of discriminatory conduct, the
severity of the conduct, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work perfor-
mance.
60
The decision produced a broader standard for liability than in, the past
and should make it more difficult for employers to win at trial. However,
the Harris decision left many questions unanswered, including whether the
objective standard in hostile environment cases should be the reasonable
person, the reasonable victim, or the reasonable woman standard. The Court
used the reasonable person terminology.' 6' It is not clear what the lower
courts will do with this issue, given the Court's failure to address the
question specifically. The Court also fails to specifically address if or how
compensatory damages can be awarded and measured in the absence of
proof of psychological injury.
157. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
158. Id. at 369.
159. Id. at 371.
160. Id. at 370-71.
161. Id. at 371.
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has published a guide
with respect to its interpretation and implementation of the Harris deci-
sion. 6 2 The enforcement guide sent out to its field staff analyzes Harris
and its effect on the Commission's investigations of charges involving
harassment.
The EEOC has taken the position that Harris reaffirmed Meritor v. Vin-
cent"'63 and clarified, rather than altered, the elements necessary for
proving hostile environment sexual harassment. The EEOC also noted that
the Court's rejection of the psychological injury requirement was consistent
with the Commission's policy. The EEOC stressed that the Court did not
elaborate on the definition of a reasonable person in Harris, but advised
investigators that they should continue to consider whether a reasonable
person in the victim's circumstances would have found the alleged behavior
to be hostile or abusive.'64
In a pre-Harris decision, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida addressed issues involving a workplace ro-
mance. In Ayers v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 6 the manager
of a retail store brought a claim under the Civil Rights Act and ADEA
alleging that her supervisor transferred her to a less lucrative store and
transferred his paramour to a more desirable store. Gladys Ayers claimed
the romantic relationship between her supervisor and her replacement was
in violation of Title VII and the ADEA.
The district court held that the hiring of the supervisor's lover did not
violate Title VII. Any coercion used in placing the manager in a more
desirable store where the supervisor and that manager resumed a sexual
relationship did not violate Title VII.' 66 The court noted the EEOC's
policy that Title VII does not prohibit preferential treatment based upon
consensual romantic relationships.'67
162. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE No. 915002.
163. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
164. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
165. 826 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
166. Id. at 447.
167. Id. at 443.
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J. Title VII-Civil Rights Act of 1964
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,'68 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a trier of fact must find for the
plaintiff when it only rejects employer's asserted reasons for discriminatory
actions. The Supreme Court overturned the Eighth Circuit's decision and
found specifically that the "trier of fact's rejection of [an] employer's
asserted, legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions does not
entitle [an] employee to judgment as [a] matter of law under McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green .... ",I69
The court reviewed its holdings on burden of proof set forth in
McDonnell Douglas and Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine.7 and noted that the ultimate question is whether the plaintiff
proved that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
because of race. The Court noted that the fact finder's disbelief of the
defendant's justification together with the elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination, would be sufficient to show intentional discrimination.
However, while mere rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons may
allow the trier of fact to infer intentional discrimination, it does not compel
judgment for the plaintiff.''
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
decided Roberts v. University of South Florida.' The trial judge deter-
168. 113 S. Ct 2742 (1993). In Newton v. CBS, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1994),
the court denied a defendant's summary judgment motion in an ADEA termination case on
the grounds that material facts remained in dispute as to whether the defendant's proffered
explanation was protection. The plaintiff raised questions about the level of her qualifications
compared to other employees and about an ambiguous comment made at the time of
termination which could have been construed to be direct evidence of age animus. In
Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found that false evidence of the employer's only proffered explanation
automatically raised a material issue of fact as to discriminatory intent, thus precluding
summary judgment and requiring a trial. Id.
169. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2742-43 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1993)). Here, the Court established an allocation of the burden of production in
Title VII discriminatory treatment cases. The employee makes out a prima facie case of
discrimination and the employer articulates a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
challenged action. The plaintiff then tries to discredit that reason and establish that the
reason is protection. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792.
170. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
171. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2755-56.
172. 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,778 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 1993).
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mined that in 1988 the University of South Florida improperly paid a female
employee less money than a black male employee. The court considered the
remedies available under Title VII, and noted it was inclined to direct that
the plaintiff be granted tenure at the university relying on opinions from the
Third Circuit 173 and the Sixth Circuit. 74  However, the trial court de-
clined to grant tenure, indicating an opportunity remained for the plaintiff
to be awarded tenure by the university. At the time of the lawsuit, she had
not yet been denied tenure. 17
5
In Patricia Thompson v. Haskell Co., 176 the District Court held that
a supervisor could not be sued individually under Title VII for alleged sex
discrimination. The court noted that the relief granted under Title VII is
against the employer, not individual employees who violate the Act.
In Watson v. Bally Manufacturing Corp.,77 a number of employees
brought an action against an employer under Title VII, as well as state tort
law. The employer argued that the allegations of improper transfer and
verbal harassment occurred more than 300 days prior to the administrative
filing of the charge, and were therefore barred. The court noted that an
allegedly improper transfer from Ohio to Florida is not the type of act that
would appear to alert an employee to his duty to assert his rights and thus,
a motion to dismiss was denied.
In Griffin v. Singletary,'78 the court held that the pending Title VII
class action tolled the need for class members to file an administrative
charge, when class certification is vacated because the representative failed
to timely file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.7
However, the court further noted that the period is tolled for those class
members wishing to bring individual suits, but is not tolled for members
wishing to bring class action suits.
In Williams v. City of Montgomery,8 ' the court faced a number of
issues including whether or not the city of Montgomery and the Mont-
gomery City/County Personnel Board were employers for purposes of Title
VII. The evidence in the case demonstrated that the Board exercised certain
duties traditionally reserved to an employer, such as establishing a pay plan,
173. See Kunda v. Mullenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
174. See Gutzwuller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1988).
175. Roberts, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,778.
176. 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,080 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 1994).
177. 844 F. Supp. 1533, 1535 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
178. 17 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1994).
179. Id. at 360.
180. 742 F.2d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1984).
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formulating minimum standards for jobs, evaluating employees, and
transferring, promoting, or demoting employees. The Eleventh Circuit
found that because of these actions, the Board was an agent of the city for
purposes of Title VII.
Though the case of NAACP v. Seibels"' does not significantly impact
more routine labor and employment issues, the court addressed litigation
which began more than twenty years ago when the United States and private
parties filed civil rights complaints against the city of Birmingham, the
personnel board of Jefferson County, and other local governmental agencies
and officials. The decision provides a fairly extensive discussion of
affirmative action programs and promotion goals.'
VI. SUMMARY OF FLORIDA REGULATIONS, STATUTES,
AND CASE LAW
The following is a summary of a broad range of issues under Florida
law involving employers and employees.
A. AIDS
Florida Statutes prohibit discrimination by an employer on the basis of
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"), Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome-related complex, and Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV)). 183  In "X" Corp. v. "Y" Person,84 X Corporation filed an
action for declaratory relief against one of its employees alleging that it was
in doubt as to its rights, duties, and responsibilities concerning the AIDS
statute. X Corporation alleged that Y Person informed several employees
that he had tested HIV-positive and had AIDS. The complaint further
alleged that X Corporation asked Y to voluntarily transfer to another
position without a loss of pay or benefits, in order to reduce the risk of
transmission of HIV. Y refused.
181. 20 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir.), opinion withdrawn, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548
(1lth Cir. 1994).
182. For a history of related cases see In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination
Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1987), afd in part, rev'd in part, 20 F.3d
1525 (1 1th Cir. 1994); NAACP v. Seibels, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,504 (N.D. Ala.
1977), a.ffd in part, rev'd in part, 616 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Birmingham Reverse
Discrimination Litig., 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,022 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
183. FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (1993).
184. 622 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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The employer argued that a failure to transfer could create a significant
risk because of exposure to situations involving lacerations or cuts. The
court determined that a declaratory judgment would resolve the apparently
conflicting duties of X Corporation to Y under the statute, and X's duty to
other employees to provide a safe working environment given a known
risk. ' 5
B. Attorney's Fees
In Department of Education v. Rushton,'86 the First District Court of
Appeal refused to allow an attorney's fee award granted by the Florida
Commission on Human Relations for representation in a collateral proceed-
ing. The attorney represented the Florida Education Association, United and
Florida Teaching Professors/National Education Association in an action
pursuant to section 120.56 of the Florida Statutes, challenging teachers
unions. The Florida Commission on Human Relations awarded the
attorney's fees pursuant to section 760.10(13) of the Florida Statutes. The
Department of Education challenged the fee award. The court reversed the
award and directed that, since the attorneys did not represent the individual
appellees in the rule challenge, the Florida Commission on Human Relations
was to exclude from the full award, all amounts associated with the attorn-
ey's representation of the union and the separate rule challenging proceed-
ing. 1 7
C. Collective Bargaining
In City of Delray Beach v. Professional Firefighters of Delray
Beach,'88 the City of Delray Beach Public Employees Relations Commit-
tee held that the city violated its employees' rights when it failed to continue
paying individual increases during the status quo period. The Fourth
District Court of Appeal, noting it was a case of first impression, affirmed
the final order entered by the Committee and held that the employees had
a reasonable expectation that they would continue to receive individual
performance increases during the period between collective bargaining
185. Id. at 1101-02.
186. 638 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994). In Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S.
Ct. 1023 (1994), the Supreme Court considered a claim for attorney's fees under the
Copyright Act. The Court reviewed its decision in Christianberg Garment, Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412 (1978), which construed attorney's fees language under Title VII.
187. Rushton, 638 So. 2d at 100.
188. 636 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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agreements. The city knew or should have known that it was violating well-
established law when it stopped paying individual performance raises.8 9
In Chiles v. United Faculty of Florida,90 the Florida Supreme Court
held that the legislature's unilateral modification and abrogation of a funded
collective bargaining agreement violated the right to collectively bargain and
constituted an impermissible impairment of contract. The Florida Legisla-
ture can reduce previously approved appropriations if it demonstrates a
compelling state interest.' 9'
D. Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992
Initially, Florida enacted the Human Rights Act of 1977.92 This
was modeled after Title VII with additional prohibitions against age, handi-
cap, and marital status discrimination. In 1992, the Florida Legislature
amended section 760.01 to rename the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977,
the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"). FCRA generally authorizes
a recovery of damages by complainants in certain cases, preserves the right
to a jury trial on issues involving damages, enlarges the time for filing a
charge, modifies procedures for the prosecution of claims, and extends the
subpoena power of the Florida Commission on Human Relations. The 1992
amendments enlarge the time within which a complaint or charge of
discrimination must be filed under FCRA from 180 to 365 days from the
time of the alleged violation.' The Act also provides for unlawful
discrimination in the areas of education, employment, housing or public
accommodation. The Florida Civil Rights Act also added two additional
189. Id. at 163.
190. 615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).
191. Id. at 673.
192. FLA. STAT. § 760.01 (1992). Section 13 of the FCRA originally provided that the
amendment would apply to conduct occurring after October 1, 1992, while § 14 provided that
the Act would take effect on July 1, 1992. Section 14 was amended by § 4 of chapter 92-
282 to provide that the effective date of the Act shall be October 1, 1992.
193. FLA. STAT. § 760.11(1) (1992). Shorter time periods have also been provided for
the investigation and handling of charges. The Florida Commission on Human Relations has
180 days to determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice
has occurred. In cases where a reasonable cause determination has been issued, a civil action
in court must be brought no later than one year after the date of the reasonable cause
determination. Id. § 760.11(3).
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exemptions. One relating to an anti-nepotism policy 94 and another
relating to religious corporations.'95
One of the most important modifications brought to FCRA is an
expansion of the type and scope of damages available. The new Act
provides that in any civil action brought pursuant to the revised chapter 760,
the court may issue an order prohibiting the discriminatory practice at issue
and provide affirmative relief from the effects of that practice, including
back-pay. The court may also award compensatory damages, including, but
not limited to, damages for mental anguish, loss of dignity, intangible
injuries, and punitive damages. That section further provides that punitive
damages, where allowed, shall not exceed $100,000.
E. Federal Civil Rights-State Decisions
There have been a number of state court decisions which examined an
employee's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Tookes v. City of Riviera
Beach,'96 a city employee brought a civil rights action against the city
alleging that he was discharged in violation of his due process rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court ruled that the trial court erred in
determining that it lacked jurisdiction over the action because the plaintiff
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action.'97
In Sublett v. District School Board of Sumter County,9 ' an employee
brought an action against the school district alleging that his termination
violated § 1983. The trial court entered summary judgment for the school
board concluding that the collective bargaining agreement waived Mr.
Sublett's right to a section 120.57 hearing, and that his failure to take
advantage of his rights under the collective bargaining agreement was fatal
to his claim. The Fifth District reversed and ordered the school board to
194. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(8)(d) (1992). Section 760.10(8) states as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, it is not an unlawful
employment practice under §§ 760.01-. 10 for an employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee to: ... (d) [tiake or
fail to take any action on the basis of marital status if that status is prohibited
under its anti-nepotism policy.
Id.
195. Id. § 760.10(9) (1993).
196. 633 So. 2d 566, 567 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
197. Id. at 567-68.
198. 617 So. 2d 374, 376-77 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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afford Mr. Sublett a formal hearing before a hearing officer pursuant to
chapter 120 to determine whether he is subject to discharge from employ-
ment. 99
F. Handicap Discrimination
The Florida Commission on Human Relations recently found evidence
of an employer's discrimination on the basis of a handicap, despite the fact
that the employee's condition did not amount to a handicap under Florida
law. In Deane v. Fleet Transport Co.,200 the hearing officer decided
whether the petition for relief charging the respondent with illegal discrimi-
nation on the basis of a perceived handicap (a history of back surgery and
mild hypertension) should be granted. The hearing officer noted that it was
not clear that the petitioner's history of back injury and mild hypertension
amounted to a handicap. But, the petitioner did state a prima facie case
showing the respondent perceived the petitioner to be handicapped as a
result of the back injury and hypertension. Thus the employer's perception
of Mr. Deane's medical condition as a handicap was deemed sufficient to
support a finding of liability. The Florida Commission on Human Relations
adopted the hearing officer's findings of fact.2"'
In Hart v. Double Envelope Corp.,22 Ms. Hart alleged that Double
Envelope Corporation unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of
a physical handicap (left wrist impairment). The Florida Commission on
Human Relations adopted the findings of the hearing officer, which found
that Ms. Hart had failed to present a prima facie case of handicap discrimi-
nation.20 3 She did not establish that she was handicapped at the time that
she was discharged or that the company knew she had a permanent handicap
or disability at the time she was discharged. The hearing officer also noted
that the employer articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons to
terminate the petitioner. She had repeatedly left work or failed to attend
when she was denied time off.
199. Id. at 377.
200. 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5067 (1993). The hearing officer in his report noted that
the petitioner had the burden to prove a prima facie case of illegal discrimination and decided
the burdens of proof and production of the evidence as set forth in Burdine.
201. Id. at 5068.
202. 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1664, 1671 (1992). The Florida Civil Rights Act does not
define disability or handicap.
203. Id. at 1665.
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The First District Court of Appeal in Brand v. Florida Power
Corp.,204 addressed the burden of proof necessary to establish handicap
discrimination. Prior to Brand, no state court had decided whether the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test applied to a claim asserting handicap
discrimination under Florida's Human Rights Act. The First District Court
of Appeal concluded that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine criteria was
inapplicable and that the preferred criteria were those listed under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.2 °5 In a footnote the court also noted that,
due to its recent enactment, the court was not clear what affect the
American With Disabilities Act of 1990 would have on handicap discrimina-
tion claims prosecuted pursuant to Florida's Human Rights Act.206 The
court speculated that from the examination of certain key provisions in the
ADA, paralleling § 504, Congress intended to extend protection against
handicap discrimination, equal to or greater than that provided by § 504, to
qualified individuals who are handicapped. The court noted that case law
interpreting § 504 would be highly persuasive authority in actions brought
under the ADA to the extent that the two provisions in the acts coin-
cide.20 7
G. Military Leave
The Florida Attorney General considered the question of whether
section 295.09 of the Florida Statutes "require[d] a public employer to hold
a position indefinitely for an employee who takes a leave of absence to
serve on active military duty[.]"2 ° The Attorney General interpreted the
statute to require a "public employer to either reinstate a returning veteran
to the same position held prior to the service in the armed forces or to an
equivalent position, if the veteran exercises his or her reemployment rights
within one year of an honorable discharge from his or her original enlist-
ment.
209
204. 633 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
205. Id. at 507-09; see 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
206. Brand, 633 So. 2d at 510 n.8.
207. Id.
208. 94 Op. Att'y Gen. 9 (1994).
209. Id.
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H. Right to Privacy
In Kurtz v. City of North Miami,21 an applicant for a clerk/typist
position with the city filed a complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement of a
regulation requiring all job applicants to sign an affidavit stating that they
had not used tobacco or tobacco products for at least one year immediately
preceding application. The trial court entered summary judgment against the
employee. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed and held that the
regulation violated the individual's right to privacy under the state constitu-
tion.2"
I. Public Employees
In McKinney v. Pate," the Eleventh Circuit stated that there is no
substantive due process action available to a government employee who
claims that reasons given for termination were a pretext. The decision
appears to overrule prior law. McKinney involved a full-time and permanent
employee of the Osceola County Building Division who claimed that he was
fired because of personal animosity toward him by one of the Osceola
County Commissioners. The claim was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the jury awarded plaintiff $145,000. The verdict was set aside by the trial
judge, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district
court's opinion 3 and later reheard the case en banc.2 14 Sitting en banc,
the court determined that there was no substantive due process claim
available to the plaintiff and that the court could not find that McKinney's
state-created property right was deserving of substantive due process
215protection.
J. Retaliation
In Wiggins v. Southern Management Corp.,2 6 Lenoria Wiggins
appealed from an order dismissing her complaint. She alleged that she was
210. 625 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 640 So. 2d
1106 (1994).
211. Id. at 902; see FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23.
212. 20 F.3d 1550, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1994).
213. McKinney v. Pate, 985 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir.), vacated, 994 F.2d 772 (11th Cir.
1993).
214. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1550.
215. Id. at 1560-61.
216. 629 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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terminated because she had provided testimony adverse to her employer in
an unemployment compensation hearing and, therefore, this termination
violated section 92.57 of the Florida Statutes. The court noted that the
statute prohibits dismissal of employees who testify in judicial proceedings
in response to a subpoena, but that the statute is not applicable to an
employee who testifies voluntarily and not under subpoena. The court
dismissed the complaint since Ms. Wiggins had testified voluntarily. The
court did state that the unemployment compensation hearings are judicial
proceedings with respect to this statute.1 7
K. School Board Underfunding
In two decisions, during 1994, the Florida Supreme Court denied both
the Florida Education Association and Public Employee Relation petitions
appealing decisions from the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal.
In Sarasota County School District v. Sarasota Classifiled/Teacher's
Ass'n 2S and the School Board of Martin County v. Martin County
Education Ass'n, 9 the Florida Supreme Court's denial of review left in
place the district court's decision that school boards have the authority,
pursuant to section 447.309(2) of the Florida Statutes, to underfund
employee contractual salaries.
L. Statute of Limitations
Chapter 95 of the Florida Statutes establishes statutes of limitations
relating to various causes of action. In Ross v. Twenty-Four Collection,
Inc.,220 the court held that a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress occurred no later than the date when the employee
allegedly was forced to resign her employment after enduring several years
of sexual harassment on the job. In Moneyhun v. Vital Industries, Inc.,221
the court held that the limitations period for an employee's quantum meruit
claim began running on the date the employment ended.
217. Id. at 1024.
218. 614 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review dismissed, 630 So. 2d 1095
(Fla. 1994).
219. 613 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), reviewdenied, 632 So. 2d 1027
(1994).
220. 617 So. 2d 428, 428 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
221. 611 So. 2d 1316, 1322 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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M. Unemployment Compensation
In Brown v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,222 the plaintiff was
a legal assistant at an Orlando law firm where she alleged that she was
sexually harassed by a male co-worker over a period of some five months.
She did not report this to her employers, but when they learned of it through
another employee, the firm met with Brown and placed her on paid adminis-
trative leave. They then asked her to return to work and offered to change
her location to the firm's main building where the alleged perpetrator's wife
worked.
She refused to return to work and quit her job after her leave of
absence expired. The court established that an employee who voluntarily
leaves her employment without a reason attributable to her employer, is not
eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits.223 The court
noted, however, that this protects workers of employers who wrongfully
cause their employees to leave their employment. In this case, the court
determined that Ms. Brown failed to show that her voluntary departure from
employment was attributable to the wrongful conduct of her employer.
In Alonso v. Arabel, Inc.,224 an employee appealed the decision of the
Unemployment Appeals Commission barring his appeal as untimely. He
argued that the appeal was untimely because all notices sent were in English
and he did not speak, read, or write English. The court held that reasonable
notice was satisfied when the notice is given in English, and that the
employees had no due process right to notice in language comprehensible
to him.225
The Fifth District in Spangler v. Unemployment Appeals Commis-
sion226 also addressed the issue of whether or not a worker's resignation
was a voluntary departure from work without cause attributable to the
employer. In this particular case, Ms. Spangler was working at a Wal-Mart
store as a night receiving stocker, and was required to work around goods
that were covered with rodent droppings, blood, and urine. She developed
a rash and an upper respiratory illnesses which she thought had been caused
by the unsanitary conditions.
222. 633 So. 2d 36, 39 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
223. Id. at 38; see FLA. STAT. § 443.101(1)(a) (1991).
224. 622 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 622
(Fla. 1994).
225. Id.
226. 632 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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She eventually complained about the conditions, refused to work, and
was sent home without pay. She then resigned from her job. The
Unemployment Appeals Commission denied her unemployment compensa-
tion claim. The Fifth District reversed and remanded, finding that, in this
case, there was nothing she could do to remedy the unsanitary and unhealthy
working conditions which existed, and her employer failed to offer her any
hope of a transfer or other remedy, such as using a mask and gloves.227
N. Unfair Labor Practice
In Sarasota County School District v. Sarasota Classified/Teachers
Ass'n, 2  the Second District Court of Appeal found that a school board
did not commit an unfair labor practice by unilaterally discontinuing
payment of step-pay increases to classified and instructional employees
during the pendency of negotiations with the union. The court said that the
school board had the right to underfund the agreements and the superinten-
dent properly offered to negotiate the impact of that underfunding.
229
0. Veteran's Preference
Section 295.09 of the Florida Statutes, as amended in 1978, provides
that veteran's preference points are to be awarded on promotional exams
upon the employee's first promotion after reinstatement or reemployment.
The legislature repealed the amendment effective July 5, 1980 and reenacted
the former version of section 295.09 that awarded preference points only to
a veteran's first promotion after reinstatement or reemployment without
230exception.
In Ramirez v. City of Miami,23' the Court of Appeal held that section
295.09 cannot be applied retroactively to award preference points to a
veteran who took a promotional exam and was not promoted before the
statutory amendment was enacted or became effective. In this case, Mr.
Ramirez had been promoted to the rank of sergeant in 1981 and alleged that
he was entitled to an award of veteran's preference points on the results of
his 1977 promotion examination. He also argued that the City of Miami's
failure to award him those points resulted in the wrongful denial of promo-
227. Id. at 99.
228. Sarasota County Sch. Dist., 614 So. 2d at 1143.
229. Id. at 1147-49.
230. Ramirez v. City of Miami, 627 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see
FLA. STAT. § 295.09(I)(a) (1993).
23 1. Ramirez, 627 So. 2d at 49.
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tion to sergeant until 1981. The court said that he was not entitled to
veteran's preference points under section 295.09 of the 1977 Florida
Statutes, and that section 295.09, as amended in 1978, could not be applied
retroactively. 2
P. Whistle-blower
In 1986, the Florida Legislature enacted a Whistle-blower's Act which
was amended in 1991.233 The statute prohibits employers with ten or
more employees from retaliating against an employee if the employee has
disclosed or threatened to disclose to a governmental agency some practice
or policy the company has engaged in that violates a law or regulation. In
1991, the legislature amended the statute to include private employers.234
In Walsh v. Arrow Air, Inc.,235 a flight engineer reported a hydraulic
leak on an airplane, against his employer's wishes, and caused a flight to be
grounded. The employee was discharged, and later brought an action for
wrongful termination. The court determined that the statute applied retroac-
tively, thus allowing the employee to pursue his claim for wrongful
termination. The court also made some broad statements about the
employment-at-will doctrine in Florida and noted that the Whistle-blower's
Act is an exception to the at-will doctrine.236 This may be indicative of
the trend in other states that the at-will doctrine is at risk in Florida.
VII. TORTS
Another area of concern for employers in Florida is when an employer
may be found liable for an employee's conduct on a vicarious liability or
respondeat superior theory.
A. Assauli and Battery
In Caprio v. American Airlines, Inc.,23 an employee brought an
action for battery, negligent retention and supervision, and violations of Title
VII against an employer. The action stemmed from alleged sexual
232. Id.
233. FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3187-.31895 (1993).
234. Id. §§ 448.101-.102.
235. 629 So. 2d 144, 145-46 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1993), review granted, 639 So. 2d
975 (Fla. 1994).
236. Id. at 148.
237. 848 F. Supp. 1528, 1529 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
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harassment. Judge Kovachevich indicated that there were sufficient issues
of fact to preclude summary judgment, including the employer's alleged
touching of the employee in an offensive manner. She further noted that in
order to state a claim of battery against an employer, the conduct must be
within the scope of employment and be activated, at least in part, by
purposes to serve the employer.238
B. Defamation
In Wagner v. Flanagan,239 a construction contractor brought a
defamation suit against a hospital and its law firm. The center's lawyer sent
a letter to the insurer's lawyer commenting on a fraud committed by the
construction contractor. The court, in addressing the issue of statute of
limitations, stated that the cause of action for defamation accrues on
publication rather than discovery, even where the defamation is private."
Defamation suits normally involve an employee versus employer action
based upon some comments made by the employer. In Jackson v. BellSouth
Mobility, Inc. ,241 a former employee brought an action against an employer
and a manager alleging defamation. The court held that the employee stated
a cause of action against both entities.242
In Tucker v. Resha,243 a taxpayer sued the executive director of the
Florida Department of Revenue for defamation and invasion of their right
to privacy. The court held that the statements that the executive director
made to members of her staff about the taxpayer's "alleged activity in illegal
gun sales, drugs, pornography, money-laundering, and organized crime
involved activities which could include nonpayment of tax or violation of
reporting requirements .... "" Because these disclosures were arguably
within the scope of the executive director's office, and since there is an
absolute privilege accorded this individual, the taxpayer could not recover
for defamation.
238. Id. at 1532.
239. 629 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 1993).
240. Id. at 115.
241. 626 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
242. Id.
243. 634 So. 2d 756, 757 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
244. Id. at 758.
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C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Food Lion, Inc. v. Clifford,245 the assistant store manager observed
an employee of Food Lion consuming food products from the deli. The
employee admitted taking the food, and after concluding that he had
engaged in theft, the store reported the incident to the sheriff's office. Food
Lion terminated the employee and filed with the state an information
charging him with petty theft. The prosecutor later dropped the case and the
employee sued for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court determined that the individual's employer,
though attempting both to obtain civil damages and to bring a criminal
complaint against the plaintiff for alleged theft of food, did not meet the
required level of outrageousness necessary to sustain an action for intention-
al infliction of emotional distress.246
D. Negligent Hiring and Retention
Third parties often try to bring a deep pocket into a lawsuit (i.e., an
employer) by alleging that an employer is liable for the actions of their
employees due to negligent hiring and/or retention. The elements of
negligent hiring are:
1. [T]he employer was required to make an appropriate investigation
of the employee and failed to do so;
2. [A]n appropriate investigation would have revealed the unsuit-
ability of the employee for the particular duty to be performed or
for employment in general; and
3. [I]t was unreasonable for the employer to hire the employee in
light of the information he knew or should have known.247
The elements of negligent retention are:
a. The employer was required to exercise reasonable care in the
retention of the employee;
245. 629 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
246. Id. at 203.
247. Garcia v. Duffy,, 492 So. 2d 435, 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986); see also
Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In
1993, the Florida Legislature amended section 400.141 of the Florida Statutes to require a
nursing home facility to check the background of certified nursing assistance applicants.
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b. The employer received actual or constructive notice of problems
with the employee's fitness for the particular duty to be performed;
and
c. It was unreasonable for the employer not to investigate or take
corrective action such as discharge or reassignment.24
The claim of negligent hiring or retention centers around the legal duty
of an employer to investigate an employee's background. This will vary
from employer to employer depending upon the nature of the business and
the jobs performed by the individual.
E. Negligent Investigation
Recently, a federal district court decided Vackar v. Package Machinery
Co.,"' in which an employee claimed that the employer had been negli-
gent in investigating the truth of allegedly defamatory statements. The court
granted summary judgment nd stated that the allegations of negligence
were embraced by the plaintiff's defamation claim. The plaintiff, therefore,
could not sue in negligence where the real claim sounded in defamation.250
The court cited no existing case law relating to the tort of negligent
investigation.
F. False Imprisonment
In Stockett v. Tolin,25" ' a female employee brought an action against
her former employer alleging sexual harassment and violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. An additional claim brought by the
plaintiff under Florida law was the tort of false imprisonment which is the
unlawful restraint of a person against his will, the unlawful detention of a
person, and deprivation of a person's liberty. The court held that "the act
of pinning the [p]laintiff against a wall and refusing to allow her to escape,
even though only done for a short period of time, was false imprison-
ment.
252
248. Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 441.
249. 841 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
250. Id. at 315.
251. 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
252. Id. at 1556. The court also noted that entering the ladies' restroom constituted an
invasion of her privacy. Id.
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G. Workers' Compensation
As of January 1, 1994, the area in which the state made the most
changes in employer/employee relationships, has been through the workers'
compensation system. The Florida Legislature made significant changes in
the workers' compensation law.
The definition of employer has been expanded to include parties in
actual control of a corporation including, but not limited to, the president,
officers, directors, and shareholders who directly or indirectly own a
controlling interest in the corporation.2 3 The definition of employee has
been amended to include aliens and minors. 4 Additionally, this section
specifically addresses independent contractors and, for all practical purposes,
an independent contractor is deemed to be an employee unless he or she
meets all of the nine specific separate criteria listed in the statute.255
In addition to the statutory changes, there were also a number of
decisions concerning workers' compensation. The Supreme Court of Florida
in Zundell v. Dade County School Board,256 reviewed the following
certified question:
Whether an employer is required to prove the existence of a preexisting
condition in compensation cases involving heart attacks and internal
failures of the cardiovascular system as a prerequisite to the application
of the test for compensability established in Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc.
v. Beasley and Richard E. Mosca & Co., Inc. v. Mosca.2"
The court rephrased the question as follows: "Whether the rule announced
in Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley can ever apply to cardiovascular
injuries occurring on the job when competent substantial medical evidence
show no evidence of a preexisting condition relevant to the injury?) 258
In this case, Mr. Zundell was an algebra teacher who suffered a
hemorrhage of the brain, which he asserted was a result of dealing with a
disruptive student. His subsequent disability forced him into retirement.
253. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(14) (1994).
254. Id. § 440.02(13). It should be noted that the new Act creates an exception to the
criteria enumerated in the statute for certain job classifications listed in the Standard
Industrial Classifications Manual of 1987.
255. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(13)(a) (1994).
256. 636 So. 2d 8, 9 (Fla. 1994).
257. Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
258. Id. (citation omitted).
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Zundell sought workers' compensation benefits for the incident. His petition
was denied by the Judge of Compensation Claims. A divided First District
Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, affirmed, but certified the question. The
Supreme Court found that the condition was compensable and said that the
facts were essentially indistinguishable from a work place exertion resulting
in a hernia. 9
In Eller v. Shova,26 ° the Florida Supreme Court upheld as constitu-
tional the provision of the workers' compensation act that requires a plaintiff
to establish culpable negligence on the part of the defendant in order to
maintain a civil action against a supervisory or managerial level co-
employee. In this case, Felecia Shova was manager of a Circle K conve-
nience store and was killed during a robbery. Her husband filed a civil
action alleging gross negligence against several management level employ-
ees of Circle K, claiming they knew the store was in a high crime area and
had been robbed many times. The trial court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice. The Second District Court of Appeal held that section 440.11(1)
was unconstitutional, and mandatory jurisdiction was vested with the Florida
Supreme Court."' The court reasoned that the worker's compensation
statute is designed to be the exclusive remedy available to an injured
employee as to any negligence on the part of the employer, and quashed the
district court's decision affirming the trial court's dismissal with preju-
dice.262
The First District Court of Appeal recently decided Rolemco Electrical
Contracting v. Sellers.263 Mr. Sellers was involved in an automobile
accident while in the course and scope of his employment with Rolemco.
He had suffered back and neck injuries and an injury to his hip prior to the
automobile accident. He was also suffering from a condition that was
caused by his alcohol consumption but manifested no symptoms. The First
District Court of Appeal reversed the workers' compensation judge's award
of the cost of the employee's total hip replacement. The court held that the
aggravation to the employee's pre-existing condition was not compensable
under the Florida Worker's Compensation Act.2 ' The court noted that
under the statute "accident" means only an unexpected or unusual event or
result that happens suddenly, and that "[d]isability ... due to an accidental
259. Id.
260. 630 So. 2d 537, 543 (Fla. 1993).
261. Shova v. Eller, 606 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
262. Eller, 630 So. 2d at 539.
263. 637 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
264. Id. at 316.
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acceleration or aggravation of a disease due to the habitual use of alcohol
• . . shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the
employment."265  The court determined that since the employee's pre-
existing condition was caused by his habitual use of alcohol, the resulting
hip replacement surgery was not covered under the workers' compensation
benefits.266
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
One issue that arises in the employment context is whether or not
proceeds from a settlement or jury verdict with respect to an employment
action are taxable. In 1992, the Supreme Court held that payment received
in a settlement of a back-pay claim under Title VII was not excluded from
gross income under section 104(a)(2).2 67 Revenue Ruling 93-88 addressed
the applicability of section 104(a)(2) to claims arising after the amendments
to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.26' The ruling states that
because the amendments authorized the recovery of compensatory damages,
such as emotional distress and mental anguish damages, in cases involving
disparate treatment claims, back-pay, and compensatory awards, these claims
were excluded from gross income. The ruling further states that awards
received from disparate impact discriminations are not excluded.269
An issue may also arise when parties enter into settlement negotiations
as to the tax implications of the allocations of the settlement proceeds. In
McKay v. Commissioner,27 the tax court upheld the parties' allocation of
settlement proceeds in the context of a wrongful discharge action. The
claims were brought for wrongful discharge, breach of an employment
contract, RICO, and punitive damages. The jury awarded $1.6 million for
compensatory damages, and $12.8 million for future damages that was
trebled by the defendant's violation of RICO, and $1.25 million in punitive
damages. The parties negotiated a settlement in which the former employer
agreed to pay $16.7 million to settle all claims. This amount was split
between the wrongful discharge tort claim, breach of contract, and
265. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1) (1991)).
266. Id.
267. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1874 (1992). On December 20, 1993, the
Internal Revenue Service issued a revenue ruling, which addressed the applicability of section
104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code to claims arising after the amendments of Title VII
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
268. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
269. Id.
270. 102 T.C. 465 (1994).
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reimbursement of litigation claims. None of the proceeds, however, were
allocated to RICO or punitive damages. The tax court upheld the allocation
of proceeds in the agreement and noted that the allocations were consistent
with the taxpayer's pleadings and the verdict which reflected a lawsuit
primarily in tort.27' Thus, it is crucial for both employers and employees
to receive tax planning advice with respect to the settlement of any action
and the allocation of settlement proceeds.
IX. CONCLUSION
The waters of employment law in Florida are potentially hazardous for
both employees and employers. Both should be ever mindful that their
actions or inactions are governed by local, state, or federal laws; decisions
by local, state or federal court, and state or federal administrative agencies.
271. Id. at487.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers decisions of the Florida courts and Florida
legislation produced during the period of July 1, 1993 to June 31, 1994
which should be of interest to the real estate professional.
II. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Gardner v. Weiler.' Judge Farmer wrote the opinion with which
Judges Gunther and Warner concurred. The seller signed a warranty deed
conveying property to her lawyer. She did not know that the deed had been
"fraudulently constructed"2 so as to effect a transaction different from the
one actually agreed upon. The lawyer had the acknowledgement notarized
out of the presence of the seller by a notary who was not aware of the
scheme nor a party to the scheme. The lawyer then recorded it. The seller
sued the notary and won a jury verdict for damages based on the theory that
the notarization allowed the deed to be recorded, which was a necessary
component in the buyer's fraudulent scheme, and thus, was the proximate
cause of the seller's harm.
The district court disagreed and reversed.3 It held that the notary's
conduct was not a substantial cause of the seller's loss, and consequently,
it was not the proximate cause.4 The unstated reasoning is probably based
on the court's belief that the seller would have acknowledged her signature
in person to the notary, if she had been asked to do so. Thus, her
negligence in taking the acknowledgement did not really further the
fraudulent scheme, which was the cause of her harm.
1. 630 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
2. Id. at 670. It is unclear from the opinion what actually happened, but footnote one
reveals that a judgment was obtained rescinding the conveyance.
3. Id. at 671.
4. Id.
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III. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Wheeling Dollar Bank v. City of Delray Beach.' Judge Klein wrote
the opinion with.which Judges Gunther and Farmer concurred. A landowner
died in 1931. His brother inherited a one-quarter interest and became a
tenant in common with the other heirs. The estate was closed in 1933. The
brother conveyed his interest to the City which took possession and built a
municipal tennis center on this land no later than 1937.
In 1990, the City brought an action to quiet the title. The owners of
the other three-quarter interest argued that the city was a co-tenant, and that
the applicable rule was that one co-tenant cannot acquire title by adverse
possession against another co-tenant who has not received actual notice of
the adverse possession claim. The circuit and district courts rejected this
argument.' They interpreted the precedents7 as requiring either actual
notice or possession which is so open and notorious as to put a co-owner on
notice of the adverse claim. In this case, the operation of a municipal tennis
center on the land for over fifty years was sufficient to satisfy the latter test.
The court also provided an alternative rationale for its holding. It
stated that the basis for the notice requirement is that "cotenants ought to be
able to repose confidence in each other."' However, the owners of the
three-quarter interest were not even aware that they owned an interest during
the period of adverse possession. Thus, there was no need to protect an
expectation of confidence.
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Arana v. Hutchison.' Chief Judge Harris wrote the opinion with which
Judges Dauksch and Thompson concurred. The buyer and sellers agreed to
the sale of a house. Complying with the terms of the document which the
buyer signed, the buyer put down a substantial initial deposit, two months
later put down an additional deposit, and for a period of two years made
monthly payments. The document also required that the buyer obtain a
financing commitment within two years. However, the seller never executed
a copy of the contract. Because the buyer did not have a signed copy of the
5. 639 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
6. Id. at 114-15.
7. Id. at 114 (citing Cook v. Rochford, 60 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1952) and Gracy v. Fielding,
70 So. 625 (Fla. 1916)).
8. Id. at 115.
9. 638 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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contract, she had difficulty obtaining a mortgage commitment. A "Contin-
gent Approval" was obtained from a lender two days before the end of the
two-year period, but notice was not sent to the sellers until two days after
the period ended. Consequently, the sellers declared the contract terminated.
The buyer sued for specific performance and won, but the trial court
held that each party was to bear the expense of its own attorney's fees. The
buyer appealed because the contract contained a provision that the prevailing
party in litigation would be entitled to attorney's fees. The district court
agreed.' 0 It noted that part of the specific performance decree required the
seller to execute the contract document." The court concluded that the
trial court apparently thought the terms of the contract document were not
in effect until it had been executed. 2  However, the attorney's fees
provision was a term in the contract as embodied by that document, and the
sellers consistently admitted that it existed. 3 Specific performance of the
contract was ordered. Thus, logically the attorney's fees provision of the
contract was also in force.
Diaz v. Security Union Title Insurance Co. 4 This was a per curiam
opinion by Judges Hubbart, Gersten, and Goderich. A husband and wife
owned a condominium as tenants in common. On the husband's death, the
wife began probate proceedings and then recorded a quitclaim deed which
appeared to vest the whole title in her. The other beneficiaries intervened
in the probate proceeding to contest the wife's claim to the unit. The
probate court enjoined the wife from disposing or encumbering her late
husband's interest.
The wife then sued to reform the deed, by which she and her husband
had taken title, so as to create a tenancy by the entirety. The estate
counterclaimed for partition and slander of title. The trial court held that
the wife and her husband's estate each owned a one-half interest, that the
estate was entitled to rent, and that the estate was entitled to attorney's fees
under section 64.081 of the Florida Statutes.5
On appeal, the district court affirmed except as to the amount of
attorney's fees.' 6 The statute provided for attorney's fees in a partition
action and in litigation which benefits the partition. Proving title was
10. Id. at 566.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The statute of frauds was not an issue discussed in this opinion.
14. 639 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
15. Id. at 1006.
16. Id.
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critical to the partition, thus, the attorney's fees expended by the estate in
the probate proceeding were for the benefit of the partition and could
properly be awarded. However, the statute provided that fees were to be
determined "on equitable principles in proportion to his interest.,"7
Therefore, since each party to the partition had a one-half interest, the estate
should have been awarded only one half of its attorney's fees.'"
Prosperi v. Code, Inc.'9 Justice Grimes wrote the majority opinion
with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald, Shaw,
Kogan, and Harding concurred. The opinion addressed the two following
certified questions from the Fourth District Court of Appeal:
IS AN OWNER WHO PREVAILS ON A COMPLAINT BY A CON-
TRACTOR OR SUB-CONTRACTOR TO ENFORCE A MECHANIC'S
LIEN UNDER PART I, CHAPTER 713, FLORIDA STATUTES
(1989), ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 713.29, EVEN
THOUGH, IN THE SAME SUIT, THE CONTRACTOR PREVAILED
AGAINST THE OWNER ON A CLAIM FOR MONEY DAMAGES
FOR BREACH OF THE CONTRACT, BOTH CLAIMS ARISING
OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION?
DOES THE TEST OF MORITZ V. HOYT FOR DETERMINING WHO
IS THE PREVAILING PARTY FOR THE PURPOSES OF AWARD-
ING ATTORNEY'S FEES APPLY TO FEES AWARDED UNDER
SECTION 713.29, FLORIDA STATUTES?20
Prosperi, the owner, hired Code, a contractor, to make improvements
on real property. A dispute arose over the amount Prosperi had paid to
Code. Code then left the job site. Code brought suit to foreclose on a
mechanic's lien and for breach of contract against Prosperi, who counter-
claimed for breach of contract. The trial court determined that $31,898.01
remained unpaid, and that $14,588.95 should be deducted for payments to
another contractor to finish the job.2' The court denied Code's attorney's
fees. The court also denied Prosperi attorney's fees, because he was not the
prevailing party, even though Code had filed false affidavits on mechanic's
liens.22 Prosperi appealed and the trial court's decision was quashed.23
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
20. Id. at 1361.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1362-63.
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The Florida Supreme Court stated that there is no unqualified answer
as to the first certified question. 24 Had Prosperi prevailed solely on an
issue of a mechanic's lien, which was brought forward with fraudulent
affidavits, he would have been awarded attorney's fees. It was not the
intent of the legislature to grant attorney's fees to a defendant who
successfully defended against a mechanic's lien, but was still found liable
for labor and materials and for breach of contract in the same case. Simply
receiving a judgment does not mean that one is the prevailing party.
Neither is the net judgment rule dispositive on the issue. The owner was
innocent as to the lien, and as such, was entitled to attorney's fees. The
contractor was not entitled to attorney's fees under the circumstances of this
case. Therefore, the court answered the second certified question in the
affirmative.
State, Department of Transportation v. Ben Hill Griffin, Inc.26 Judge
Blue wrote the opinion. Acting Chief Judge Threadgill and Judge Quince
concurred. The Department of Transportation brought an action to condemn
property. The respondent was joined as a party because it possibly had
acquired a prescriptive easement. The respondent retained an attorney and
filed an answer. After it concluded that it did not have any interest in the
property and agreed to be dropped from the action, the trial court granted
its motion for attorney's fees.27
The district court reversed.2 ' A claim for attorney's fees must be
based upon a contract or a statute. This claim was based on section 73.091
of the Florida Statutes which provides: "Except as provided in s. 73.092,
the petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit
court, including, but not limited to, a reasonable attorney's fee . ... 9
There was nothing in section 73.092 to prevent this respondent from
recovering attorney's fees. However, the district court used the purpose
approach to deny fees to this respondent.
The purpose of this statute was to make whole a landowner whose
property has been taken. This respondent did not have any property.
Therefore, the purpose of this statute would not be accomplished by
allowing this respondent to recover attorney's fees. While the court was
24. Prosperi, 626 So. 2d at 1363.
25. Id.
26. 636 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
27. Id. at 826.
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1993).
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following established precedent," the reasoning was based upon an
unacceptable premise. In fact, the purpose of requiring compensation for
landowners whose land has been taken by the government is to prevent
public burdens of society from being unduly shifted to a narrower class.
The attorney's fees statute should further that purpose as well. In this case,
the respondent had not become part of a narrower class forced to shoulder
the cost of a societal need when it became obligated to pay attorney's fees
to protect whatever interest it might have had in this land.
V. BROKERS
Baxas Howell Mobley, Inc. v. BP Oil Co.3 Judge Gersten wrote the
opinion for the panel which included Judges Nesbitt and Jorgenson. A
broker was allegedly offered the following deal: the buyer would pay a
commission if it acquired a particular property; but, the buyer would pay the
commission only if the broker could not get a commission from the seller.
The seller filed for bankruptcy and the buyer eventually bought the property
from the bankrupt's estate. The broker filed a claim in bankruptcy for its
commission. The claim was denied because the bankruptcy court concluded
the broker was not employed by the seller and was not the procuring cause
of the sale.32
The broker then sued the buyer in state court. The buyer raised the
defenses of: 1) claim preclusion (res judicata) and 2) issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel). The buyer's theory was that the seller's bankruptcy
also had relieved it of its obligation to pay a commission, which could not
be obtained from the seller. The trial court granted summary judgment for
the buyer, but the district court reversed.33
Claim preclusion would only apply if the two cases involved the same
claim or cause of action. This action involved breach of a commission
contract with the buyer. The bankruptcy claim involved breach of a
commission contract with the seller. Because these were different contracts,
claim preclusion was inapplicable.
Since the bankruptcy court is a federal court, the federal theory of issue
preclusion was applied. For issue preclusion to apply, the issue decided in
30. Ben Hill Griffin, Inc., 636 So. 2d at 826 (citing Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So.
2d 684 (Fla. 1954)). The rule is that only a landowner whose land was taken may recover
attorney's fees under this statute. See id.; see also Grieser v. State, Dep't of Transp., 371
So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
31. 630 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
32. Id. at 208-09.
33. Id. at 210.
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the first case must be the same as the issue in the later case. The issue in
this case was whether the broker had a commission contract with the buyer.
However, the issues decided in the bankruptcy court were whether the
broker was employed by the seller and whether the broker had been the
procuring cause of the sale. These issues were not the same. Thus, issue
preclusion was inapplicable.
Edelstein v. Flanagan.34 Judge Klein wrote the opinion. Chief Judge
Dell and Senior Judge Downey concurred. The sole shareholder of a
business listed it for sale with a real estate broker. A buyer was located and
a contract for the sale of the business's assets was executed. Later, the
parties entered into a new contract for the sale of seller's shares of stock,
rather than the business's assets. The seller accepted promissory notes for
part of the purchase price. The buyer then defaulted on the notes.
Consequently, the seller sued.
The buyer claimed, inter alia, that he was entitled to rescission based
upon the Florida Securitiep and Investor Protection Act." The theory was
that the transaction involved the sale of securities, the broker was not
licensed as a securities broker, and under Florida law any sale of securities
by someone not licensed is subject to rescission. 36 The court rejected this
claim." It noted that the broker was engaged to find a buyer for the
business, which is what the broker did. Even though the transaction was
ultimately structured to be the sale of the corporate stock, it did not
transform the nature of the brokerage into securities brokerage covered by
the Securities Act.
The legislature has amended chapter 475 of the Florida Statutes, which
regulates real estate brokers and salespeople, to deal with the responsibilities
to the buyer.3' Definitions are provided for "disclosed dual agent," who
is the agent of both the buyer and seller and owes each a fiduciary duty, and
"transaction broker," who is not the agent of either the buyer or the seller
but acts to facilitate the sale and owes each a duty of disclosure of known
facts. 39  The broker or salesperson must disclose whether he or she is
34. 630 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
35. FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1989).
36. Id. § 517.211(1).
37. Edelstein, 630 So. 2d at 1206.
38. Act of July 1, 1994, ch. 94-119, § 134, 1994 Fla. Laws 233, 342. Chapter 94-119
also involves amendment to the regulations of a wide array of professions. Inter alia, it also
modifies the procedure to recover from the Real Estate Recovery Fund. Act of Oct. 1, 1994,
ch. 94-337, § 4, 1994 Fla. Laws 2233, 2235 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 475.482).
39. FLA. STAT. § 475.01 (1991), amended by, Act of July 1, 1994, ch. 94-119, § 134,
1994 Fla. Laws 233, 342.
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acting as an agent or as a transaction broker. If the broker or salesperson
is going to act as a dual agent, he must get written permission to do so, and
he must disclose for whom he is acting as an agent.
VI. CONDOMINIUMS
Bisque Associates of Florida, Inc. v. Towers of Quayside No. 2
Condominium Ass 'n.40 Judge Nesbitt wrote the opinion. Bisque Associates
is the owner of a condominium at the Towers of Quayside. A series of
drainage backups caused approximately $10,000 in damage. Bisque sought
damages for diminution of value to the rental property. At trial, Quayside
requested that the judge exclude all evidence of the diminution of value,
arguing that the difficulties were temporary. Bisque argued that it could no
longer rent the unit. The trial judge held for Quayside.41 The jury found
damages for repairs only.42
Bisque appealed. The question was whether determination of a
permanent or temporary injury to real property is a matter of law or a jury
question. This was a question which had not been explicitly addressed in
Florida. 3 Bisque wanted to plead impairment to value because of its
requirement to disclose material facts to potential buyers. Per the majority,
even though the court can rule on the expertise of witnesses, it should not
prevent the jury from hearing evidence because it decided the damage was
not permanent.44 Therefore, the judgment as to the permanent nature of
the damages was reversed.45
Braemer Isle Condominium Ass'n v. Boca H, Inc.46 In a prior
settlement over construction defects, the condominium association released
Hyman from all claims known or unknown. Subsequently, further defects
were discovered in the same buildings which were the subjects of the
previous litigation. Braemer brought suit against Hyman on these damages.
Hyman was awarded a summary judgment based upon the previous
settlement.
47
Braemer appealed the summary judgment. The settlement which ended
the previous litigation was the culmination of a two-year discovery process
40. 639 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
41. Id. at 999.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Bisque Assocs., 639 So. 2d at 1000.
46. 632 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1994).
47. Id. at 707.
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which went to a jury trial. The settlement was entered by two parties of
equal bargaining power and was not the result of fraud, coercion, or undue
influence." Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment.49
Brooks v. Ocean Village Condominium Ass'n.50 Brooks was the
owner of a condominium at Ocean Village. As a result of unpaid condo-
minium assessments totaling $3984.44, the association sought to foreclose
a lien against Brooks. At trial, a default judgment was entered against
Brooks. The trial court denied Brooks' motion to set aside the default."
Brooks appealed, asserting that the trial court, a circuit court, was
without jurisdiction to enter the default judgment. County courts are now
included among the courts with competant jurisdiction to hear foreclosure
matters. The district court held that, as the amount at issue was within the
jurisdictional limit of the county court, the circuit court was without
jurisdiction to enter the default and default judgment, and therefore reversed
and remanded the case to county court.52
Fisher v. Tanglewood at Suntree Country Club Condominium Ass 'n.
Fisher owns several units in the Tanglewood condominiums, all of which
are located in building 1100. Fisher refused to pay special assessments, as
none of his units were in the buildings on which the association levied the
assessments. The association filed a three count complaint seeking
foreclosure, money damages, and injunctive relief. Fisher counterclaimed
with declaratory judgment, slander of title, abuse of process, and breach of
fiduciary duty. The trial court awarded summary judgment for the
association on foreclosure, abuse of process, and breach of fiduciary duty.
The other counts were not disposed of by the trial court. 4
Count I of the complaint was a non-final judgment. Count II alleged
the same grounds, but sought a different remedy (money damages). Count
III of the counterclaim, abuse of process, was moot, as the court granted the
foreclosure. Misuse of process, after the process issues, constituted abuse
of process. Count IV was properly dismissed because the counterclaim
failed to state a cause of action in that Tanglewood was named in the action,
not the board of directors. 5
48. Id.
49. Id. at 708-09.
50. 625 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
51. Id. at 111.
52. Id. at 112.
53. 19 Fla. L. Weekly D483 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1994).
54. Id. at D483.
55. Id.
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The trial court also required Fisher to pay $7200 during the pendency
of the trial to Tanglewood 6 This amount reflected a compromise wherein
monies were paid in lieu of the appointment of a receiver. Fisher failed to
include any transcript of the record, and as such, could not prove reversible
error. Therefore, the order was affirmed."
Glynn v. Siegal." This is ani opinion written by Judge Stevenson with
which Judges Anstead and Pariente concurred. The question before the
court was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment of
foreclosure against those unit owners who failed to pay their monthly fee on
a community facilities lease. 9
The question arose when certain unit owners challenged the procedure
used by the lessor of the facilities. The lessor devised a program by which
a unit owner could purchase an undivided interest in the lease. This resulted
in a warranty deed to the purchasing unit owner for that share. That unit
owner would receive a monthly sum equivalent to the rent. On the books,
the lessor showed the due payments as counterbalancing entries. The result
was that the purchasing unit owner no longer had to mail in his or rent
under the lease. Non-purchasing unit owners asserted that the transaction
resulted in a rent reduction for the purchasing unit owners. As a result, they
claimed it violated the mandate that all unit owners were obligated equally
for common expenses."
The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment. 1 It reasoned
that each owner still had the obligation to pay the monthly rent. The only
difference was that the purchasing unit owners were to receive an equal
amount in return for their investment. Thus, the court stated that eliminat-
ing double check writing did not alter the obligation to pay rent.62
Islander Beach Club Condominium Ass'n of Volusia County v.
Johnston."3 Johnston was the owner of three condominium unit weeks at
Islander Beach Club. On December 5, 1992, a meeting was to be held in
order to elect three directors for the Board of Administration. Proxy votes
were maintained in a secure area and unopened until inspected by an
independent Certified Public Accounting firm prior to election. Johnston
56. Id. at D484.
57. Id.
58. 637 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
59. Id. at 325.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 623 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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waged a proxy fight and demanded to see the sealed proxies. Islander
refused, as it considered the proxies "non-public" until three days before the
election when they would be opened. Johnston obtained an injunction to
inspect the voting proxies as they were received.'
Islander appealed. The district court stated that the most logical
interpretation of section 718.111 of the Florida Statutes is that voting
proxies are not "official records" subject to inspection until after the election
for which they were given. However, this does not mean that sealed proxies
can not be inspected as they come in. If the management has information,
then such information must be made available to the membership.
Nevertheless, a voting proxy has no legal effect until the vote is actually
cast. As proxies are reversible until cast, they are not official records."
Korandovitch v. Vista Plantation Condominium Ass 'n.66 Judge Klein
wrote the opinion with which Chief Judge Dell and Judge Anstead
concurred. The front doors of the individual condominium units at Vista
Plantation are on the outside of the building. The declaration of condomini-
um prohibits unit owners from making alterations in the appearance of the
exterior of the buildings.67 The problem arose when the condominium
association permitted Mr. and Mrs. Korandovitch and other condominium
owners to replace their screen doors with storm doors having tinted
windows. The storm doors blocked the view of the units' address numbers
located on the units' front doors. The owners, inquiring into whether the
association would approve a request to permit them to install address
numbers on their walls, next to the doors, received information that the
board would not permit it. The unit owners installed the numbers without
getting the association's approval and the board sued to obtain a permanent
injunction prohibiting the current placement of the numbers. The trial court
granted, by summary judgment, a permanent injunction in favor of the
board." The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed.69
In determining whether it was proper for the trial court to resolve the
dispute on summary judgment, the district court noted there are two
categories of restrictions with regard to condominiums." One category
involves restrictions actually located in the applicable declaration of the
64. Id. at 629.
65. Id.
66. 634 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
67. Id. at 274.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 275.
70. Id. at 274-75.
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condominium. These are more like covenants running with the land. As
such, courts presume they are valid. The only bases for invalidating these
types of restrictions is finding that the particular restriction is completely
arbitrary as applied, that it violates public policy, or that it abrogates a
fundamental constitutional right.7 Another category involves restrictions
not expressly found in the declaration. These restrictions are usually made
by the board at its discretion. Such restrictions are judged by a measure of
reasonableness. Since the declaration in this case did not expressly address
the placement of the units' address numbers, the court determined that the
restriction fell into the second category.72 In this category the board has
discretion to pass rules and make decisions that are reasonably related to the
unit owners' health, happiness, and peace of mind.73
The owners argued that there was a safety issue as the numbers could
not be seen through the tinting, and as the board approved the tinted storm
doors, the board should be estopped from preventing the application of the
numbers. After considering these arguments and looking at the photographs
included in the record, the appellate court reversed the summary judg-
ment.74
Pine Ridge at Haverhill Condominium Ass 'n v. Hovnanian of Palm
Beach I1, Inc.7' Damages were awarded to the condominium association
for construction defects which included inadequate lighting and water
intrusion from improperly installed windows. After the verdict was entered,
the motion for prejudgment interest was denied, because the jury did not
determine a date of IOSS.
76
The association appealed and the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed.77 Because no date of loss was set, the damages could have been
fixed at the time the property was turned over. As such, interest should be
awarded from that date forward.7" The court also reversed the appellee's
award of attorney's fees and stated that after the calculation of prejudgment
interest, the amount recovered would not be over 25% less than the offer.7 9
71. Korandovitch, 634 So. 2d at 274-75.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 629 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 639 So. 2d 978 (Fla.
1994).
76. Id. at 151.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 151-52.
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Therefore, an award of fees based on a rejection of an offer would be in
error.
8 0
Rogers & Ford Construction Corp. v. Carlandia Corp.8 Chief Justice
Barkett wrote the majority opinion and Justices McDonald, Shaw, Grimes,
Kogan, and Harding joined. Justice Overton concurred with an opinion.
Carlandia purchased a condominium developed by Rogers and Ford. Four
years later, Carlandia brought suit for defects to the common areas, but
alleged no defects to the individual unit." The circuit court dismissed the
claim with prejudice, finding that Carlandia did not have individual standing
and did not join the condominium association as an indispensable party.83
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed finding that Carlandia had
standing to sue, since it possessed an individual share of the common
areas.84 Nevertheless, the district court certified to the Florida Supreme
Court the question "[m]ay an individual condominium unit owner maintain
an action for construction defects in the common elements or common areas
of the condominium?" 85
The supreme court restated the question as two questions:
(1) Does a condominium unit owner have standing to sue the developer
or general contractor to recover damages for construction defects or
deficiencies in the common elements or common areas of the condo-
minium?
(2) If so, must the interests of the other unit owners be represented in
the suit for the unit owner with standing to maintain the action?86
Thereafter, it answered both questions affirmatively.
87
The supreme court reasoned that the legislature cannot determine who
has standing to sue, for that is a judicial function.88 Usually, the courts
look to one holding a legally protectable right or interest in jeopardy, or
having an interest in some other justiciable controversy, as being one who
may seek judicial determination of that issue. Such a person or entity
typically is classified as a real party in interest for the purposes of Florida
80. Pine Ridge, 629 So. 2d at 152.
81. 626 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1993).
82. Id. at 1351.
83. Id. at 1351-52.
84. Id. at 1352.
85. Id. at 1351.
86. Rogers & Ford Constr. Corp., 626 So. 2d at 1351.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1352.
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Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(a). The allegations in Carlandia's complaint
identified a sufficient threatened interest. Carlandia's undivided share of the
common elements would be affected by damages to them.
A further question was whether the legislature affected the right to sue
for such defects by transferring that right to the condominium association."
In looking at section 718.111(3) of the Florida Statutes, the supreme court
noted that the statute does not designate the condominium association as the
sole holder of the right to sue. The statute merely gives the association the
capacity to bring suit. The court noted that the statute expressly reserved
to the unit owners their statutory and common law rights to sue without
necessarily involving the association.9" Those rights include the right to
sue for construction defects.9' Therefore, the supreme court held that a
condominium unit owner has standing to sue the developer or general
contractor to recover damages for construction defects or deficiencies in the
common elements or common areas of the condominium.92 However, as
a matter of judicial economy to avoid "piecemeal litigation," the individual
owner may bring such suits only after the owner has taken steps necessary
to assure that the other unit owners' interests are represented in the
immediate litigation.93 Finally, the Florida Supreme Court expressly stated
that it did not determine whether a unit owner might proceed with an
individual action against the association or its board members for failing to
pursue the claims, since that question was not presented by this case.94
Taylor v. Wellington Station Condominium Ass'n." The association
filed a complaint that Taylor, a member of the association's Board of
Directors, had breached his fiduciary duty. Taylor was also an officer of the
developer and a 25% shareholder in the developer. The association alleged
that Taylor failed to enforce obligations of the developer, and failed to
designate expenses properly chargeable to the developer. The trial court
entered partial summary judgment finding Taylor personally liable for
willfully breaching his duties.96 The question of willfulness is properly
decided by a jury. The evidence did not eliminate the factual issue as to
89. Id. at 1352-53.
90. Id. at 1353.
91. Rogers & Ford Constr. Corp., 626 So. 2d at 1354.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1355 n.7.
95. 633 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
96. Id. at 44.
19941
229
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
whether Taylor's conduct rose to the level required for individual liability.
Therefore, the district court reversed.97
Torres v. K-Site 500 Associates.98 On October 22, 1989, Torres and
Lueckhardt entered into a contract to purchase a condominium from K-Site
500 Associates. A deposit of $25,580 was placed on the unit, but Ms.
Lueckhardt stated that she wanted the unit placed in her name only. The
two buyers were not married and Torres had an inadequate financial history
for a mortgage. K-Site informed the buyers that although the two names
were on the agreement, Lueckhardt could finance by herself. Lueckhardt
submitted the application for financing and received a thirty-year fixed
mortgage at 9.625%. 9'
In February of 1991, the buyers received a letter from K-Site informing
them that the project was near completion and they would be receiving
information about closing. Additionally, in the fifth paragraph, there was
a sentence which stated that the letter constituted notification concerning
paragraph three of the purchase agreement. Paragraph three stated that the
buyer's obligation to purchase was contingent upon a commitment for a
mortgage, and specified a ten-day period for submission of a mortgage
application.'00
The application was rejected because Torres was not on the applica-
tion.' When resubmitted the terms were 11%. The buyers sought to
recover the deposit. The trial court found for the sellers, because the
application was submitted after the ten-day period. 2
According to the appellate court, although the application was not
submitted within the ten-day period after receipt of the letter, the letter was
not proper notification that an application was required to be submitted.
Therefore, the ten-day period could be waived. It would be inequitable to
allow the sellers to recover the deposit when they acquiesced in the breach.
Therefore, it reversed the lower court. 3
Further, as to condominiums, an amendment to section 718.116 of the
Florida Statutes became law on June 3, 1994 without the governor's
approval. 0 4 The amendment includes greater detail as to the liability of
97. Id. at 45.
98. 632 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
99. Id. at 111.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Torres, 632 So. 2d at 112.
104. Act of Oct. 1, 1994, ch. 94-350, § 10, 1994 Fla. Laws 2367, 2385.
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unit owners for unpaid assessments, regardless of how they acquired title to
the property. Particularly, a first mortgagee which acquires title by
foreclosure or by deed in lieu of foreclosure would be liable for prior
assessments. However, limitations have been provided in the amendment.
Of note, the amendment as to first mortgagees applies only to those first
mortgagees whose mortgages were recorded after April 1, 1992. The act as
amended will take effect October 1, 1994.05
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Moorman v. Department of Community Affairs."0 6 Judge Gersten
wrote the opinion. Judge Baskind filed a concurring opinion. Chief Judge
Schwartz filed an opinion specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The property involved was located within the Big Pine Key Area of Critical
Concern in Monroe County. Some landowners had obtained permits to
build fences on their land. When the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory
Commission rescinded their permits, the landowners appealed. The reason
for the rescission was that Monroe County Land Development Regulations
banned all fences in the area; the regulation provided there would be no
exceptions.
The court pointed out that an exercise of the police power must relate
to public health, safety, and welfare and that the means chosen to implement
the regulation must "bear a reasonable and substantial relation to the purpose
sought to be attained."'0 7 Following a basic rule of construction, the court
should try to sustain the constitutionality of a statute by indulging every
reasonable doubt in favor of its constitutionality, i.e., by interpreting it, if
possible, to be in harmony with the constitution. On the other hand, the
Florida Constitution recognizes the importance of private property' and
the importance of minimizing government intrusion into the lives of its
citizens.'0 9 Consequently, the means chosen must be narrowly tailored to
be the least restrictive means. The district court found that the record would
not support a finding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied."0
105. Id. at 2357.
106. 626 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 639 So. 2d 977
(Fla. 1994).
107. Moorman, 626 So. 2d at 1110 (quoting In re Forfeiture of 1969 Piper Navajo, 592
So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. 1992)); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
108. See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9.
109. See id. § 23.
110. Moorman, 626 So. 2d at 1111.
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Thus, it proceeded to consider a facial challenge, concluding that it was
unconstitutional because the statute was not narrowly tailored."'
Chief Judge Schwartz correctly, but without explanation, challenged
this logic."' The purpose of the regulation was to protect an endangered
species, the Key Deer. The record revealed that only one of the four
properties involved was actually in the Key Deer's natural habitat, so that
fences on the other three properties would not harm the deer. In some
cases, fences might actually be beneficial to the Key Deer. In addition, the
fence was necessary for one landowner to protect his children from falling
into the nearby canal, a serious danger. These facts could and should have
been sufficient to demonstrate that the regulation was not constitutional as
applied to these properties.
VIII. CONSTRUCTION
The legislature amended the State Emergency Management Act"t3 by
adding a new statute" 4 to deal with contractor rip-offs during a declared
emergency,115 that causes "damage to a significant number of residential
structures,"'"1 6 or during the two years following enactment, in the area
covered by the Hurricane Andrew emergency proclamation." 7 If the
contract is to make repairs or improvements to residential real property, the
contractor can use deposits or advances only: a) to purchase materials
related to the contract;".8 b) to pay for work done under the contract; or
c) to pay for governmental fees or charges, e.g., permit fees needed to
perform the contract. Additionally, the contractor can only use up to 15%
to pay necessary expenses and overhead connected with the contract."'
A contractor who has received over 10% of the contract price is
required to apply for permits within thirty days and to begin work within
111. Id.
112. See Chief Judge Schwartz's special concurrence and dissent. Id.
113. FLA. STAT. §§ 252.31-.63 (1993).
114. Act of July 1, 1994, ch. 94-110, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 151, 151 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 252.361).
115. An emergency can be declared by the governor. It may not continue for longer
than sixty days unless renewed by the governor. It may be terminated by the governor or
by a concurrent resolution of the legislature. FLA. STAT. § 252.36(2) (1993).
116. Ch. 94-110, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws at 152.
117. Id. §2, at 152.
118. FLA. STAT. § 252.361(2) (1993).
119. Id.
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ninety days after receiving the permits.' A contractor is prohibited from
not performing for a ninety-day period, if it is done with an intent to
defraud.' The statute provides an inference that intent to defraud exists
if the contractor has received money for future work, and has failed to
perform for thirty days after the date of receiving notice to perform. 2
Notice to perform could be given after sixty days of nonperformance.
Violation of this statute constitutes theft.' Depending on the
amount, the conduct may be classed as petit theft, which is a misdemeanor,
or grand theft,2 4 which may be classified as a felony of the first, second,
or third degree. The penalty could be as much as thirty years imprison-
ment.
25
Castro v. Sangles.126  Chief Judge Schwartz wrote the opinion.
Landowners hired an unlicensed contractor and then obtained a building
permit by making the sworn misrepresentation that no contractor would be
involved in the construction. Subsequently, the landowners sued the
contractor over his alleged breach of the construction contract. The trial
court dismissed the case, holding that the contract was unenforceable under
section 489.128 of the Florida Statutes127 The district court affirmed.
28
The statute provided:
As a matter of public policy, contracts entered into on or after October
1, 1990, and performed in full or in part by any contractor who fails to
obtain or maintain his license in accordance with this part [chapter 489,
Part I] shall be unenforceable in law, and the court in its discretion may
extend this provision to equitable remedies. 9
The district court pointed out the general rule, that no action can be
maintained on an illegal contract if a person is himself guilty of a wrongdo-
ing. Certainly that is consistent with the plain language of the statute, which
120. Id. § 252.361(3).
121. Id. § 252.361(4)(a).
122. Id. § 252.361(4)(b). The contents of the notice to perform are specified in §
252.361(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes.
123. FLA. STAT. § 252.361(5) (1993).
124. Id. § 812.014(2).
125. Id. § 775.082(3)(b).
126. 637 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
127. Id. at 990.
128. Id. at 992.
129. Id. at 990 n.1.
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provides that the contract is "unenforceable." Next, the district court
explained why the exceptions to this rule would not apply.
When a statute makes a contract illegal in order to protect a narrow
class of victims, the contract's illegality may not be used to further victimize
that class. Thus, if this statute was intended to protect consumers, it could
not be invoked to victimize consumers. However, the purpose of this
subsection is to protect the general public from a wide range of ills
associated with unlicensed contractors. 3 Therefore, this exception was
not applicable.
Another exception is that a wrongdoer may not invoke the rule to the
detriment of an innocent party. However, the parties here were in pari
delicto. The landowners had engaged in prohibited conduct, when
apparently in order to get a lower price, they had misrepresented the facts
to get the permit. They claimed to have suffered from one of the anticipat-
ed harms of using an unlicensed contractor, shoddy work.
It should be noted that in 1993, the legislature moved to strengthen the
statute. 3 ' The 1991 version of the statute made the contract unenforce-
able at law. The court of equity could, in its discretion, extend that
protection to equity. Now the contract is unenforceable in equity as
well.
32
IX. COVENANTS, DEEDS, AND RESTRICTIONS
Loveland v. CSX Transportation, Inc.'33 Judge Jorgenson, joined by
Judges Ferguson and Goderich, wrote the court's opinion. The court
reversed summary judgment in favor of titleholders in an action to enforce
a reversionary interest in a 1926 deed.' 34
130. See FLA. STAT. § 489.101 (1991).
The Legislature recognizes that the construction and home improvement
industries may pose a danger of significant harm to the public when incompetent
or dishonest contractors provide unsafe, unstable, or short-lived products or
services. Therefore, it is necessary in the interest of the public health, safety,
and welfare to regulate the construction industry.
Id.
131. Act of July 1, 1993, ch. 93-166, § 17, 1994 Fla. Laws 1015, 1041.
132. "As a matter of public policy, contracts entered into on or after October 1, 1990,
and performed in full or in part by any contractor who fails to obtain or maintain his license
in accordance with this part [chapter 489, Part I] shall be unenforceable in law or in equity."
FLA. STAT. § 489.128 (1993) (emphasis added).
133. 622 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
134. Id. at 1123.
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In 1926, Redlands Sales Co. transferred property to the predecessor in
interest to CSX. The warranty deed provided that in the event the property
was abandoned and not used for railroad purposes, it would revert to the
grantor. In 1984, 1985, and 1987, CSX sold portions of this property to
purchasers who did not use their respective lots for railroad purposes. In
1990, Loveland, the successor in interest to Redlands, brought an action for
declaratory relief seeking a reverter, quiet title, and ejectment against CSX
and the subsequent purchasers of the property.' All parties filed motions
for summary judgment. The trial court granted a summary judgment against
Loveland, holding that CSX had not abandoned the property, and even if it
did, that the statute of limitations and laches barred any action because of
earlier leases by CSX. 36
The district court, in reversing the summary judgment noted that,
although a restriction is construed strongly against the grantor, it must be
construed within the intent of the parties. 137 If there is only one construc-
tion which gives full effect to the instrument's words, that construction
should be used.'38 CSX contended that reverter is improper as long as the
railroad operated on the property, even if there were a substantial transfer
of property. The district court rejected this.'3 9 The intent of the restric-
tion was for the property to be used for railroad purposes.
Since CSX still operated a railroad on the property, the district court
decided that two questions needed to be answered. The first was whether
the transferred parcels were abandoned or no longer used for railroad
purposes. 4 A "railroad purpose" is one for the primary benefit of the
public and not an individual. 4 ' Therefore, if parcels are conveyed to
those who are not using the property for railroad purposes, the restriction is
violated and the reverter clause may apply. The sales in this case violated
the restriction.'42
The second question, if the reverter clause applied, is whether there
might be a reversion only as to those parcels which were no longer used for
railroad purposes."' The district court noted that partial reversion has
135. Id. at 1121.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Loveland, 622 So. 2d at 1121.
139. Id. at 1122.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Loveland, 622 So. 2d at 1122.
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been appropriate where the parcels violating the restriction could equitably
be separated from the main parcel.'
The time for the triggering of the reverter clause must be considered.
Some portions of the main tract were leased prior to being sold. The lease
may trigger the reversion, which may then be barred as a result of the
statute of limitations of laches. However, the date of sale triggers the
reversion for other parcels. These questions were not answered by the
record. Therefore, this was a premature summary judgment.'45
Margate Investment Corp. v. Lupowitz. ' This is an opinion written
by Judge Polen with which Judges Glickstein and Warner concurred. The
question before the court was whether the grantor, under a warranty deed
containing a warranty against encumbrances, would be liable for a breach
of such warranty when the grantor had failed to pay 1980 real estate taxes
which were not assessed until 1985.117 Noting that taxes cannot become
due and give rise to a lien until they are assessed, the court found that the
grantor was not liable under the subject covenant, since the taxes assessed
in 1985 did not encumber the property in 1981 when the warranty deed was
made and delivered. 14
8
Palm Point Property Owners' Ass'n v. Pisarski.149 Justice Kogan
wrote the opinion with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton,
McDonald, Shaw, Grimes, and Harding concurred. The matter came to the
Florida Supreme Court from the certified question:
ABSENT A SPECIFIC RULE OF PROCEDURE, DOES A PROPER-
TY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION THAT IS NOT A DIRECT SUCCES-
SOR TO THE INTERESTS OF THE DEVELOPER AND PROVISION
FOR WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE GRANTOR'S ORIGI-
NAL SUBDIVISION SCHEME HAVE STANDING TO MAINTAIN
AN ACTION TO ENFORCE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS? 50
Palm Point Property Owners' Association sought to enjoin Pisarski
from violating deed restrictions regarding constructing a swimming pool,
stem walls, and docks. Pisarski sought a dismissal, alleging the association
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 638 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
147. Id. at 143.
148. Id. at 144.
149. 626 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1993).
150. Id. at 195.
Vol. 19
236
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman
had no standing because it was not a successor in interest to the developer.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and the district court affirmed.'51
The supreme court noted the general rule, that a restrictive covenant
can only be enforced by the party whom the covenant was intended to
benefit. 52  There was no intent that these covenants benefit Palm
Point.' Thus, enforcement by the association would be proper only if
the association was a direct successor in interest to the developer, or the
developer expressly assigned to the association the enforcement rights. 54
Neither occurred here. In addition, the supreme court expressly rejected the
theories of associational standing, and homeowners' associations' automatic
standing to enforce covenants as representatives of the associations'
members, without legislative authority."'
Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass'n v. Caruana'56 Justice Shaw
wrote the opinion with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton,
McDonald, Grimes, Kogan, and Harding concurred. Before the court was
the certified question:
WHETHER THE FLORIDA MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
HAS THE EFFECT OF EXTINGUISHING A PLAT RESTRICTION
WHICH WAS CREATED PRIOR TO THE ROOT OF TITLE WHERE
THE MUNIMENTS OF TITLE IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE DE-
SCRIBE THE PROPERTY BY ITS LEGAL DESCRIPTION WHICH
MAKES REFERENCE TO THE PLAT AND THE MUNIMENTS OF
TITLE STATE THAT THE CONVEYANCE IS GIVEN SUBJECT TO
COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS OF RECORD. 57
Townsend Construction Corporation and Caruana purchased a parcel
of land in Sunshine Vistas and began construction of a building. The
association sought to enforce a setback restriction contained in a plat
predating the root of title. Townsend and Caruana argued that the
Marketable Record Title Act extinguished the setback restriction, because
it was not specifically identified in the muniments of title beginning with the
151. Id. at 196.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Pisarski, 626 So. 2d at 196.
155. Id. at 197.
156. 623 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1993).
157. Id. at 491.
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root of title. 5 The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment.'59
The Third District Court of Appeal agreed. 6
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the results of the lower courts and
answered the certified question in the negative. 6  In doing so, the
supreme court reasoned that Florida's Marketable Record Title Act specifies
that marketable record title will not affect restrictions found in muniments
of title on which the current estate is based beginning with the root of
tile.62 However, the same statute provides an exception where there is a
specific reference in the root of title, the muniments to the book and page
of the recorded instrument give rise to the restriction, or a reference by
name to the plat contains the restriction.'63
In this case, the root of title was a 1951 deed. This deed specifically
referred to Sunshine Vistas, the name of the recorded plat containing the
restriction. Likewise, subsequent deeds, muniments of title, referred to
Sunshine Vistas. Therefore, the court felt that to have held otherwise would
have been to ignore the words in the statute.'"
Sweeney v. Mack.'65 Judge Griffin wrote the opinion with which
Chief Judge Harris and Judge Diamantis concurred. The Fifth District Court
of Appeal reversed the trial court's finding that applicable covenants and
restrictions prohibited the construction in question even though the
developer's architectural review committee approved the plans.'66
The Sweeneys purchased a lot in a fly-in development in 1988 and
submitted plans for the construction of their dwelling and hangar to the
developer's designated architectural review committee. The committee
approved the plans and the Sweeneys began constructing their dwelling.
Their neighbors, the Macks, objected to the design and the committee again
reviewed and re-approved the plans. Subsequently, the Macks sought and
obtained an injunction against the Sweeneys. The trial court found the
covenants and restrictions to be clear and unambiguous and the design to
violate the provisions.'67
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Sunshine Vistas, 623 So. 2d at 491.
162. Id. at 490.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 492.
165. 625 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 625 (Fla.
1994).
166. Id. at 17.
167. Id. at 16.
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The district court noted that even where a developer or an architectural
review committee retains the absolute power to approve building plans, they
may not act arbitrarily. However, there is no evidence in this case that the
committee's actions were arbitrary.168 Furthermore, even though cove-
nants and restrictions must be construed in favor of the freer use of the
property, the clear and reasonable intent of the parties will be honored.'69
However, where the covenant or restriction is ambiguous, the construction
will go against the party attempting enforcement. 7 The district court
found these provisions to be far from unambiguous, with terms such as
hangar and garage being undefined.'
X. EASEMENTS
Bell v. Cox.'72 Judge Thompson wrote the majority opinion with
which Judge Peterson concurred with opinion and Chief Judge Harris
dissented with opinion. The question before the court was whether Florida's
statutory way of necessity easement provisions found in sections 704.01(2)
and 704.04 of the Florida Statutes were unconstitutional. 73
The question arose from the servient land owner, Bell, who challenged
an award of a statutory way of necessity to Cox for the benefit of his land.
Bell argued that the statute's referring to land "outside any municipality"
denied equal protection under article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution
because it created an arbitrary distinction between property outside a
municipality and property inside a municipality. 74
The appellate court affirmed the trial court. 75 In so doing it deter-
mined that the statute did not abridge any fundamental right and did not
affect a suspect class. Therefore, the appellate court determined that the
applicable test was a rational basis standard rather than strict scrutiny. The
inquiry, therefore, was whether there was any conceivable basis on which
the classification bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state pur-
pose. 76 In reviewing the record, the appellate court found that Bell did
not meet the burden of showing that there was no conceivable factual basis
168. Id. at 17.
169. Id.
170. Sweeney, 625 So. 2d at 17.
171. Id.
172. 19 Fla. L. Weekly D962 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1994).
173. Id. at D963.
174. Id.
175. Id. at D964.
176. Id.
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on which the regulation would not relate to a legitimate state purpose.'
Likewise, the court dismissed Bell's challenges of unconstitutionality for not
defining the term "unreasonable refusal" to allow attorney's fees under
section 704.04 and found that the two sections in question were not contrary
to the public policy goal of protecting ecologically sensitive land pursuant
to section 187.201 of the Florida Statutes.78
Chicago Title Insurance v. Florida Inland Navigation District.
179
This is a per curiam opinion with which Chief Judge Dell, Judge Klein and
Senior Judge Owen concurred. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
judgment that a perpetual easement in favor of the United States was not
extinguished either by a patent to Florida, not making the patent subject to
the easement, or by Florida's Marketable Record Title Act.'
Chicago Title sought a judicial declaration that the property, the title
to which it insured, was not subject to a perpetual easement granted by
Florida to the United States. Title to the subject property vested in Florida
in 1850 as a result of the Swamp Lands Act.'' However, the title rights
were inchoate until Florida requested a patent and the United States, in turn,
issued one. These were not done until 1970. Prior to 1970, Florida
conveyed two interests in the property: the perpetual easement to the United
States in 1941, which was recorded in 1942; and in 1953 fee simple title
subject to the perpetual easement to the insured's predecessor in title to said
property prior to 1970.82
Chicago Title argued that the 1970 patent, in not mentioning the
easement, passed fee simple title and the easement to the state which title,
by way of the doctrine of relation, passed to the state's subsequent grant-
ee. "'83 The district court held that the 1970 patent was merely an adminis-
trative action providing only the record evidence of the transfer of title. 8
4
It did, however, perfect the title vested in the state in 1850.85
Alternatively, Chicago Title argued that the 1953 transfer constituted
the root of title under Florida's Marketable Record Title Act. The court
found that the Marketable Record Title Act did not apply to federal property
177. Bell, 19 Fla. L. Weekly at D963.
178. Id. at D964.
179. 635 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
180. Id. at 104-05.
181. Id. at 104.
182. Id. at 105.
183. Id.
184. Chicago Title, 635 So. 2d at 105.
185. Id.
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interests as it would violate the Supremacy Clause extending to Congress the
right to dispose of federal property rights.'86
Colonial Acquisitions, Inc. v. Titus."7 This is an opinion written by
Chief Judge Harris with which Judges Dauksch and Griffin concurred. It
reversed the trial court's finding of an ingress and egress easement and to
remand the matter for a judgment consistent with the Fifth District Court of
Appeal's opinion. 8 '
Since it was clear that the trial court had not found an express
easement, the question was whether one existed through prescription or
necessity. The use was permissive. Therefore, it was not a prescriptive
easement, even though they used the property for over twenty years.89
In addition, even though the land owners closed off access from the alleged
easement holder's property to Highway 50, there was no evidence presented
that there was no reasonable access to their property. Therefore, there was
insufficient evidence to support an easement by necessity. 9 '
Dance v. Tatum. 9' Justice Shaw wrote the opinion with which Chief
Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald, Grimes, Kogan, and
Harding concurred. The Florida Supreme Court approved the district court's
decision and answered in the negative the following certified question:
WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF MOORINGSASSOCIATION, INC. V TOR-
TOISE ISLAND COMMUNITIES, THE STATEMENT IN ALBRECHT V
DRAKE LUMBER CO., TO THE EFFECT THAT AN IRREVOCABLE
LICENSE BECOMES AN EASEMENT BASED ON EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL, MEANS THAT AN IRREVOCABLE LICENSE CAN NO
LONGER EXIST IN FLORIDA. 192
In 1975, Dance purchased a tract of land. Included in the deal was an
architectural design by the seller for a car dealership. The paving of the
tract required drainage onto an adjacent lot, also owned by the seller, even
though there was no written easement to do so. In 1984, the sellers sold the
adjacent lot to the respondent who sold the parcel to petitioner Dance in
1987, subject to a purchase money mortgage and note. 93 Dance defaulted
186. Id.
187. 636 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
188. Id. at 878.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 629 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1993).
192. Id. at 128 (citations omitted).
193. Id.
1994]
241
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
on the note and a foreclosure ensued. Dance did not challenge the judgment
which was entered for Tatum, but argued that he had an easement to the
borrow pit on the adjacent parcel for drainage, even though no written
easement was ever executed between any of the parties.' 94
The trial court held that Dance had an irrevocable drainage license
which survived the foreclosure.' 95 The district court held that the license
was irrevocable but was personal to Dance and could not be transferred. 6
The Florida Supreme Court held that a license sometimes becomes
irrevocable when substantial improvements have been made by the licensee.
However, previous case law holding that such licenses become easements
is in conflict with other case law holding that an easement must be created
by express grant, prescription, or implication.' 97 The supreme court found
that the district court was correct in finding the use of the adjacent parcel
to be an irrevocable license and not an easement. 98
Haight v. Hall.'99 This is a per curiam opinion with which Judges
Ferguson, Jorgenson, and Levy concurred to affirm the trial court's
judgment annulling an easement deed.200 In 1982, Haight attempted to
install an air conditioning unit and a gas tank on his property. Because he
had to comply with setback requirements, Haight sought a perpetual
easement covering a thirty-foot section on the eastern border of his neighbor
Hall's property. In consideration of the easement, Haight paid Hall ten
dollars. Thereafter, he constructed a driveway on her property.20' In
1990, Hall decided to sell the property and, during a title search, the grant
of an easement was discovered. Thus, the buyer refused to purchase unless
the easement was extinguished. Haight refused to relinquish the easement
voluntarily and Hall sought, and was granted, a declaratory judgment
annulling the instrument. Haight appealed.20 2
Hall testified that she granted Haight temporary use of the property.
She admitted to signing a letter granting this temporary use, but claimed she
was fraudulently induced into signing an easement document and that there
were no witnesses or notary present when she signed the purported
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Dance, 629 So. 2d at 128.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 129.
199. 625 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
200. Id. at 1312.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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letter." 3 The notary could not recall the execution of the easement
document and the witnesses to the deed gave conflicting testimony as to its
execution and their witnessing. Furthermore, Haight's wife testified that
when she saw the deed it contained no witnesses or notary.0 4 As a result,
the trial court found Hall's testimony more persuasive.0 5 The Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding there to be substantial competent
evidence to support the trial court decision.20 6
Howell v. Miller. °7 This opinion, written by Judge Parker with
Acting Chief Judge Campbell and Judge Fulmer concurring, affirmed the
trial court's awarding an injunction to remove a fence and remanded the
case for further consideration of the servient estate owner's counter-
claim.20 '
The Howells and the Millers owned lots in a subdivision where all lots
have a perpetual nonexclusive road right-of-way easement. Additionally
some lots, including the Howells' and the Millers', had perpetual nonexclu-
sive canal easements.20 9 The Howells constructed a fence across the road
right-of-way easement on their lot, and the Millers filed their suit for
injunctive relief.210 The trial and appellate courts found the fence an
unreasonable interference with the easement.2" The trial court, however,
failed to address the issue in the counterclaim dealing with the scope of the
easement. Thus, the district court affirmed the injunction but remanded the
counterclaim's issues for consideration.
Phelps v. Griffith."3 This is a per curiam opinion with which Acting
Chief Judge Campbell and Judges Parker and Patterson concurred in
reversing the trial court's judgment establishing a prescriptive easement. 214
The Phelps were the owners of an unpaved road, known as Lemon Patch
Road, running across the southernmost portion of their property to the
Griffiths' property. Adjacent to that road was a fifteen-foot wide easement
which was deeded to the Griffiths for ingress and egress to their property.
203. Id.
204. Haight, 625 So. 2d at 1312.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 638 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
208. Id. at 545.
209. Id. at 544.
210. aId
211. Id. at 544-45.
212. Howell, 638 So. 2d at 544-45.
213. 629 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
214. Id. at 305.
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Thus, there were two parallel dirt lanes, with Lemon Patch Road being the
more improved of the two. Phelps fenced off the Lemon Patch Road, which
the Griffiths preferred to use. However, there was no evidence that the use
of the road adversely affected the Phelps, or their use of the property. The
Griffiths brought an action for a prescriptive easement and were awarded
that easement by the trial court,2 5 even though the Phelps took the
position that the use was neither continuous nor adverse to their own
interests, despite the continued use since 1965.216
The appellate court acknowledged the rebuttable presumption that use
is permissive. However, the court took the position that the real inquiry was
whether the use was beneficial to the actual owner or whether it interfered
with the owner's property rights.217 Recognizing that the burden is on the
one alleging the use to be adverse, the appellate court noted that there was
implicit evidence of permissive use and a record devoid of evidence that the
use of the road prevented the Phelps from using the property as they
intended. 218  Therefore, the district court reversed the judgment and
remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment
consistent with the appellate court's opinion.219
Water Control District of South Brevard v. Davidson.220 Judge Sharp
wrote the opinion with which Judges Goshom and Peterson concurred. The
court reversed part of a lower court judgment against the Water Control
District ("District"). The lower court ruled that the District had failed to
obtain title to uncultivated and unimproved portions of the disputed lands.
Therefore, the District's claims to the drainage and maintenance easements
on those portions were invalid.22'
The first question addressed was whether the District had acquired title
to the properties. After reviewing the establishment procedure of drainage
districts in general, and analyzing the procedures followed as to this district,
the court concluded that the District was properly formed and had appropri-
ately acquired title to the properties.222
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 306.
218. Phelps, 629 So. 2d at 306.
219. Id.
220. 638 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
221. Id. at 521.
222. Id. at 523.
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The next question was whether the District's interests in the properties
were properly preserved after it acquired title.22  Specifically, the court
had to address whether the Marketable Record Title Act ("MRTA") extingu-
ished the District's interests in the unused portions of the easement.224
Even though the root of title for some portions of the disputed lands referred
to the District's interests, the roots of title to other portions of the disputed
lands did not.225 Therefore, the question was whether the District's ease-
ment interests fell under other MRTA exceptions. Relying on sections
717.03(1) and (5), and 704.05(1) and (3) of the Florida Statutes, the court
found that where the District's interests were in one easement, its partially
using one section of the easement preserves its rights in the entire ease-
ment.226 Therefore, MRTA did not extinguish the District's drainage and
maintenance easement interests.
227
XI. EMINENT DOMAIN
Broward County v. Patel.221 Justice Kogan wrote this unanimous
opinion. The Florida Supreme Court had been asked the following certified
question:
MAY TiE GOVERNMENT SUBMIT EVIDENCE THAT THE
SEVERANCE DAMAGES OF A CONDEMNEE MAY BE CURED
OR LESSENED BY ALTERATIONS TO THE CONDEMNEE'S
PROPERTY WHEN THOSE ALTERATIONS REQUIRE THE
GRANT OF A VARIANCE FROM THE APPROPRIATE GOVERN-
MENTAL ENTITY HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPER-
TY?
229
The question was answered in the affirmative. The court, relying heavily
upon a treatise, Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain,230 pointed out that
the fact that the landowner can probably obtain rezoning of the land has
long been considered relevant evidence in determining a condemnation
award. There is persuasive authority that the reasonable probability of
223. Id. at 525.
224. Id.
225. Water Control Dist. ofS. Brevard, 638 So. 2d at 525.
226. Id at 526.
227. Id.
228. 641 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1994).
229. Id. at 41.
230. JULIUs L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1994).
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obtaining a variance should also be considered relevant evidence.23" ' There
is no reason why it should not be considered relevant evidence in determin-
ing severance damages. The one claiming that the variance could be
obtained would have the burden of proof on the issue. Whether it is
reasonably probable that the variance could be obtained would be a question
of fact.
Once the reasonable probability of the variance being obtained had
been determined, then the amount of damages is the question. The proper
test is "the price that would be paid by a knowledgeable buyer willing but
not obligated to buy, to a knowledgeable owner willing but not obliged to
sell. '232 That would have the effect of properly factoring into the price
the possibility, however remote, that the variance might be denied. In this
case, the trial court had erred in calculating damages. It had awarded
damages lower than those testified to by any of the expert witnesses,
including the government's expert witness. Thus, its decision was not
supported by substantial competent evidence. Secondly, the possibility of
obtaining a variance was treated as a certainty. Finally, the costs involved
in adapting the property to take advantage of the variance were not included
in the damages.
American Dive Center, Inc. v. State, Department of Transportation.233
This was a per curiam opinion with which Judges Hersey, Polen, and
Stevenson concurred. American Dive Center purchased another dive shop
in 1989. The shop was never closed but the name was changed. In 1990,
the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") began the condemnation
of an area which included the location of the dive shop. American Dive
Center sought lost business damages but, to receive them, the business
would have to be "an established business of more than 5 years' stand-
ing. 234 The trial court granted summary judgment to the DOT on the
basis that American Dive Center did not qualify.
235
The district court reversed. 236 The supreme court had established that
in such cases "[t]he essential inquiry ... is whether there was 'continuous
operation of the business at the location where the business damages [were]
231. Patel, 641 So. 2d at 42-43. Consequently, the supreme court disapproved Williams
v. State, Dep't of Transp., 579 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) and State, Dep't of
Transp. v. Byrd, 254 So. 2d 836 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1971). Id.
232. Id. at 43.
233. 632 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
234. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1989).
235. American Dive, 632 So. 2d at 278.
236. Id. at 279.
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alleged to have been suffered."'237  Whether the current owner had
operated the business that was there for five years was not the issue. The
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the record did not
conclusively show that a dive shop had not been operated at that site for
five years.
Bolduc v. Glendale Federal Bank. 3' Judge Pariente wrote the
opinion with which Chief Judge Dell and Judge Glickstein concurred. This
case did not follow the normal order of proceedings for a condemnation of
leased property. One tenant entered into a stipulated final judgment for its
full damages. The other tenant had a jury trial to determine its total
condemnation award, including business damages. Thereafter, the owner
settled with the DOT. Subsequently, the tenants sought the apportionment
of the owner's award and won. The trial court granted them the "'bonus
value' of their leasehold interests in the condemned property."2"'
The district court reversed, however.4 Had the tenants followed the
normal procedure, the value of the property would have been determined
first. A subsequent hearing would have been held to apportion the award
according to the respective rights of the claimants. But the tenants here had
taken other quicker routes to get full recovery. They were not entitled to
more than that. The effect of the apportionment was to allow the tenants
a double recovery. That was impermissible. This case should serve as a
warning to tenants faced With condemnation.
Broward County v. Ellington.24' Chief Judge Dell wrote the opinion.
Judge Glickstein and Senior Judge Owen, William C., Jr., concurred. A
consultant had been hired by the county to forecast the future needs of the
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport and had concluded that
additional land should be acquired to meet the airport's needs and to
minimize noise conflicts with the surrounding communities. A second
consultant was hired to determine how much additional property to acquire.
Acting on these reports, the county began to buy the properties west of the
airport. When one landowner would not sell, the county brought this
eminent domain suit. Even though the landowner did not present any
witnesses, the trial court found in his favor because it had concluded that the
237. Id. at 278 (quoting Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. K.E. Morris
Allignment Serv. Inc., 444 So. 2d 926, 930 (1983)).
238. 631 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
239. Id. at 1128.
240. Id. at 1129.
241. 622 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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county had enough land for the airport's needs and that the land was not
being taken for a public purpose.242
The district court reversed.243 The trial court was right in that private
property may only be taken for a public purpose, but limiting uses which are
incompatible with the operation of an airport is a public purpose.244 The
trial court was also right in that private property may not be taken unless the
taking is necessary to accomplish the public purpose. But the "necessity"
requirement is of a reasonable necessity, not an absolute one. For the
uninitiated, that may seem confusing. "Necessity" is an absolute term.
How can it be modified to be less than absolute? The critical question is:
necessary for what? As this case illustrates, that question may make
necessary seem like a relative rather than an absolute term.
The Florida Supreme Court has provided a two-tier test to determine
if property can be taken.245 First, the condemning authority must show it
has a reasonable need for the condemnation. The Director of Planning and
Development for the county's Aviation Department had testified that, in
order to guarantee that commercial uses in this area would be airport related,
the land must be taken by the government and subjected to the government's
development scheme before being leased or sold for commercial use. The
Director's conclusions were based upon studies by the consultants. The use
was consistent with the county's master plan. That amounted to substantial
competent evidence of the reasonable need, so it was enough to satisfy the
first tier.
Once the first tier has been satisfied, the burden shifts. The second tier
requires the challenger to show that the government has acted illegally, in
bad faith, or has grossly abused its discretion. Here, the challenger had not
submitted any evidence, so it failed to establish its affirmative defense.
City of Cocoa v. Holland Properties, Inc.246 Judge Peterson wrote
the opinion with which Judges Goshorn and Thompson concurred. This
case also involved the question of reasonable necessity and the Fifth District
Court of Appeal relied on Ellington.2 47 The first tier of the two-tier test
required the condemnor to show that it had a reasonable need to take the
242. Id. at 1030-31.
243. Id. at 1032.
244. See Test v. Broward County, 616 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
245. See City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, 346 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1977).
246. 625 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 624 (Fla.
1994).
247. Ellington, 622 So. 2d at 1029.
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property. Under Broward County v. Steele,2 41 the quantum of proof
required to satisfy the first tier is the introduction of "some evidence
showing reasonable necessity for taking. 2 49 The land was to be used for
well sites and the city had obtained permits for the consumption of water to
be produced from the St. Johns River Water Management District. The trial
court then held a hearing to determine whether events since the issuance of
the permit had eliminated the necessity, and decided that there was no
necessity. The district court, however, concluded that this was an error. °
The issuance of the use permit was enough to satisfy the first tier. The
evidence at the hearing would be relevant to the second tier, in order to
determine whether the condemning authority had acted in bad faith or
abused its discretion.
The legislature has revised certain procedural aspects of chapter 73 of
the Florida Statutes.2"' It has provided that section 73.032 shall be the
"exclusive offer of judgment provisions for eminent domain actions. '' 52
It provides the time when offers of judgment must be made and the
technical requirements of such offers. Sections on costs253 and on attor-
ney's fees254 were also modified, the most notable change being a sched-
ule for determining the fee based on the benefit produced.
XII. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Hughes Supply, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation."
Chief Judge Harris wrote the majority opinion with which Judges Sharp and
Peterson concurred. 6 Hughes operated a fuel storage facility and paid
the annual premiums to participate in the Florida Petroleum Liability
Insurance and Restoration Program. Subsequently, Hughes discovered a
discharge of diesel fuel coming from one of its storage tanks. Hughes
reported the leak to the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation.
The Department ordered the tank drained. Hughes, however, neglected to
drain the tank in a timely manner. Thus, the Department denied Hughes
248. 537 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
249. City of Cocoa, 625 So. 2d at 19 (quoting Steele, 537 So. 2d at 651-52).
250. Id. at 20-21.
251. Act of May 11, 1994, ch. 94-162, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 564 (amending FLA. STAT.
§§ 73.032, .091, .092 (1993)).
252. See id. at 565.
253. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1993).
254. Id. § 73.092.
255. 622 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
256. Id. at 1057.
1994]
249
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
coverage for the restoration; as it determined that Hughes was not in
substantial compliance with chapter 376 of the Florida Statutes."7
The Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the Department's determina-
tion." 8 The court reasoned that the owner need be knowledgeable of the
rules but cannot rely on others for guidance. An instruction for drainage,
while not ordered to be immediate, must, according to the rules, be
accomplished within three days of discovering the leak. Hughes' actions
failed to comply with the provisions required. 9
Young v. Department of Community Affairs.260 Justice Harding wrote
the majority opinion with which Justices Overton and Grimes concurred,
Chief Justice Barkett concurred specially with an opinion with which
Justices Shaw and Kogan concurred, and Justice Kogan concurred with an
opinion with which Justice Shaw concurred in result only, and from which
Justice McDonald dissented with an opinion.26' In rendering its opinion,
the supreme court answered the Third District Court of Appeal's certified
question by holding "that when the state land planning agency initiates a
proceeding before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission
pursuant to section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1987), that agency carries both
the ultimate burden of persuasion and the burden of going forward. 262
In 1988, the Youngs applied for clearing permits on Big Pine Key.
Monroe County granted the permits and transmitted copies to the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs as required. The Department appealed those
permits to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. The
Youngs failed to participate at an administrative hearing because the
Commission ruled that they had the burden of proof. The Commission
denied the permits.2 63  Although the Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed the Commission's denial, the supreme court quashed the decision
and remanded the matter for a new hearing before a hearing officer.264 In
so doing, the supreme court reasoned that the effect of the Department's
purported appeal to the Commission was really a request to stay the
effectiveness of an otherwise valid county order. Therefore, since it was the
Department which asserted that the proposed development failed to comply
257. Id. at 1059.
258. Id. at 1061.
259. Id. at 1060.
260. 625 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1994).
261. Id. at 831.
262. Id. at 835.
263. Id. at 832.
264. Id. at 835.
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with chapter 380 of the Florida Statutes, the Department should bear the
burden.26
XIII. EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Jordan v. Boisvert.2" Judge Joanos wrote the opinion with which
Judges Miner and Kahn concurred. The parties signed an agreement for the
sale of real property. The contract included a description of the property
and a sketch, but provided for a survey to determine the exact legal
description. Three surveys were conducted, each different due to the uncer-
tainty as to which of several willow trees was intended to be a critical
monument. When the parties could not agree on a legal description, the
buyer brought this action for specific performance.
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of relief.
Pointing out that the "trial court's judgments are entitled to a presumption
of correctness,"267 it added that
[t]he fact that the surveyor performed three surveys, each of which
varied the boundary lines of the property at issue, constitutes substantial
evidence to support the trial court's finding that even considering the
description in the contract for sale, attached drawing, and extrinsic
evidence, the description was insufficient to permit a surveyor to
establish the boundaries of the property.268
Since the exact property could not be identified, there had been no meeting
of the minds. Consequently, there was no contract.
The trial court had reserved jurisdiction to determine the attorney's fees
to be awarded. The district court found this to be an error because the basis
for the award was the attorney's fees provision in the contract.269 Since
the contract did not exist, logically fees could not be awarded under one of
its terms.
Long v. Moore.270 This is a per curiam decision with which Judges
Smith, Kahn, and Lawrence concur. The Longs bought a home for
$100,000 from the Moores. The terms were $50,000 down with the sellers
taking back a $50,000 purchase money mortgage. When the Longs could
265. Young, 625 So. 2d at 835.
266. 632 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
267. Id. at 256.
268. Id. at 257.
269. Id.
270. 626 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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not make the payments, Mr. Moore took them to the courthouse where they
executed a deed conveying the property back to the Moores. Apparently,
the Longs were allowed to remain in possession under a lease. Subsequent-
ly, the Moores filed an action to recover unpaid rent and evict the Longs
from the property. The Longs counterclaimed for rescission of both the
original sale and the subsequent reconveyance, and for the imposition of an
equitable lien on the property.27'
The rescission claim was based upon Mr. Long being a paranoid
schizophrenic. This condition prevented him from understanding the nature
and effect of this long-term real estate transaction, even though he was able
to comprehend the arithmetic involved. A conveyance to or from a party
under such mental disability would be voidable. However, this author
cannot help but wonder who, besides Mr. Long, constituted the "Longs."
Presumably, it was Mrs. Long. But there was no mention of her existence,
or her mental capacity or condition. The existence of a competent co-
grantee or co-grantor would certainly seem to be relevant to the issue of
rescission.
A critical issue in granting rescission was whether the court would be
able to return the parties to the status quo ante. Here, it appears that the
Moores were not in a position to return the down-payment to the Longs.
However, the court notes that it would be sufficient to fashion an equitable
remedy "which would be fair to both parties." '272 An example provided
is to subject the property to an equitable lien in favor of the Longs for
whatever amount the trial court subsequently determines is due to them.
Zanakis v. Zanakis.273 The opinion was written by Judge Klein and
concurred with by Judge Hersey and Senior Judge Owen, William C., Jr.
This case involved the imposition of a constructive trust and the clarification
of the terms "resulting trust" and "constructive trust." The mother of two
sons owned property. She quitclaimed the property to herself and her
responsible son so they would hold it as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship. The purpose of the transfer was to hold the property for the
other son who had problems with drugs and alcohol.
When the problem son was killed, the responsible son abandoned his
wife and moved in with his late brother's widow. They later married. A
dispute arose with his mother, so the "responsible" son quitclaimed the
property to his new wife. She brought this action for partition. Granting
271. Id. at 1388.
272. Id. at 1389.
273. 629 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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the mother's counterclaim, the trial court "imposed a resulting trust"274 on
the property for the benefit of the mother.
A constructive trust is a remedy imposed by the court of equity to
avoid unjust enrichment, even though it is not what the parties intended. In
contrast, a resulting trust arises because that is what the parties intended and
equity regards the substance rather than the form of a transaction. The trial
judge correctly recognized that this was a situation for a resulting trust,
although to characterize it as "impos[ing] a resulting trust" '275 would be
incorrect. This resulting trust arose upon the delivery of the deed by the
mother because the parties intended the title to be held for the benefit of the
problem son. However, the result was correct even if the labeling was not.
The "responsible" son also argued that the parol evidence rule should
have prevented the admission of evidence regarding a resulting or construc-
tive trust. The district court correctly rejected that argument.276 It is, as
the court stated, "well-established . . . that constructive or resulting trusts
involving real estate can be based on parol evidence." '277
The parol evidence rule provides that the terms of an integrated
agreement may not be contradicted by proof of a prior or contemporaneous
oral agreement or an earlier tentative draft.27 In this resulting trust, there
was no attempt to vary the terms of the deed. The legal title was vested in
the grantee exactly as the deed specified. However, equity recognized that
the parties intended an additional consistent term, that the "responsible" son,
the legal title holder, hold that title in trust. Similarly, the parol evidence
rule is inapplicable to a constructive trust. The constructive trust is not
based upon a prior or contemporaneous agreement. It is not based upon any
agreement. It is a remedy to prevent unjust enrichment.
XIV. HOMESTEAD
Hubert v. Hubert.279  Judge Klein wrote the majority opinion with
which Judges Anstead and Senior Judge Owen, William C., Jr., concurred.
The court reversed a trial court order establishing that the appellant's
remainder interest in his deceased father's homestead was not exempt from
274. Id. at 182.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 183.
277. Id.
278. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, ch. 3
(3d ed. 1987).
279. 622 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 624
(Fla. 1994).
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the levy of creditors because his remainder was subject to a life estate in
someone other than the decedent's heirs.280
Decedent was survived by two sons, Donald and Richard. The father
bequeathed to Donald the entire estate, except for a present life estate in the
homestead to his father's friend or until the father's friend remarried.
Richard was a judgment creditor of the estate and maintained that the
remainder was not exempt. Richard's theory was that the homestead lost its
exempt status when the decedent bequeathed a life estate to someone other
than an heir. Donald argued that if the current life estate had been held by
a surviving spouse, his interest would still be exempt. Likewise, a vested
remainder interest can be granted to a lineal descendant and a life estate
given to the surviving spouse, while both of them are protected. The trial
court agreed with Richard.28' The district court ruled that while the home-
stead protection did not inure to the life estate, it did inure to the remainder
interest. 8 2
Jacobs v. Jacobs. 3 Judge Cobb wrote the majority opinion revers-
ing and remanding the trial court's awarding attorney's fees. Judge Dauksch
concurred and Judge Griffen concurred with an opinion. In determining the
attorney's fee issue, the court had to decide whether Mary Jacobs' position
was frivolous. In essence, she claimed that she could waive her homestead
rights after her spouse passed away and that it would have the same effect
as if she had waived her homestead rights while he was alive.284
Jake and Mary Jacobs married in 1954. Jake had four children from
a previous marriage and Mary had one child from a previous marriage. Jake
had a piece of property titled solely in his name. In 1984, he executed a
will which devised all of his property as follows: 30% to Mary and 70%
to his children and stepson. However, in 1989, Jake executed a warranty
deed of the property to Mary. After his death, Mary attempted to rescind
the deed, stating that Jake did not have the mental capacity to execute it.
The trial court denied recission and the four stepchildren demanded and
received attorney's fees on the ground that the action was frivolous. Their
contention was that Mary would fair the same regardless of whether the
property was received through deed or by homestead.285
280. Id. at 1049.
281. Id. at 1050.
282. Id. at 1051.
283. 633 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
284. Id. at 31.
285. Id.
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Mary argued that she could have taken under Jake's will, rather than
accept the life estate in the homestead property under Florida law. Mary
never executed a waiver of her rights to the homestead property, either
before or during the marriage. Jake could not devise his property other than
to a surviving spouse. The question was whether he could devise in part.
According to the appellate court, there should be no impediment of a spouse
choosing to accept less than 100% of the fee or the life estate. The only
issue was the attorney's fees, as such, the argument was not frivolous and
the award of fees was reversed.8 6
King v. Ellison."7 Judge Polen wrote the majority opinion with
which Judge Dell and Senior Judge Walden, James H., concurred. The
court affirmed the trial court's dismissing with prejudice a complaint seeking
a declaratory decree that the testators became the constructive trustees of the
subject property for all of the children and stepchildren named in the
will.288 In so doing, the district court certified the following question:
WHETHER SECTION 732.401(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1991),
WHICH VESTS A REMAINDER INTEREST IN HOMESTEAD
PROPERTY IN LINEAL DESCENDANTS, IS UNCONSTITUTION-
AL WHEN APPLIED .TO DEFEAT A TESTATOR'S INTENT TO
DEVISE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY EQUALLY TO ADULT
STEPCHILDREN AS WELL AS ADULT LINEAL DESCEN-
DANTS?28 9
King is the natural daughter of Florence Calhoun, and Ellison is the
natural daughter of Hubert Calhoun. Florence and Hubert were married and
executed wills devising their individual estates to all of their children and
stepchildren to share and share alike. After Florence died, Hubert married
Rosemarie. Two years later Hubert died, leaving Rosemarie with a life
estate and the remainder in Hubert's lineal descendant, Ellison. Appellants
purchased the life estate from Rosemarie. King argued that the remarriage
should not cause the lineal descendants of Florence to be divested of what
was their and their natural mother's home. King asked at trial for the
appellees to be named as constructive trustees of the property and be given
proportional credit for the purchase price of the life estate. King argued that
286. Id. at 32.
287. 622 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 632 So. 21 1026
(Fla. 1994).
288. Id. at 600.
289. Id.
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section 732.401 of the Florida Statutes was unconstitutional as the adult
children of Hubert were benefitted over the wishes contained in Florence's
will. The trial court dismissed the complaint.290
The Fifth District Court of Appeal, while finding merit in King's
argument, failed to agree that the state has no legitimate interest in vesting
the remainder in adult descendants. Therefore, it certified the above
question to the Florida Supreme Court.29'
LaBelle v. LaBelle.292 Judge Cobb wrote the majority opinion with
which Judge Thompson and Associate Judge Hauser concurred. Dorothy
LaBelle was permitted to intervene in the dissolution involving her ex-
husband Rupert and his then wife Carmel without objection from either
party. Rupert fraudulently used Dorothy's funds to obtain a residence which
he claimed was protected from a constructive trust since it was his home-
stead.293 Since the homestead protection does not apply to properties
which are purchased with traceable fraudulently obtained funds, Rupert
could not validly rely on the homestead protection.294
Sigmund v. Elder.295 Judge Smith wrote the opinion with which
Judges Ervin and Allen concurred. The First District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's finding that a deed executed by the decedent to
himself and his wife to create a tenancy by the entirety in homestead
property was void ab initio under the 1885 Florida Constitution since the
surviving wife did not join in the execution. 296 At trial, Ruth was found
to possess a life estate with the surviving adult children possessing the
remainder interest.297
The district court rejected the surviving spouse's arguments that the
Marketable Record Title Act should cure the problem and that section
689.11 of the Florida Statutes permitted such a transfer, since the constitu-
tional requirements controlled.29
290. Id. at 599.
291. Id. at 600.
292. 624 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
293. Id. at 742.
294. Id.
295. 631 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
296. Id. at 330.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 331.
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XV. INSURANCE
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County.299
This is a per curiam opinion from an appeal heard before Chief Judge
Schwartz and Judges Baskin and Levy. The question before the court was
whether the replacement cost homeowner's insurance policy in question
would provide coverage for the cost of complying with the county's
requirement that homeowners, after the impact of Hurricane Andrew, make
structural improvements to their houses to bring them into compliance with
the South Florida Building Code including, bfit not limited to, elevating the
houses to conform to the county's flood elevation requirements."'
Noting that the construction of ambiguities in an insurance policy is a
question of law, the court found that the language in question was not
ambiguous and needed no construction." ' The policy in question was not
subject to more than one interpretation. It first excluded enforcement of an
ordinance or law regulating construction or repair of a structure. It provided
that there would be no insurance for losses or increased costs associated
with the enforcement to be in compliance with construction laws or
regulations. Therefore, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in
finding the policy and its exclusions ambiguous and unclear as a matter of
law.3
0 2
XVI. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. A.G..S.
Corp.3 0 3 Justice Grimes wrote the opinion in which Chief Justice Barkett
and Justices Overton, Shaw, Kogan, Harding, and Senior Justice McDonald
concurred. Chief Justice Barkett also wrote a brief concurrence, in which
Justice Kogan concurred, to clarify that total takings and temporary takings
were not the only categories of unconstitutional takings possible. Until
1990, when it was declared unconstitutional in Joint Ventures, Inc. v. State,
Department of Transportation,304 a statute0 5 had allowed certain agen-
cies to designate privately owned land as being reserved for road construc-
299. 639 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
300. Id. at 64.
301. Id. at 65.
302. Id. at 66.
303. 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994), opinion clarified, 1994 WL 275841 (Fla. Apr. 7, 1994).
304. 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
305. FLA. STAT. § 337.241 (1987).
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tion. No building permits could be issued for new construction or for
substantial renovation of nonresidential structures for at least five years on
land so designated. Two landowners claimed, in inverse condemnation
suits, that they were entitled to compensation because the designation of
their land had amounted to a taking, a temporary taking during the period
between the land's designation and decision striking down the statute which
allowed the designation. In the trial court, the landowners prevailed on a
motion for summary judgment and the district court affirmed," 6 but
certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
WHETHER ALL LANDOWNERS WITH PROPERTY INSIDE THE
BOUNDARIES OF INVALIDATED MAPS OF RESERVATION
UNDER SUBSECTIONS 337.241(2) AND (3), FLORIDA STATUTES
(1987), ARE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECEIVE PER SE DECLA-
RATIONS OF TAKING AND JURY TRIALS TO DETERMINE JUST
COMPENSATION.
The supreme court responded with a negative answer.
The crux of the problem was that the supreme court had not clearly
stated the basis for its decision in Joint Ventures. 117 If the basis for
invalidating the statute had been its violation of the taking clause, then
compensation would have been required and the only issue in question
would have been the amount. However, if the basis had been the violation
of the Due Process Clause, then no compensation would be required unless
provided for by a statute.
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that Joint Ventures relied upon
a due process violation because: the plaintiffs had not sought compensation
for a taking; the court's analysis had focused on the method, not the effect
of the statute; and the decision was to invalidate the statute, not to require
the agency to choose between abandoning its action or providing compensa-
tion.3"8 Thus, the relief sought, the court's analysis, and the court's
conclusion were all consistent with a due process violation.
The conclusion would not necessarily deprive the plaintiffs of relief.
It merely deprived them of a head start in their litigation. Because the
taking had already been established in the earlier case, on remand the
306. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 608 So. 2d 52
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 621 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1993), and quashed by
640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
307. Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 622.
308. Tampa-Hillsborough, 640 So. 2d at 57-58.
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plaintiffs would have to prove that their land had, in fact, been taken during
the period that it was designated as being reserved for road construction.
Palm Beach County v. Wright."9 Chief Justice Grimes wrote the
opinion with which Senior Justice McDonald and Justices Overton, Shaw,
Kogan, and Harding concurred. The Palm Beach County Comprehensive
Plan ("Plan") included a section on traffic circulation. On a map, it identi-
fied transportation corridors for new roads or the expansion of existing
roads. The Plan prohibited the granting of any permits for development
within the corridors which would interfere with the future roadway
construction. Owners of property along an existing road challenged the
constitutionality of the Plan because the map showed that part of their land
would be the site of possible future road widening. The constitutionality of
this part of the Plan was attacked based upon the precedent of Joint
Ventures10 in which the supreme court had declared a similar statute3 '
unconstitutional. The issue was presented to the supreme court in the form
of the following certified question:
IS A COUNTY THOROUGHFARE MAP DESIGNATING CORRI-
DORS FOR FUTURE ROADWAYS, AND WHICH FORBIDS LAND
USE ACTIVITY THAT WOULD IMPEDE FUTURE CONSTRUC-
TION OF A ROADWAY, ADOPTED INCIDENT TO A COMPRE-
HENSIVE COUNTY LAND USE PLAN ENACTED UNDER THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION ACT, FACIALLY UNCON-
STITUTIONAL UNDER Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of
Transportation?
1 2
The supreme court provided a negative answer. The statute in Joint
Ventures had been found to violate the Due Process Clause, not the taking
clause. 3 Consequently, it could not be used as the basis for a claim that
a taking per se had occurred.
Furthermore, the supreme court concluded that this ordinance did not,
on its face, violate the Due Process Clause.314 Comprehensive planning
for future growth protects the public and is, consequently, a proper exercise
309. 641 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1994).
310. Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 622 (FIa. 1990); see also A.G. WS. Corp., 608 So.
2d at 52.
311. FLA. STAT. § 337.241 (1987).
312. Wright, 641 So. 2d at 51 (citation omitted).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 53.
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of the police power. That planning must logically include plans to handle
increased traffic. Thus, a legitimate state interest was substantially
advanced. While the statute in Joint Ventures was intended only to depress
the price that the public would have to pay if it eventually took the land,
this ordinance was intended to ensure that future development would be
compatible with the Comprehensive Plan. It provided the county flexibility
in dealing with placement of the roads and issuance of permits to offset
particular hardships. Moreover, most land adjacent to the corridors would
increase in value, giving its owners benefits to offset any loss.
The court recognized that some landowners may suffer harm due to
their particular circumstances. 3'5 They would be able to claim that they
had suffered from a taking. But the court went on to remind readers that:
the landowner's entire parcel would be considered in making that determina-
tion; a taking would only occur when the landowner had been deprived of
substantially all economically beneficial use of the land; and such a claim
would probably be premature until a landowner had been denied a
development permit.316
Department of Transportation v. Gefen.317 Chief Justice Grimes
wrote the unanimous opinion. The landowner's property fronted on a street
on which there were access ramps to the interstate highway. When the
access ramps were closed, the property decreased in value as a commercial
site. The landowner brought this inverse condemnation action for compen-
sation for his loss and prevailed at trial and before the district court. The
supreme court reversed, answering in the negative the following certified
question:
WHETHER AN OWNER OF COMMERCIAL PROPERTY HAS
SUFFERED A COMPENSABLE TAKING WHERE ACCESS TO AN
INTERSTATE HIGHWAY BY MEANS OF A STREET FRONTING
ON APPELLEE'S PROPERTY IS CLOSED, AND SAID CLOSING
RESULTS IN SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED ACCESS TO THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY, ALTHOUGH NO ACCESS FROM ABUT-
TING STREETS HAS BEEN CLOSED.""
315. Id.
316. Id. at 54.
317. 636 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 1994).
318. Id. at 1345.
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The supreme court found that Palm Beach County v. Tessler319 was
distinguishable from Gefen. In Tessler, the court held that an inverse
condemnation action might lie for substantial loss of access even though
none of the landowner's property is appropriated. However, in this case,
access to a public road was not diminished, i.e., there was no loss of access.
The harm was caused by a diminution in traffic flow along the fronting
road. That was not a compensable loss.320
More interesting is the dicta in this case. The Department has plans to
condemn a portion of this land at some time in the future. When it does
happen, the Department will not be allowed to take advantage of the value
reduction which resulted from its having closed the access ramps. The court
held that would be like a condemning authority trying to take advantage of
the decrease in property values caused by the announcement of its plans to
condemn, which has long been prohibited.321
Alexander v. Town of Jupiter.322 Judge Warner wrote the opinion
with which Judges Anstead and Gunther concurred. Landowner applied for
a permit to clear property so that a survey could be conducted. The permit
was refused because zoning ordinances had not yet been adopted to conform
the zoning to the comprehensive plan. It took over two years to obtain the
permit. The landowner sued, inter alia, for temporary taking of her
property. The trial court rejected the claim based upon the ripeness
doctrine.323 It reasoned that the original denial was not a final decision
on the application.
The district court disagreed and reversed. 24 A claim of permanent
taking would be precluded by the ripeness doctrine. But the claim here was
for compensation for a temporary taking. It would turn on whether the
delay was reasonable, i.e., merely a normal delay associated with the public
land use planning process or not. As a statute required inconsistencies
between zoning and the comprehensive plan be resolved within one
year,325 the district court concluded that a temporary taking might have
occurred here.326
319. 538 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1989).
320. See State, Dep't of Transp. v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1981).
321. See Dade County v. Still, 377 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1979); State v. Chicone, 158 So.
2d 753 (Fla. 1963).
322. 640 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
323. See Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990) (adopting the federal ripeness doctrine).
324. Alexander, 640 So. 2d at 83.
325. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202 (1985).
326. Alexander, 640 So. 2d at 83.
1994]
261
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Flotilla, Inc.327
Chief Judge Frank wrote the opinion with which Judges Ryder and Patterson
concurred. A bald eagle nest was discovered in the 173 acres which a
developer had bought. Development within 750 feet of the nest was
prohibited until inspectors concluded, three years later, that the eagles had
abandoned the nest. The developer sued, claiming that his land had been
taken. The Second District Court of Appeal disagreed.
First, the court pointed out that the nature of the claim was that a
regulatory taking had occurred. 328  The government had not physically
taken the property. One factor to be considered was "whether the regulation
precludes all economically reasonable use of the property. 32 9 In this case,
the development was to proceed in six phases, but protection of the eagle's
nest only delayed one phase. The developer "retained the desired use of the
majority of its land; most of the property was developed. Because the
property as a whole retained an economic life, we cannot agree that the land
use restrictions are compensable. 33°
The court went on to point out that "[t]he government neither owns nor
controls the migration of the wildlife species it protects. 33' Consequently,
"[o]f the few courts that have encountered this question, most agree that the
government owes no compensation for and may constitutionally protect
wildlife whose unwanted occupation on private land arguably diminishes the
market value of that land.""33 It seems to be suggesting that compensation
would never be required where the regulation is for the protection of
wildlife. It is doubtful that such a sweeping rule should, or could, ever
develop.
XVII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Non Lawyer Preparation of and
Representation Of Landlord in Uncontested Residential Evictions.333 Last
year, the Florida Supreme Court decided to conduct an experiment. For one
year, it would allow property managers to complete, sign, and file com-
327. 636 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
328. Id. at 764.
329. Id. (relying upon Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380 (Fla.
1981), cert. deniedsub noma. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981)).
330. Id. at 765.
331. Id.
332. Florida Game, 636 So. 2d at 765-66.
333. 627 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1993) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
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plaints and motions for defaule34 using approved forms335 in uncontested
residential evictions for nonpayment of rent. Further, in uncontested cases,
property managers could also obtain final judgments and writs of possession.
But the terms "property manager" and "uncontested residential eviction" had
not been defined.
The supreme court, after reviewing numerous comments and sugges-
tions, decided that, for the purpose of this experiment, a property manager
would be "one who is responsible for the day-to-day management of the
residential rental property, as evidenced by such factors as responsibility for
renting of units, maintenance of rental property, and collection of rent. 336
A corporate manager could qualify under this definition. The manager must
have written authorization from the landlord to perform these responsibili-
ties.
A case would be considered contested, for the purposes of this
experiment, when a hearing was scheduled. Once a hearing is scheduled in
a case, the landlord will have to hire an attorney for representation or the
landlord will have to go to the hearing himself.
Hillman Construction Corp. v. Wainer.337  Judge Farmer wrote the
opinion with which Judges Glickstein and Pariente concurred. A tenant had
hired a general contractor to improve the rental property. The contractor
had not been paid and the tenant had filed bankruptcy. The landlord
regained possession and rented the premises to a new tenant. The contractor
filed an action against the landlord for unjust enrichment based upon the
allegations that the improvements enhanced the value of the premises and
allowed the landlord to charge the new tenant a higher rent. The trial court
had dismissed for failure to state a claim, but the district court reversed. 338
In so doing, the district court stated:
The elements of a cause of action for unjust enrichment are: (1)
plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge
thereof; (2) defendant voluntarily accepts and retains the benefit
conferred; and (3) the circumstances are such that it would be inequita-
334. The Florida Barre Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of and Representation
of Landlord in Uncontested Residential Evictions, 605 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1992), opinion
clarified, 627 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1993); see Ronald Brown, Real Property: 1993 Survey of
Florida Law, 18 NOVA L. REV. 389, 398 (1993).
335. See The Florida Bar re Approval of Forms Pursuant to Rule 10-1.1 (b) of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, 591 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1991).
336. Advisory Opinion, 627 So. 2d at 487.
337. 636 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
338. Id. at 577.
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ble for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying the value
thereof to the plaintiff.339
The facts in plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged these elements. The
court emphasized that it was not ruling on the merits of the claim. It was
only deciding that if the plaintiff managed to prove what it had alleged, then
theoretically it might prevail.
The plaintiff had also made a claim for an equitable lien based upon
the same facts. The trial court had also dismissed that claim and, in a
footnote, the district court agreed.340
It is interesting that the case did not involve a construction lien;34
perhaps the contractor had not complied with the statutory requirements for
obtaining one. A construction lien can attach to the landlord's interest if the
improvements are made in accordance with the terms of the lease. 42
However, the landlord may protect its property from construction liens by
1) having the lease provide that construction liens will not attach to the
landlord's interest and 2) recording the lease or a notice of that clause if all
leases on this property include the same clause.343 If the lease specifically
provided that no construction lien could attach and the contractor had notice,
even constructive notice, of that, it would seem inequitable to allow the
contractor to circumvent the spirit of that agreement by recovering under the
unjust enrichment theory.
Homeowner's Corp. of River Trails v. Saba.34 4 Judge Altenbemd
wrote the opinion with which Acting Chief Judge Ryder and Judge Patterson
concurred. A homeowners/tenants association had challenged an increase
in the lot rentals. When mediation failed, the association filed an action to
have the rent increase declared unreasonable. Section 723.033(1) of the
Florida Statutes provides:
If the court, as a matter of law, finds a mobile home lot rental amount,
rent increase, or change, or any provision of the rental agreement, to be
unreasonable, the court may: (a) Refuse to enforce the lot rental
agreement. (b) Refuse to enforce the rent increase or change. (c)
Enforce the remainder of the lot rental agreement without the unreason-
able provision. (d) Limit the application of the unreasonable provision
339. Id.
340. Id. at 577 n.1.
341. See FLA. STAT. ch. 713, pt. 1 (1993).
342. Id. § 713.10.
343. Id.
344. 626 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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so as to avoid any unreasonable result. (e) Award a refund or a
reduction in future rent payments. (f) Award such other equitable relief
as deemed necessary. 45
The trial judge, however, entered a partial final judgment based upon a
finding that the statute was unconstitutional on its face for a number of
reasons, including: 1) that it violated the due process clause of the Florida
Constitution; 346 2) that it violated the due process clause of the United
States Constitution;147 3) that it was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority; 348 and, 4) that it was a per se taking of private
property without payment of just compensation in violation of both the
Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution. 349  The district
court found the conclusions to be premature.350 The questions involved
both law and fact, but the trial court had not heard any evidence.
It also pointed out that this was not a rent control statute in the
traditional sense. Such statutes require landlords to rent at below market
prices and are justified by an emergency. But this statute only would
prevent rent that was in excess of the market rate.35' Consequently, this
statute could not be invalidated on the basis that there was no legislative
finding of an emergency.
Hutchinson v. Kimzay of Florida, Inc.352 Judge Thompson wrote the
opinion with which Judge Peterson concurred specially, without opinion.
Judge Griffin concurred in part, but dissented in part. Kimzay had a long
term ground lease. The ground rent would escalate when one of the
following events occurred: twenty-five years had expired or Kimzay was
no longer the largest subtenant. Hutchinson claimed that the latter had
occurred and sent Kimzay a twenty-day notice of default because the rent
payment was inadequate. When the increased payments were not made, the
landlord sent a three-day notice letter demanding the rent due or possession
of the property353
The tenant in this case was in an odd situation. The rent was to be
adjusted according to the Commodity Price Index, which no longer existed.
345. FLA. STAT. § 723.033(1) (1991).
346. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
347. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV.
348. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; id. art. III, § I.
349. Id. art. X, § 6.
350. Saba, 626 So. 2d at 275.
351. See FLA. STAT. § 723.033(4) (1993).
352. 637 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
353. Id. at 943.
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So the rent could not be determined with certainty and yet the tenant was
being threatened with eviction for nonpayment of the correct amount. The
tenant then filed suit for a declaratory judgment on the amount of the rent
and also for an injunction to prevent the landlord pursuing the eviction until
the amount had been determined. The trial court granted a temporary
injunction, but the landlord counterclaimed for possession of the premises
and damages.354 The tenant filed a motion to dismiss that counterclaim,
alleging its filing violated the injunction. After the ensuing motions and
hearings, the trial court affirmed its earlier injunction. The district court
interpreted this as the granting of a second injunction.355
The district court found that the first injunction had expired by its own
terms when the tenant failed to post the required bond.356 Moreover, it
concluded that the trial court had erred by granting the first injunction
because the tenant had an adequate remedy at law and would not have
suffered irreparable harm without the injunction.357 It could simply have
raised the need to determine the rent as a defense in the eviction action.
The district court also found that the second injunction had been
improperly granted because: the court had not stated the reasons for its
decision; the decision was not based upon affidavits, verified pleadings, or
sworn testimony; and the trial judge failed to require that a bond be posted
as was required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.358
It seems logical to allow a tenant a reasonable opportunity to have the
rent determined and make the payment before the tenant can be evicted for
nonpayment. If the county court could fashion that relief, then the remedy
at law would be adequate. There is apparently nothing in this case to
suggest that the county court could not have determined the rent and then
have given the tenant a reasonable time to pay before any eviction order
would take effect. But the case provides an example of why a rent
escalation clause should provide not only a formula for determining the rent,
but a procedure by which the rent can be determined if a planned formula
fails for some reason. Arbitration or the provision of alternative formulae
might be considered by the parties.
354. Id. at 944.
355. The first was issued on June 26, 1992 and the second was issued on December 18,
1992.
356. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 944.
357. Id.
358. Id.; see also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b).
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Meli Investment Corp. v. O.R.359 This was a per curiam opinion in
which Judges Barkdull, Nesbitt, and Goderich joined. Claiming the tenants
had heldover beyond the end of the lease, a landlord sued for eviction and
damages. The tenants disputed the holdover claim and counterclaimed
based upon wrongful eviction, harassment and discrimination against a
victim of AIDS which was, and is, prohibited by statute.3 60  After the
tenants prevailed, the court considered their motion for attorney's fees.
Both the Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act36' and section
760.50(6)(a)(3) of the Florida Statutes provide for the recovery of
reasonable attorney's fees by the prevailing party.362 The trial court, after
hearing evidence, determined that tenants' counsel had expended sixty hours
on the case and were entitled to an hourly rate of $175. It then applied a
risk multiplier of two to reach a total award of $21,000.
The district court vacated this decision and remanded the case with
directions not to use a risk multiplier.3 63 The court noted that attorney's
fees cases are divided into "three basic categories: 1) public policy
enforcement cases; 2) tort and contract claims; and 3) family law, eminent
domain, and estate and trust matters. 3 6' A risk multiplier is applicable
in the public policy category only to offset a litigants facing substantial
difficulties in finding legal counsel. However, there was no evidence in the
record that such substantial difficulties existed in this case. The trial court
erred in applying a risk multiplier to counsel's efforts in that aspect of the
case.
365
The risk multiplier is applicable to tort and contract claims. The trial
court would have been correct in applying it to the portion of counsel's time
spent on the issue of whether the tenants had held over or whether either
party had breached the terms of the lease. On remand, the trial court would
have to divide counsel's time between these two categories and then
recalculate the total fee.
N.E.P. International, Inc. v. Falls.366 Judge Hersey wrote the opinion
with which Judges Gunther and Warner concurred. The tenant breached the
lease. The lease allowed rent acceleration in the event of the tenant's
359. 621 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
360. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(6)(a)(3) (1991).
361. Id. ch. 83, pt. 11 (1991).
362. See id. § 83.48.
363. Meli Inv. Corp., 621 So. 2d at 677.
364. Id. (citing Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 833 (Fla. 1990)).
365. Id.
366. 629 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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default, so the trial court awarded judgment for the full amount of the rent,
including charges and real estate taxes for the full unexpired term. That was
error. In awarding damages, future damages must be reduced to their
present value.367
What complicated this case further was that the property was taken by
eminent domain after the breach but before the term was scheduled to end.
When a landlord has been allowed to recover future rent, taxes, or other
charges (even at the reduced present value), there must be a provision to
credit the tenant with any rent the landlord received or any overpayment for
the taxes or charges by the tenant. An accounting must eventually take
place. A trial court could retain jurisdiction to perform this accounting, or
simply provide that an independent action for an accounting may be brought
later.
In this case, the lease had been terminated by the taking. There would
be no future damages to reduce when the trial court reconsidered the case
on remand. At that time, the court could also perform the accounting and
then award damages along with prejudgment interest.
Orlando Regional Center, Inc. v. Ivey Properties, Inc.368 Judge
Peterson wrote the opinion with which Judges Dauksch and Cobb concurred.
This was a declaratory judgment action brought to determine the rent due
under the terms of a commercial lease. The rent included a percent of the
gross annual revenues, over a base amount, and a credit for capital
expenditures. The lease provided instructions for calculating these amounts
in narrative form, so calculating the rent was a complicated matter, at best.
The trial court's decision was reversed because "[n]either the result proposed
by the lessee nor the result proposed by the lessor and accepted by the trial
court represents an end product of a logical straightforward application of
the lease provisions in question."369
What is noteworthy about this case is the court's suggestion for the
future. "The lease does not provide an example of a computation, a
common method of aiding the interpretation of narrative instructions in
making mathematical calculations. An example could have avoided this
litigation. 3 70 The court demonstrated this by reducing the narrative to
mathematical formulae37' and then applying the formulae to the numbers
367. Id. at 1019.
368. 622 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
369. Id. at 1095.
370. Id. at 1094 n.1.
371. Id. at 1095.
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on which the parties had agreed.372 Those drafting or negotiating a
commercial lease would be well advised to follow the court's advice.
Seymour v. Adams. 73 Judge Griffin wrote the opinion. Chief Judge
Harris and Judge Dauksch concurred. The landlords obtained an eviction
judgment, including ajudgment for $8600 in unpaid rent. When the sheriff
executed the eviction writ, the tenant could not remove his personal
property, so it remained in the landlords' possession. The tenant demanded
access to the property, but the landlords refused, claiming a lien for the
unpaid rent. The tenant paid the rent due and again demanded his personal
property. The landlords again refused, this time based on a claim for the
unpaid storage fees. 74
The tenant sued for conversion, property damage, civil theft, and return
of the property. The trial court granted the landlords' motion for summary
judgment, but the district court reversed.375 The lease did not give the
landlord the right to retain possession of the tenant's personal property. The
landlords were not entitled to retain possession for unpaid storage fees based
on the "Disposition of Personal Property Landlord and Tenant Act 376
because they had not complied with its requirement of notice. 7 The
statutory landlord's lien for unpaid rent did not give them the right to retain
possession?" Furthermore, docketing the writ of execution did not give
them the right to retain possession. Consequently, summary judgment
should not have been granted on these claims because they were based upon
the landlords' wrongful refusal to return personal property to the tenant.
Thal v. S.G.D. Corp.379 This was a per curiam opinion by Judges
Jorgenson, Levy, and Gersten. One of the terms of the lease to Foljan, the
tenant, required that he pay the property taxes. After the taxes fell three
years in arrears, the landlord sued to terminate the lease and evict the
possessors. Landlord and tenant entered into a settlement agreement,
supported by consideration, under which Foljan surrendered the lease. The
problem was that Foljan had subleased the premises to S.G.D., and S.G.D.
372. Id.
373. 638 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
374. Id. at 1046.
375. Id.
376. FLA. STAT. §§ 715.10-.111 (1991).
377. Seymour, 638 So. 2d at 1048 (citing FLA. STAT. § 715.104 (1991)).
378. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 83.08 (1991)).
379. 625 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review dismissed, 632 So. 2d 1027
(Fla. 1994).
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had refused to settle the case. The trial court refused to evict the subten-
ant.
380
The case turned on whether the settlement agreement amounted to a
termination of the Foljan's lease or whether it amounted to a surrender. If
the master lease is terminated, the rights of subleases are also terminated
because they are based upon the master lease. However, if the master lease
is voluntarily surrendered, then the landlord is the recipient of the tenant's
interest encumbered by the subleases. The district court concluded that the
master lease had beed canceled due to the tenant's default in not paying
property taxes. Thus, since the master lease fell, the sublease also fell. 8
The fact that the judgment was entered based upon an agreement of the
parties did not change that characterization.
The subtenant argued that it should not be evicted because it would
lose $400,000 in improvements. The district court had little sympathy for
this argument.382 It pointed ,out that this was a commercial sublease,
entered into at arms length between sophisticated business people. The
corporation knew that the sublease was no better than the lease of its mesne
landlord and, therefore, it had the opportunity to protect itself. Conse-
quently, there was nothing in the record to justify equitable relief.3 3
XVIII. LIENS AND MECHANIC'S LIENS
All-Brite Aluminum, Inc. v. Desrosiers.384 Acting Chief Judge Parker
wrote the majority opinion with which Justices Altenbernd and Blue
concurred. All-Brite filed this appeal challenging a lower court decision that
it was not the prevailing party under section 713.29 of the Florida
StatutesM and, therefore, was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees
and costs. 386 The dispute arose from a construction contract between the
Desrosiers, the owners of the real property, and a general contractor. The
general contractor filed for bankruptcy after being paid in full by the
Desrosiers but failed to pay All-Brite, a subcontractor. After All-Brite
timely filed its claim of lien and a complaint to foreclose the construction
lien, the Desrosiers advised All-Brite that some of the work was incomplete.
380. Id. at 852.
381. Id. at 853.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. 626 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
385. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1991).
386. All-Brite, 626 So. 2d at 1021.
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AII-Brite completed the work requested by the Desrosiers and amended its
claim of lien and complaint to reflect the additional money due for the
completed work. The Desrosiers then tendered payment to All-Brite for
only the moneys due under the original claim of lien and complaint. The
parties stipulated to a lien amount that was fifty-four cents less than the sum
claimed under the amended claim of lien and complaint. The trial court,
granting a lien for the stipulated amount, held there was no prevailing party.
Therefore, each party was responsible for its own costs and fees.3" 7
The appellate court found that All-Brite was the prevailing party.388
The court acknowledged that one must have recovered an amount exceeding
that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim in order to be a
prevailing party and entitled to the award of attorney's fees. Thus, the
Second District Court of Appeal reasoned that the amount offered in
settlement of the claim must have been made before the lienor filed his
complaint to foreclose the lien.389
The Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Soltesiz.390 Judge Campbell wrote
the majority opinion in this case with which Acting Chief Judge Danahy and
Judge Altenbemd concurred. The question before the court arose from a
consolidated appeal from two circuit court cases. The cases held that Dollar
Savings' foreign judgement, which it recorded pursuant to section 55.503
of the Florida Statutes, was subordinate and inferior to Barnett Bank's
mortgage, which was recorded within thirty days following Dollar's issuance
of recordation of the foreign judgment. In essence, the question was one of
whether a foreign judgment's lien priority arises as of the date the foreign
judgment is recorded pursuant to section 55.503 of the Florida Statutes or
the expiration of thirty days after the judgment creditor issues its notice of
recordation. 9'
In the instant case, Mr. and Mrs. Soltesiz executed a second mortgage
in favor of Barnett three days after they received notice that Dollar had
recorded its Ohio judgment in Sarasota, Florida. The second mortgage had
the effect of diminishing the Soltesiz's equity in their Sarasota County,
Florida condominium. Dollar did not know of Barnett's second mortgage
and did not learn of it until the Soltesizs attempted to convey title to that
condominium. Thereafter, Barnett filed a mortgage foreclosure action on
both its first and second mortgages on the property, joining Dollar as a
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1022.
390. 636 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. 1994).
391. Id. at 63.
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defendant to determine lien priority. Both the court hearing the Soltesiz's
declaratory decree petition, and the court hearing the Barnett foreclosure
action found Dollar's foreign judgment subordinate to Barnett's second
mortgage.392
The appellate court perceived the question as one of whether section
55.503 of the Florida Statutes established a priority date for the lien, and
whether that date may be different than when the lien becomes enforce-
able.393 Ultimately, it concluded that the priority of a foreign judgment
lien is established when it is recorded pursuant to the requirements of
chapter 55 and section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes, even though the
enforcement of that lien may be delayed by further statutory provisions such
as sections 55.507 and 55.509.394
Emerald Designs, Inc. v. Citibank F.S.B.395 Judge Klein wrote the
majority opinion with which Judge Glickstein and Associate Judge Gross
concurred. The question before the appellate court was whether a subcon-
tractor has the right to claim an equitable lien against the undisbursed
construction loan funds in the hands of a lender, where although the
construction project is completed, the lender forecloses. 396
This question arose out of a foreclosure action in which Emerald
Designs, a subcontractor/defendant, filed a counterclaim to establish an
equitable lien on the undisbursed construction loan funds held by Citibank.
The gist of Emerald Designs' allegations was that Citibank would be
unjustly enriched if it were permitted to foreclose on the completed homes
and still retain the undisbursed loan funds. Contrary to the position taken
by the circuit court, the appellate court found for the subcontractor.397 It
stated that, since the subcontractor was not seeking priority over a recorded
mortgage, the subcontractor did not need to allege fraud or misrepresentation
to establish an equitable lien on the undisbursed construction loan funds.398
Therefore, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the subcontractor's
counterclaim for failure to state a .cause of action.399
392. Id. at 64.
393. Id. at 65.
394. Id. at 66.
395. 626 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
396. Id. at 1084.
397. Id. at 1085.
398. Id.
399. Id.
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Federal National Mortgage Ass' v. McKesson."' Associate Judge
Ramirez wrote the majority opinion with which Judges Gunther and Stone
concurred. The question before the court was whether the trial court erred
in granting summaryjudgment in favor of a mobile home park homeowners'
association, declaring the associations' maintenance assessment lien superior
to the lien of the first mortgagee.40 1
To support its claim that its lien was superior, the association relied on
a declaration of covenants, which was the source of the lien rights for the
association. The association was the holder of a first mortgage that was
recorded after the declaration of covenants but before the association's claim
of lien. Citing "first in time is the first in right," the appellate court
reversed the summary judgment and found the first mortgage lien to be
superior. °2 Nevertheless, it certified to the Florida Supreme Court the
following question:
WHETHER A CLAIM OF LIEN RECORDED PURSUANT TO A
DECLARATION OF COVENANTS BY A HOMEOWNER'S
ASSOCIATION HAS PRIORITY OVER AN INTERVENING
RECORDED MORTGAGE WHERE THE DECLARATION AUTHO-
RIZES THE ASSOCIATION TO IMPOSE A LIEN FOR ASSESS-
MENTS BUT DOES NOT OTHERWISE INDICATE THAT THE
LIEN RELATES BACK OR TAKES PRIORITY OVER AN INTER-
VENING MORTGAGE.0 3
Gazebo Landscape Design, Inc. v. Bill Free Custom Homes, Inc. 4
This is an opinion written by Judge Polen with which Judges Anstead and
Stone concurred. The question before the court was whether the trial court
erred in refusing to enforce Gazebo's mechanics lien against the homeown-
ers for landscaping work done by Gazebo through a general contractor,
when Gazebo had not provided notice to the owner within the forty-five day
period after furnishing services or materials, as required by section
713.06(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes. 5
The gist of the question was when does a subcontractor begin to furnish
services for the purpose of timely providing the required notice to the
owner. In this case it was November 7, 1990, when one of Gazebo's
400. 639 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
401. Id. at 79.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 80.
404. 638 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
405. Id. at 88.
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representatives traveled with the property owners to meet with the tree
collector so that the property owners could select the trees. On December
5, 1990, Gazebo's employees dug the holes in preparation for the trees, and
December 7, when they planted the trees. On January 15, Gazebo sent
notice to the owner as required. However, the notice was returned
unclaimed. Therefore, on January 18, 1991, Gazebo posted a notice to the
owner on the gate of the homeowner's residence." 6
Noting that when a motion for an involuntary dismissal is made, the
trial court should consider all facts in evidence in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff,0 7 the appellate court held that the facts at bar determined
that the subcontractor did not begin to furnish its services until the work was
actually performed at the job site.40 8 Therefore, the trial court should look
at all circumstances surrounding the particular job or transaction to
determine when the time begins to run.40 9 It also certified the following
question to the supreme court:
DOES A SUBCONTRACTOR BEGIN TO FURNISH SERVICES,
FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIMELY PROVIDING A NOTICE TO
OWNER IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 713.06(2)(a), FLORI-
DA STATUTES (1991), WHEN, WITHOUT ANY BINDING
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO DO SO, HE OR SHE BEGINS
TO SELECT MATERIALS AT SOME LOCATION OFF THE JOB
SITE, FOR FUTURE INSTALLATION ON THE JOB SITE?410
Lehmann Development Corp. v. Nirenblatt.41' This is a per curiam
opinion by Acting Chief Judge Threadgill, Judge Blue, and Associate Judge
Reese. The only question before the court was whether the time computa-
tions found in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(a) control the time
period within which one must commence an action to enforce a construction
lien pursuant to section 713.22(1) of the Florida Statutes. Recognizing that
those computations apply to calculating the time within which to serve a
notice to owner under section 713.06(2)(a), the appellate court held that they
would to the period within which an action to enforce a construction lien
must be commenced under section 713.22().412
406. Id.
407. Id. at 89.
408. Id.
409. Gazebo, 638 So. 2d at 89.
410. Id.
411. 629 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
412. Id. at 1099.
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Prosperi v. Code, Inc. 4"3 This is an opinion written by Justice
Grimes with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald,
Shaw, Kogan, and Harding concurred. The Florida Supreme Court gave an
ambivalent answer to the question of whether an owner, who prevails on a
complaint filed to foreclose a mechanic's lien, would be entitled to
attorney's fees even though the same suit resulted in a judgment in favor of
the mechanic against the owner on a count for breach of contract for the
same transaction. 4 In so doing, the court reasoned that a claimant's
obtaining a net judgment is merely a significant factor, but not necessarily
a controlling factor, in determining the status of a prevailing party under
section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes. Thus, the trial judge is permitted
discretion to balance the equities in determining which party in fact
prevailed on the primary issues.1
Roger Homes Corp. v. Persant Construction Co. 416 Judge Jorgenson
wrote the majority opinion with which Judges Barkdull and Goderich
concurred. The question before the court was whether there was a sufficient
lien interest to support a lis pendens, where there was no duly recorded
instrument or mechanic's lien claim to support the lien interest." 7
The question arose out of a contract between Roger Homes and Persant
for the construction of roads and a water, sewage, and drainage system.
When Persant did not get paid for some of its work, it filed a mechanic's
lien. Roger Homes then signed an unsecured promissory note for the
balance due under the contract. Ultimately, Roger Homes failed to pay the
full amount of the note. Persant sued on the promissory note and attempted
to establish an equitable lien on Roger Homes' real estate on which Persant
had made the improvements. Consistent with this, it filed a lis pendens on
the property.418
Noting that an equitable lien might be sufficient to support a lis
pendens, the appellate court opined that, based on section 48.23 of the
Florida Statutes, such would have to be based on a duly recorded instrument
or on a mechanic's lien.4 9 The court also noted that an allegation that
Roger Homes was insolvent would support a claim by the contractor that
413. 626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
414. Id. at 1363.
415. Id.
416. 637 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
417. Id. at 6.
418. Id.
419. Id.
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there would be no adequate remedy at law.42 Therefore, it would be
entitled to an equitable lien for which a lis pendens could be recorded.42" '
However, this is not shown in the record for Persant did not allege that
Roger Homes was insolvent. Therefore, the lis pendens was improper in
this case."'
C.L. Whiteside & Associates Construction Co. v. Landings Joint
Venture.423 Judge Farmer wrote the majority opinion with which Judge
Anstead and Senior Judge Walden concurred. The primary question before
the court was whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment
dismissing a subcontractor's mechanic's lien claim, where the subcontractor
had not filed formal notice to the owner.42 4
The Landings Joint Venture owned the property in question. RV
Landings, Inc. and Virginias at Delray, Ltd. were equal partners in that joint
venture. The joint venture, through its managing venture, RV Landings,
entered into a construction contract with Ragland Construction as the general
contractor. The same individual served as president of both RV Landings
and Ragland Construction. In addition, he was the principal shareholder of
RV Landings and the sole shareholder of Ragland, although he had no
ownership interest and performed no functions for Virginias.425 That same
individual signed the construction contract on behalf of the joint venture,
signed the notice of commencement for the joint venture, and was the
person to receive notice for the owner.426 Although an employee signed
the construction contract on behalf of Ragland, the president of Ragland
signed the contract with Whiteside for the structural shell work on the
project. Knowing of the common relationships between the owner and the
general contractor and having dealt with their president on prior occasions,
Whiteside sent no notice to the owner, believing it was unnecessary.427
It was not until a dispute arose that Whiteside sent its notice to the owner,
and subsequently, filed its claim of lien.428
420. Id. at 7.
421. Roger Homes, 637 So. 2d at 7.
422. Id.
423. 626 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
424. Id. at 1051.
425. Id. at 1052.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. C.L. Whiteside, 626 So. 2d at 1052.
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Referring to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Aetna Casualty
v. Buck,429 the court stressed that the purpose of serving a notice to the
owner was to inform the property owner that those not in privity of contract
with the owner were providing improvements to the property, and that they
would look to the property in the event they were not paid for their services
and materials. Thus the owner would be protected from possibly paying the
owner's contractor money which ought to go to an unpaid subcontrac-
tor.430 Hence, the notice to owner provisions of section 713.06 of the
Florida Statutes are excused when a subcontractor establishes privity with
the property owner. To establish privity, the owner must have knowledge
that a particular subcontractor is supplying services or materials and the
owner either expressly or impliedly assumed the contractual obligation to
pay those services. 41  Therefore, the subcontractor may also establish
privity where the owner and general contractor share a common identi-
ty.432 In this case, the appellate court held that there was a sufficient
question as to whether there was an established relationship between the
owner and general contractor so as to establish privity, thereby rendering the
notice to owner unnecessary.433
XIX. MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass'n v. Caruana.434 Justice Shaw
wrote the opinion in which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton,
McDonald, Grimes, Kogan, and Harding concurred. The question was
whether a setback restriction was extinguished by Florida's Marketable
Record Title Act ("MRTA").435 The restriction was contained in a plat
filed in 1925. A developer purchased two lots in the area in 1990. When
building began, the homeowners' association sought a declaratory judgment
that the developer was violating the setback restriction. The developer's
root of title, by the time of this litigation, was a warranty deed dated
October 6, 1951. That deed referred to the plat by book and page in the
429. 594 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1992), appeal after remandsub nom. Pappalardo Constr. Co.
v. Buck, 630 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), and review denied, 639 So. 2d 976 (Fla.
1994).
430. C.L. Whiteside, 626 So. 2d at 1052.
431. Id. at 1053.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. 623 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1993).
435. FLA. STAT. §§ 712.01-.10 (1989). The relevant portions of this chapter have not
been changed to date.
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public records and also stated that the conveyance was subject to covenants
and restrictions of record.436 The trial court and the district concluded that
the restriction had been extinguished,437 but the Third District Court of
Appeal, with Chief Judge Schwartz dissenting only on the certification
issue,43 certified as being of great public importance, the following
question:
WHETHER THE FLORIDA MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
HAS THE EFFECT OF EXTINGUISHING A PLAT RESTRICTION
WHICH WAS CREATED PRIOR TO THE ROOT OF TITLE WHERE
THE MUNIMENTS OF TITLE IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE DE-
SCRIBE THE PROPERTY BY ITS LEGAL DESCRIPTION WHICH
MAKES REFERENCE TO THE PLAT AND THE MUNIMENTS OF
TITLE STATE THAT THE CONVEYANCE IS GIVEN SUBJECT TO
COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS OF RECORD.43
9
MRTA would, in effect, extinguish any restriction or title defect which
was in the record prior to the root of title.440  However, there is an
exception for "[e]states or interests, easements and use restrictions disclosed
by and defects inherent in the muniments of title on which said estate is
based beginning with the root of title. ... "44' But "a general reference
... shall not be sufficient to preserve them unless specific identification by
reference to book and page of record or by name of recorded plat be made
therein . . ,14' The district court found that the reference in this case
was too general to satisfy the statutory requirement, 443 but the supreme
court unanimously disagreed 4 4 because the deed referred to "Sunshine
Vistas," the name of the recorded plat that imposed the restriction.445
436. Sunshine, 623 So. 2d at 492.
437. Id. at 491.
438. Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass 'n v. Caruana, 597 So. 2d 809, 811 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 618 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1992), and decision quashed by 623
So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1993). Judge Schwartz stated that "the issue involved here-while perhaps
interesting and certainly arguable-is of no concern, let alone of great importance, to anyone
but the litigants and an abstractor or two. The public as a whole could not care less." Id.
439. Sunshine, 623 So. 2d at 491.
440. See FLA. STAT. § 712.02 (1989).
441. Id. § 712.03(1).
442. Id.
443. Sunshine, 623 So. 2d at 492.
444. Id.
445. Id.
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The supreme court used very traditional logic. The court stated that as
a rule of statutory interpretation, every word or phrase included by the
legislature must have been intended to have meaning. Why else would it
have been included? Here, the statutory language "unless specific identifica-
tion by reference to... name of recorded plat be made therein.. ." would
be rendered meaningless by the district court's interpretation. Therefore, the
court concluded that the reference in this deed satisfies the plain meaning
of the statute.
That conclusion is bolstered by another line of logic. Reference in a
deed description to a plat generally has the effect of incorporating the plat's
terms into the deed. It is therefore consistent that such incorporation by
reference would be specific enough to satisfy the requirements of MRTA for
saving those terms, e.g., use restrictions, from being extinguished.
Water Control District of South Brevard v. Davidson.446 Judge Sharp
wrote the opinion with which Judges Goshom and Peterson concurred.
Landowners claimed that the Water Control District ("District") did not have
an easement for drainage and maintenance along the sides of a canal. The
district court concluded that the District had sustained its burden of proof
that it had acquired the easement by a 1922 decree which had not been lost
by reason of MRTA.447
The right of way on one side of the canal was being used. That placed
the easement within one of the statute's exceptions.44 The exception still
applied to the right of way on the other side of the canal even though it was
not in use. The two sides were part of one reservation. Use of a part of the
reserved easement was sufficient to place the entire easement within the
statutory exception to MRTA.449 This result was reinforced by invoking
the policy that "MRTA should be broadly construed to protect these rights
[for the use and benefit of the public] to the extent possible under the
law., ,450
XX. MOBILE HOME PARKS
Aspen-Tarpon Springs Ltd. Partnership v. Stuart.45' Judge Barfield
wrote the opinion with which Judges Wilfe and Mickle concurred. Owners
446. 638 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
447. Id. at 526.
448. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 712.03(5) (1991)).
449. Id.
450. Id. (citing City of Jacksonville v. Horn, 496 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1986)).
451. 635 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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of mobile home parks sought a declaration that two provisions of the Florida
Mobile Home Act452 were invalid. They first challenged section 723.033
of the Florida Statutes.453 This section enables a court to grant relief to
park tenants upon a finding that the rent or a rental increase is unreasonable
as a matter of law. 54 It also provides that "a lot rental amount that is in
excess of market rent shall be considered unreasonable.""45  The owners
challenged this section as violating due process, but the trial court dis-
agreed.456
The court concluded that the statute satisfied the rational basis test
because it was rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the protection
of a class of tenants who are in a uniquely vulnerable situation because they
only rent the lots on which the mobile homes are placed.457 The tenants
own the mobile homes which are "mobile" only in theory. Thus, it is not
economically feasible to move them because the moving expense may
approach, or even exceed, the home's value. Therefore, the tenants are at
a tremendous disadvantage in dealing with the landlord.
The trial court also rejected the claim that the legislature failed to
provide the Department of Business Regulation and the courts with
sufficient standards to guide the application of the statute.458 The statutory
test was whether the rent or rental increase was "reasonable." The
controlling principal is that a statute should be interpreted to avoid
constitutional defects whenever it is reasonably possible. By reading
subsections (3), (4), (5), and (6)439 in pari materia, the trial court was able
to interpret the statement in subsection (3) that "a lot rental amount that is
452. FLA. STAT. ch. 723 (1993). Section 723.001 of the Florida Statutes provides that
"[tihis chapter shall be known and may be cited as the 'Florida Mobile Home Act."'
453. Aspen, 635 So. 2d at 62-63 (citing FLA. STAT. § 723.033 (Supp. 1990)). The
statute had been amended in 1990 by Act of Oct. 1, 1990, ch. 90-198, § 9, 1994 Fla. Laws
879, 883.
454. FLA. STAT. § 723.033(1).
455. Id. § 723.033(3).
456. Aspen, 635 So. 2d at 63.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. Subsection (4) provided: "Market rent means that rent which would result
from market forces absent an unequal bargaining position between mobile home park owners
and mobile home owners." Subsection (5) provided: "In determining market rent, the court
may consider rents charged by comparable mobile home parks in its competitive area. To
be comparable, a mobile home park must offer similar facilities, services, amenities, and
management." Subsection (6) provided: "In determining whether a rent increase or resulting
lot rental amount is unreasonable, the court may consider economic or other factors.
FLA. STAT. § 723.033(4)-(6) (1993).
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in excess of the market rent shall be considered unreasonable" to be
"directory, rather than as mandatory and conclusive.""46 The court could
also have pointed out that relief was not mandatory, but within the court's
discretion. Whether a court of equity should exercise its discretion is a
standard which has a long evolution.
The district court agreed with the trial court's reasoning and conclusion.
It pointed out that this was not a traditional rent control statute.46 ' Rather,
it was intended "to balance the interests of mobile home owners and park
owners in the context of their unique economic relationship. ' 462 Section
723.061(2) of the Florida Statutes did not fare as well. This section
requires a mobile park owner who wishes to change his land use, either to
pay to have the tenants moved to another comparable park within fifty
miles, or to purchase the mobile homes and appurtenances from the tenants
at a statutorily determined value.463 The trial court held section 723.061-
(2) to be unconstitutional and the district court affirmed.4M Both conclud-
ed that its enforcement would cause an unconstitutional taking of the
landlord's private property without compensation. The district court pointed
out that "neither the 'buyout' option nor the 'relocation' option is even
economically feasible. Therefore, as a practical matter, the challenged
statute authorizes a permanent physical occupation of the park owner's
property and effectively extinguishes a fundamental attribute of ownership,
the right to physically occupy one's land. 4 65 Thus, it would amount to
a physical taking of the land. Moreover, it "singles out mobile home park
owners to bear an unfair burden, and therefore constitutes an unconstitution-
al regulatory taking of their property.
4 66
The district court also stated that section 723.061(2) did "not substan-
tially advance a legitimate state interest.16' That was unnecessary to its
logic, and seems to this author, to be inconsistent with what the court said
about the previous section. Protection of this group of tenants is a
legitimate state interest. Requiring the landlord to buy them out or relocate
them before changing the land use is a substantial increase in their level of
protection. The legislature cannot accomplish that by superimposing that
460. Aspen, 635 So. 2d at 63.
461. Id. at 67.
462. Id.
463. FLA. STAT. § 723.061(2) (1993).
464. Aspen, 635 So. 2d at 67.
465. Id. at 68.
466. Id.
467. Id.
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requirement upon existing landlord-tenant relationships. However, whether
that could be made a prospective requirement on future mobile home park
lot rentals is still an interesting question.
XXI. MORTGAGES
Batchin v. Barnett Bank of Southwest Florida.468 This is an opinion
written by Acting Chief Judge Ryder with which Judges Parker and Lazzara
concurred. The question before the court was whether, in a foreclosure
action, where the lender's attorney had factual information in his file
showing the defendant's address and phone number, service by publication
was proper.
4 69
In finding that service by publication was improper under the
circumstances, the appellate court noted that chapter forty-nine of the
Florida Statutes permits service by publication only where personal service
cannot be effected and that strict conpliance with these statutory procedures
for serving a defendant by publication is required.47 The one attempting
to serve by publication must affirm under oath that the plaintiff reasonably
employed the knowledge he had available and made an honest and
conscientious effort to acquire the information necessary to effect personal
service. The court stated that a diligent search would require an attorney to
review his own law firm's files. Thus, failing to look in one's own files
does not meet this test.47'
Carteret Savings Bank v. Citibank Mortgage Corp.472 This is an
opinion written by Justice Overton with which Chief Justice Barkett and
Justices McDonald, Shaw, Grimes, Kogan, and Harding concurred. This
opinion addressed a certified question from the Fourth District Court of
Appeal as follows:
WHERE A THIRD PARTY MORTGAGE LOAN IS USED NOT
ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PURCHASING PROPERTY, BUT IN
ADDITION, FOR CONSTRUCTING IMPROVEMENTS ON THE
PROPERTY, IS THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE MORTGAGE
ENTITLED TO PRIORITY AS A PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE
468. 19 Fla. L. Weekly D852 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1994), supercededon reh'g
in pl., 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1693 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1994).
469. Id. at D852.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. 632 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1994).
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OVER A GENERAL JUDGMENT CREDITOR OF THE MORTGAG-
OR?
473
Although the parties reached settlement prior to the rendering of the
supreme court's opinion, the court felt it was necessary to answer this
question of first impression in Florida since it was a question likely to arise
in the future, and other courts which had addressed the definition of a
purchase money mortgage under these circumstances have not ruled
consistently. 474 Therefore, the supreme court answered the certified
question in the negative. In so doing, it held that only the portion of a
mortgage loan that extended to purchase the property and existing improve-
ments would be entitled to priority as a purchase money mortgage.4 "
City of Jacksonville v. Nashid Properties, Inc.476 This is a majority
opinion written by Judge Kahn with which Chief Judge Zehmer and Judge
Benton concurred. The question before the court was whether the city was
exempt from having its mortgage lien extinguished by a tax deed issued
pursuant to section 197.552 of the Florida Statutes.47 7
The question arose when the city received an assignment of mortgage
from Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association of Jacksonville prior to
the issuance of the tax deed to Nashid. Nashid's position was that the
statutory reference to a "lien of record" did not apply to a mortgage held by
the city, but applied to governmental liens arising from taxes or other
governmental services. The appellate court rejected Nashid's position,
finding the statute clear on its face.47
CSB Realty, Inc. v. Eurobuilding Corp.479 This is a per curiam
opinion from an appeal heard before Judges Nesbitt, Baskin, and Gersten.
The question before the court was whether the trial court erred in allowing
the mortgagor to redeem the property foreclosed upon at the foreclosure sale
price, rather than for the amount of the judgment. The appellate court held
that to redeem the property, the mortgagor must pay the mortgage debt.480
473. Id. at 599.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. 636 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
477. Id. at 875.
478. Id. at 876.
479. 625 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
480. Id. at 1275-76.
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In so doing, it must pay the judgment amount when the foreclosure price is
less than the judgment obligation.48'
FDIC v. Diamond C Nurseries, Inc.482 This is an opinion written by
Judge Klein with which Judges Gunther and Polen concurred. The question
presented to the court was whether an unrecorded satisfaction of mortgage
which secured a loan from a lender, subsequently taken over by the FDIC,
barred foreclosure by the FDIC.4"3
Diamond C Nurseries allowed Republic Bank For Savings to place a
mortgage lien on Diamond C's fifty-three acre nursery in Palm Beach
County, Florida, as collateral for loans from the lender to business associates
of Diamond C's controlling shareholder. When the loan went into default,
Republic Bank filed its foreclosure action. Diamond C raised satisfaction
of the lien as an affirmative defense. It appears that the satisfaction was
signed by a Republic's president one month after the parties executed the
note and mortgage and one month before Republic recorded the mortgage.
However, the satisfaction was not recorded until almost two months after the
foreclosure action began. Subsequently, FDIC, as manager of the FSLIC
resolution fund, was substituted as plaintiff.484
Referring to both the D'Oench doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), the
court held that the unrecorded satisfaction did not preclude the foreclosure
action in question.485 The court recognized that D'Oench established a
federal policy to protect the FDIC from misrepresentations as to lenders'
assets and liabilities in their portfolios, where the FDIC insured those
lenders or made loans to those lenders.4"6 The court also acknowledged
that § 1823(e) was enacted so that bank examiners could rely on a bank's
records to evaluate the institution's assets and to judge adequately the loan
transactions in which those banks were involved. Therefore, no agreement
which would reduce the FDIC's interests in any asset acquired by it in
taking over a lending institution would be valid against the FDIC, unless thb
agreement: 1) was in writing, 2) was executed by both the depository
institution and anyone claiming an adverse interest under it, 3) was approved
by the institution's board of directors or its loan committee (reflected in the
481. Id.
482. 629 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 637 So. 2d 234 (Fla.
1994).
483. Id. at 158.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id.
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minutes of said board or committee), and 4) appeared continuously, after its
execution, as an official record of a depository institution." 7
In the present case, the lender's president responded to the examiner's
criticism of its dealings with the parties, by showing that the property in
question had been appraised at over one million dollars and that the lender
had obtained a mortgagee title insurance policy insuring the lien in question.
This occurred one year after the loan had taken place. Two years after the
loan had taken place another examination revealed that the property was still
the primary asset securing that loan.488 Therefore, the affirmative defense
was defeated both by the D'Oench doctrine and by § 1823(e)." 9
Frohman v. Bar-Or.49 This is a per curiam opinion by Judges
Anstead and Hersey, and Senior Judge Mager. The question was whether
the trial court erred in dismissing a petition for a deficiency decree solely
because it was filed more than one year after the final judgment of
foreclosure was entered.49" ' In affirming the dismissal, the court certified
the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
DOES FLORIDA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.420(e) APPLY
TO A POST-TRIAL PROCEEDING, SUCH AS A MOTION FOR A
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT IN A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
SUIT
4 92
Mederos v. Selph (L. T.), Inc.493 This is an opinion written by Chief
Judge Harris with which Judges Dauksch and Cobb concurred. The
question presented to the court was whether a reformed mortgage, correcting
the identification of the mortgagor, had priority over the liens of judgment
creditors which were recorded between the recording of the original
mortgage and the recording of the reformed mortgage ultimately identifying
the correct mortgagor.494
Mederos loaned money to Selph's corporation. In return, Selph put up
two parcels of real estate as collateral. Originally, the mortgage reflected
the corporation as the owner and mortgagor for both parcels of property.
In reality Selph individually owned one parcel as a tenant in common with
487. Diamond C Nurseries, 629 So. 2d at 159.
488. Id. at 160.
489. Id. at 160-61.
490. 637 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
491. Id. at 370.
492. Id.
493. 625 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
494. Id. at 894.
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his former wife. After the mortgage was originally recorded, Selph's former
wife and another judgment creditor properly recorded their judgments
against Selph individually. Thereafter, Mederos filed an action to reform
the mortgage. The trial court permitted the reformation but ruled that the
reformed mortgage was subject to the judgment creditors as to Selph's 50%
interest in the property held with his ex-wife as tenants in common.495 In
affirming the trial court, the appellate court reasoned that a recorded
mortgage from one who is not the owner of record creates no mortgage lien
on the property and provides no notice to anyone subsequently acquiring an
interest in that property.496
Orlando Hyatt Associates, Ltd. v. FDIC.497 This is an opinion
written by Chief Judge Harris with which Judges Sharp and Thompson
concurred. The question before the court was whether the trial court
committed error when it permitted a mortgagee to apply the income from
the subject premises encumbered by the mortgage lien, against any debt
owed to the mortgagee while the foreclosure proceedings were still in
progress.
498
Orlando Hyatt borrowed money from Dollar Dry Dock Savings Bank,
and secured the loan with a second mortgage on the Orlando Hyatt Hotel.
Subsequently, the parties executed a mortgage modification agreement, a
consolidated note replacing the original one, and an amended and restated
second mortgage and security agreement. In addition, Orlando Hyatt
secured the modified loan with a Present Assignment of Owner's Remittance
Amount, assigning absolutely all of its right, title, and interest in any
remittance due it under the management agreement with the Hyatt Corpora-
tion, the corporation which managed the hotel. 99
Once the loan went into default, the FDIC, as successor mortgagee,
filed its foreclosure action. In response to the FDIC's motion seeking the
appointment of a receiver and motion to compel the deposit of rents, the
trial court ordered that the FDIC was to receive the hotel's revenues directly
and after paying the first mortgagee, apply them to its second mortgage
which was involved in the foreclosure action. 00
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. 629 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
498. Id. at 975.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 976.
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The court reasoned that since section 697.07 of the Florida Statutes
applies only to rents, it did not apply to hotel revenues."' Therefore, the
court and the parties would have to look to other statutory and case law.
Citing numerous Florida cases,"' the court ruled that although a mortgag-
or may pledge rents and profits from realty, such a pledge does not become
binding until the trial court either appoints a receiver, or the mortgagee goes
into actual possession. Therefore, even if the assignment is absolute and
unconditional, it does not give the mortgagee a right to the funds before the
trial court has made a determination on the merits of the foreclosure
action." 3
Ormond Beach Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Citation Mortgage,
Ltd."4 This is an opinion written by Judge Griffin with which Chief
Judge Harris and Judge Thompson concurred. The question presented to the
court was whether section 697.07 of the Florida Statutes permitted the
assignment of rents in the possession of the mortgagor at the time of the
mortgagee's written demand as well as to those collected after the de-
mand. 5
Prior to the enactment of section 697.07, Florida's lien theory provided
for no transfer of ownership in rents until there was a change of the
ownership in the underlying property." 6 Although the 1991 version of
section 697.07 apparently intended to permit the mortgagee to reach even
those rents in the mortgagor's possession at the time of demand, the courts
were not clear on the subject. However, this court found that the 1993
revision to that statute clarified the intent and permitted the mortgagee to
sequester both categories of rent.50 7
Padron v. Plantada.5 8 This is an opinion written by Judge Levy.
The question before the court was whether a mortgage broker performed as
required under the contract with the prospective mortgagors, thereby
entitling him to a broker's fee.509
The prospective borrowers and the broker entered into an agreement for
the payment of a broker's commission, if the broker were to procure a loan
501. Id.
502. Orlando Hyatt, 629 So. 2d at 976-77.
503. Id. at 977.
504. 634 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
505. Id. at 1092.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. 632 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 639 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1994).
509. Id. at 113.
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commitment at a fixed interest rate for thirty years. Instead, the broker
procured a commitment in the required principal amount with a floating rate
for thirty years. The borrowers immediately rejected the commitment.
Ultimately the prospective borrowers acquired a mortgage through another
broker and through another lender. When the broker sued for his commis-
sion, the trial court entered judgment in the broker's favor. The appellate
court, however, held that the offered commitment with a floating interest
rate did not comply with the contract requirement of a 10% fixed interest
rate, since the floating interest rate was subject to increase anytime before
closing. Therefore, the broker was not entitled to his commission 10
Parker v. Heilpern.51 ' This is a per curiam opinion from an appeal
heard by Judges Anstead, Glickstein, and Farmer. The question was
whether the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding, who had not
yet been successfully served with process, waived her objection to jurisdic-
tion when she objected to a co-defendant's motion for sharing in the
proceeds of any sale. The appellate court found that such a waiver had not
occurred since the defendant sought no affirmative relief.5"2
Pici v. First Union National Bank of Florida.513 This is an opinion
written by Judge Frank with which Acting Chief Judge Ryder and Judge
Blue concurred. The question before the court was whether the trial court
erred in issuing a prejudgment writ of replevin." 4
Pici defaulted on his note with First Union by failing to make the
September and October 1992 payments. When First Union notified Pici of
the default and demanded that the account be brought current on October
26, 1992, Pici paid all sums, including late charges on November 1992 to
a teller at one of First Union's branches. After its default notice of October
26, and before Pici's payment on November 9, First Union, without notice
to Pici, decided to accelerate the balance of the note. First Union filed its
complaint on November 13, 1992 and sought an ex parte prejudgment writ
of replevin, posted its bond, and seized the collateral. On November 16,
1992, Pici made the November payment to First Union. Subsequently, he
moved the trial court for a dismissal of the writ of replevin. From the
denial of that motion, Pici took this appeal." 5
510. Id. at 113-14.
511. 637 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
512. Id. at 296.
513. 621 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 629 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1993).
514. Id. at 733.
515. Id.
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In reversing the trial court, the appellate court noted that Florida law
identifies equitable grounds for denying foreclosure on an accelerated basis.
These grounds include circumstances where the mortgagor has tendered
payment after default but before the notice of the mortgagee's accelerating
the obligation has been given to the mortgagor." 6 Noting that the key
term is "tender," the court emphasized that it is not necessary for the
mortgagee to accept the tender for this equitable principle to apply. Actual
acceleration cannot be accomplished without notice to the debtor. Once the
debtor tenders all sums due, his account is current and a prejudgment writ
of replevin would not be sustained.51
Republic National Bank v. Manzini & Associates, P.A.51 This is a
per curiam opinion from an appeal held before Chief Judge Schwartz and
Judges Nesbitt and Cope. The question presented to the court was whether
the holder of a note and mortgage was estopped from asserting its mortgage
on the ground that the FDIC gave mistaken information as to the mortgage's
satisfaction." 9
Manzini and Associates took a quitclaim deed to a condominium in
place of receiving payment for legal services. At the time it knew that there
was a mortgage on the subject property. Subsequently, the FDIC advised
the firm that the mortgage was satisfied. Therefore, although this informa-
tion was incorrect, the law firm took the position that the lender should be
estopped from asserting its mortgage. 20
In reviewing this case, the district court noted that a satisfaction or
release of the mortgage given as the result of a mistake will not benefit any
person or entity who acquires an interest in the property so long as they did
not rely on or advance any consideration on the faith of such representa-
tion.52' In this case, the law firm neither relied on nor advanced any
consideration on the basis of the incorrect information. Therefore, Republic
was not estopped from asserting its mortgage.
Sand Point Village, Ltd. v. Highlands Insurance Co."' This is an
opinion arising out of an appeal heard before Judges Baskin, Jorgenson, and
516. Id. at 734.
517. Id. at 733-34.
518. 621 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 625 (Fla.
1994).
519. Id. at 710.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. 634 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct App. 1994).
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Levy. The question was whether the trial court erred in enforcing a
settlement stipulation between an insurance company and property owner.
The settlement provided for insurance payments to the first mortgagee, but
not to the second mortgagee. The second mortgagee also challenged the
dismissal of the action with a discharge of the insurance company's further
liability relating to the fire in question.524
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court.525 In so
doing, it reasoned that the second mortgagee had not been given adequate
time to explore the ramifications of the settlement agreement. In addition,
the court noted that the second mortgagee was not a party to the settlement.
Therefore, since its rights are materially affected by the decision as to
whether or not it receives proceeds from the insurance company and as to
the amount of insurance paid to the first mortgagee, resulting in a reduction
in the principal owed to the first mortgagee, the trial court erred in discharg-
ing the insurance company prior to the second mortgagee's being afforded
the opportunity to conduct the necessary discovery to ascertain the
ramifications of the settlement agreement.
5 26
Sciandra v. First Union National Bank.27  This is a per curiam
opinion from an appeal heard before Acting Chief Judge Hall and Judges
Blue and Altenbernd. Judge Altenbernd concurred specially with an
opinion. The question was whether the trial court erred in awarding interest
on the amount found due as pre-judgment interest. The Second District
Court of Appeal found that the trial court did err, and therefore, reversed
that portion of the judgment.52
Judge Altenbernd's concurring opinion raises the doctrine of merger,
i.e., that the cause of action and the damages recoverable as a result of it,
merge into the judgment entered on that cause of action.529 Judge
Altenbernd noted that the judgment's aggregate amount includes many
elements of damages, including, but not limited to the interest in question.
Once the judgment is entered it does not bear interest as a cause of action
or as an element of damage but, rather, as a single judgment. Therefore,
there would not be a compounding of interest. The concurring opinion
524. Id. at 312.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. 638 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
528. Id. at 1009.
529. Id. at 1010.
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suggests that it would be more appropriate to regard pre-judgment interest
as an early award of judgment interest to solve the problem.53
Also, effective October 1, 1994 is Senate Bill No. 204 of chapter 94-
288 of the Florida Statutes.3' As of that date it will be unlawful for any
person, with the intent to defraud the owner of real property, to engage in'
such activities as purchasing defined real estate subject to loans that either
are in default at the time of purchase, or which go into default within one
year after the purchase, where such loan is secured by a mortgage or deed
of trust, and there is a failure to make the mortgage payments and the
purchaser uses the income from such properties for his own use. These acts
will constitute a third degree felony and will be punished as provided in
sections 775.082, 775.083, and 755.084 of the Florida Statutes.532
XXII. OPTIONS
Drost v. Hill.33 This is an opinion written by Judge Cope with
which Judges Nesbitt and Levy concurred. A six month lease included a
term option to extend the lease for a five year term. If the five year option
would have been exercised, then the tenants would also have had the option
to purchase the property. But neither a purchase price nor a method of
determining a purchase price were specified. The price was to be estab-
lished at some time in the future.
The tenant notified the landlord that it was exercising the five-year
extension option, but the parties were unable to agree to the terms. The
tenant sued for specific performance, which the trial court awarded, ordering
the landlord to provide that the option purchase price would be the
property's fair market value. The district court reversed. It held that the
lack of terms and the ongoing negotiations established there had been no
meeting of the minds on a material term, i.e., the price. Consequently, the
option was illusory and an illusory contract cannot be enforced.534
XXIII. TAXES
Florida Hotel and Motel Ass 'n v. State.35 This is an opinion written
by Judge Webster with which Judges Booth and Allen concurred. The
530. Id.
531. Act of Oct. 1, 1994, ch. 94-288, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 1854.
532. See id.
533. 639 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1994).
534. Id. at 106.
535. 635 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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question before the court was whether the tangible personal property that
hotels and motels purchase and use in guest rooms, incident to their
business, is purchased for "resale," and thereby prohibited from a tax
exemption on that ground. The court also considered whether imposing a
sales tax or use tax on the purchase of that property and upon the rental of
guest rooms constituted duplicate taxation.536
The subject questions arose from a petition for a declaratory statement
filed with the Department of Revenue by Florida Hotel and Motel Associa-
tion, Inc. and Naples Golf and Beach Club, Inc. When the department
rejected their claims, they took the subject appeal. Recognizing that hotels
and motels are in the business of furnishing services and entertainment, the
appellate court noted that hotels and motels are simply not in the business
of buying and reselling or leasing guest room furniture, furnishings, and
consumables.537 Therefore, they were not entitled to the exemption
provided by section 212.05(1)(a)l.a of the Florida Statutes."'
Fuchs v. Wilkinson.539 This is an opinion written by Justice Overton
with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices McDonald, Shaw, Grimes,
Kogan, and Harding concurred. The question presented to the court was
whether the trial court erred in holding that the limitations on the assessed
value of homestead property contained in an amendment to article VII,
section 4, of the Florida Constitution, were to become effective January 1,
1994, rather than January 1, 1995, thereby making 1993 the base year for
the limitations' application. The question came before the Florida Supreme
Court as one certified from the Second District Court of Appeal.540
The Florida Supreme Court held that the amendment's clear language
indicated January 1, 1994 as the first "just value" assessment date.5 4 ,
Because of this, the operative date for the limitations contained in the
amendment to establish the "tax value" of homestead property would be
January 1, 1995.542
The difficulty arising in this case came from the amendment's lack of
an effective date provision. Where an amendment fails to establish an
effective date, the Florida Constitution provides that the amendment shall
become effective on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January
536. Id. at 1045.
537. Id. at 1047.
538. Id.
539. 630 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1994).
540. Id. at 1044.
541. Id. at 1045-46.
542. Id. at 1046.
Vol. 19
292
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman
following the date of the election in which the voters adopted the amend-
ment.143 The amendment in this case was adopted November 3, 1992, and
thus became effective on January 5, 1993. Therefore, the year following the
effective date of the amendment is 1994 and, pursuant to the express
language of the statute, January 1, 1994 became the date for assessing the
property at just value. As a result, January 1, 1995 became the first tax year
date where the limitations in the amendment would be used to calculate the
"tax value" of the homestead property.5"
Margate Investment Corp. v. Lupowitz.5 45 This opinion was written
by Judge Polen with which Judges Glickstein and Warner concurred. The
question before the court was whether the grantor, under a general warranty
deed executed in 1981, breached its covenant against encumbrances by
failing to pay those real property taxes levied for 1980, but were not
assessed until 1985.546 Relying on section 197.056(1) of the Florida
Statutes, the court opined that real estate taxes are liens as of the year the
taxes are levied. Therefore, if they in fact encumber the property when the
grantor makes the warranty, the grantor has not breached the warranty
against encumbrances. 47
Santana v. Metropolitan Dade County.48 This is an opinion written
by Judge Cope. The sole question before the court was whether one who
was looking to redeem a tax deed had to pay not only what was due on the
tax deed but, in addition, any other delinquent taxes that remained unpaid
even if they had not yet been reduced to tax deeds.549 The Third District
Court of Appeal answered the question in the affirmative.55 °
Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc.551 This is a per
curiam opinion with which Acting Chief Judge Campbell and Judge
Threadgill concurred, and with which Judge Schoonover concurred in result
only. The question was whether churches, which are exempt from taxation,
would also be exempt from the payment of special assessments. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court in finding that fire and rescue
543. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(c).
544. Fuchs, 630 So. 2d at 1046.
545. 638 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
546. Id. at 143.
547. Id.
548. 641 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
549. Id. at 118.
550. Id. at 119.
551. 641 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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services were valid special assessments for which churches would be liable,
but that stormwater management services would not be. 52
Section 3 Property Corp. v. Robbins.53 This is an opinion written
by Justice McDonald with which Justices Overton, Shaw, Grimes, Kogan,
and Harding concurred, and with which Chief Justice Barkett concurred in
the result only. The question before the court was presented as a certified
question:
Is there a right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 22 of the Florida
Constitution (1968), in a tax action to challenge a Property Appraiser's
grant of an agricultural exemption?.54
The Florida Supreme Court answered the question in the negative.5
The court reasoned that controversies surrounding the taxation of real
property were typically found in equity, not in law. 56 The majority
looked to section 194.171 of the Florida Statutes to ascertain whether the
legislature had provided for an alternative approach. Finding that it had not,
the court determined that, although it would require some factual determina-
tion to answer the question, the analysis was more like determining an
interest in realty, thereby invoking the court's equitable jurisdiction. 57
SEC v. Elliott."8 This is an opinion written by Justice Shaw with
which Justices Overton, Kogan, and Harding concurred. However, Chief
Justice Barkett dissented with an opinion with which Justices McDonald and
Grimes concurred. The question presented to the court was a question
certified by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal as follows:
Does a Florida tax certificate represent an interest in land for purposes
of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, so that Article 9 does not
govern the creation of a security interest therein by virtue of §
679.104(10) [, Florida Statutes (1991)?] 559
552. Id. at 901.
553. 632 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1993).
554. Id. at 596.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. 620 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit answered the certified question
in the affirmitive. See 998 F.2d 922 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
559. Id. at 159.
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The question arose from Elliott's use of Florida tax certificates as
collateral for a loan. When his assets ended up in equitable receivership, the
creditors attempted to collect the taxes paid on the subject properties.
However, the district court's order froze those assets. The district court
concluded that those certificates were intangible personal property when
used as collateral, i.e., general intangibles, and that the only way to protect
a security interest in those assets would have been by filing a UCC
financing statement with the secretary of state. Because the creditors had
failed to do so, they were unsecured. 60 The Florida Supreme Court
answered the certified question in the affirmative, thereby finding that the
UCC filing was unnecessary.-
6
The majority opinion based its conclusion on the analysis of three
statutes. The first was section 197.102.562 This statute defines a tax
certificate as a legal document representing unpaid delinquent real property
taxes which becomes a first lien on the subject property. The second statute
was section 679.104(1 0).563 This statute provided that chapter 679 would
not apply except to provide for fixtures, to the creation of or the transfer of
interests in or liens upon real estate, including leases or rents. The third
statute was section 679.102(2).64 This statute provided that chapter 679
would not apply to statutory liens. The court reasoned that because a tax
certificate was a lien on real property and a statutory lien, the language of
sections 197.02(3), 679.104(10), and 679.102(2) clearly excludes tax
certificates from chapter 679. The majority felt that the primary question
was whether the tax certificate itself was exempt from chapter 679.565
On the other hand, Chief Justice Barkett and Justices McDonald and
Grimes differed on that question. Chief Justice Barkett's dissenting opinion
pointedly criticized the majority opinion. The dissent agreed that one's
holding of a tax certificate creates an interest that is not subject to chapter
679. However, it pointed out that the question here was whether the
transfer of an interest in those certificates as collateral for a loan would be
subject to chapter 679.566 To support their position, the dissenters pointed
to the UCC's official comment to section 679.102(3). The gist of the
official comment is that the UCC does not apply to the creation of a
560. Id. at 159-60.
561. Id. at 159.
562. FLA. STAT. § 197.102(3) (1991).
563. Id. § 679.104(10).
564. Id. § 679.102(2).
565. Elliott, 620 So. 2d at 160.
566. Id. at 161.
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mortgage. In addition, it will not apply to the sale of the note by the
mortgagee. On the other hand, if the mortgagee pledges the note to secure
the mortgagee's separate indebtedness to a third person, the UCC would
apply to that security interest. The dissenters felt that the circumstances
involved in the instant case were analogous to the last scenario in the
official comment.
67
XXIV. TITLE INSURANCE
Sommers v. Smith and Berman, P.A.168 This is an opinion written by
Judge Klein with which Chief Judge Dell and Senior Judge Owen con-
curred. The question before the court was whether a title insurance
company was liable to the purchasers of real estate for the purported
negligence of the attorney who handled the closing and issued the title
insurance policy through the underwriter.1
69
The purchasers and the sellers of the real estate in question entered into
a contract. However, the contract refers to the property only by street
address. Because of representations made by the seller and the real estate
broker, the purchasers thought that the property was larger than it actually
was. The lawyer who represented the buyers at closing and who issued the
title insurance policy through the underwriter was aware of a survey that
obtained a legal description fitting the buyers' expectations but which was
different from the legal description in the deed and the title insurance policy.
The appellate court held that, since one can be an agent of the insurance
company for one purpose and an agent of the insured for other purposes,
there would be no liability on the part of the underwriter where the title
insurer did not conduct the closing as a "closing agent."57
XXV. VENDOR AND PURCHASER UNDER CONTRACT OF
PURCHASE AND SALE
Bird Lakes Development Corp. v. Meruelo.7' This is an opinion
written by Judge Ferguson. The buyer bought thirty-five acres of undevel-
oped land after the seller orally represented that there were sewer lines. On
discovering that not to true, the buyer sued for specific performance and
567. Id.
568. 637 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
569. Id. at 61.
570. Id. at 61-62.
571. 626 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 637 So. 2d 233 (Fla.
1994).
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damages. The judgment for the buyer was affirmed.572 The trial court did
not err when it concluded that the parties entered into an oral contract to
construct the sewers. The oral contract did not involve the transfer of any
interest in land, e.g., an easement, so it was not required to be in writing by
the Statute of Frauds. Furthermore, the contract to construct the sewers was
collateral to, but independent of, the contract of sale. Consequently, the
merger clause in the contract of sale would not be applicable to the sewer
construction contract. 3
Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Ameripalms 6B GP, Inc.574 This was a
per curiam opinion from Judges Hubbart, Gersten, and Goderich. This case
involved contract interpretation and the parol evidence rule. The buyer and
seller began negotiating the purchase and sale of two properties, parcels 6
and 6B. The transaction was eventually structured as two separate contracts
of sale. The terms of the first contract, which covered parcel 6B, required
the buyer to give a $25,000 deposit, and to pay $2 million in cash, and to
deliver a $675,000 promissory note at closing.575
The draft note provided that the note would be payable when the buyer
and seller "close, or are obligated to close, on the sale of Unit 6 ....
However, the note they executed provided that it would only be payable
when the city accepted their application for processing for development
approval. When the city accepted the application for processing, the buyer
paid the note. The seller used the money to satisfy some of its mortgage
debt owed to Citicorp Real Estate.
But something went awry. There was never a closing on parcel 6.
Consequently, the buyer sued for the return of its $675,000 from the seller
and Citicorp Real Estate on the theories of conversion, money had and
received, and unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the buyer and the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.577
The trial court apparently relied upon the contract to reach its
conclusion that the money should be returned. It stated that "[t]he law is
well established that two or more documents executed by the same parties,
at or near the same time, and concerning the same transaction or subject
matter are generally construed together as a single contract."57 The note
572. Id. at 236.
573. Id. at 238.
574. 633 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
575. Id. at 48.
576. Id.
577. Id. at 48-49.
578. Id. at 49.
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and the contract were not executed at the same time, but they were executed
by the same parties and the contemporaneous requirement was satisfied by
their having grown out of the same transaction. The contract provided the
only evidence of the parties' intent to treat the two sales as one transaction,
so summary judgment was appropriate. 79
Cruise v. Graham.8 This is an opinion written by Judge Hersey
with which Judges Gunther and Stone concurred. As part of a real estate
transaction, the seller agreed to take back a second mortgage for part of the
purchase price. The agreement provided that the buyer would obtain the
rest of the purchase price from another lender who would have a first
mortgage, but the first mortgage debt could not exceed $35,950. When it
was foreclosed, the seller and his attorney discovered that the first mortgage
debt was $45,000.8I
The seller had $35,950 in reserve to redeem the property from the first
mortgage in the event of default. However, the seller apparently was not
allowed to redeem for that amount and the foreclosure sale extinguished his
security interest. As a result, the seller brought this suit for fraudulent
misrepresentation against the mortgage broker and its employee, Ray Cruise.
The seller prevailed in the trial court and the Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed.'82
The first defense raised was that the defendants' representations had
been made to plaintiff's attorney and not directly to the plaintiff. The
appellate court had little difficulty in disposing with this argument.
Generally, an attorney is an agent of his or her client. The acts of an agent
are the acts of the principal. Therefore, misrepresentations made to the
agent are, in effect, misrepresentations made to the client.
Another defense raised was that the seller, or seller's attorney, was
negligent or at fault for not properly examining the documents prior to or
at the closing. But this was an action based on fraud. Fraud is an
intentional tort. Consequently, the seller's comparative fault or negligence
was not a defense.
Finally, the defendants argued that punitive damages should not have
been awarded since there was no evidence introduced that the defendants'
conduct was outrageous or reprehensible. The district court rejected the
argument." 3 It is now an accepted rule in Florida that punitive damages
579. Citicorp Real Estate, 633 So. 2d at 49.
580, 622 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
581. Id. at 38.
582. Id. at 39-40.
583. Id. at 41.
298
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/1
1994] Brown / Grohman 299
can be awarded based upon a claim of fraud if there is sufficient evidence
to support an award of compensatory damages.584 In this case there was
sufficient evidence that: 1) the representations had been made, even if that
had occurred in a telephone conversation two months before the closing, 2)
the defendants had justifiably relied upon them, and 3) the plaintiff had been
harmed. 8 5
Edelberg v. Monogram Building & Design.86 This is an opinion
written by Judge Hersey with which Judge Pariente and Senior Judge
Walden, James H., concurred. Section 501.1375 of the Florida Statutes
concerns contracts to purchase one or two-family homes from building
contractors or developers. 8 7 The statute requires deposits of up to 10%
of the purchase price be put in interest bearing escrow accounts. According
to the statute, that money can be released without the signature of both the
buyer and seller in only five situations: 1) the posting of a surety bond; 2)
the existence of a master security bond; 3) the buyer properly terminates the
contract; 4) the buyer defaults; or 5) at closing, if the funds have not been
previously disbursed. 588 The Fourth District Court of Appeal interpreted
the language of the fourth situation. 89
The escrow money had been in a law firm's trust account. The buyers
allegedly tried to withdraw from the transaction due to their financial
reverses. The developer considered this to be a default which would entitle
it to withdraw the money. As required by the statute, it gave the buyer
notice of its intention to make the withdrawal, after a seventy-two hour wait,
based upon the default. The buyers claimed that they were not in default
because the contract was conditioned on their ability to get financing. They
sought, but were refused, a temporary injunction. So the developer
completed the statutory procedure and withdrew the money.590
The trial court refused to issue the injunction because it involved only
a dispute over money. The district court rejected the trial court's logic.
First, it pointed out that the statute allowed disbursal in the event of a
buyer's default, not in the event the developer certifies that the buyer is in
584. Id.
585. Cruise, 622 So. 2d at 39.
586. 630 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
587. FLA. STAT. § 501.1375 (1989).
588. Id.
589. Edelberg, 630 So. 2d at 1228-29.
590. Id. at 1228.
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default. There had been no determination here that the buyer was in
default.59
Furthermore, the statute was intended to be a consumer protection
device. Both the spirit of the statute and procedural due process592 require
that the buyer receive a full and fair hearing on a disputed issue at a
meaningful time. Consequently, the trial court should not have denied the
injunction. There would have to be a judicial determination whether buyer
had defaulted before the funds could be disbursed.
The district court, however, refused to speculate on the whether the act
provided this escrow agent immunity. The act does provide immunity for
the escrow agent who complies with the statutory procedure following
default.593 But in this case, a trial court would first have to determine if
there had been a default.
594
Green Acres, Inc. v. First Union National Bank.595 This is an
opinion written by Judge Pariente with which Judges Polen and Farmer
concurred. The buyers sued for damages, alleging that the sellers knew, but
intentionally failed to disclose, that the land contained an Indian burial site
which would interfere with their development plans. The trial court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court
reversed, holding that the buyers should have been given the opportunity to
amend the complaint to include the claim that the sellers had breached a
contractual duty to disclose those facts.596 The court reasoned that this
claim could be based upon certain language in the documents.5 97
The court declined to expand Johnson v. Davis,598 which had abol-
ished caveat emptor in residential real estate sales, to include commercial
real estate transactions.5 99 The First District Court of Appeal had taken
that step,600 but the Second and Third District Courts of Appeal had
expressly refused to do so. 60 ' This court, however, left open the possibili-
591. Id. at 1229.
592. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
593. FLA. STAT. § 501.1375(7)(d) (1989).
594. Edelberg, 630 So. 2d at 1229.
595. 637 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
596. Id. at 364-65.
597. Id. at 364.
598. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
599. Green Acres, 637 So. 2d at 365.
600. See Haskell Co. v. Lane Co., 612 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review
dismissed sub nom. Service Merchandise Co. v. Lane Co., 620 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1993).
601. See Mostoufi v. Presto Food Stores, Inc., 618 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 626 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1993); Futura Realty v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctrs. Inc., 578
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ty that it might conclude, at a later time, that commercial real estate sellers
might have a duty to disclose material facts under particular circumstan-
ces.6"2 It is obviously time for the supreme court, or the legislature, to
clarify the obligations of the commercial real estate seller.
Mall v. Pawelski. °3 This was a per curiam opinion in which Judges
Gunther and Pariente, and Senior Judge Downey concurred. The buyer had
purchased a house with a seventeen-year-old roof which began to leak
shortly after the home was purchased. The buyers eventually replaced the
roof, sued for the replacement cost, and won in the circuit court. While
agreeing that the seller was liable, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed on the issue of damages.6"4
The buyers had bargained for a seventeen-year-old roof. To allow
them to recover for the full cost of a new roof with a far greater life
expectancy would give them far more than they had bargained for, unjustly
enriching them at the seller's expense. The buyers were entitled only to
recover for the roof's replacement, "prorated to account for the increased
life expectancy of the new roof."6"5
Walton v. Runck.6"6 This is an opinion written by Judge Hall with
which Chief Judge Frank and Judge Parker concurred. This case involved
a contract to exchange a parcel of North Dakota land for some Florida land.
A dispute arose, which resulted in this suit. The trial court concluded that
the parties had abandoned the contract. Then, exercising its broad equity
powers, the trial court divided the equity in the Florida land and ordered it
sold even though neither party had asked for that relief. The district court
concluded that, under established law, the trial court did not have jurisdic-
tion to grant such relief without a request for it from one of the parties.607
XXVI. WATER AND WATER COURSES
Chiles v. Floridian Sports Club, Inc.6"' This is an opinion written by
Chief Judge Harris with which Judges Sharp and Thompson concurred. The
question before the court was whether the trial court erred in holding, as a
So. 2d 363 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 591 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1991).
602. Green Acres, 637 So. 2d at 365.
603. 626 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
604. Id. at 292.
605. Id.
606. 630 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
607. Id. at 222.
608. 633 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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matter of law, that the waters of the St. Johns River in Welaka (Putnam
County) were non-tidal waters." 9
Through a series of mesne conveyances, Floridian acquired title to real
property abutting the St. Johns River, at which time a lease was in effect
that required the abutting landowner to make annual rental payments to the
state for the submerged land underlying the landowner's boathouse and
docks. However, when the state demanded the required lease payments,
Floridian filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it was
exempted from having to make such rental payments. Floridian's argument
in favor of such exemption was that, since prior cases have found that the
St. Johns River waters were non-tidal in Welaka, the affidavits in opposition
to Floridian's motion for summary judgment, purportedly factually
establishing that the waters in that area were tidally influenced, were
ineffective for the purposes of defeating a motion for summary judg-
ment.6"0 To gain the protection of the Butler Act and to show that the
state had no title to the submerged lands, Floridian needed to show that the
waters were either non-tidal or that, if they were tidal waters, the improve-
ments were completed prior to May 29, 1951 when the Butler Act was
repealed as to submerged land in tidal waters.61'
The Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings since the supreme court took the position that,
notwithstanding prior case law, the affidavits presented by the state in this
case created genuine issues of material fact.6" 2
Concerned Citizens of Putnam County for Responsible Government,
Inc. v. St. Johns River Water Management District.6 1 3 This is an opinion
written by Judge Peterson with which Judges Goshorn and Thompson
concurred. The question before the court was whether the trial court erred
in dismissing Citizens' complaint for injunctive relief with prejudice.
Citizens' goals were that the St. Johns River Management District be
required to establish minimum water flow levels; to refrain, until that time,
from issuing consumptive water permits as to those areas of the district
having critical water shortage problems; and, to cut back the water
consumption volume in those critical areas until the region recovered
sufficiently." 4
609. Id. at 50.
610. Id.
611. Id. at 51.
612. Id. at 52-53.
613. 622 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
614. Id. at 521.
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Citizens' complaint sought to require the district to comply with the
Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, chapter 373 of the Florida Statutes,
particularly section 373.042 which requires each district to establish
minimum flows and levels.6"' The district had taken the position that,
although the statute states that each district "shall" establish such minimums,
the use of the word "shall" in this section is a directory % ord, rather than
a mandatory one.6" 6
The Fifth District Court of Appeal pointed out that the usual meaning
of "shall" is mandatory. Therefore, the question was whether there was
anything in the particular statute to evidence that there was a legislative
intent that it was merely directory. Finding that nothing existed to give the
language that effect, the court held that the complaint was sufficient to
require a response by the district.617 Therefore, the trial court erred. The
appellate court vacated the lower court ruling and remanded for further
proceedings.
618
Royal Palm Square Ass 'n v. Sevco Land Corp.619 This is an opinion
written by Chief Judge Frank with which Judges Ryder and Campbell
concurred. The question presented to the court was whether the South
Florida Water Management District ("District") erred in entering a final
agency action resulting in the dismissal with prejudice of Royal Palm's
amended petition for an administrative hearing in opposition to Sevco's
application for modification of an off-site surface water system permit.62
The question arose when Sevco entered into a contract to purchase
unsettled land next to Royal Palm's property. To determine whether it
could develop the area, Sevco applied to the District to modify the permit
for an off-site surface water system so that Sevco could also run its waters
into that system. To permit this, the District required the creation of an
association between Sevco and Royal Palm to manage the entire water
system. In response, Sevco produced what was entitled a final operation
and maintenance agreement which supposedly showed the association
between Sevco and Royal Palm. However, Royal Palm had not reached
such an agreement with Sevco.
62
'
615. Id. at 522.
616. Id.
617. Id. at 523.
618. Concerned Citizens, 622 So. 2d at 525.
619. 623 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review dismissed, 639 So. 2d 981
(Fla. 1994).
620. Id. at 534.
621. Id.
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Believing that there was such an agreement between the two entities,
the District approved the modification of the permit, provided that the
association was given sufficient ownership of the system so that it had
control over the entire water management facility. Royal Palm amended its
petition challenging the modification because Sevco did not have any
ownership interest in the water management system as required by the
District. After an informal hearing, the Water Management District's
governing board granted the amended petition. However, because Sevco
subsequently agreed to assume the sole and comprehensive responsibility for
the maintenance of that system, the District never had a formal hearing and
dismissed Royal Palm's amended petition with prejudice.622
In deciding to reverse the District and remand the matter with direction
to initiate appropriate formal hearings, the appellate court found that Royal
Palm had met its burden. First, it had to demonstrate that it had a
substantial interest that would suffer immediate injury by the modification.
Royal Palm met this requirement since it was a property owner possessed
of legal right to drain into the system, and its rights could be diminished
dramatically by the introduction of additional surface waters.623 Second,
it had to show that the injury suffered was the type for which such formal
hearings were designed to protect. With respect to the second requirement,
Royal Palm alleged in its amended petition that Sevco's application failed
to satisfy the prerequisite that there was an entity with sufficient ownership
for a proprietary control over the system.624
XXVII. ZONING
Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder.625
This is an opinion written by Justice Grimes with which Chief Justice
Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald, Kogan, and Harding concurred.
Justice Shaw dissented without an opinion. Landowners sought rezoning of
a one half acre parcel. The planning and zoning staff concluded that the
rezoning would be consistent with the comprehensive plan except for the
fact that it was located in the flood plain. After discovering the flood plain
problem could be eliminated by raising the elevation with fill, the planning
and zoning board approved the rezoning request. The application then went
622. Id. at 534-35.
623. Id.
624. Royal Palm Square, 623 So. 2d at 535.
625. 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993); see John W. Howell and David J. Russ, Planning vs.
Zoning: Snyder Decision Changes Rezoning Standards, FLA. B.J., May 1994, at 16.
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to the county commission. A number of citizens appeared to oppose
rezoning, expressing fears of increased traffic. Without stating a reason, the
county commission denied the rezoning. From there, the case went to the
circuit court, where the landowners were unsuccessful, and subsequently to
the district court of appeal, where their degree of success was amazing.626
However, that success was short lived. The Florida Supreme Court quashed
the district court's opinion. 27
The enactment of an original zoning ordinance is legislative in
character. However, rezoning may be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.
Legislative action "results in the formulation of a general rule of policy,
whereas judicial action results in the application of a general rule of
policy." '628 Therefore, "comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion
of the public are legislative in nature." '629 Conversely, rezonings which
affect a limited number or properties or property owners are judicial in
nature. In this case, the rezoning decision of an area of one-half acre owned
by one person was clearly quasi-judicial. 30
Such decisions are reviewable by the courts by writs of certiorari. The
standard of review is strict scrutiny, but not in the way that term is used in
describing review in constitutional cases. The review is to determine if the
rezoning is in strict compliance with the comprehensive plan. Rezoning that
is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan would be reversed. However,
that does not mean that an application for rezoning consistent with the
comprehensive plan must be granted. The purpose of planning is to deal
with the future as well as the present. The government must be given
leeway to conduct that planning. If the government's decision to deny the
rezoning is based upon substantial, competent evidence, then the court
should defer to that decision.
Accordingly, a landowner who seeks to rezone a particular property is
involved in a quasi-judicial proceeding. He or she has the burden of
proving that the proposal is consistent with the comprehensive plan and
complies with the procedural requirements of the zoning ordinance. Then
the burden of proof shifts to the government. The government must
demonstrate that the denial accomplishes a legitimate public purpose, i.e.,
626. Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991),jurisdiction accepted, 605 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1992), and quashed by 627
So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
627. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
628. Id. at 474.
629. Id.
630. Id.
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that the refusal to rezone is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreason-
able.63 ' Having failed to obtain the rezoning, the landowner might claim
that the denial effects a taking of his or her property and seek compensation
by an action for inverse condemnation.
Parker v. Leon County.632 This is an opinion written by Justice
Grimes with which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald,
Kogan, and Harding concurred. Justice Shaw dissented without a written
opinion. In Parker, two cases were consolidated for review by the Florida
Supreme Court.633 In both cases, developers had applied for approval of
preliminary subdivision plats and met with denials from the County
Planning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners on the
theory that the proposed subdivisions were inconsistent with the comprehen-
sive plan. Each developer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
circuit court which held in favor of the developers. 634 The First District
Court of Appeal reversed.635
The district court reasoried that the developers' sole route to circuit
court review of the County Commission decision was via section 163.3215
of the Florida Statutes.636 However, the filing of a verified complaint
with the local government within thirty days of its "inconsistent action" is
a condition precedent to relief under this section.637 Consequently, on
remand the circuit court dismissed the developers' actions. 63 ' The district
court affirmed and certified the following question to the supreme court:
WHETHER THE RIGHT TO PETITION FOR COMMON LAW
CERTIORARI IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE IS
STILL AVAILABLE TO A LANDOWNER/PETITIONER WHO
SEEKS APPELLATE REVIEW OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DEVELOPMENT ORDER FINDING COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
631. Id.
632. 627 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1993).
633. Emerald Acres Investments, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Leon County,
601 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed by Parker v. Leon County, 627 So.
2d 476 (Fla. 1993); Parker v. Leon County, 601 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992),
quashed by 627 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1993).
634. Parker, 627 So. 2d at 477.
635. Leon County v. Parker, 566 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
636. Id. at 1316.
637. Inconsistent action refers to governmental action inconsistent with the comprehen-
sive plan. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(4) (1989).
638. Parker, 627 So. 2d at 478.
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INCONSISTENCY, NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 163.3215,
FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)639
The supreme court answered the question in the affirmative and
quashed the district court opinion. The court used the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation to reach its conclusion that section 163.3215 applied
to intervenors,6 0 not to the unsuccessful applicant for a permit or approv-
al. 641
XXVIII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of cases and legislation evidences the continuing
evolution of Florida property law. It does not seem to be developing in a
manner inconsistent with the mainstream of real estate law in the United
States. However, it is critical that the property practitioner remain current,
despite the large number of judicial opinions and legislative enactments, to
avoid the complications and pitfalls which befell some of the litigants
discussed in the cases above.
639. Id. at 477.
640. See Board ofTrustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Seminole County
Board of County Comm'rs, 623 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied,
634 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1994). The Fifth District Court of Appeal held in this case that the
Department of Natural Resources and the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund, claiming that the county's development order was inconsistent with the
comprehensive plan, were limited to relief under § 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at
596.
641. Parker, 627 So. 2d at 479-80.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's version of the Uniform Commercial Code is found in chapters
670-680 of the Florida Statutes. This survey covers the substantive changes
in Florida's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or "Code") and the cases
interpreting the Code during the period of July 1, 1993 to July 15, 1994.
During the past year, there were only a few cases with written opinions that
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Mr. Young has been with Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. since
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tions, creditor's rights, commercial litigation, mortgage foreclosures, insolvent financial
institutions, and lender liability. He also does work for the FDIC and the RTC relative to
insolvent financial institutions. Mr. Young frequently lectures on the above mentioned topics
and is the author of "Creation of Security Interests," a chapter in Secured Transactions in
Florida, a Florida Bar publication.
The author would like to express his appreciation for the assistance of Thomas P. Wert,
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dealt with substantive Code issues. This survey presents the few cases that
warrant discussion.
II. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
The only substantive change to the UCC during the survey period was
the repeal of chapter 676 of the Florida Statutes, relating to bulk transfers.'
At least two events prompted the formation of a subcommittee to review the
status of chapter 676. First, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute had recommended
repeal, or at least significant revision, of the UCC article on bulk transfers.2
Second, many members of the Florida Bar had expressed concern that
chapter 676 was serving no useful purpose in its present form.'
The subcommittee, formed by both the Financial Institutions and the
Bankruptcy/UCC Committees to study and report on the status of chapter
676, recommended the chapter's repeal and advised against any further bulk
sales legislation.' The subcommittee found that compliance with chapter
676 substantially decreased due to the cost and delay involved when the
provision was followed.5 The subcommittee also reported that chapter 676
often gave little relief to aggrieved creditors and that the chapter's remedy,
nullifying the transfer, was not practical in today's transactions.' The
Florida Legislature followed the subcommitee's recommendation and the
repeal of chapter 676 of the Florida Statutes became effective on July 1,
1993.7
III. CASES INTERPRETING FLORIDA'S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Lease as a Security Interest
In In re Howell,8 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Florida determined to what extent a particular lease constituted a financing
1. Act of Apr. 23, 1993, ch. 93-77, § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws 436, 436.
2. STAFF OF FLA. SENATE COMM. ON UCC, SB 710 (1993) STAFF ANALYSIS 2 (Feb.
22, 1993).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Ch. 93-77, §§ 3-4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 436.
8. 161 B.R. 285 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1993).
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arrangement making any security interest created by the lease avoidable by
the trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544.9 In Howell, the
debtor entered into an agreement with the defendant to purchase the good
will and parts inventory of the defendant's auto repair business.' In a
separate agreement, the debtor agreed to lease from the defendant all the
furniture, equipment, and tools for use in the business." The debtor
operated the auto repair business until he filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition." The plaintiff, who was the bankruptcy trustee, sought a
declaratory judgment that the lease was really a financing arrangement rather
than a true lease, making any interest avoidable by the trustee due to the
defendant's failure to file a UCC-1 financing statement.'
3
To determine the character of the agreement, the court looked to
section 671.201(37) of the Florida Statutes for the definition of "security
interest," and noted that subsection (a) of the statute would require a finding
that there was a security interest if the lease contained a nontermination
clause along with one of the other enumerated items. 4 Because the lease
in question did not have a nontermination clause, the court then looked to
subsection (b) of the statute, which states that a transaction does not create
a security interest merely because one of the listed items is present. 5
The court held that any relevant factor or circumstance may be
considered when determining whether the transaction created a security
interest or a true lease. 6 The court explained that the statute merely
precluded the finding of a security interest based on any single factor listed
in subsection (b). 7 After reviewing the circumstances surrounding the
lease, the court listed nine factors that indicated that the lease created a
security interest.' The court concluded that it was left with "an unmistak-
9. Id. at 287.
10. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id.
13. Howell, 161 B.R. at 287.
14. Id. at 287-88.
15. Id. at 288.
16. Id. at 289.
17. Id. at 288.
18. Howell, 161 B.R. at 289. The nine factors set out by the court are:
1) Lessee is responsible for insuring the leased property;
2) Lessee bears the risk of loss or damage to the subject property, and bore
risk of any liability arising from its use;
3) Lessee is responsible for the payment of all taxes associated the [sic]
leased property;
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able impression that the lease was entered to effectuate a security interest in
the leased property."' 9
B. Florida's Blood Shield Statute
In Walls v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co.,20 a personal representative
of the estate of a hemophiliac brought a products liability wrongful death
action against the manufacturer of plasma products which allegedly led to
the hemophiliac's death from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS"). 2' One of the issues decided in Walls by the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida was whether Florida's
"blood-shield" statute22 precluded failure-to-warn products liability claims
against a seller of blood or blood products.23 This issue was raised when
the defendant argued that the plaintiffs claim was time-barred because the
applicable statute of limitations was Florida's four year negligence statute
of limitations rather than the limitations on products liability actions.24
The defendant relied on Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc.,25
a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Florida, in support of its
argument that Florida's "blood-shield" statute essentially turned the
plaintiffs claim into a pure negligence action.26 The defendant contended
4) Lessee is responsible for all maintenance and repairs of the leased
property;
5) Default provisions of the lease are similar to those found in a typical
financing arrangement;
6) The lease contains a remedy provision which is similar to those found in
financing arrangements;
7) The lease specifically excluded any warranties;
8) The term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic
life of the leased property; and
9) The lessee has the right to purchase the leased property at the end of the
lease term for nominal additional consideration.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
19. Id. at 290.
20. 832 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
21. Id. at 1469.
22. FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1993).
23. Walls, 832 F. Supp. at 1472-74.
24. Id. at 1471.
25. 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1992).
26. Walls, 832 F. Supp. at 1472.
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that the statute precluded a products liability claim against it." Upon
careful review of Silva, the Walls court held that Silva did not support the
defendant's position.28 The court noted that the Silva court stated that
Florida's "blood-shield" statute "was enacted to eliminate actions for strict
liability against blood banks and to limit U.C.C. warranties in the context
of the sale of blood by blood banks." '29 The Walls court pointed out that
section 672.316(5),30 by its own terms, only applies to allegations of
breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose.'
The court stated that the plaintiff's claim was "not a claim for breach
of an implied warranty of fitness or merchantability" and refused to extend
the statute's reach to failure-to-warn actions.32 The court concluded that
the statute did not limit the plaintiff's ability to bring a failure-to-warn
action against a manufacturer of blood products or convert the claim into a
pure negligence action.33 Consequently, the court held that the products
liability statute of limitation applied to the instant case.
C. Negotiable Instruments
The only decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Florida relating
to the UCC during the last year is State v. Family Bank of Hallandale.5
The issue before the court was whether state warrants were negotiable
instruments under the UCC.36 The comptroller had placed a stop payment
order on a warrant when it was discovered that the original warrant had
been mailed to the wrong company." Several months after the Federal
Reserve Bank of Miami returned the original warrant to the respondent due
to the stop payment order, the respondent filed suit against the State of
Florida.3" The respondent argued that it was a "holder in due course"
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1472-73.
29. Id. at 1473.
30. FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1993).
31. Walls, 832 F. Supp. at 1473.
32. Id. at 1474.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 623 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1993).
36. Id. at 475.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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under the theory that state warrants were negotiable instruments, and thus
it was entitled to reimbursement by the State.39
In a unanimous decision, overruling the First District Court of Appeal,
the court held that state warrants were not negotiable instruments.4" In
support of its conclusion, the court noted that the Florida Legislature
amended section 673.1041 of the Florida Statutes as a direct response to the
trial court's decision in the case.4' The substance of this amendment is
now found at section 673.1041(11) of the Florida Statutes and provides that
"[a] warrant of this state is not a negotiable instrument governed by this
chapter."42 Consequently, the court held that the respondent was not a
holder in due course and that it took the warrant subject to the State's
defense that it had issued a valid stop payment order.4 3
D. Bank Deposits and Collections
The Fifth District Court of Appeal determined in Sun Bank N.A. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.41 whether a bank may charge
back a customer's account for a check with a forged or unauthorized
signature once the account had received final settlement and payment.45
In Sun Bank, a check drawn on an account at Citizens and Southern
National Bank ("C & S Bank") payable to Physician's Computer Systems
("PCS") was endorsed by a PCS employee as PCS's chief operating
officer.46  The check was then delivered to Cosmopolitan Lady Spa,
Inc./Cosmopolitan Fitness Corporation ("Cosmopolitan") where it was
endorsed and deposited into its account at Merrill Lynch.47 Merrill Lynch
in turn deposited the check into its account with Sun Bank and later
received final settlement and payment.48
39. Id. at 475-76.
40. Family Bank, 623 So. 2d at 477-78.
41. Id. at 478-79. The court referred to chapter 91-216, section 1, 1991 Florida Laws
2065, which added subsection (4) to section 673.1041 of the Florida Statutes.
42. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(11) (1993).
43. Family Bank, 623 So. 2d at 479.
44. 637 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
45. Id. at 280.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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More than one year later, C & S Bank notified Sun Bank that the
endorsement by the PCS employee was unauthorized.49 An affidavit from
PCS's president stated that the person who endorsed the check was no
longer employed by PCS at the time the check was signed. 0 Even though
Merrill Lynch denied liability, Sun Bank debited the amount of the check
from Merrill Lynch's account without notifying it.5 Consequently, Merrill
Lynch filed suit against Sun Bank for wrongfully debiting its account.
5 2
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant Merrill
Lynch's motion for summary judgment and held that "Sun Bank's right to
charge back Merrill Lynch's account was limited to the midnight deadline
or within a longer reasonable time prior to final settlement" as specified by
section 674.212 of the Florida Statutes.3 The court refused to recognize
an exception to the final settlement deadline just because an unauthorized
endorsement was involved. 4 The court also rejected the argument that
section 674.406 of the Florida Statutes, relating to the customer's duty to
discover and report an unauthorized signature or alteration, authorized Sun
Bank's actions.55 The court reasoned that section 674.406 allows a claim
to be made upon a drawee bank, but it does not authorize the collecting
bank to remove funds unilaterally from a customer's account. 6
The court pointed out that even though Sun Bank was precluded from
charging back, it could still assert a breach of transfer warranty claim under
section 674.207 of the Florida Statutes.57 Concluding that summary
judgment was properly granted, the court stated that "while questions
regarding the unauthorized endorsement may be material to a suit on a
warranty claim, they are not material to the issue of whether Sun Bank
could, unilaterally and without notice, charge back Merrill Lynch's
account."5"
49. Sun Bank, 637 So. 2d at 280.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
54. Sun Bank, 637 So. 2d at 282.
55. Id. at 283.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 282-83.
58. Id. at 283.
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E. Letters of Credit
The First District Court of Appeal held that although a creditor can
perfect a security interest in a letter of credit by possession, the creditor may
not have a right to draw directly against proceeds from the letter of
credit.59 Furthermore, the creditor's security interest may be diminished
by set-offs against the letter of credit beneficiary by the person for whom
the letter of credit was issued.6" In Futch, a bank loaned a borrower
monies secured by the proceeds of a $110,000 letter of credit which was
issued to secure a judgment in favor of the borrower.6' Subsequent to the
bank's accepting assignments of the expected letter of credit proceeds as
collateral for the loans, the borrower and the judgment debtor agreed that
the judgment debtor would offset approximately $68,000 against the
judgment amount as settlement for another lawsuit.62 When the borrower
filed a petition in bankruptcy, the creditor sought an adjudication as to its
priority to proceeds from the letter of credit.
The Futch court held that the creditor had properly perfected its interest
in the letter of credit by taking possession as required by section 679.305 of
the Florida Statutes.63 However, since the letter of credit was not express-
ly assignable, the creditor did not have a right to draw directly against the
proceeds of the letter of credit because only the borrower or the trustee in
bankruptcy maintained the right to execute a draw.' Moreover, the
judgment debtor's set-off was held permissible and the amount of proceeds
available to the creditor under the letter of credit was effectively reduced.65
Thus, creditors should be careful when lending monies secured by proceeds
in letters of credit that are not expressly assignable since they will not have
the right to make direct draws on such letters of credit. Additionally, such
creditors should be aware that the value of their security interest may be
reduced by subsequent agreement between the borrower and the person for
whom the letter of credit was issued.
59. Citizens & Peoples Nat'l Bank of Pensacola v. Futch, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D693,
D696 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1994).
60. Id.
61. Id. at D693.
62. Id.
63. Id. at D696.
64. Futch, 19 Fla. L. Weekly at D696.
65. Id. at D695.
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F. Investment Securities
In First Bank of Immokalee v. Rogers NK Seed Co.,66 the Second
District Court of Appeal addressed whether the appellant's security interest
in stock owned by Precision Agricultural Products, Inc. ("Precision") was
superior to appellee's judgment lien. 7 Precision had signed a security
agreement listing several shares of stock as collateral for a loan from the
appellant."8 "Because the stock was in the possession of Precision's
broker," the appellant notified the broker by mail that Precision had assigned
the stock as collateral for a loan.69 The broker responded by refusing to
"'hold the securities in trust for anyone other than our client,' but offering
to assist in a physical transfer of stock certification if that was the desire of
Precision."7 However, the appellant took no further action at that time.7'
About a year and a half later, the appellee obtained ajudgment against
Precision.72 Subsequently, the appellee discovered the existence of the
stocks and attempted to sell them to satisfy the judgment."3 This action
prompted the appellant to intervene "to establish the priority of its security
interest."74 In reversing the trial court's decision, the court held that the
appellant's security interest had priority over the appellee's judgment
lien.75 First, the Immokalee court pointed out that according to section
678.321(1) of the Florida Statutes, a security interest in stock is perfected
when it "is 'transferred' to the secured party or its designee pursuant to a
provision of section 678.313(1).,,76 Next, the court stated that Precision's
broker was a "financial intermediary" as defined in section 678.313(4) and
that according to section 678.313(1)(h), a transfer occurred when written
notification was received by the "financial intermediary on whose books the
interest of the transferor in the security appears ... Finally, the court
concluded that the letter received by Precision's broker, notifying it that
Precision had assigned the stock to appellant, constituted a "transfer" of the
66. 637 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Immokalee, 637 So. 2d at 12.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 13.
76. Immokalee, 637 So. 2d at 12.
77. Id.
1994]
316
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
stock pursuant to these provisions.7" The court noted that Precision's
broker "had no ability to decline or prevent the transfer that resulted from
its receipt of the notification." '79
G. Secured Transactions
1. Chattel Paper
In Blazer Financial Services, Inc. v. Harbor Federal Savings & Loan
Ass 'n,8" the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether
a purchaser of chattel paper was entitled to take the paper free and clear of
a prior security interest to the full extent of the paper's face value."' In
Blazer, the appellee held a perfected security interest in ajewelry company's
"existing or acquired collateral, including its accounts and chattel paper, at
three of its retail locations."82 Later, the appellant agreed to purchase from
the retail jewelry company 1100 sales contracts which consisted of retail
installment sales contracts, security agreements, and accounts receivable.83
Over half of these contracts were subject to the security interest held by the
appellee and were purchased by the appellant at a discounted price. 4 Later
the same year, the jewelry company filed for bankruptcy.85 Subsequently,
the appellee filed suit alleging that the appellant converted its collateral.
The appellant claimed that it had priority over the appellee's security interest
under section 679.308 of the Florida Statutes.86
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 623 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
81. Id. at 582.
82. Id. at 581.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Blazer, 623 So. 2d at 581.
86. Id. Section 679.308 of the Florida Statutes provides:
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new value and takes
possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has priority over a security
interest in the chattel paper or instrument:
(1) Which is perfected under s. 679.304... or under 679.306 ... if he
acts without knowledge that the specific paper or instrument is subject to
a security interest; or
(2) Which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a
security interest (s. 679.306) even though he knows that the specific paper
or instrument is subject to the security interest.
FLA. STAT. § 679.308 (1993).
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's
finding that the appellant had purchased the chattel paper in its ordinary
course of business and without knowledge of the prior security interest
according to section 679.308. However, reversing the decision of the
trial court, the appellate court held that the protection provided by section
679.308 extended to the full face value of the paper, irrespective of the
amount paid by the purchaser of the paper.88 The court reasoned that
"[m]odem commercial practices make it impracticable for a retail lender
purchasing chattel paper in the ordinary course of its business to inquire into
the factual circumstances surrounding the transactions on which the paper
is based[,]" while a money lender is in a better position to protect itself
against the borrower's actions.8 9 The court also pointed out that its
holding was consistent with the UCC's official comment to section 679.308
of the Florida Statutes."
2. Security Agreements
Reversing the trial court, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held in
Cook v. Theme Park Ventures, Inc.,9 that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether certain documents constituted a written security
agreement.92 In Cook, the debtor brought an action for declaratory
judgment against a storage company to enjoin the company from selling a
certain painting stored by the debtor to cover storage fees.93 An assignee
of the creditor intervened, claiming that he had a security interest in the
painting, and because the debtor had defaulted on its loan, the assignee was
entitled to possession of the painting.94 The court stated two or more
documents together may evidence a security agreement." The court noted
that whether a security agreement existed was important due to section
679.203 of the Florida Statutes which provides: a "security interest is not
enforceable against the debtor and does not attach to the property unless the
87. Blazer, 623 So. 2d at 582.
88. Id. at 583.
89. Id. (quoting Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 713 S.W.2d
351 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)).
90. Id.
91. 633 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
92. Id. at 471.
93. Id. at 469.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 470.
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collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to an agreement
or the debtor has signed a security agreement .... ""
The court reviewed documents sent from debtor's predecessor in
interest to the creditor regarding the use of the painting as collateral for a
new loan. The documents included a security agreement, a UCC financing
statement, and a letter, signed by debtor's predecessor, specifically
referencing the security agreement covering the painting and the UCC
financing statement.97 The letter stated that "if the documents appear to
be in order, then the funds could be sent by check or wire .. . ."" It was
undisputed that debtor's predecessor wired the funds a few days later.99
The Cook court concluded that the documents, taken together, were
"sufficient to create an issue of fact regarding the existence of a security
agreement covering the painting."'00  The court pointed out that the
comment to section 679.203 states that the writing requirement of the
section is in the nature of that required for the statute of frauds.' Under
this standard, only one of the documents being considered to satisfy the
writing requirement must be signed by the debtor, provided that the signed
writing refers to the other necessary documents. 0 2  Thus, the court
concluded that the letter signed by the debtor's predecessor along with the
security agreement and UCC financing statement were enough to create an
issue of fact even though the other documents were unsigned.
0 3
3. Certificates of Deposits
In Bank of Winter Park v. Resolution Trust Corp., °4 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal determined the respective rights of two parties who had
competing interests in a certificate of deposit ("CD"). 5 Specifically, the
court addressed the issue of whether a bank was prevented from asserting
its set-off rights against a party who had a perfected security interest under
article 9106 The appellant, Winter Park, had loaned $300,000 to three
96. Cook, 633 So. 2d at 470 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 679.203(1)-.203(1)(a) (1993)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 471.
101. Cook, 633 So. 2d at 471.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 633 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
105. Id. at 54.
106. Id. at 54-55.
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officers of American Pioneer Federal Savings Bank ("American Pioneer").
Although the loan was supposed to be unsecured, the appellant insisted that
one of the officers maintain an account with the appellant bank. 7 As a
result, one of the officers deposited $100,000 in an account and the
appellant issued a CD to him in that amount. The CD contained provisions
prohibiting transfer without the appellant's consent and granting the
appellant certain set-off rights.'0° A short time later, the officer used the
CD as collateral for a loan from American Pioneer without the appellant's
knowledge or consent."9
About a year later, the appellant notified the officer that he was in
default on the loan."0 The next day, American Pioneer informed the
appellant that it planned to redeem the CD when the CD matured later the
same month."' Subsequently, the appellant told American Pioneer of its
intention to exercise its contractual right of set-off against the CD proceeds.
The appellee, as receiver for American Pioneer, sued the appellant to
recover the proceeds of the CD."
2
The court began its discussion by stating that the decision in this case
would be governed by the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens
National Bank of Orlando v. Bornstein."' Under the reasoning of
Bornstein, the nonnegotiable CD at issue in the instant case was an
"instrument" as defined in section 679.105(1)(i) of the Florida Statutes.
Thus the officer's assignment to American Pioneer "was 'a transfer entitled
to secured transaction treatment under article 9."'' 4 However, the Winter
Park court noted that the Florida Supreme Court, in Bornstein, further
construed section 679.104(9) of the Florida Statutes to mean that a bank
does not need to comply with the provisions of article 9 in order to preserve
its set-off rights." 5 Thus, the instant court concluded that the appellant
had the right of set-off, as long as its right accrued prior to receiving notice
of the assignment of the CD to American Pioneer."6
Reversing the decision of the trial court, the appellate court held that
the appellant's interest in the CD was superior to the appellee's because the
107. Id. at 54.
108. Id.
109. Winter Park, 633 So. 2d at 54.
I10. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see Citizens Nat'l Bank of Orlando v. Bornstein, 374 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1979).
114. Winter Park, 633 So. 2d at 54 (citing Bornstein, 374 So. 2d at 6).
115. Id. at 55.
116. Id.
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appellant had declared the officer in default on the loan before it was
notified of the CD's assignment to American Pioneer."7 Moreover, the
court gave an alternative ground for reversal. The court stated that the
Bornstein court specifically held that section 679.318(4) of the Florida
Statutes did not invalidate the CD's restrictions on assignment." 8 There-
fore, the court concluded that the appellant should have prevailed because
American Pioneer took assignment of the CD subject to its provision
requiring the appellant's prior written consent." 9
The court acknowledged that its interpretation of Bornstein was directly
contrary to two federal court decisions.2 ' Bornstein reached the Supreme
Court of Florida upon certified questions from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 2' However, applying the Florida Supreme
Court's answers to the certified questions in Bornstein, the Winter Park
court awarded the CD proceeds to the secured creditor.'22 Likewise, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted
Bornstein to mean that the priority provisions in article 9 govern even
though the dispute involves a bank with set-off rights.'23
IV. CONCLUSION
The UCC in Florida has not undergone remarkable change in the past
year. During the survey period, there was little revision of the Florida
Statutes which constitute the UCC, other than the repeal of chapter 676,
which deals with bulk transfers. Although recent case law reveals no
particular trend in the courts' interpretation of the UCC in any specific area,
the cases reviewed herein should help further clarify the rights of those
conducting commercial transactions in Florida.
117. Id. at 56.
118. Id.
119. Winter Park, 633 So. 2d at 56.
120. See id. at 55.
121. See Bornstein, 374 So. 2d at 6.
122. Winter Park, 633 So. 2d at 54.
123. Id. at 55.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The court,' readers, and authors must be aware of the contemporary
reality that the United States Courts of Appeals sit in most cases both as the
* This article is adapted from a chapter written by Professor Baker in The First
Decade: The US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 1981-1991, which was
coauthored by J. Ralph Beaird and Sharon Kennedy.
** Alvin R. Allison Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.S., cum laude,
Florida State University, 1974; J.D. with high honors, University of Florida, 1977. Professor
Baker is also the author of RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS (1994). Professor Baker would like to thank U.S. Circuit Judges John
C. Godbold and James C. Hill for their helpful comments and suggestions. He is also
grateful for the support and encouragement of coauthors Beaird and Kennedy, as well as the
able research assistance of-Diana Nichols and Michael S. Truesdale.
I. The generic reference "the court" will be used throughout this chapter. "The court"
is the appropriate reference both to an entire court of appeals and to a particular division or
panel. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 250, cert. denied
sub nom. Metzger v. Western Pac. R.R., 346 U.S. 910 (1953). When relevant, the distinction
will be made explicit between a three-judge panel and an en banc court.
322
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
appeal of right and as the final court of review. Justice Byron White made
the point:
The Supreme Court of the United States reviews only a small percent-
age of all judgments issued by the twelve courts of appeals. Each of
the courts of appeals, therefore, is for all practical purposes the final
expositor of the federal law within its geographical jurisdiction. This
crucial fact makes each of those courts a tremendously important
influence in the development of the federal law, both constitutional and
statutory. Hence, it is an obviously useful and significant service to
keep close track of and to publicize, particularly for the benefit of
lawyers and judges, the work of the circuits.2
Thus, the decisions of the courts of appeals have become, if not less fallible,
more final in all areas of federal law.3 The Eleventh Circuit's decisions,
like the decisions of the other courts of appeals, have great effects on the
legal life of our Nation. Consequently, the commentator's task becomes
more important.
Likewise, the task of commentary is difficult. The period covered
here-the first decade of the Eleventh Circuit-represents, quite literally and
figuratively, the formative era of the court. Indeed, the volume of decisions
and their variety are qualities that ought to humble, if not intimidate, most
commentators. Justice Holmes once observed that a common law court
could be expected to replicate the entire corpus juris in the space of a single
generation. The Eleventh Circuit did this consciously between 1981 and
1991. In Bonner v. City of Prichard,5 the inaugural en banc court held that
the new court-just cleaved from the former Fifth Circuit-would deem
itself bound by the precedents of the old court.6 Of course, any transfused
2. Byron R. White, Dedication, 15 TEx. TECH L. REV. ix, ix (1984) (footnote omitted);
see also THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 21-27 (1994).
3. Cf Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
4. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897).
The reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation take up pretty
much the whole body of the law, and restate it from the present point of view.
We could reconstruct the corpus from them if all that went before were burned.
The use of the earlier reports is mainly historical ....
Id. at 458.
5. 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
6. Id. at 1207. See generallyBAKER, supra note 2, at 52-73. For a detailed elaboration
of the legislative and political history of the statute creating the Eleventh Circuit and the
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precedent of the Fifth Circuit or any subsequent decision of the new
Eleventh Circuit is subject to reconsideration by the en banc court.
A second reason for the difficulty in developing commentary on the
Eleventh Circuit is the large volume of the court's decisions. One is
reminded of Douglas Freeman's famous entreaty that a historian-presum-
ably even lawyer/amateur court historians--"should never undertake to
report the thinking of his subjects without written evidence or reliable
autoptic proof."7 The problem facing the court historian, however, is the
sheer volume of the writings that describe the thinking of the circuit judges
as they go about deciding so many appeals. In the first decade of the
Eleventh Circuit, Federal Reporter, Second Series increased by almost 300
volumes, from 661 to 950 volumes. This is the principal resource for the
story of the Eleventh Circuit's first decade.' The statistics have an almost
astronomical order of magnitude to them. Although too much is too often
made of the "crisis of volume" in the United States Courts of Appeals,9 a
decade worth of comparison is instructive for present purposes.'0 Let us
compare these standard quantitative measures: the gross number of appeals
filed; appeals filed per three-judge panel; appeals terminated; terminations
per panel; and pending backlog of appeals.
In its first year, the 1981 court year, with twelve active judges,
Eleventh Circuit figures were: appeals filed-2,433; appeals filed per
policy issues of precedent in the new court, see generally Thomas E. Baker, A Legislative
History of the Creation of the Eleventh Circuit, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 363 (1992); Thomas
E. Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. L.J. 725 (1982);
Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw.
L.J. 687 (1981); Thomas E. Baker, A Primer on Precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, 34
MERCER L. REv. 1175 (1983).
The various configurations between the former Fifth Circuit and the new Eleventh
Circuit are no longer relevant, except in one regard. The Supreme Court grants writs of
certiorari to Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit, the administrative unit which corresponded
to the new Eleventh Circuit. Both are included in this discussion.
7. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
THE THIRD CIRCUIT at viii (1981).
8. See HARVEY C. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 1891-1981, at v (1984);
see also Thomas E. Baker, Judges, Heal Thyselves: The Dawn of the Third Millennium of
F.3d, LEGAL TIMEs, Mar. 7, 1994, at 30.
9. See BAKER, supra note 2, at 31-52; see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 109 (Apr. 2, 1990).
10. See John C. Godbold, The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals-The First Ten Years,
43 MERCER L. REV. 961, 972 (1992).
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panel-608; appeals terminated-2,191; terminations per panel-548;
and pending cases-2,261.
The statistics for 1991, ten years later, still with twelve judges
authorized, are sobering: appeals filed-4,436 (up 82%); appeals filed
per panel-1,109 (up 82%); appeals terminated-4,107 (up 87%);
terminations per panel-1,027 (up 87%); and pending cases--4,171 (up
84%)."
The docket of the Eleventh Circuit is large compared to most other regional
courts of appeals. In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit ranked third in appeals
filed and terminated and second in cases pending. 12 The Eleventh Circuit
handles approximately ten percent of all the federal appeals filed nationwide.
Only the undivided Ninth Circuit and the new Fifth Circuit have larger
dockets, and both of those courts have many more judgeships than the
Eleventh Circuit.
The geography and demography of the Eleventh Circuit are unique and
difficult to capture in a two dimensional account. Already, in its first
decade, the new Eleventh Circuit has developed its own legal culture, a
complex of people and places, representative of the legal issues of the day
and inclusive of those perennial questions of federal court jurisdiction that
have defined the republic. To select the "leading cases" is at once very
difficult and highly arbitrary. No doubt many important decisions are left
out of this account. Certainly, other chroniclers would choose differently.
There are as many methodologies of court history as there are historians of
courts. 13
As a practical matter, it would be impossible to conduct an in-depth
review of all the decisions made by the Eleventh Circuit during the court's
first decade.'4 The Mercer Law Review, however, does perform that task
in an annual symposium. The eleven issues covering the relevant period
total over 3500 pages of analysis by more than ninety professional authors
who are experts in their fields. The approach taken in this article is more
selective; it ventures into, at least, some preliminary impressions about the
contributions of the Eleventh Circuit bench to the national law. The focus
11. Id.
12. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD STATISTICS, Table B, at 19 (Dec. 31, 1991).
13. See, e.g., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT (1977); HISTORY OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
(1976). See generally Helen B. Nies, Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 505 (1992).
14. RAYMAN L. SOLOMON, HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 1891-1941, at 185
(1976).
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here is on the cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1981 to 1991 which
arose in the Eleventh Circuit. Only the Supreme Court has a national
perspective on the federal law. The perspective from the Supreme Court
thus provides some basis for identifying important cases and for venturing
first decade impressions on the Eleventh Circuit.
While the vantage of this article is from the United States Reports, it
bears emphasis that the purpose of this article is to begin to understand how
the Eleventh Circuit's decisions have contributed to the national law. While
there are many more assessments of the Supreme Court than there are
writings about the United States Courts of Appeals,'" an effort was made
to sample the secondary literature on the intermediate court as well. The
substantive discussion and citations here reflect the careful reporting and
analysis provided during the surveyed period by the seventeen law reviews
in the three states of the Eleventh Circuit.'
6
It also should be made explicit that the high reversal rate of the
surveyed decisions does not reflect poorly on the Eleventh Circuit. The
"decided propensity" of the Supreme Court, statistically speaking, is to grant
a writ of certiorari in cases it intends to reverse.' 7 The Eleventh Circuit's
experience in this regard is consistent with the treatment afforded to all the
other courts of appeals.'8 Often, the Supreme Court is called on to pick
and choose between conflicting approaches taken by different courts of
appeals, to resolve intercircuit conflicts. In these cases, the opinions in
conflict-both the one preferred and the one rejected-contribute to the High
Court's analysis. Whether the Supreme Court eventually agrees or disagrees
with the Eleventh Circuit, therefore, is not as important as an appreciation
15. But see generally J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUITS (1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
16. Alabama: Alabama Law Review, Cumberland Law Review. Florida: Florida
Journal of International Law, Florida Law Review, Florida State University Law Review,
Nova Law Review, Stetson Law Review, University of Florida Journal of Law & Public
Policy, University of Florida Law Review, University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law
Review, University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, University of Miami Law Review.
Georgia: Emory International Law Review, Emory Law Journal, Georgia Law Review,
Georgia State Law Review, Mercer Law Review.
17. But see Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Rehnquist Court Disposition ofLower
Court Decisions: Affirmation Not Reversal, 74 JUDICATURE 84 (1990).
18. See Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Disposition of Federal Circuit Court Decisions,
68 JUDICATURE 245 (1984); Gerald F. Uelmen, The Influence of the Solicitor General upon
Supreme Court Disposition of Federal Circuit Court Decisions: A Closer Look at the Ninth
Circuit Record, 69 JUDICATURE 361 (1986).
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for the contribution by the Eleventh Circuit to the Supreme Court's
decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
plays the important role of error correction and law development in every
appeal decided.' 9 The Supreme Court could not perform its essential role
otherwise.
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
This article is a juridical account of the first decade of a court, and for
the reasons just described, the discussion centers on the most visible
evidence of the intermediate court: appellate decisions. There admittedly
is much missing from this account. It is appropriate to spend at least a few
paragraphs, before proceeding with the case commentary, to highlight what
has happened in the Eleventh Circuit that does not appear in the pages of
Federal Reporter, Second Series. Fortunately, that account has already been
written by John C. Godbold, Senior Circuit Judge. His account may be
relied on for background and context.2"
Judge Godbold is the only person to have ever served as chief judge of
two regional courts of appeals (the old Fifth Circuit, at the time of division,
and the new Eleventh Circuit).2' He was thus a witness to this history. In
his recommended article, Judge Godbold describes many of the behind-the-
scenes events of establishing a new court of appeals: renovating the Elbert
P. Tuttle Courthouse in Atlanta; building up a library; hiring support staff;
organizing a clerk's office; recruiting staff attorneys; establishing the
Historical Society; continuing the federal judicial tradition of public service;
and performing other tasks essential to the smooth operation of the
institution.
Judge Godbold's extracurricular history identifies how some early
traditions have already formed in the Eleventh Circuit. Following its parent
circuit, the court of appeals has consciously "chose[n] to be not a mere
recipient of documents but a proactive participant in assuring the prompt
and orderly progress of appeals."22 Its local rules and internal operating
procedures are designed with this goal in mind. Personnel in the clerk's
office and staff attorneys share the judges' commitment to differentiated
case management. Improving relations between the state and federal courts
19. See White, supra note 2, at x; see also BAKER, supra note 2, at 17-21.
20. See Godbold, supra note 10.
21. Harvey Couch, A Brief History of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 56 TUL. L.
REV. 948, 958 (1982).
22. Godbold, supra note 10, at 967.
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in the Eleventh Circuit has been one of the new court's highest priorities.
Generally, "[h]abeas corpus cases are an especially sensitive area,"'23 but
the most "difficult and demanding" appeals are those brought by state
prisoners sentenced to death." Death sentence cases account for forty to
fifty appeals each year, and almost every appeal continues through the
system to the Supreme Court's docket.25 The Eleventh Circuit has
contributed much more than its share of these difficult cases. By Judge
Godbold's count, nearly half of the Supreme Court's leading death penalty
decisions of the last decade have involved Eleventh Circuit appeals.26
The most disagreeable extracurricular episode of the first decade may
have been the investigation and impeachment of District Judge Alcee
Hastings. Hastings was indicted in 1981 on criminal charges of bribery,
conspiracy, and obstruction of justice, allegedly involving a bribe by an
attorney to give lenient sentences to the attorney's clients. At separate trials,
the attorney was convicted, but Hastings was acquitted. Elaborate
proceedings were conducted by the Eleventh Circuit, which eventually
recommended that the matter be referred to the House of Representatives.
The House voted to impeach and the Senate convicted Hastings and
removed him from judicial office. The episode lasted more than six years
and was characterized by the most serious of charges and countercharges:
by claims of racism made by Hastings which were ultimately rejected, by
accompanying litigation that raised issues of constitutional dimension, and
by the inevitable distraction and turmoil endemic to such serious proceed-
ings. In the end, the Eleventh Circuit performed this difficult and distasteful
task most admirably. Judge Godbold concludes:
These lengthy and difficult proceedings reached beyond the confines of
charges against Hastings. They established important principles, and a
methodology, for handling within the judiciary serious misconduct
charges against judicial officers. Hastings was the first federal judge to
be impeached after acquittal on underlying criminal charges. The
proceedings demonstrated that in a judicial conduct matter the federal
judiciary had the capacity to investigate and to act in the most difficult
of circumstances.27
23. Id. at 977.
24. Id. at 974.
25. Id. at 974, 976.
26. Id. at 976; see infra text accompanying notes 236-65.
27. Godbold, supra note 10, at 982; see also Victoria Santoro, Comment, Federal
Judges'Absolute Immunity from Criminal Prosecution Prior to Impeachment: United States
v. Hastings, 7 NOVA L.J. 623 (1983).
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The most tragic event of the first decade was the assassination of
Circuit Judge Robert S. Vance in 1989. The heartfelt sense of loss
described by Judge Godbold on behalf of himself and his colleagues is a
fitting testimonial to Judge Vance,28 but it also underscores and further
justifies the high regard the Nation continues to show its federal appellate
courts. The men and women who have served on the Eleventh Circuit have
carried on the grand tradition of Article III of the Constitution. They have
served above and beyond the call of judicial duty, often under difficult and
challenging circumstances. In this regard, the Eleventh Circuit is not a court
apart from the larger whole, spanning only two decades. Rather, it is part
of a larger whole, with a history that spans two centuries.
III. ORGANIZATION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, like the
other courts of appeals, is best described as a "case-deciding court." '29 This
is to say that the Eleventh Circuit's "day-to-day work is decisional in the
common law tradition. 30
It considers and decides discrete controversies and, where appropriate,
records in an opinion its decision and its reasoning process. A decision
may do no more than decide the dispute. Or it may add by accretion
to the body of law, a bit here, an explanation there. Occasionally a
decision may extend the law to new territory. But ordinarily extension
of the law is a consequence of decision-making, not a pursuit of law-
making.3
The organization followed here is to collect Supreme Court decisions
between 1981-1991 in which the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari
to the Eleventh Circuit and sort them into the following common law
subject areas for discussion: Administrative Law; Antitrust; Civil Procedure
and Federal Jurisdiction; Constitutional Law; Criminal Law and Procedure;
Evidence; Labor Law; and Taxation.
28. Godbold, supra note 10, at 983-84.
29. Id. at 984.
30. Id.
31. Id.; seeBAKER, supra note 2, at 14-17; see also POSNER, supra note 15, at 294-315.
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IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
It may seem odd to begin a survey of a court's contribution to the
national law with what may be described as "agency law," but the average
citizen likely will only see the inside of a courtroom, especially a federal
courtroom, when called to jury duty. The reality is that most "Americans
usually deal with their government through the administrative process." '32
Administrative law, broadly defined, describes the legal structure of the
executive branch, especially the quasi-independent agencies, along with the
procedural restraints, especially judicial review, with which the government
is administered. At the constitutional level, administrative law includes
concerns for procedural due process and separation of powers, but the most
important constraints on the federal agencies are at the level of statutory
law. The first federal judicial task always is to assure that the agency is
being faithful to the congressional intent in the legislation creating the
particular program. Second, other more general statutes, like the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act,33 oblige the federal courts to act as a kind of
watch-dog over the agencies. Since the Roosevelt era, these agencies have
grown in size, importance, and responsibility; consequently, the judicial
tasks have grown apace.34
The generic drug industry lost an important federal regulation decision
in United States v. Generix Drug Corp.35 A unanimous Supreme Court
held that new "drugs," as the term is used in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, included generic drug products and, therefore, such products
were subject to prior FDA approval, even though the active ingredients had
been separately approved.36 The drug manufacturer made a number of
arguments based on legislative history and administrative practice as applied
to the generic marketing of prescription and over-the-counter drugs, but to
no avail. That was not the plain meaning of the term, at least the meaning
32. David King, Administrative Law, 18 TEx. TECH L. REv. 237, 237 (1987).
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
34. See generally Robert F. Vargo, Real Estate Transactions: The Existence of a
Federal Security, 14 CUMB. L. REv. 301 (1984); Judy Bateman Shepura, Comment,
Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA: Interpretations Within the Eleventh Circuit, 19 CUMB. L.
REV. 131 (1988); Sally Clark Bowers & Linda K. Browning, Eleventh Circuit, Rule 10b-5:
The "State of the Mind" Elements in the Eleventh Circuit, 12 CUMB. L. REv. 633 (1982);
Joan M. Vecchioli, Note, Securities Regulation: The Sale of a Closely-HeldBusiness in Light
of Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 15 STETSON L. REv. 619 (1986).
35. 460 U.S. 453 (1983).
36. Id. at 461.
1994]
330
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
plain to the Supreme Court, which reversed the court of appeals. The three-
judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit had sided with the manufacturer to reach
the common sense conclusion that the term "new drug" referred only to the
active ingredient, and not to the inactive "excipients," such as coatings,
binders, and capsules.37
Sullivan v. Hudson s was an important ruling to the millions of retired
persons residing within the geographical jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit,
as well as in the rest of the country.39 After the Department of Health and
Human Services denied the claimant's application for Social Security
disability benefits, she sought federal court review. The district court
affirmed the agency's decision, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed because
the Secretary had not followed applicable regulations.4" On remand, the
claimant was awarded benefits, and subsequently sought attorneys' fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act.4 The district court denied the fees
and the claimant brought an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which held in
her favor and directed that attorneys' fees be awarded.42 The Supreme
Court agreed with the conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit and held that it
was within the district court's power under the Act to award a Social
Security claimant attorneys' fees for representation provided during the
administrative proceedings which were held pursuant to the district court's
order remanding the action to the Secretary.43
The same Act was involved in a second decision in an otherwise
unrelated area of administrative law that was decided differently. The
Eleventh Circuit held that the Equal Access to Justice Act did not apply to
deportation proceedings." The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit decision, which held that the administrative proceedings were not
37. United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 654 F.2d 1114, 1120 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept.
1981) (Hill, J., for Markey & Clark, JJ.).
38. 490 U.S. 877 (1989).
39. See Bernard P. Matthews, Jr., Comment, Social Security Continuing Disability
Reviews and the Practice of Nonacquiescence, 16 CUMB. L. REv. 111 (1985); Anthony J.
Russo, Comment, The Social Security Disability Programs: Representing Claimants Under
the Changing Law, 14 STETSON L. REV. 131 (1984).
40. Hudson v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 781, 785 (11th Cir. 1985).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
42. Hudson v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 1453, 1460 n.9 (1 th
Cir. 1988) (Johnson, J., for Clark & Dumbauld, JJ.).
43. Sullivan, 490 U.S. at 892.
44. Ardestani v. United States Dep't of Justice, INS, 904 F.2d 1505, 1515 (11th Cir.
1990) (Fay, J., for Roney, J.; Pittman, J., dissenting).
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adversary adjudications for which the government had waived sovereign
immunity, and authorized the award of attorneys' fees and costs. 4
One piece of the difficult issue of political asylum found its way
through the Eleventh Circuit in a case involving Haitians. In Ray v. United
States Department of Justice, INS,46 some Haitians sought the names of
other Haitian nationals who had been returned to Haiti, relying on the
Freedom of Information Act.47  The district court ordered the State
Department to disclose the information which had been redacted from the
requested documents and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme
Court, however, reversed and held that the disclosure would violate the
subjects' weighty interests in privacy.49 According to the majority, the
interests of the public and those making the request were not sufficient to
justify the disclosure.
The issue in King v. St. Vincent's Hospital" was whether the
Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act5 implicitly limits the length of
military service after which a member of the Armed Services retains a right
to civilian reemployment. The Eleventh Circuit had determined that the
employee's request for a three-year leave of absence, so the employee could
perform a tour of duty in the National Guard, was per se unreasonable under
the Act. 2 Reading the statute as a whole, considering the Act alongside
related legislation, and with an eye on the underlying congressional purpose,
the Supreme Court reversed, inferring that the reemployment guarantee was
unqualified and absolute. 3
Even this small sampling of the administrative law decisions demon-
strates how more and more areas of life have become "federalized" under
national legislation and why the Congress has assigned the critical function
of agency oversight to the courts of appeals in the administrative scheme.
45. Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 521 (1991).
46. 908 F.2d 1549 (11 th Cir. 1990) (Gibson, J., for Fay & Johnson, JJ.). See generally
Ellen B. Gwynn, Note, Race and National Origin Discrimination and the Haitian
Detainees--Jeanv. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985), 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 333 (1986).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
48. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1561.
49. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 542 (1991).
50. 112 S. Ct. 570 (1991).
51. 38 U.S.C. § 4324(d) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
52. St. Vincent's Hosp. v. King, 901 F.2d 1068, 1072 (11th Cir. 1990) (Tuttle, J., for
Roney & Hill, JJ.).
53. King, 112 S. Ct. at 575.
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V. ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust law is comprised of a body of statutes, judicial decisions,
administrative regulations, and enforcement activities designed to regulate
market structure and competitive behavior in the national economy. The
core principles of antitrust law reflect a fundamental belief in the market
mechanism, i.e., the belief that economic policies are best determined by
disaggregated, independent, profit seeking firms striving to satisfy consum-
ers who themselves are seeking to maximize satisfaction through individual
market choices. Beyond purely economic considerations, there is a
background of political mistrust for any concentration of power in a
democracy. Whether these assumptions are still valid within the modem
regulatory state and how they might be transformed by the reality of a
global marketplace are questions beyond the Supreme Court and this
discussion.
When two rival bar review companies agreed that one of them would
withdraw from the Georgia market, some former law students did what they
had been taught to do; they brought suit, alleging a violation of the Sherman
Act.54 In Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., the Supreme Court had little
trouble concluding that the students' theory of the case was sound. A
market allocation agreement between competitors, who had previously
competed in the Georgia market, could be an illegal restraint of trade of the
state market even though the arrangement was that one company would take
the Georgia market and the other would have the whole rest of the country.
It only took a short per curiam opinion to explain this to the Eleventh
Circuit. The three-judge panel had struggled with several procedural issues
surrounding the antitrust claim and had divided on the substantive issue. 6
On appeal, the court of appeals majority seemed disposed to defer to the
district court, while the dissenting circuit judge seemed less willing to do
so." Agreeing with the panel dissenter that there was enough to the case
to get beyond summary judgment, the Supreme Court reversed."
A perennial issue of antitrust law is whether the alleged bad actors are
private entities subject to the antitrust laws or whether they are state actors
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1988 & Supp. Il1 1991).
55. 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
56. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 874 F.2d 1417 (11 th Cir. 1989).
57. Compare id. at 1422-28 (Hatchett, J., for Fitzpatrick, J.) with id. at 1430-41 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
58. Palmer, 498 U.S. at 49.
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and entitled to an immunity by virtue of the so-called "state action"
doctrine.59 The Supreme Court, as is the fashion these days, has developed
a two-prong test: The challenged restraint must be one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as a state policy, and the state must actively
supervise any private anti-competitive conduct.60 The Supreme Court
determined that this test was satisfied in Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States.6' Thus, the United States could not
bring suit against two rate bureaus composed of motor common carriers
operating in four states which were expressly permitted to submit collective
rate proposals to the public service commissions in each state. The case had
rolled around in the court of appeals for a three-judge hearing62 and an en
banc rehearing.63 Once again, the court of appeals dissenters had it right,
at least according to the Supreme Court majority who concluded that the
rate making had been expressly permitted by virtue of the state's clear intent
to displace price competition.64 The otherwise private action need not be
compelled by the state to trigger immunity under the case law.
In ICC v. American Trucking Ass 'ns,65 the Supreme Court was called
on to reconcile the Motor Carrier Act of 198066 with the powers of the
Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"). Ever since the Reed-Bulwinkle
Act of 1948,67 motor carriers have enjoyed immunity from antitrust laws
to enter into rate bureaus of the kind described in Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc.6" To receive this immunity, the rate bureaus
themselves must make an application with the ICC describing their rate
making procedures. In 1981, the ICC announced it was going to implement
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 by fashioning a new remedy for rate-bureau
violations: a tariff submitted in substantial violation of a rate-bureau
59. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
60. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
61. 471 U.S. 48, 65-66 (1985).
62. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1982) (Johnson, J., for Scott, J.; Hill, J., dissenting).
63. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 702 F.2d 532 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1983) (en banc).
64. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 471 U.S. at 65-66.
65. 467 U.S. 354 (1984).
66. 49 U.S.C. § 10706(b)(3) (1988).
67. 49 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1988), repealedby Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(b)-(c), 92 Stat.
1466, 1470 (1978). The substance of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948 is now codified in 49
U.S.C. § 10706 (1988).
68. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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agreement would be rejected automatically and retroactively. The Eleventh
Circuit held that the ICC lacked this authority. 9  Over dissent, the
Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the ICC's newly announced policy
was allowed under the agency's discretionary power to elaborate upon
express statutory remedies when necessary to achieve specified statutory
goals.7"
While the Eleventh Circuit's rulings were not used as vehicles for any
profound rethinking of the antitrust law, the decisions described above did
contribute interstitially to the maintenance and operation of the federal law
on the subject." This occurred even though the beginning decade of the
Eleventh Circuit overlapped with a relatively inactive period in antitrust law
history.
VI. CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The threshold "principle of first importance [is] that the federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction."'72 Thus, technically speaking, every
federal court decision is a decision about federal jurisdiction. Ever since the
beginning of the federal courts, the jurisdictional inquiry has always been
two-dimensional. The scope of federal judicial power is determined first,
by examining Article III of the Constitution and second, by interpreting
some enabling statute of the Congress."3 Limits on judicial power apply
to exercises over the persons of the litigants as well as over the subject
matter of the litigation. Once a case or controversy is deemed to belong in
federal court, the suit must follow an elaborate trial routine of procedural
rules and practices toward some remedy, followed by at least one appeal of
right. Eleventh Circuit decisions about each of these phases found their way
onto the Supreme Court's docket.
69. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1355 (1 1th Cir. 1982)
(Godbold, C.J., for Anderson & Hoffman, JJ.).
70. American Trucking Ass'ns, 467 U.S. at 371.
71. See Richard A. Booth, Foreword: The Seventh Circuit as a Commercial Court, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 667 (1989).
72. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 7, at 27 (5th ed. 1994); see
also Patricia T. Mandt, Note, Application of Standing Principles in the Eleventh Circuit:
ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, 35 ALA. L. REV. 377 (1984); Ruth E.
Todd-Chattin, Note, Save Our Dunes v. Alabama Department ofEnvironmental Management:
Has the Voice of the Dunes Been Silenced?, 41 ALA. L. REv. 525 (1990).
73. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441,442 (1850); Hodgson & Thompson
v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809); Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75,
93 (1807).
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The mootness doctrine focuses judicial attention on "the sequence of
litigation events out of a traditional and constitutional concern for the very
existence of a 'case or controversy' itself. 74  If a matter earlier in
controversy is somehow resolved, the judgment of the federal court has
nothing to accomplish. The lack of a judicial task ends the Article III
power. Justiciability must be actual and present, not merely speculative or
historical. Legislation can overtake the litigation and render it moot. For
example, in Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 5 the Supreme Court
declared the case moot due to amendments to a federal statute that were
enacted while the case was pending. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's judicial
handiwork, analyzing rather arcane issues of federal banking law, was
rendered a nullity.76
Alternatively, the postfiling conduct of third party nonlitigants may
eliminate the need for federal court intervention, as happened in Iron Arrow
Honor Society v. Heckler.77 In that case, an all male honorary organization
had brought suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prohibit the Secretary from
interpreting a federal regulation to require that a private university ban the
organization from campus. When the president of the university voluntarily
banned the organization for as long as it continued its all male membership
policy, the Supreme Court announced that the federal case was closed.78
The majority drew an important distinction between voluntary discon-
tinuance by a party defendant-which does not moot the controversy for the
practical reason that there would be nothing to stop the defendant from
going right back to the offending behavior-and the situation before the
Court, which involved a voluntary, unilateral, and unequivocal action by a
third party nonlitigant.79 This brought an end to a lengthy proceeding that
had gone up and down the federal courts for several years, to the relief of
at least some of the Eleventh Circuit judges.8
74. James C. Hill & Thomas E. Baker, Dam Federal Jurisdiction!, 32 EMORY L.J. 3,
18 (1983).
75. 494 U.S. 472 (1990).
76. Continental Illinois Corp. v. Lewis, 827 F.2d 1517 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(Fay, Clark, & Henderson, JJ.), opinion clarified, 838 F.2d 457 (1 th Cir. 1988) (per curiam),
and vacated, 494 U.S. 472 (1990).
77. 464 U.S. 67 (1983).
78. Id. at 73.
79. Id. at 71-72.
80. See Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. Unit B 1983)
(Tuttle, J., for Anderson, J.); id. at 565 (Roney, J., dissenting).
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The most important decision arising in the Eleventh Circuit in the area
of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction was Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 8' decided by the Supreme Court in 1985. The issue was at
once important and difficult, witnessed by the fact that the Supreme Court
was revisiting the issue for the umpteenth time in the Rudzewicz decision
itself, and since then has returned to the issue in later cases, in an as yet
unsuccessful effort to "get it right."
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the district court's
exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to the Florida "long-arm statute" violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A divided panel of
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "U]urisdiction under the[] circumstances
would offend the fundamental fairness which is the touchstone of due
process."82 The Supreme Court majority thought otherwise.83 In a rather
metaphysical discussion of the so-called "minimum contacts" line of cases,
the Supreme Court basically told the Burger King Corporation to 'have it
your way'. . . by allowing its Florida diversity action to proceed against a
Michigan franchisee who refused to vacate the restaurant's premises after
termination of his franchise.""4
An earlier decision had made it clear that a nonresident defendant is not
subject to specific jurisdiction unless he has directed acts toward the
forum." Thus, the Burger King holding clarified that not all of the
defendant's contacts related to the controversy must be with the forum. In
fact, the defendant-franchisee had far more controversy related contacts with
Michigan than with Florida and had never actually visited Florida. The
Supreme Court explained that an individual's contract with an out-of-state
party, without more, does not automatically establish sufficient minimum
contacts in the other party's home forum.86 Instead, a proper due process
analysis should take into account the prior negotiations and contemplated
future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and both parties'
course of dealings, to answer the question whether the defendant has
purposely established minimum contacts with the forum and, therefore, is
81. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
82. Burger King Corp. v. Macshara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984) (Vance, J.,
for Pittman, J.; Johnson, J., dissenting).
83. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
84. Summary and Analysis, Michigan FranchiseeSubjectto Florida's Long-Arm Statute,
53 U.S.L.W. 1177, 1177 (1985); Rex R. Perschbacher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied: Mr.
Justice Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585
(1986).
85. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
86. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79.
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subject to suit there. On the facts, the majority found a substantial and
continuing relationship between the Michigan defendant-franchisee and the
plaintiff's Miami headquarters. In its totality of the circumstances analysis,
the High Court also made something of the fact that the defendant was an
experienced and sophisticated businessman, represented by counsel, who
could not point to any other factors establishing the unconstitutionality of
the assertion of personal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court's decision seems to be something of an effort' to
find'some theoretical accommodation between the metaphysics of due
process and the contemporary business reality that controversy related
contacts often occur in multiple states, each of which may have a police
power regulatory interest in applying its own contract law: "[t]o recognize
specific jurisdiction only in a place which is the exclusive source of related
contacts would often deny [alternative] forum[ states] the legitimate
expression of their regulatory interests.""7 This is the underlying principle
justifying jurisdiction in these cases: the forum state's traditional police
power to regulate commercial activities occurring within the state."8
During the 1980s, the federal courts' workload reflected the fact that
the Nation's economy was sputtering. Bankruptcy filing increased, and so
there were more bankruptcy appeals in the pipeline. Bankruptcy jurisdiction
is exclusively federal, of course, and it can be a source of federal friction
with the state courts. Owen v. Owen 9 dealt with one such friction. In
Owen, the Supreme Court held that ajudicial lien may be avoided under the
bankruptcy statute,90 as impairing a debtor's state law exemptions, even
though the state has defined exempt property in such a way as specifically
to exclude property encumbered by such liens.9' This reversed the
Eleventh Circuit's reconciliation of the federal provision with the state
law.
92
87. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE §
17[C], at 73 (1989).
88. See generally Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770
(1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 286.
89. 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
91. 500 U.S. at 313-14.
92. In re Owen, 877 F.2d 44, 47 (11th Cir. 1989) (Roney, C.J., for Powell & Tjoflat,
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Under the Feres93 doctrine, the United States Government has no
Federal Tort Claims Act94 liability for injuries to members of the armed
services when those injuries arise out of or in the course of military
service.95 The issue was analyzed at great length by the Eleventh Circuit,
first by a three-judge panel96 and then, by the divided en banc court on
rehearing.97 The Supreme Court relied on the circuit judges' debate to
conclude that a service member killed during activity incident to military
ser-Vice could not recover under the Act.98 More particularly, the majority
ruled that the death of a Coast Guard helicopter pilot during a rescue
mission at sea was activity incident to military service and his widow could
not bring an action against the government under the Act.99
When a federal law creates a duty without expressly providing a
remedy, a federal court may imply a remedy under the law. The importance
of this implication is that it automatically and necessarily creates federal
jurisdiction over the newly created cause of action.'00 The remedy can be
implied directly under the Constitution. In United States v. Stanley,'' a
divided Supreme Court rejected the claim of a former serviceman against
military officers and civilian researchers to recover for injuries he sustained
as a result of a secret Army experiment in which LSD was administered to
him. 0 2 The majority found support for this conclusion in its precedents
cautioning against routinely implying a cause of action under the Constitu-
tion, as well as in the unique disciplinary structure found in the military, to
93. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). See generally Norma J. Mungenast,
Eleventh Circuit, Federal Tort Claims Act: The Development and Application of the
Discretionary Function Exemption, 13 CUMB. L. REv. 535 (1983).
95. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
96. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (Fay, J., for Vance &
MacMahon, JJ.).
97. Johnson v. United States, 779 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc)
(Johnson, Roney, Tjoflat, & Hill, JJ., dissenting).
98. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1987), rev g779 F.2d 1492 (11 th
Cir. 1986).
99. Id.
100. See Thomas E. Baker, Thinking About Federal Jurisdiction-of Serpents and
Swallows, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 239, 265-66 (1986).
101. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
102. Id. at 686.
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which Congress had acquiesced in various statutes." 3 This part of the
Eleventh Circuit decision0 4 was reversed.
10 5
In a second decision, Bush v. Lucas,0 6 the Supreme Court again
disallowed a remedy directly under the Constitution, this time under the
First Amendment. Suit was brought against the government by an employee
alleging a retaliatory demotion and defamation in response to his public
criticism of the agency for which he worked. Because the claims arose out
of an employment relationship which was governed by comprehensive
procedural and substantive provisions affording meaningful remedies against
the United States, the majority concluded that implying a cause of action
under the Free Speech Clause was unnecessary and would be inappropri-
ate.'0 7 This result and reasoning followed the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' treatment of the case.0 8
The implied remedy can be based on some regulatory statute as well.
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,"9 a decision reversing the
Eleventh Circuit,"0 the Supreme Court permitted a high school student,
who alleged that she was subjected to sexual harassment and abuse by her
coach/teacher, to seek monetary damages in addition to other equitable
relief."' The Court held that an individual's damage action was implied
under Title IX,"' which prohibits gender discrimination in any program
receiving federal funds.
13
The only decision of note under the Erie doctrine' 4 involved a
choice of forum clause in a freely negotiated commercial contract. In
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,"5 the Supreme Court affirmed
the Eleventh Circuit decision and held that federal law and not state law
controlled whether to grant a motion to transfer the case to the venue
103. Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
104. United States v. Stanley, 786 F.2d 1490 (1lth Cir. 1986) (Hatchett, J., for
Henderson & Allgood, JJ.).
105. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 686.
106. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
107. Id. at 388-89.
108. 647 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (Roney, J., for Godbold & Simpson, JJ.).
109. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
110. 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990) (Henley, J., for Hill, J.; Johnson, J., concurring).
111. 112 S.Ct. at 1038.
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
113. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1036.
114. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460 (1965).
115. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), aff'g 779 F.2d 643 (11 th
Cir. 1986).
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approved in the written contract." 6 According to the majority, the general
federal transfer of venue statute' '-which applies to transfers for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses in the interest of justice---was
controlling, as that statute was annotated in federal court interpretations." 8
Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment," 9 ratified in 1791, federal
litigants enjoy the right to trial by jury, although the right is textually
limited to "suits at common law." Consequently, a court deciding whether
a party has a right to a jury trial must act as a historian of eighteenth
century English civil procedure. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,2 °
a majority of the historians on the Supreme Court rejected the conclusions
of the Eleventh Circuit' historians. The majority concluded that the
Seventh Amendment entitles a litigant who has not submitted a claim
against a bankruptcy estate to a jury trial when that party is sued by the
bankruptcy trustee to recover an allegedly fraudulent money transfer.'
Issues involving remedies figured in several Supreme Court reviews of
Eleventh Circuit decisions. In the-first, Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,'
the High Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that the Warsaw
Convention,2 4 which sets forth conditions under which an international air
carrier can be held liable for injuries to passengers, does not allow for the
recovery of damages for mental or psychic injuries unaccompanied by some
manifestation of physical injury. 25  In the second, INS v. Jean, 26 the
Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's understanding'27 that the
Equal Access to Justice Act'28 allowed for an award of fees against the
116. Id. at 32.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
118. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 22; see also Sara E. Akin, Note, Review of Intercircuit
Transfer Orders Under Section 1404(a), 35 ALA. L. REV. 167 (1984).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
120. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
121. Id. at 64-65, rev'g sub nom. by an equally divided Court, In re Chase & Sanbom
Corp., 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988) (Morgan, J., for Fay & Hatchett, JJ.).
122. Id. at 64.
123. 499 U.S. 530 (1991), rev'g 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989) (Anderson, J., for
Johnson & Atkins, JJ.).
124. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988).
125. Eastern Airlines, 499 U.S. at 552-53.
126. 496 U.S. 154 (1990).
127. Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1988) (Clark, J., for Eschbach, J.;
Kravitch, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(I)(A) (1988). See generally Alice M. Bradley & Bryan
Essary, Comment, The Treatment of Attorney's Fee Enhancements in Alabama and the
Eleventh Circuit: Justice! The Law! My Ducats and My Daughter, 20 CUMB. L. REv. 769
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government in the fee litigation stage of a proceeding without a second
finding that the fee was substantially justified.'29 In a third remedies
decision, the Supreme Court affirmed an Eleventh Circuit holding that
conduct by federal officials must be discretionary in nature, as well as
within the scope of their employment, before the conduct can be deemed to
be absolutely immune from state-law tort liability. 30
A fourth case involving the law of remedies resulted in a reversal of
the Eleventh Circuit.'3 In Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank,32
the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had
erred by refusing to consider the possible preclusive effect, under state law,
of a state court judgment which had rejected a res judicata claim based on
a previous federal judgment. 33 The unanimous Court was loathe to allow
the highly intrusive remedy of a federal court injunction against enforcement
of the state court judgment. Instead, the Court ruled that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires that the federal court give the state court judgment,
including the resolution of the res judicata issue, the same preclusive effect
it would have in another court of the same state.
34
The last remedies decision of the period returned the Supreme Court's
attention to the procedural puzzles of affirmative action or reverse discrimi-
nation. 131 White firefighters brought suit alleging that they were being
denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks under a consent decree
that had been entered in a previous employment discrimination lawsuit
between black firefighters and the county. The Eleventh Circuit allowed the
plaintiffs to challenge the consent decree. 36 Even though they had failed
to intervene in the earlier employment discrimination lawsuit, in Martin v.
(1990).
129. Jean, 496 U.S. at 165-66.
130. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988), aflg 785 F.2d 1551 (1 1th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (Johnson, Hatchett, & Murphy, JJ.). Wesifall was subsequently superseded by
the Federal Employee Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, which is
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988). See generally Robert S. Glazier, Note, An Argument
Against Judicial Immunity for Employment Decisions, 11 NOVA L. REV. 1127 (1987).
131. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 525, rev'g747 F.2d 1367 (1 th Cir. 1984) (Thomberry, J., for Godbold, J.;
Hill, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. In reBirmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492 (1 Ith
Cir. 1987), affid sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
136. Id. at 1498 (Tjoflat, J., for Henderson, J.; Anderson, J., dissenting).
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Wilks,'37 the Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs to challenge the employ-
ment decisions taken pursuant to the consent decree.
Finally, the Supreme Court reached two decisions on the subject of
appellate procedures of a rather technical nature. '  In one, the Supreme
Court vindicated the authority of a United States court of appeals to award
damages to an appellee upon determining that the underlying appeal is
frivolous.'39 In the other, the Court reconciled Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) to hold
that a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment interest constituted
a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which had the effect of nullifying
a notice of appeal filed before the district court ruled on the motion.'40
It should be neither surprising nor unexpected that the Eleventh
Circuit's procedural and jurisdictional decisions are so numerous and that
the Court of Appeals has already made such a telling contribution to the
national law on these subjects. The main role of the intermediate courts of
appeals is to supervise the district courts.' 4 ' District courts in the Eleventh
Circuit have large and diverse caseloads. Consequently, the appeals of right
that are generated can be expected to present novel and difficult issues.'
42
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
American Constitutionalism represents an original contribution to
political thought. Constitutional law describes the relationship between the
137. 490 U.S. 755, 769 (1989).
138. See generally Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21
GA. L. REV. 399 (1986); Kurt M. Saunders, Plying the Erie Waters: Choice of Law in the
Deterrence of Frivolous Appeals, 21 GA. L. REV. 653 (1987).
139. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987), rev'g768 F.2d 1287 (11th Cir.
1985) (per curiam) (Vance, Johnson, & Morgan, JJ.).
140. Ostemeck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 173-74 (1989), affg Ostemeck v.
E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc., 825 F.2d 1521 (11 th Cir. 1987) (Anderson, J., for Hatchett &
Tuttle, JJ.).
141. See generally Steven A. Childress, Standards of Review in Eleventh Circuit Civil
Appeals, 9 NOVA L.J. 260 (1985).
142. See generally Joseph W. Little et al., Section 1983 Liability of Municipalities and
Private Entities Operating Under Color of Municipal Law, 14 STETsON L. REV. 565 (1985);
Randall R. Rader, Section 1983, The Civil Rights Action: Legislative and Judicial Directions,
15 CUMB. L. REV. 571 (1985); Jeanne Maguire, Note, Ghost of Injunctions Past:
Resurrection of Municipal Liability for Unintentional Acts, 17 STETSON L. REV. 857 (1988)
(discussing Williams v. City of Dothan, 818 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1987)); Christopher M.
Shulman, Note, Cave Canem-- Police Department Liability and Equitable Standing Under 42
US.C. § 1983, 19 STETsON L. REV. 973 (1990).
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individual and the government. 43 In this relationship, there are explicit
as well as implicit limitations on the power of government which guarantee
individual rights. In the peculiar American version of this social compact,
the judicial branch of government explicates these rights and is often called
on to play the role of the guarantor of civil rights and civil liberties. The
Supreme Court, of course, takes the lead in this regard, but the United States
Courts of Appeals perform the role of supporting actor in this drama of
democracy.144  The Eleventh Circuit struggled with the often difficult
accommodations between government power and individual liberty in
important areas of constitutional law: Preemption; Procedural Due Process;
Takings; Race Discrimination; Voting Rights; Privacy; Free Speech and
Press; and Free Exercise of Religion.
While it is a familiar and well-established principle that the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution 4' invalidates all state laws that
interfere with or are contrary to federal law, the course of application of that
principle has taken some strange turns. In the exercise of its Commerce
Clause'46 power, Congress can expressly preempt a specific form of state
regulation or preclude state regulation of the subject. 47 Alternatively, the
courts often find an implied congressional intent to preempt a particular area
or even a whole field in which the federal interest is dominant. Two
Eleventh Circuit cases "went up" to the Supreme Court under preemption
holdings. In Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., '4 the Supreme Court reversed and held that federal regulation
governing collection of blood plasma from paid donors did not preempt the
local ordinances which the Eleventh Circuit had thrown out.'4 9 In Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett,'5 the High Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit
143. See generally Hala Ayoub, Comment The State Action Doctrine in State and
*Federal Courts, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 893 (1984).
144. See, e.g., Douglas D. SeIph, Comment Taylor v. Ledbetter: Vindicating the
Constitutional Rights of Foster Children to Adequate Care and Protection, 22 GA. L. REV.
1187 (1988) (analyzing Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (1 1th Cir. 1987)).
145. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2.
146. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
147. See John-Edward Alley et al., Local Governments and the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The Impact of Garcia v. SAMTA and the 1985 FLSA Amendments, 15 STETSON L.
REV. 715 (1986).
148. 471 U.S. 707 (1985), rev'g 722 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1984) (Tuttle, J., for Fay &
Henderson, JJ.).
149. Id.
150. 494 U.S. 638 (1990), affg 867 F.2d 1305 (1 Ith Cir. 1989) (Vance, J., for Kravitch
& Henderson, JJ.).
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holding that the exclusivity provisions in state workers' compensation laws
did not bar migrant workers from bringing a private action under the federal
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act' 5' for intentional
violations of the Act.
52
The constitutional command of procedural due process obliges the
government to afford a person adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity
to be heard whenever the government deprives the person of property or
liberty.'53 In Lyng v. Payne,'54 the Court approved the notice published
by the Secretary of Agriculture in the Federal Register which set out details
and conditions of the particular loan program and which followed the
agency's regulations. The Eleventh Circuit struggled with the issue and had
thought worse of the Secretary's efforts.' 55 In a second case, Davis v.
Scherer,'56 the Supreme Court assumed, for the purposes of its decision,
that a discharged state highway patrol officer had been afforded fundamen-
tally fair process, even though the full hearing would not take place until
after his termination. This decision changed the result the Eleventh Circuit
had reached and consequently changed the outcome on the controlling issue
of qualified immunity for state officials.'57
The predeprivation procedure versus postdeprivation procedure
distinction, and the property versus liberty distinction both came up again
in Zinermon v. Burch,'58 when the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's en banc decision.'59 This important precedent for patients' rights
reasoned that when a state can feasibly provide a predeprivation hearing
before taking property, it generally must do so, regardless of the adequacy
of a postdeprivation state court tort remedy. 6 Postdeprivation hearings
151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 183 1-1872 (1988); see also supranotes 83-90 and accompanying text.
152. Adams Fruit Co., 494 U.S. at 650-51.
153. See generally Romaine S. Scott, Mennonite: What Does it Mean to Alabama
Mortgages After Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Morrison?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 969 (1985)
(analyzing FDIC v. Morrison, 747 F.2d 610 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1019
(1985)); Michael A. Logan, Note, Power of Sale Foreclosure: What Process is Due?, 36
ALA. L. REv. 1083 (1985) (discussing Morrison, 747 F.2d at 610).
154. 476 U.S. 926 (1986).
155. Payne v. Block, 714 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir.) (Clark, J., for Godbold & Henderson,
JJ.), modified, 721 F.2d 741 (11 th Cir. 1983), and vacated, 469 U.S. 807 (1984) (mem.).
156. 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
157. Scherer v. Graham, 710 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Davis v.
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
158. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
159. Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Servs., Inc., 840 F.2d 797(1 Ith Cir.
1988) (en banc).
160. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138-39.
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may be sufficient in situations when a predeprivation hearing would be
unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at stake if the state
is genuinely unable to prevent a random deprivation of some liberty interest.
In Zinermon, the Supreme Court held that a mental patient's allegation that
employees at the state institution had admitted him "voluntarily," without
taking any steps to ascertain whether he was competent to consent to his
own admission, stated a good cause of action for deprivation of procedural
due process, even though state tort remedies were available after the
fact. 161
While the issue of takings has troubled the Supreme Court for the last
decade or more, and shows no signs of 'receding,162 the Eleventh Circuit
contributed only one important holding during its first decade in this
area. 63  In FCC v. Florida Power Corp., " the Supreme Court reversed
the Eleventh Circuit'65 and held that the Federal Pole Attachments
Act, 66 which authorized the FCC to determine just and reasonable rates
that utility companies could charge cable television systems for stringing
cable television, does not give the cable companies any right to use the
utility poles. As to the taking issue, the Court concluded that when the FCC
set the rates, in the absence of parallel state regulations, the lower rates set
by the FCC were not confiscatory and did not effectuate a taking of the
property of the utilities under the Fifth Amendment. 67 Having thus
reasoned, the Court did not reach the Eleventh Circuit's theory of the case
that the Act was an unconstitutional constraint on the judicial power to
determine just compensation.
Issues of race have resonated as issues'of constitutional law for as long
as the Republic has existed under the Constitution of 1787. Constitutional
161. Id.; see Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (holding that mentally retarded
patients can be "voluntarily" admitted by family members under a lower threshold showing
than is applied in the same state's laws for the mentally ill).
162. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Pennell
v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
163. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the Florida Bar Interest on Trust Account Program.
Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819"F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.) (Hill, J., for Johnson & Eschbach,
JJ.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987) (mem.). See generally Gregory A. Hearing, Funding
Legal Services for the Poor: Florida's IOTA Program--Now Is the Time to Make It
Mandatory, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 337 (1988); Rachael S. Worthington, Comment,
IOTA-Overcominglts Current Obstacles, 18 STETSON L. REv. 415 (1989).
164. 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
165. 772 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (Roney, Fay, & Dumbauld, JJ.).
166. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1988).
167. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 254; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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compromise gave in to slavery and then gave way to apartheid and Jim
Crow which later gave way, at least formally, to the civil rights movement.
Four decades after Brown v. Board of Education,"' issues of race continue
to resonate in constitutional cases. In 1985, the Supreme Court affirmed,
in the strongest terms, a holding of the Eleventh Circuit'69 that a provision
in the Alabama State Constitution disenfranchising those convicted of crimes
of moral turpitude was unconstitutional because it denied the plaintiffs their
right to vote on the basis of race. The unanimous opinion in Hunter v.
Underwood' found that the 1901 enactment,'' although neutral on its
face, was motivated by an original intent and desire to discriminate against
African-Americans and had effectuated that discriminatory impact ever
since.
Issues about remedies for past racial discrimination have polarized the
Supreme Court in numerous cases for decades. 72 It thus comes as no
surprise that two of the most important equal protection decisions arising in
the first decade of the Eleventh Circuit were about remedies. In the first,
a fractured Supreme Court upheld a requirement that fifty percent of the
promotions in the state Department of Public Safety be awarded to African-
Americans until approximately twenty-five percent of the rank was
comprised of members of that race. The plurality opinion in United States
v. Paradise'73 upheld this remedial decree first by invoking a compelling
state interest to eradicate the past discriminatory exclusion and second by
concluding this was a narrowly tailored solution. This decision was one of
several civil rights cases Congress later overruled, in effect, with the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.'
The second equal protection remedy decision was Freeman v. Pitts.1
75
As one of the twin successors of the former Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit was called on to provide guidance to district courts contemplating
how and when to end supervision of public school districts still operating
under remedial injunctions for de jure segregation. The three-judge panel
168. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
169. Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1984) (Vance, J., for Clark &
Tjoflat, JJ.).
170. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
171. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 182.
172. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
173. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
174. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000e (1988).
175. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
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read Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent to require the district
court to retain jurisdiction in these cases until the school district attained
unitary status in six identified administrative areas for an extended
period. 76 The Supreme Court was of another mind, however, and held
that the district court need not retain active control over every aspect of the
school district until all aspects were unified. 77 Rather, the district court
had jurisdiction and discretion to relinquish control in incremental stages
before full compliance was achieved in every area of school administration.
Considered alongside some other contemporaneous holdings, the Supreme
Court seemed to be signalling that federal district courts could not continue
indefinitely to administer local public schools, even school systems that had
been guilty of invidious racial segregation in the past.'78
One of the most controversial constitutional decisions of the Eleventh
Circuit's first decade involved the issue whether a state sodomy statute
violated the fundamental rights of homosexuals. The Bowers v. Hard-
wick'79 case was decided by the narrowest possible margin in the Supreme
Court and by a two to one vote in the Eleventh Circuit. 8 The Supreme
Court concluded, over an intense dissent, that the Constitution did not
protect homosexual relations, even by consenting adults, in the privacy of
their own home. The case and its implications continue to swirl around the
High Court and beyond, without sign of any lessening of the controversy.
In Butterworth v. Smith,' a reporter who had testified before a grand
jury challenged a state statute that proscribed any disclosure of the witness's
own testimony. The Eleventh Circuit held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional and the Supreme Court agreed.'82 The statute violated the First
Amendment rights of free speech and free press without sufficient justifica-
tion, especially with regard to the truthful disclosure of the witness's own
testimony after the grand jury's term ended.
176. Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1450 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (Hatchett, J., for Fay &
Allgood, JJ.), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
177. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1450.
178. Compare Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) with Missouri v. Jenkins,
495 U.S. 33 (1990).
179. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
180. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., for Tuttle, J.;
Kravitch, J., concurring and dissenting in part), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
181. 494 U.S. 624 (1990), aftfg 866 F.2d 1318 (11 th Cir. 1989) (Vance, J., for Kravitch
& Henderson, JJ.).
182. Id. at 636.
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First Amendment rights of another kind were involved in Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement.'83 An organization brought suit to
challenge a county ordinance that authorized an administrator to vary the fee
charged for assembling and parading to reflect estimated costs for any public
expenses for police and for clean up. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc,
held in favor of the challengers.'84 The Supreme Court granted review
and affirmed, holding that the ordinance was facially invalid under
established case law.' 5 Aside from the legal issues, which were relatively
straightforward and simple, there was a great deal of emotion in the
underlying facts of this case. The county had been the site of the largest
nationally publicized civil rights rally since the 1960s, where an affiliate of
the Ku Klux Klan (the Nationalist Movement) held a counter-demonstration.
Shortly thereafter, the county enacted the challenged ordinance. Two and
one-half years later, the ordinance was constitutionally challenged by the
Nationalist Movement which sought to hold a demonstration opposing the
federal holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr.
The last considered decision arising from the Eleventh Circuit is a
reminder of the region's tradition as the "Bible belt."' 86 Parents of public
school children complained about a state statute that authorized a daily
period of silence during the school day for meditation or silent prayer.
187
The district court dismissed the parents' challenge. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed in part and affirmed in part. 88 In Wallace v. Jaffree,"'89 the
Supreme Court adhered to past precedents and affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's decision. It voided the statute because the measure served as an
endorsement of religion and lacked any secular purpose and, therefore, it
violated the Establishment Clause principle that government must pursue a
183. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
184. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 934 F.2d 1482 (11 th Cir. 1991) (en
banc), aff'g 913 F.2d 885 (1 1th Cir. 1990). There were multiple opinions at both stages of
appeal.
185. Forsyth, 112 S. Ct. at 2405.
186. Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983); see also
James J. Dean, Comment, Ceremonial Invocations at Public High School Events and the
Establishment Clause, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1001 (1989); William Turbeville, Comment,
Constitutional Law: Establishment Clause Standing Clarified, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 188
(1983) (discussing ACLU v. Rabun County, 678 F.2d 1379 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
187. Jaffree, 554 F. Supp. at 1104.
188. 705 F.2d 1526 (11 th Cir. 1983) (Hatchett, J., for Clark & Scott, JJ.). See generally
James J. McAlpin, Note, Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners: An Interpretivist
Challenge, 34 ALA. L. REV. 657 (1983).
189. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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course of complete neutrality in matters of religion.' The decision
marked one of the most controversial battles over church and state
jurisprudence in recent years.' 9'
These decisions from the first decade of the Eleventh Circuit fully and
fairly represent the constitutional law issues of the day. These are the
questions that required answering for our Republic to function as a
representative democracy. In these accommodations of government power
and individual right, the Eleventh Circuit contributed to the Supreme Court's
continuing effort to respond, for this generation of Americans, to what might
be called the Madisonian dilemma: empowering the government sufficiently
for its tasks, yet at the same time limiting it from overreaching the
individual. The "Father of the Constitution" and the drafter and chief
sponsor of the Bill of Rights once explained this perpetual dilemma:
It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself. 2
VIII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Federal criminal law and criminal procedure are inextricably inter-
twined.'93 The adjectival rules of procedure describe the process by which
the substantive criminal law is enforced. For the Eleventh Circuit, as well
as for the Supreme Court, substance and procedure have a duality of policy
190. Id. at 55-56.
191. See generally Kenneth P. Nuger, Judicial Responses to Religious Challenges
Concerning Humanistic Public Education: The Free Exercise and Establishment Debate
Continues, 39 ALA. L. REV. 73 (1987); Rodney K. Smith, Now is the Time for Reflection:
Wallace v. Jaffree and Its Legislative Aftermath, 37 ALA. L. REV. 345 (1986).
192. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
193. See generally Anne S. Emanuel, The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine Dies a Quiet
Death-OrAre the Reports Greatly Exaggerated?, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 269 (1988); David
M. Lazarus, Note, Entrapment: A Review of the Principles of Law Governing This Defense
as Applied by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 7 NOVA L:J. 611 (1983).
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and constitutionality.' 94 A federal criminal law first must be interpreted
and then tested for constitutional validity. A federal procedure must square
with the constitutional rights found in the Bill of Rights. Federal procedure,
for the most part, is constitutional procedure; of the twenty-three individual
rights identified in the first eight amendments, twelve concern criminal
procedure. Federalism makes matters more complicated when a state
criminal conviction is being challenged in a collateral preceding in the
nature of habeas corpus in federal court. 95 A state substantive law must
be interpreted in federal court in the same way a state court would interpret
it, but then the federal constitutional overlay must be applied.'96 A state
has no police power to violate the Constitution of the United States. State
procedures, likewise, must afford at least the minimum federal procedural
due process found in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated liberties.
97
The Eleventh Circuit's decisions considered such perennial issues as
interpretation of federal criminal statutes, self-incrimination, right to counsel,
speedy trial, jury, due process, double jeopardy, and the right to appeal.
Issues about death penalty procedures and procedures on federal habeas
corpus review also were much in evidence and proved particularly
difficult.'98
The Eleventh Circuit functioned as a common law court to interpret the
Federal Bank Robbery Act. 99 In United States v. Bell,2"' a three-judge
194. See generally Deborah S. Braden, Eleventh Circuit, Fourth Amendment Seizure:
The Fifth Circuit Adopts a Restrictive Definition, 13 CUMB. L. REv. 79 (1982); Mark T.
Davis, Eleventh Circuit, Drug Paraphernalia Laws: Clearing a Legal Haze, 13 CUMB. L.
REv. 273 (1982); W. Dennis McKinnie, Eleventh Circuit, Use of Electronic TrackingDevices
in the Fifth Circuit: Trailing the New Approach, 13 CUMB. L. REV. 51 (1982).
195. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
196. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
197. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541-52 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting).
198. See generally Charles Graddick, Debunking the Ancient Writ: A Critical Analysis
of the Law of Habeas Corpus, 14 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1984); Michael Mello & Ruthann
Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases,
13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31 (1985); Barbara A. Ward, Competencyfor Execution: Problems
in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35 (1986); Valerie Shea, Comment, Eleventh
Circuit Rejects Claim of Florida Death Row Inmates: Ford v. Strickland, 7 NOVA L.J. 415
(1983).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1988).
200. 649 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981) (Tjoflat, J., for Godbold, J.; Vance, J.,
dissenting).
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panel had reversed, but a divided en banc court affirmed the conviction.2"'
A Supreme Court majority settled the issue (on which the circuits had
divided much like the en banc court had) and ruled that the statute was not
limited to common law larceny but also included the defendant's crime of
obtaining money under false pretenses.0 2
The Supreme Court resolved another circuit conflict in Garcia v.
United States, 3 and again sided with the Eleventh Circuit's approach,2
to hold that the statute proscribing assault and robbery of any custodian of
"mail matter or of any money or other property" of the United States05
covered "flash money" being used by an undercover secret service agent to
buy counterfeit currency. A third decision involved an interpretive issue
under the Hobbs Act,206 about which the circuits were in conflict. Again,
the Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuift 7 and concluded that
the affirmative act of inducement by a public official was not a necessary
element of the offense of extortion under color of official right in a case
styled Evans v. United States.
2 8
Few Supreme Court decisions have had as much sustained controversy
to them as has Miranda v. Arizona. °9 One testament to the complexity
of that doctrine is that nearly thirty years later there are still difficult issues
and applications which continue to divide the courts of appeals and the
Supreme Court. Wainwright v. Greenfield"'° is one example. The
majority affirmed the Eleventh Circuit decision21 that the use of a
defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of his
sanity violated due process.
The right to counsel is recognized as being central to the adversarial
system ofjustice. First decade decisions touched on three critical questions.
201. United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc) (opinions filed
by Vance, Anderson, & Tjoflat, JJ.).
202. Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356 (1983).
203. 469 U.S. 70 (1984).
204. United States v. Garcia, 718 F.2d 1528 (1lth Cir. 1983) (Atkins, J., for Fay &
Kravitch, JJ.).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1988).
206. Id. § 1951 (1988).
207. United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790 (lth Cir. 1990) (Kravitch, J. for Cox &
Dyer, JJ.).
208. 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).
209. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
210. 474 U.S. 284 (1986).
211. Greenfield v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 329 (11 th Cir. 1984) (Tjoflat, J., for Godbold
& Henderson, JJ.).
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In Wainwright v. Torna,2 12 the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals" 3 and held that since the petitioner had no constitutional right to
counsel to pursue a discretionary review in the state supreme court, he was
not deprived of effective assistance of counsel as a result of his retained
counsel's failure to timely file the application for review." 4
The Supreme Court granted review of a fractured en banc decision" 5
and announced the proper standard for the effective assistance of counsel in
Strickland v. Washington.21 6 The Sixth Amendment/Due Process right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the benchmark
for judging any allegation of ineffectiveness must be whether, considering
all the circumstances, the defense attorney's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on to have produced a just result. The defendant, in order to raise a
successful challenge, must show that there is a reasonable probability that
the result of the proceeding would have been different, but for the defense
counsel's unprofessional errols.217
Reversals under a reasonableness standard reflect the reviewing court's
perception of the average defense attorney, and from the run of decisions
rejecting right to counsel claims, the members of the federal bench seem to
have a rather low opinion of the average criminal defense attorney.2"8 In
Burger v. Kemp," 9 for example, the Supreme Court held that the defense
attorney's professional partnership with the attorney representing his client's
codefendant in a separate prosecution did not so infect the attorney's
representation as to constitute active representation of a competing interest.
The Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit's outcome22" and went on to
conclude that there was some reasonable basis for the defense attorney's
212. 455 U.S. 586 (1982).
213. 649 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (per curiam) (Miller, Johnson, & Clark,
JJ.).
214. Torna, 455 U.S. at 586.
215. 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (opinions filed by Vance, Tjoflat, Clark,
Johnson, Roney, & Hill, JJ.).
216. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
217. Id. at 694.
218. See Thomas E. Baker, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 34 MERCER L. REV.
1241, 1271 (1983).
219. 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
220. Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (Vance & Allgood,
JJ.; Johnson, J., dissenting).
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failure to develop and present evidence of the defendant's troubled family
background at the penalty stage of his capital prosecution.221
In a 1990 decision, Doggett v. United States,222 the Supreme Court
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's summary of the proper analysis for a
speedy trial claim,' but disagreed with the intermediate court's applica-
tion of the rules to the facts. In a relatively rare holding, the Supreme Court
concluded that the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial by the eight-and-one-half year delay between his indictment and
his arrest.2
24
The central right to a competent and unimpaired jury was involved in
Tanner v. United States.2 ' Responding to the defendants' allegations and
offers of proof, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit 26 and
held that an evidentiary hearing was barred under Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b)'s general prohibition of juror impeachment.227  The Court also
concluded that no hearing was necessary to resolve the particular allegations
of juror abuse of alcohol and drugs since there were sufficient other bases
to reject the claims. The right to an impartial jury composed of jurors who
are competent and unimpaired could be adequately protected by other trial
procedures, such as voir dire, in-court observations by counsel, court, and
other trial participants, and by the procedure, allowed by the trial court here,
to conduct a post-trial evidentiary hearing to impeach the verdict by non-
juror evidence of the alleged misconduct.
The Due Process Clause protects an accused against a conviction except
upon proof beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. The
Supreme Court was called on to apply settled rules about burden-shifting
inferences and presumptions in jury instructions in Francis v. Franklin.221
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the trial judge's instruction to the jury
had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of intent and that
221. Burger, 483 U.S. at 776.
222. 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992).
223. United States v. Doggett, 906 F.2d 573 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (Kravitch, J., for Atkins,
J.; Clark, J., dissenting).
224. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2686.
225. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
226. United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (Garza, J., for Hill &
Anderson, JJ.).
227. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 107.
228. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
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the error was not harmless.229 The Supreme Court majority agreed that
there was reversible error in the charge.23°
Double jeopardy complications arose in Garrett v. United States.23'
The defendant was convicted of a continuing criminal enterprise, conspiracy
to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, and using a telephone to
facilitate illegal drug activities. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion.232 The Supreme Court looked first to the intent of Congress and then
to the limits of the Fifth Amendment to hold: 1) Congress intended that the
continuing criminal enterprise offense be a separate offense and authorized
prosecution for both the predicate offense and the enterprise offense; 2) the
prosecution for the continuing criminal enterprise offense after the earlier
prosecution for marijuana importation did not offend principles of double
jeopardy; 3) the Fifth Amendment did not bar cumulative punishments for
the enterprise offense and the underlying predicate importation offense.23 3
The right to appeal was the subject of Wasman v. United States.234
Following an appellate reversal of his earlier conviction, the defendant was
retried and again convicted. The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's second handling of the case 23 and held that after retrial and
reconviction, following a successful appeal, a trial court may justify an
increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events
that occurred after the first sentencing. Any presumption of vindictiveness
was rebutted by the trial judge's careful explanation that the second sentence
was greater because of an intervening conviction; therefore, the longer
second sentence was manifestly legitimate.
Every judge on the Eleventh Circuit will admit that the most difficult
of all appeals, in terms of their toll on the judicial psyche, are death penalty
appeals. The facts are difficult. The law is difficult. Additionally, these
difficulties are made worse by the weight of responsibility for the outcome.
229. Franklin v. Francis, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1983) (Tjoflat, J., for Hill &
Simpson, JJ.).
230. Francis, 471 U.S. at 326; see also Burger, 483 U.S. at 781-83 (holding a similar
claim of error harmless).
231. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
232. United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (Kravitch, J., for Fay &
Atkins, JJ.); see also Sandra Bower Ross, Comment, The Pattern Element of RICO Before
and After Sedima: A Look at Both Federal and Florida RICO, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 321
(1987).
233. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 773.
234. 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
235. United States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663 (11 th Cir. 1983) (Markey, J., for Fay &
Clark, JJ.).
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McCleskey v. Kemp, 6 a 1987 decision, was understood at the time
to represent the last, best challenge against the death penalty. The case was
reviewed en bane in the Eleventh Circuit on the issue of whether proof of
disparate racial impact could be the basis for a holding that a state's death
penalty was unconstitutional. The en bane judges debated among them-
selves in lengthy opinions, but the majority concluded that the statistical
showing had not been sufficient.2" An African-American defendant was
convicted in a Georgia trial court of armed robbery and the murder of a
white police officer. He was tried and sentenced under state procedures
which the Supreme Court had upheld in 1976.238 To support his claim in
federal court, the defendant-petitioner proffered a statistical study (the
Baldus study) that purported to show a disparity in the imposition of the
death sentence in Georgia based on the murder victim's race and, to a lesser
extent, on the defendant's race. The exhaustive and comprehensive study
of all the murder prosecutions in the state revealed that African-American
defendants whose victims were white have a statistically significant greater
likelihood of receiving the death penalty. The Supreme Court of the United
States, by a five to four vote, rejected this argument under the incorporated
Eighth Amendment and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9
The second substantive death penalty holding came down in Ford v.
Wainwright.24 The Supreme Court majority reversed and remanded the
Eleventh Circuit panel decision.24 The High Court interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit a state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a
prisoner who is insane. The Court held that state procedures for determin-
ing the sanity of the death row inmate were not adequate to assure a full and
fair hearing on the critical issue, and therefore the petitioner was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on the question in the collateral federal trial court.242
236. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
237. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (opinions filed by
nine judges: Roney, Tjoflat, Kravitch, Vance, Anderson, Godbold, Johnson, Hatchett, &
Clark, JJ.).
238. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, stay granted, 429 U.S. 1301, and vacated, 429
U.S. 875 (1976).
239. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308-13.
240. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
241. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (lth Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (Vance &
Stafford, JJ.; Clark, J., dissenting).
242. Ford, 477 U.S. at 418.
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Jury selection in death cases must be sensitive to the constitutional
interests of both the accused and the state.243 The Supreme Court used the
case of Wainwright v. Witt?44 to caution courts of appeals about their
proper role when reviewing the factual issue of whether a prospective juror
was sufficiently biased as to be excludable. The Eleventh Circuit 45 erred,
according to the Supreme Court, in the panel's willingness to second guess
the district court's assessment of what had happened in the state trial court.
In Darden v. Wainwright,2 46 the en banc court in the Eleventh Circuit
ruled in favor of the state prisoner.4 7 The Supreme Court subsequently
vacated and remanded the Eleventh Circuit decision based on Wainwright
v. Witt.2 4' However, on remand, the en banc court denied relief.2 49 The
second time the case came before the Supreme Court, the majority
definitively held that under the circumstances the particular juror had been
properly excluded for indicating that he had moral, religious, or conscien-
tious principles in opposition to the death penalty that were so strong that
he would be unable to recommend a death penalty regardless of the
evidence. 5
Procedures and events at the penalty phase of capital prosecutions
routinely serve as the focus of later federal habeas corpus challenges. In
Wainwright v. Goode,25' the Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh
Circuie52 erred in substituting its own view for the view of the state
supreme court on the issue of whether the state trial court relied on an
impermissive aggravating factor.2" The majority went on to opine that,
even if the state trial judge relied on the problematic factor, the state trial
did not produce a sentence so arbitrary as to violate the Constitution. In
Hitchcock v. Dugger,254 the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit,
243. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
244. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
245. Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (Tuttle, J., for Kravitch, J.;
Roney, J., specially concurring).
246. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
247. Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (opinions filed
by Johnson, Tjoflat, Hill, & Fay, JJ.).
248. Wainright v. Darden, 469 U.S. 1202 (1985).
249. Darden v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
250. Darden, 477 U.S. at 178.
251. 464 U.S. 78 (1983).
252. Goode v. Wainwright, 704 F.2d 593 (11 th Cir. 1983) (Anderson, J., for Godbold
& Hoffman, JJ.).
253. See Goode, 464 U.S. at 83-84.
254. 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
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sitting en banc,2" and held that the advisory jury in the state trial court
had been unconstitutionally "instructed not to consider, and the sentencing
judge [had improperly] refused to consider, evidence of nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances . . ." that should have been considered." 6 In
Parker v. Dugger,257 the Supreme Court held that the state supreme court
had incorrectly determined that the state trial had found no mitigating
circumstances in pronouncing sentence and, consequently, had failed to
follow constitutional procedures required for weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors. 8
The surveyed decisions of the Eleventh Circuit also provide a window
on the arcane and convoluted procedures in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. The procedural rules in these actions are more easily stated than
applied, as the Eleventh Circuit learned in two decisions. In Amadeo v.
Zant,259 the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit260 and deter-
mined that the district court's finding that the petitioner had established
cause for his state court procedural default was not clearly erroneous and
should have been affirmed under settled principles. On the other hand, in
Dugger v. Adams,26" ' the Supreme Court did not find cause excusing the
petitioner's default under the relevant case law and reversed the Eleventh
Circuit.26
2
The most important first decade habeas holding came in McCleskey v.
Zant.263 It involved the issue of abuse of the writ, an issue that in death
penalty cases can make the difference between a last minute stay or
execution."' Again, the Supreme Court used an Eleventh Circuit deci-
sion... as a vehicle for national lawmaking. The majority held that when
a state prisoner files a second or subsequent petition the state bears the
255. Hitchcock v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 1514(1 th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Roney, J., for
the majority; Johnson J., dissenting).
256. Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 398-99.
257. 498 U.S. 308 (1991).
258. Id. at 320-22.
259. 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
260. Amadeo v. Kemp, 816 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (Vance &
Henderson, JJ.; Clark, J., dissenting).
261. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
262. Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1986) (Johnson, J., for Roney &
Fay, JJ.).
263. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
264. See Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200 (1984).
265. McCleskey v. Zant, 890 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1989) (Kravitch, J., for Edmondson
& Roney, JJ.), affd 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
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burden of pleading abuse of the writ; the burden is satisfied if the state
describes prior petitions and identifies the issue raised for the first time; then
the procedural burden shifts to the petitioner to show cause and actual
prejudice or, alternatively, a fundamental miscarriage of justice. With this
elaboration, the Supreme Court effectively narrowed the possibility that a
state prisoner could succeed on any petition that followed the first federal
collateral review.
Collectively, these criminal law and criminal procedure decisions
demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit has taken its place alongside the other
United States Courts of Appeals. It is one of the main pipelines of these
cases to the Supreme Court, but the influence flows in both directions. The
court of appeals is directed toward the responsibility of correcting errors in
the nine district courts under its supervision.266 But it has a national
orientation at the same time. In Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, the
Eleventh Circuit is the judicial institution that has the primary federalizing
responsibility for implementing the national policy on crime and, at the
same time, for guaranteeing the promise of the Bill of Rights to citizens
accused of crime.
What is most evident, perhaps, in the death penalty and habeas corpus
decisions, is the constitutional abstraction of federalism. The three
sovereign states in the Eleventh Circuit have made the criminal justice
policy decision to rely on the death penalty. Consequently, the Eleventh
Circuit has the macabre responsibility of being something of a death court,
or more accurately, a constitutional court in these capital cases. According
to one expert, of the forty-three habeas death penalty cases decided by the
Supreme Court during the period being studied, nearly half of them
originated in the Eleventh Circuit.2 67  Many of these, as demonstrated
above, have had national significance for this area of criminal law and
constitutional procedure. It is safe to predict that the incorporated Eighth
Amendment will continue to demand the attention of the Eleventh Circuit
bench for the foreseeable future.268
Finally, it should be noted that the court of appeals' frequent reliance
on the en banc mechanism to deal with these issues suggests a prudent
exercise of collegial decision-making. These full-court efforts help assure
266. 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1988).
267. Godbold, supra note 10, at 976; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797
(1982) (holding that application of the death penalty to a defendant who was not a principal,
but only an aider and abetter, was unconstitutional).
268. See generally Timothy W. Floyd, Criminal Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH L. REv. 493
(1991).
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that the law of the circuit will be uniform and will express the judicial
philosophy of the majority of the circuit judges. Through en banc hearings
past panels are rehabilitated and future panels are informed. Even more
important, the Supreme Court benefits from the fuller and more diverse
expressions of judicial views contained in the multiple opinions that issue
from full-court review.
IX. EVIDENCE LAW
The Federal Rules of Evidence have, as their express objective, "to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly deter-
mined."269 On three occasions, the Supreme Court used Eleventh Circuit
appeals as a vehicle to address the law of evidence.
In Amadeo v. Zant," a state prisoner was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. He was in federal court on a collateral challenge based
on alleged equal protection violations in the selection of his petit jury.271
The issue before the Supreme Court dealt with the relationship between a
district court and a court of appeals when reviewing findings of fact.272
On the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the factual findings upon
which the district court had based its conclusion-that the petitioner had
established cause for his procedural default of not objecting to the jury
selection at the state criminal trial-were not clearly erroneous; therefore,
the court of appeals should not have set aside the district court's grant of
relief. If there are two permissible views of the same evidence, the view of
the trier" of fact cannot be deemed clearly erroneous. The appellate court
cannot engage in fact-finding.
The Supreme Court gave the district judge a lesson in evidence law in
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey.273 The spouses of deceased Navy pilots
brought an action against the aircraft manufacturer and the service company.
The district court entered a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the
defendants and the Eleventh Circuit reversed after a rehearing en banc 4
Having determined that a Navy investigative report was sufficiently
269. FED. R. EvID. 102.
270. 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 259-61.
272. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
273. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
274. Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498 (11 th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per
curiam) (Tjoflat & Johnson, JJ., specially concurring).
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trustworthy to be admissible, the district court also admitted, over plaintiffs'
objections, most of the report's "opinions," including a statement suggesting
that pilot error was most probably the cause of the crash. The Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's admission of these "opinions," under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), and agreed that the material was not
excludable as hearsay.275 Factually based conclusions or opinions are not
excludable, according to the Court's interpretation of the rule and the
Advisory Committee Notes, when they appear in a public record or report,
so long as the record or report otherwise satisfies the trustworthiness
criterion making it admissible in the first place.
In a rather rare alternative holding, the Supreme Court held that the
district court had abused its discretion in restricting the scope of cross-
examination of a witness.276 However, the Court remanded for further
proceedings consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 106. The witness, a
Navy flight instructor, had testified on direct examination as an adverse
witness that he had made certain statements, arguably supporting the theory
of pilot error, in a detailed letter in which he also took issue with some of
the other findings in the previously mentioned report. The Supreme Court
held that he should have been permitted to testify on cross-examination that
his letter also included statements that he believed that the crash was due to
power failure, so that the jury would be presented with a complete account
of his letter.2 77 The Supreme Court reasoned that when one party has
made use of a portion of a document and a distortion or misunderstanding
can only be averted through the presentation of another portion of the
document, the additional material required to be presented for the sake of
completeness is ipso facto relevant and admissible. 78
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) codifies the long-accepted common
law rule, which the federal courts have always followed, that a jury verdict
cannot be impeached with a juror's testimony as "to the effect of anything
upon [his] or any other juror's mind or emotions ... except that ... [such
testimony is admissible on the question of] whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. 2 79 In Tanner v. United
275. Rainey, 488 U.S. at 153. See generally Joel R. Brown, Comment, The Confronta-
tion Clause and the Hearsay Rule: A Problematic Relationship in Need of a Practical
Analysis, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 949 (1987).
276. Rainey, 488 U.S. at 153.
277. Id.
278. See FED. R. EvID. 401, 402.
279. Id. 606(b).
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States,"' the Supreme Court affirmed an Eleventh Circuit decision2"'
that allegations of substance abuse by the jurors did not fall within the
exception and, therefore, an evidentiary hearing was not required. This
result was dictated by the text of the rule, the legislative history, and the
strong public policy of ensuring full and free deliberations, in order to
protect jurors from harassment by the losing party, and to preserve the
community's trust in the jury system. As if to cover all bases, the majority
went on, in dicta, to say that affidavits and testimony noting that jurors had
consumed alcoholic beverages at lunch and that several had fallen asleep in
the afternoon did not form an adequate basis for placing any mistrust on the
jury verdict.
These evidence law decisions highlight several important themes.282
The law of evidence is the domain of trial lawyers and trial judges: those
who apply it and make it. The law in this area is rule-based, but the
Federal Rules of Evidence are codifications and restatements of common
law principles. Therefore, the rules are best understood against that
background of understanding.. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit seems to be
respectful of the district court's role in the court system. The trial is
supposed to be the main drama, while the appeal is merely the critic's
review. It is at the trial where the adversarial processes work to approxi-
mate truth. The main role of the appellate court is to help insure that the
trial proceeds in a fair and efficient manner as an asymptote of what
happened and who did what to whom and why.2"3
X. LABOR LAW
The history of labor law in the United States contains more social
history and class conflict than legal theory. The legal response to the labor
280. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
281. United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765 (11th Cir. 1985) (Garza, J., for Anderson,
J.; Hill, J., specially concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 217-19.
282. See generally Robert S. Catz & Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L. REV.
89 (1987); Kenneth J. Melilli, Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis
of State Law, 22 GA. L. REV. 667 (1988); William A. Schroeder, Evidentiary Use in
Criminal Cases of Collateral Crimes and Acts: A Comparison of the Federal Rules and
Alabama Law, 35 ALA. L. REV. 241 (1984); Michael D. Ermert, Comment, MentalDisorder
in Witnesses: An Overview of Competency and Credibility Issues, 41 ALA. L. REv. 167
(1989).
283. Compare Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the Responsibility
of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507 (1969) with Charles A. Wright, The Doubtful
Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957).
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movement and the opposing movement against labor organization has
largely been statutory. The primary developments have occurred in the halls
of Congress, not in federal courtrooms. Nevertheless, the federal courts
have had the important responsibilities of interpreting and applying the
edicts of the legislative branch. The first legislative goal is to ensure
"industrial peace"' among the employers, the labor organizations and the
individual employees.2"4 In more recent years, Congress has constructed
an elaborate statutory framework for protecting the rights of workers from
a host of marketplace discriminations. The federal courts, including the
courts of appeals, provide a forum for keeping the labor peace and for
policing the labor place.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's2. 5 decision in
Edward J DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction
Trades Council."6  The National Labor Relations Board2 7 ("NLRB")
issued an order instructing the union to stop distributing handbills, at a
construction site, which urged mall customers not to shop at any of the
mall's stores until the mall owner guaranteed that the building contractors
would pay fair wages. The Supreme Court first held that the NLRB
interpretation of the National Labor Relations Ace88 ("NLRA") was not
entitled to judicial deference, particularly when the NLRB interpretation
would raise serious First Amendment problems.28 9 Instead, the Court
rejected the argument that the union's peaceful distribution of handbills at
the mall entrances violated the NLRA provision, making it an unfair labor
practice to "threaten, coerce, or restrain any person" to cease doing business
284. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1 (1976); see also Sarah L. Manning, Eleventh Circuit, Wright
Line: The Burden of Proof in Dual Motive Cases Under Section 8(A)(3), 13 CUMB. L. REv.
239 (1982) (discussing Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced,662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982)); David J. Middlebrooks, Comment,
Nonmajorily Bargaining Orders: Predicting the Eleventh Circuit's Vote, 34 ALA. L. REV.
85 (1983).
285. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328 (1 Ith
Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (Hill, Anderson, & Tuttle, JJ.).
286. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
287. See generally Patricia Diaz Dennis, Principles That Guide My Decisionmaking, 15
STETSON L. REv. 5 (1985) (the author is a member of the NLRB).
288. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988).
289. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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with another.29° Such handbilling and appeals to consumers did not fall
within the scope of the congressional meaning and intent.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit29' in Hechler v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 759.292 The case
required the High Court to interpret and apply the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947293 ("LMRA"). An electrical apprentice brought suit
against her union, alleging that the union had breached its duty to ascertain
that she possessed essential training and skill before being assigned to
perform ajob at which she was injured. After the lawsuit was removed, the
district court dismissed it for failure to comply with the federal statute of
limitations. The Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of the employee. However,
the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the claim fell within the preemp-
tive effect of section 301 of the LMRA. This conclusion was reinforced by
the policy behind the statute to provide a uniform meaning to contract terms
in collective bargaining agreements, since the lawsuit depended on the
meaning to be given to the relevant agreement between the parties.
Therefore, the federal, and not the state, limitations period applied.
Accordingly, the only question left on remand was whether the claim was
based on the union's duty of fair representation, in which case the brief
federal six-month period applied, or whether the claim amounted to a third-
party beneficiary suit based on the collective bargaining agreement, in which
case a longer federal statute of limitations period would apply.
In a very important decision to the region's migrant workers, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit,294 holding that exclusivity
provisions in state workers' compensation laws do not bar migrant workers
from bringing private actions under the Federal Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act.2 95 The decision in Adams Fruit Co.
v. Barrett96 relied on the actual language of the federal statute and
depended on the Congressional history of the measure in analyzing
preemption.
290. Florida Gulf Coast, 485 U.S. at 578 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)
(1988)).
291. Hechler v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 759, 772 F.2d 788 (11th Cir.
1985) (Clark, J., for Henderson & Tuttle, JJ.).
292. 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
293. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1988).
294. Barrett v. Adams Fruit Co., 867 F.2d 1305 (11th Cir. 1989) (Vance, J., for
Kravitch & Henderson, JJ.).
295. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
1872 (1988)).
296. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
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The Supreme Court was called on to interpret and apply the Federal
Service Labor Management Relations Statute297 in Fort Stewart Schools
v. Federal Labor Relations Authority.29 The Federal Labor Relations
Authority ("FLRA") had ruled that the Army was required to negotiate with
a union representing employees of two elementary schools located in the
Fort. The Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit 99 that the
FLRA should be upheld. The union's proposals, relating to mileage
reimbursements, various types of paid leave, and salary increases, fell within
the statute's coverage of "conditions of employment," at least in the
interpretation of the FLRA. 00 The Supreme Court found no reason to
reject the agency's interpretation.
What was probably the most important Supreme Court labor law
decision to come out of the Eleventh Circuit in its first decade was Hishon
v. King & Spalding.30' A female attorney sued one of the oldest and most
prestigious law firms in the circuit. She alleged that the firm's decision not
to promote her from associate to partner constituted sex-based discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 A divided panel of the
Eleventh Circuit held that the Act did not apply to such partnership
decision-making. 33  The Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the
plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim and was entitled to her day in court.
Partnership consideration was part and parcel of the employment relation-
ship, even though making partner was not automatic or guaranteed.
Partnership consideration could not be based on any of the factors prohibited
by Title VII: race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Application of
the Civil Rights Act did not infringe on the firm or members' constitutional
rights of expression or free association.0 4
297. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988).
298. 495 U.S. 641 (1990).
299. Fort Stewart Schs. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 860 F.2d 396 (1 th Cir. 1988)
(Hatchett, J., for Vance & Nesbitt, JJ.).
300. See Fort Stewart Schs., 495 U.S. at 644-50.
301. 467 U.S. 69 (1984); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir.
1982) (employing sexual harassment analysis relied on by Supreme Court in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
302. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. III 1991). See generally Andrea Zelman,
Comment, Civil Rights: Law Partners as Employees for Title VII Purposes, 35 U. FLA. L.
REV. 201 (1983).
303. Hischon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1030 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) (Fay, J., for
Young, J.; Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
304. Hischon, 467 U.S. at 73-79; see also Martha E. Waters, Recent Decision, Title VII:
Relieffor Sexual Harassment in the Eleventh Circuit, 35 ALA. L. REV. 193 (1984).
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The Supreme Court had occasion to reverse another Eleventh Circuit
holding, 5 under Title VII, in Florida v. Long."6 State employees
brought a class action alleging that the State of Florida's pension plan
system for state employees discriminated on the basis of sex. Specifically,
the Supreme Court was asked to decide the date upon which pension funds
covered by Title VII were required to offer benefit structures that did not
discriminate on the basis of sex, and whether persons who, in fact, retired
before that date were entitled to adjusted benefits to eliminate any sex
discrimination for all future benefits. This called for an interpretation of the
statute and some reconciliation of earlier decisions.3"7 Choosing the date
of the later of its two decisions, the majority reasoned that the Court's first
decision, which invalidated discriminatory pension plan contributions, did
not put the state on notice that its optional pension plan, that offered sex-
based benefits, was in violation of the federal law. Therefore, liability could
not be imposed for Florida's conduct before the second Supreme Court
decision that explicitly prohibited such discriminatory benefits. Further-
more, the legislative purposes behind Title VII would not be advanced by
an inequitable award of retroactive damages against the states and local
governments.
The last mentioned labor law decision to arise in the Eleventh Circuit
was School Board of Nassau County v. Arline."8 This case dealt with the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.309 A school teacher, who alleged that she was
fired from her job solely for the reason that she had a history and suscepti-
bility to tuberculosis, argued that the statute protected her as a "handicapped
individual" who was "otherwise qualified to teach .... ,"'0 The Eleventh
Circuit held that the contagious disease constituted a statutory handicap.3 '
The Supreme Court affirmed and held that the statute prohibited the school
system, as a federally funded state program, from discriminating against her
solely by reason of her handicap. The case was remanded for further
305. Long v. Florida, 805 F.2d 1542 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (Godbold, J., for Fay & Atkins,
JJ.).
306. 487 U.S. 223 (1988).
307. See Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensa-
tion Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
308. 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1983)).
309. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
310. Arline, 480 U.S. at 275.
311. Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 764 (lth Cir. 1985)
(Vance, J., for Anderson & Henley, JJ.).
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proceedings to determine whether the teacher, in fact, was otherwise
qualified to teach, and therefore, fired improperly.
These labor law decisions demonstrate the essential "federalness" of
employment law, once the issues go beyond traditional state contract law
and workers' compensation statutes. Federal law is based on statute. The
limited role of the judicial branch, consequently, is to divine the legislative
intent and be true to the Congressional scheme. The flow of influence goes
both ways: national policies are implemented in the local community
through federal court enforcement and the Eleventh Circuit produces the
case vehicles for deciding issues with nationally binding effects.
X. TAXATION
It has been said that "[t]he technical laws Congress has devised tend to
make the comprehension of the income tax system all too absorbing in time
and energy."3 2  Mercifully for the author, the Eleventh Circuit has not
developed a reputation as a leading tax court. Only two decisions during
the first decade had to do with tax law and neither is absorbing.
In the first tax decision, Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 13 a bankruptcy
trustee, who had been appointed under a confirmed plan to liquidate and
distribute the debtors' property after the property was transferred to a trust
created by the plan, sought a declaratory judgment on the question of the
trustee's obligation to file income tax returns and to pay taxes upon the gain
realized from the sale of real estate. 3 4 The plan was silent on this issue.
The Bankruptcy Court decided that the trustee did not have to file or pay
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed." 5 The Supreme Court, however,
disagreed. Since the trustee was an assignee of all or substantially all of the
property of the corporate debtors, the trustee would have to file returns and
pay taxes as if there had been no plan. As a fiduciary, the trustee had to
file returns and pay the taxes due on income attributable to the individual
debtor's property. The unanimous Court held that the United States' earlier
failure to object to the plan, which was silent about taxes, did not preclude
the government from seeking payment of taxes from the trustee.3" 6
312. MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1 (3d ed.
1988).
313. 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992).
314. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1988); 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3)-(4) (1988).
315. In re Holywell Corp., 911 F.2d 1539 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (Hatchett, J., for Henderson,
J.; Cox, J., dissenting).
316. Holywell, 112 S. Ct. at 1021.
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The only other tax case was Dickman v. Commissioner."7 The
Eleventh Circuit reversed a determination by the United States Tax Court
which had concluded that intrafamily, interest-free demand loans did not
result in taxable gifts." 8 The Supreme Court sided with the Commissioner
and determined that the loans were taxable gifts of the reasonable value of
the use of the money being loaned." 9 This result resolved a conflict
among the circuits in favor of the approach the Eleventh Circuit had taken
on direct appeal. The issue was of obvious importance to the proper
functioning of the tax system. 2°
Two decisions do not constitute a sufficient sample to reach any
conclusion about the status of tax law in the Eleventh Circuit. Any
assessment is left for some future evaluation.
XI. CONCLUSION
It has been difficult even to attempt to account for ten years of
decisions in so many different areas of the law. It is even more difficult,
if not impossible, to summarize the overall significance of the Eleventh
Circuit's contributions to the law of the Nation. Nevertheless, even an
arbitrary selection process, as was used here, allows one to begin to
appreciate the responsibility of decision-making borne by the judges of the
intermediate federal court.
Federal judicial history was made with the creation of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The judicial and legal history
made in turn by the Eleventh Circuit, during its first decade, has been true
to its judicial parent, the former Fifth Circuit, which aptly deserved the title
of a "great court.""32 The priority of the first decade circuit judges was
"characterized by the goal of achieving stability as an institution."322
317. 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
318. Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (Hill, J., for Godbold,
J.; Fay, J., concurring) (interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 2501 (1980)).
319. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 337-38.
320. See David Vetter, Comment, Gift Taxation: Interest-FreeDemand Loans-Gift or
Equivalent Exchange?, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 549 (1983); James L. Webster, Recent Decision,
Dickman v. Commissioner: The Supreme Court Applies the Gift Tax to Interest-Free Loans,
35 ALA. L. REv. 553 (1984). Congress has since addressed this issue. See 26 U.S.C. § 7872
(1988).
321. John M. Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LoY. L. REv. 787, 787 (1980);
see also BAKER, supra note 2, at 52-73.
322. Godbold, supra note 10, at 984; see also Michael L. Chapman,Appellate Procedure
Under the New Eleventh Circuit Rules, 18 GA. ST. B.J. 134 (1982).
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Obviously, by any account, that goal has been achieved. This newest of
regional courts of appeals has already struggled with many of the most
difficult issues of the day. It has sought to accommodate history and
precedent with the felt needs of the present.
This first decade of the Eleventh Circuit is merely its prologue. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has established its own identity, taken its
place alongside its twin, the new Fifth Circuit, and has found its own voice
among the other regional courts of appeals that comprise the intermediate
tier of the federal court system. It has performed thus far with a high-
minded purpose and in the best traditions of the Article III judiciary.
What, in the end, are the distinctive characteristics of the Eleventh
Circuit's jurisprudence? Perhaps the best conclusion is that it is too soon
to answer that question, after only one completed decade. Such a post-
diction must be attempted from the appropriate posture of intellectual
modesty and should be understood to be fraught with the same uncertainty
that characterizes predictions of the future. What the future will bring for
the Eleventh Circuit one can only wait and see. For example, before World
War II, who could have predicted what the civil rights cases would mean to
the old Fifth Circuit, and vice versa?
What can be said with great confidence is that the Eleventh Circuit will
continue to decide difficult and complex appeals in the best common law
tradition. The Supreme Court will continue to look to the Eleventh Circuit
for issues of national importance and for guidance on how they should be
decided. In this way, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit will continue to perform its assigned role of establishing precedent
and administering justice under the Constitution for the citizens living within
its boundary and for the rest of the Nation.323
323. Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1026 (1988).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of computers has revolutionized many aspects of society,
including the practice of law.' Despite an initial hesitation by legal
professionals in taking advantage of computer technology, computers have
become commonplace in most law offices for word processing, research,
and billing. One analyst noted that the use of computers "has set the stage
for the most significant technological revolution to affect the practice of law
1. Kathleen M. O'Connor, Computer Animations in the Courtroom: Get with the
Program, 67 FLA. B.J. 20, 20 (1993) (providing general overview of computer animations
and discussing the standards for admissibility in Florida).
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since the invention of the photocopy machine."2 In the past few years,
computer technology has found its way into the courtroom.3 Litigators are
now turning to computers to generate graphic evidence that will help them
educate and persuade the judge or jury to find in their favor.'
The use of computer generated evidence has become commonplace in
civil litigation.' However, in criminal cases its use has developed more
slowly. This lag has been due in part to the expense of creating computer
generated evidence.' The high cost of creating an animation has not kept
it from being used in civil cases because it often leads to settlements, which
are more cost effective than trials.' Because recent advances in technology
have significantly decreased the production costs of computer generated
evidence, it is now being used more frequently in criminal trials.' While
only one reported decision deals with the use of computer animation or
simulation in a criminal case, 9 a handful of trial courts around the country
have admitted such evidence." Recently, in State v. Pierce, the Seven-
2. Jeffrey Allen, Computers and the Litigator, 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 493, 493 (1984)
(discussing various uses of computers within the practice of law and focusing on the
computer's role in litigation).
3. Lory Dennis Warton, Comment, Litigators Byte the Apple: Utilizing Computer-
Generated Evidence at Trial, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 731, 731 (1989) (providing an in-depth
explanation of the admissibility standards for computer-generated business records and
computer simulations).
4. Elaine M. Chaney, Note, Computer Simulations: How They Can Be Used at Trial
and the Arguments for Admissibility, 19 IND. L. REv. 735, 735 (1986). The author focuses
on the practical considerations of the admissibility problems an attorney may face when
introducing computer simulations. Id. at 741-56. The author also examines potential
arguments an attorney may advance when seeking to introduce such evidence. Id. at 756-59.
5. Vicki S. Menard, Admission of Computer Generated Visual Evidence: Should There
Be Clear Standards?, 6 SOFTWARE L.J. 325, 325-26 (1993) (citing Rorie Sherman, Moving
Graphics: Computer Animation Enters Criminal Cases, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1992, at 1).
6. See Rorie Sherman, Moving Graphics: Computer Animation Enters Criminal Cases,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1992, at 32. The author points out that the overall cost of computer
animations dropped dramatically; thus, the market for animations has been growing steadily.
Id. The author also states that admission of computer animation in criminal trials was
inevitable once it became affordable. Id.
7. Donald C. Dilworth, ComputerAnimations Reach Criminal Court, TRIAL, Sept. 1992,
at 26. The author discusses society's growing interest in videos and focuses on the use of
computer animation in criminal trials. Id. In particular, the author examines People v.
Mitchell, No. 12,462 (Cal. Super. Ct. Marin County Feb. 19, 1992). Id.
8. Sherman, supra note 6, at 32.
9. People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
10. See Sherman, supra note 6, at 32 (citing State v. Phillips, No. 87-3 65 (Ariz. Super.
Ct. Gila County 1988)); Dilworth, supra note 7, at 26 (citing Mitchell, No. 12,462).
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1 Boyle
teenth Circuit Court, in Broward County, Florida, admitted in evidence a
computer animation proffered by the prosecution to show how an accident,
in which a truck struck three children, occurred."' Despite objections made
by the defense that the computer animation was not accurate, the judge
admitted the animation as demonstrative evidence. 2 The defendant was
convicted of vehicular homicide and was sentenced to sixty years in
prison. 3 The defense claimed that the trial court erred in admitting the
animation, and appealed to the Fourth District. 4 The issue of whether a
computer animation should be admitted in evidence presents an issue of first
impression in this state. Consequently, the Fourth District Court of Appeal's
ruling may dictate the way Florida courts respond in the future to the
proffering of computer animations and simulations in criminal trials.
This comment will consider computer animations and simulations, and
their possible effects on criminal trials. Part II presents an overview of
computer animations and contains a brief discussion of the history and
preparation process. Part III reviews the standards for admissibility in
Florida. Part IV discusses the advantages and disadvantages of allowing
such evidence. Part V discusses State v. Pierce, the main focus of this
comment. The discussion includes an in-depth analysis of the case and its
possible ramifications.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF COMPUTER ANIMATION
Computers were initially used in litigation to create visual data, such
as charts, diagrams, and graphs. 5 The next significant occurrence involv-
ing the use of computers in the courtroom was the development of computer
11. State v. Pierce, No. 92-19316CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1992) (admitting animation
as demonstrative evidence to show how a vehicular homicide occurred), appeal docketedNo.
93-01302 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1993).
12. Order on Computer Animation Evidence at Trial at 6, State v. Pierce, No. 92-
19316CF1OA (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1992) [hereinafter Order on Computer Animation]; Record
at 2342.
13. Initial Brief of Appellant at 3, State v. Pierce, No. 92-19316CFI0A (Fla. 17th Cir.
Ct. 1992), appeal docketed, No. 93-01302 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1993) [hereinafter
Appellant's Brief].
14. Notice of Appeal at 1, State v. Pierce, No. 92-19316CFIOA (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct
1992), appeal docketed, No. 93-01302 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1993); Record at 2390.
15. Marshall S. Turner & Andrew T. Houghton, In with the Old, In with the New:
Interactive Animations Are Wave of the Future, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 16, 1993, at S-I (discussing
the evolution of the use of computers in litigation and comparing the advantages of
interactive computer graphics, which are prepared in the courtroom, with those prepared in
advance).
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animations. 6 First used in 1979 in aviation litigation, 7 computer anima-
tions and simulations have since been used in a variety of civil cases,
ranging from automobile accident cases to patent infringement cases.'
8
Among these are instances in which animations or simulations were offered
to reconstruct an accident;' 9 to demonstrate a company's reliance on the
patented technology of another;2" to reconstruct how physical damage to
a home occurred from a hurricane;2' to demonstrate in a breach of contract
case how a product performed as intended;22 and to demonstrate how a
product could be perfected.23 Most recently, however, computer anima-
tions and simulations have infiltrated the area of criminal law.24 According
16. Id.
17. Sherman, supra note 6, at 32. According to Alan Treibitz, a representative of one
of the larger established computer animation companies, computer animation was first used
in a 1979 airplane crash case. Id.
18. David W. Muir, Debunking the Myths About Computer Animation, in SECURITIES
LITIGATION 1992, at 591, 596-97 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
444, 1992). "Computer animations ... have been used for reconstructing, or reenacting,
accidents, including automotive and truck accidents, aircraft collisions, ... and construction
equipment accidents." Id. Computer animation is useful in patent litigation, where technical
differences are difficult to distinguish, as well as in industrial accidents involving alleged
faulty machinery, because the machine's operation can easily be depicted. Id.
19. See, e.g., Starr v. Campos, 655 P.2d 794 (Ariz. 2d Ct. App. 1982); Schaeffer v.
General Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062 (Mass. 1977); Richardson v. State Highway &
Transp. Comm'n, 863 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1993); Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A., 509 N.W.2d 603
(Neb. 1994); Deffinbaugh v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 588 N.E.2d 189 (8th Ct. App.),
dismissed, 562 N.E.2d 894 (Ohio 1990).
20. See generally Michael V. Ciresi & Jan M. Conlin, A High-Tech Case: Lessonsfrom
Honeywell v. Minolta, TRIAL, Sept. 1992, at 22 (citing Honeywell, Inc. v. Minolta Camera
Co., Civ. No. 87-4847 (D.N.J. 1987)). The author discusses the use of animation to simplify
the presentation of technical information to the jury in a patent infringement case. Id.
21. Strock v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., No. 92-2357, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17431, at *1 (4th Cir. July 12, 1993) (admitting computer animated videotape
simulation proffered by the plaintiff to show how damage to his beach house occurred during
Hurricane Hugo).
22. Holland v. Dick Youngberg Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 348N.W.2d 770 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (using computer simulated test to show that truck purchased from dealer was not
impaired and could achieve speed of 55 miles per hour with a full load).
23. Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.) (offering computer
simulation by the plaintiff to show that its anti-skid device could be made workable and
fail-safe), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
24. See McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 721. At trial, the defendant proffered a reenactment
of an automobile accident which caused the death of four friends. Id. The trial court
admitted the reenactment into evidence and defendant was acquitted. Id.; see also Sherman,
supra note 6, at 32 (citing Phillips, No. 87-365 (using animation to prove that an entrance
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to some commentators, computer animation and simulation are the "wave
of the future," and they predict that this type of evidence will be used with
increasing frequency in criminal trials.25
A. Definitions, Terms, and the Preparation Process
A computer animation is a type of motion picture created with the help
of a computer.26 It consists of a series of computer generated still images,
which are then recorded in rapid succession onto a videotape to create the
illusion of movement.27 A computer simulation differs significantly from
an animation. In a simulation, the computer program is used to reconstruct
an event by analyzing data and producing conclusions based on information
contained in the software program being used.2' Hence, in a simulation,
the computer actually supplies missing data by making calculations based
on the laws of physics.29 Once the simulation is complete, it can be trans-
formed into an animation.3" The animation is then used to illustrate the
conclusions drawn by the simulation.3'
Computer animations are prepared using a six-step process.32 The
first step involves the collection of data, including police or accident reports,
testimony of eyewitnesses, calculations made by experts, photographs,
drawings, and all other relevant information.3 Next, the experts meet to
decide what movement will be visually portrayed in the animation. 34 For
wound was caused by a gun held against the victim's head and not fired from a distance));
Dilworth, supra note 7, at 26 (citing Mitchell, No. 12,462 (proffering animation to show that
the victim's position and the timing proved the killing was deliberate and premeditated)).
25. Sherman, supra note 6, at 32 (quoting John M. Dedman, Director of Training at the
National College of District Attorneys, and Peter Barett, a criminologist with Forensic
Science Associates).
26. James W. Dabney, Animation Is Invading Courtrooms, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 6, 1993, at
4 (discussing computer animation in general, its various uses, and specifically its presentation
at trial).
27. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 22 (citing Barry Sullivan, Computer-Generated
Reenactments as Evidence in Accident Cases, 3 HIGH TECH L.J. 193 (1989)).
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Ian S. Jones et al., ComputerAnimation-Admissibility in the Courtroom,
SAE #910366, 143, 147 (published by the Society of Automotive Engineers ("SAE"), 400
Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096-0001)).
30. Roger Parloff, Now Showing in a Courtroom Near You, AM. L., May 10, 1990, at
4 (using laser disc systems and computer animations at trial).
31. Id.
32. Muir, supra note 18, at 598.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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instance, in an animation of an automobile accident, the experts must decide
if both cars should be in motion, or if only one should move. In the third
step, data is loaded into the computer and the actual computer models of the
objects or scene are created.35 The fourth step involves entering additional
data regarding the position of an object with respect to time.36 This step
controls the portrayal of how and where an object will move throughout the
animation.37 During the fifth step, the computer analyzes all the input data
and generates still frames of the image.3" Once the computer has rendered
all the still frames, the images or frames are recorded in succession onto a
videotape in order to create the illusion of movement.39
B. Uses of Computer Animation at Trial
Animations can be used three ways at trial: 1) as a tutorial to explain
complex scientific concepts; 2) as an illustration (similar to a sketch pad) to
show an expert's opinion of how an event occurred or to show facts
presented by witnesses; or 3) as a simulation, whereby an event is recreated
by the computer, and the recreation then forms the basis of an expert
opinion as to how the event occurred.4" For instance, in a medical
malpractice case, an animation could be used as a tutorial to show jurors a
complete view of the circulatory system of the human body. It could then
take jurors on a voyage through skin and tissues to show them the
circulatory system from the perspective of being inside the veins or arteries.
An example of how an animation could be used as an illustration would be
to recreate an automobile accident in which all relevant information
regarding the accident is known. The animation would then be used by an
expert to demonstrate his or her opinion of how the accident occurred, just
as if he or she were drawing on a chalkboard. A simulation, on the other
hand, might be used in a multi-vehicle collision where the sequence of
impacts is unknown. In that situation, a computer simulation could calculate
the missing data using the known data, together with the laws of physics,
35. Id.
36. Id. at 598-99.
37. Muir, supra note 18, at 599, 600-01.
38. Id. at 599.
39. Id.
40. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 22. As explained previously, an animation and a
simulation are very different. In a simulation, known facts are entered into the computer
which will then analyze the data and generate conclusions based on the information contained
in the software program. Id. Thus, the computer actually supplies missing information. Id.
A simulation can then be converted to an animation. Id.
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and show how the initial accident and the resultant chain of accidents
occurred. From this recreation, the expert would formulate his or her
opinion of how the accident took place. With its many applications,
computer animation may become a vital tool for all parties in the courtroom.
Nevertheless, the standard for admissibility of such evidence will vary.
III. ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS IN FLORIDA
The evidentiary standard for admissibility of a computer animation
depends on whether the animation is proffered as demonstrative evidence or
scientific evidence.4 ' Generally, when an animation is used as a tutorial
or illustration, it is being offered as demonstrative evidence.42 Demonstra-
tive evidence is "evidence addressed directly to the senses without
intervention of testimony."'43 This type of evidence usually consists of
objects which illustrate verbal testimony, such as maps, diagrams, photo-
graphs, models, or charts.44
Virtually no case law in Florida discusses the standards of admissibility
for computer animations.45  Therefore, the general rules regarding
demonstrative evidence enunciated in the Florida Statutes should be
followed.46 In Florida, all relevant evidence is admissible unless its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice.47 Relevant evidence is defined as "evidence tending to prove or
disprove a material fact."'4 Hence, in order to have a computer animation
admitted in evidence, an attorney must first prove that the animation is
relevant and that it will assist the trier of fact.49 The attorney must also
prove that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.5" To prove
relevance and probative value, the attorney must show that the animation is
what its proponent claims: it must accurately and fairly depict the testimony
41. Menard, supra note 5, at 328 (citing Lory Dennis Warton, Litigators Byte the Apple:
Utilizing Computer-Generated Evidence at Trial, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 731, 741 (1989)
(recommending adoption of the relevancy balancing standard of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as admissibility standard for computer-generated evidence)).
42. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 22.
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 432 (6th ed. 1990).
44. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 22.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 90.402-.403 (1993).
47. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.402-.403 (1993).
48. Id. § 90.401.
49. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 24.
50. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1993).
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presented." If the attorney can prove that the expert's testimony meets
these guidelines, and that the animation is merely an illustration of the
expert's testimony, there should be little trouble in admitting the animation
in evidence. 2
On the other hand, when a simulation is proffered as scientific
evidence, the standard for admissibility is much higher. 3 In a simulation,
the computer performs calculations and supplies missing data, and is
considered to be more than an illustration of an expert's testimony. 4
Consequently, a simulation is subject to the standard of admissibility for
novel scientific evidence.5 Under this standard, a simulation must meet
either the DauberW6 or Frye57 test for admissibility, depending on the
jurisdiction. Although the United States Supreme Court rejected the Frye
test in federal cases,58 Florida courts require conformity to the Frye
standard in cases in which a new scientific technique is used.59 To have
a simulation admitted in evidence in Florida, an attorney must be able to
prove that the scientific principle is "sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the field in which it belongs." ' Therefore, an expert
51. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 24 (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.901 (1993)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). In Daubert,
the Court held that many considerations bear on the inquiry of whether a method is
scientifically valid. Id. at 2796-97. The Court listed several considerations. These include:
1) whether the theory or technique can be (or has been) tested; 2) whether the theory or
technique has been subject to peer review and publication; 3) the known or potential error
rate; 4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation and; 5) whether
the theory or technique has attracted widespread acceptance within the relevant scientific
community. Id.
57. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the court held that
expert testimony can be admitted when "the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs." Id. at 1014.
58. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799.
59. Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993). In a case involving pedophile
profile evidence, the court evaluated the admissibility of expert scientific testimony and stated
that it was not admissible in Florida unless it met the test for novel scientific evidence
established in Frye. Id. In note 2 of the court's opinion, the court further explained that
although the United States Supreme Court recently construed Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence as superseding the Frye test, Florida continues to adhere to the Frye test for the
admissibility of scientific opinions. Id. at 829 n.2.
60. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 25.
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must be qualified and must testify that the computer program used to create
the simulation has achieved general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community." If the simulation utilizes theories recognized by the laws of
physics, it should be admitted. 2 This standard is based on the fact that the
theories recognized by the laws of physics have long been recognized by the
scientific community.6 3
In addition to meeting the Frye standard, the proponent of a computer
simulation must also show that the simulation is relevant and that it will
assist the trier of fact. 4 In order to meet these standards, the attorney will
have to: 1) qualify the computer animator as an expert; 2) establish that the
computer hardware and software are accepted within the relevant scientific
community; 3) show the accuracy of the data input into the computer; 4)
qualify the accuracy of the animation calculations; and 5) establish the
accuracy of the media on which the animation will be presented, thus
verifying that minimal distortion occurred in the process of videotaping.
Overcoming these hurdles can prove difficult. First, the attorney must show
that the computer animator has the proper credentials and experience to
qualify as an expert. 6 Second, the attorney must demonstrate that the
computer hardware is commercially available and that its use has gained
acceptance by practitioners in the particular field.6 7  Third, the attorney
must show that the computer software is commercially available and that its
use has gained acceptance by practitioners in the particular field. Fourth,
the attorney must show the source and accuracy of the data entered into the
computer. 9 This fourth step is the most important because the basis of a
simulation rests on the quality of the data entered, and also because most
challenges to animations and simulations are based on the accuracy of the
input data.7" Fifth, the attorney must prove the accuracy of the calculations
61. Id. (citing Chaney, supra note 4, at 744).
62. Id. (citing Chaney, supra note 4, at 748).
63. Craig Murphy, Computer Simulations and Video Re-Enactments: Fact, Fantasy and
AdmissionStandards, 17 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 145, 156 (1990) (discussing admission standards
and authentication requirements for computer animations and simulations).
64. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 26.
65. Id. (citing Jones et al., supra note 29, at 149-50).
66. Id. (citing Jones et al., supra note 29, at 149).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 26 (citing Jones et al., supra note 30, at 149).
70. Parloff, supra note 30, at 4 (quoting Howard Nations, a Houston-based plaintiff's
attorney).
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performed by the computer." To demonstrate their accuracy, the calcula-
tions should be checked against hand calculations or benchmark tests.72
Finally, the attorney must be able to show that the videotaping process did
not create distortion. 3 Because the process is detailed and complex, the
proponent of computer simulation will find the standards for admissibility
of such evidence to be exacting.
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
COMPUTER ANIMATION
Our society has become a visual society;74 most people seldom read,
but watch television for hours every day.75 Indeed, one commentator has
noted that "the average American will have watched over 25,000 hours of
television by the age of 18. "76 As a result, people in today's society rely
on visual sources for the majority of their information." What better way
to communicate with a jury than with the use of graphics presented in a
manner similar to television?
Graphics are a wonderful way to communicate complex issues to a
jury.7" The clich6, "a picture is worth a thousand words," captures the
advantages of using computer animations. Oftentimes, animations can help
clarify and simplify complex or technical evidence.79 One of the biggest
advantages of using an animation is that the event can be observed from
almost any angle or position.8" An animation can show views from the
front, the inside, the outside, or even from overhead.8' The animation "can
71. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 26 (citing Jones et al., supra note 30, at 149).
72. Id. Benchmark tests are tests where the results are known.
73. Id. (citing Jones et al., supra note 29, at 150).
74. Dilworth, supra note 7, at 26.
75. Bruce G. Vanyo, Communicating with "Post-Literate" Jury: Advanced Graphic
Exhibits in Patent Trials, in PATENT LITGATION 1992, at 409, 411 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 349, 1992) (using graphic
exhibits in patent litigation).
76. Dilworth, supra note 7, at 26 (quoting Dan Luczak, Chief Executive Officer of
Forensic Technologies International).
77. Vanyo, supra note 75, at 411-12.
78. Muir, supra note 18, at 593.
79. David Weinberg, "Seeing is Believing" When You Use Scientific Animation, MICH.
LAW. WKLY., Dec. 6, 1993, at 5B (providing a general overview of computer animation, its
admissibility, and its advantages).
80. Dabney, supra note 26, at 4.
81. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 20 (citing Kathlynn G. Fadely, Use of Computer-
Generated Visual Evidence in Aviation Litigation: Interactive Video Comes to Court, 55 J.
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place the jury in the driver's seat of an automobile involved in a collision,
in the cockpit of an airplane about to crash, or in the position of an
eyewitness to a crime." 2 Hence, jurors can be mentally transported to the
scene of the actual event.8 3 Another advantage is that visual obstructions
can be eliminated, thereby allowing the jury to view the inside of a machine
or a component which might otherwise be impossible to photograph with a
regular camera.8
In addition to displaying various perspectives of an event, animations
can be shown in slow motion 5 or can detail a particular part of an event
to help focus the jury's attention on it. 6 Furthermore, an animation can
be extremely beneficial when an event is too dangerous or too expensive to
reenact.8 7 For example, in a collision involving multiple vehicles, an
animation could be used to show how the accident occurred without going
through the trouble or expense of physically reenacting it, and without
endangering lives. However, the most significant advantage of using a
computer animation is that jurors retain more and understand the informa-
tion better when it is presented visually. 8 Indeed, one commentator has
stated that "[m]otion pictures are a memorable and attention-getting event
during a trial."8 9  When a computer animation is used, it is likely that
jurors will pay close attention to what they are viewing.9"
Like all types of evidence, a computer animation has disadvantages as
well. One of the biggest disadvantages is that the animation is only as good
as the data entered into the computer,9 and, as computer mavens say,
"garbage in, garbage out."92 In short, if the data entered into the computer
is not accurate, the depiction of the event in the animation will not be
AIR L. & CoM. 839, 849 (1989)).
82. Id.
83. Sherman, supra note 6, at 1.
84. Dabney, supra note 26, at 4.
85. Weinberg, supra note 79, at 5B.
86. Id.
87. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 20.
88. Dilworth, supra note 7, at 26 (quoting Dan Luczak, Chief Executive Officer of
Forensic Technologies International).
89. Dabney, supra note 26, at 4.
90. Id.
91. See generally Jerome J. Roberts, A Practitioner's Primer on Computer-Generated
Evidence, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 254, 255 (1973-74) (providing a basic understanding of the
principles of computerization and an outline for examining the worth of computer-generated
evidence).
92. Mike Jensen, Using Computers to Generate Graphics for the Courtroom, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., Sept. 13, 1993, at S4.
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accurate.93 Another disadvantage is that technology can distort an issue as
easily as it can clarify one.94 Facts could be misrepresented to present a
scenario other than what took place.95 This misrepresentation is most
likely to occur when the stakes in the litigation are high.96 In addition,
animations are made to be continuous, and oftentimes gaps are filled with
speculation, not fact.97 Therefore, attorneys and their experts should
carefully review animations for technical accuracy.
Some additional drawbacks of computer animations are that they are
still relatively expensive and therefore, as some people claim, cater to the
rich.98 Moreover, they take time to produce,99 and once produced, are not
easily altered.' One of the biggest obstacles for an opponent of an
animation to overcome is that jurors tend to place more weight on what they
see and less weight on what they hear or read.' Often, jurors think that
evidence produced by a computer is more accurate or reliable.'0 2 Thus,
an attorney opposing a computer animation must inform the jury that the
information presented is only as good as the data entered into the computer
to create the animation. In addition, the attorney must review the data for
errors because a computer can only process the data that is entered into
it.'03 If an error is made in data entry, or incorrect data is used, the
animation will not accurately reflect the event. Furthermore, the computer
only processes data it is instructed to process and it can only process the
information in the way it has been so instructed. 4 Therefore, an attorney
opposing admission of an animation must employ an expert to review the
93. James A. Sprowl, Evaluating the Credibility of Computer-Generated Evidence, 52
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 547, 553 (1975) (explaining in detail the credibility of computer-
generated evidence).
94. J. Stratton Shartel, Computer Animation Often Provides Winning Edge for Litigators,
May, 1993, available in WL, TP-ALL, 7 No. 5 PH-INLIT 1, at 1.
95. Id. at 2.
96. Id.
97. Sherman, supra note 6, at 33 (quoting Peter R. DeForest, a forensic scientist).
98. Id. at 32.
99. Turner & Houghton, supra note 15, at S1.
100. Id.
101. Vanyo, supra note 75, at 411.
102. Murphy, supra note 63, at 146 ("When people receive information from the televi-
sion they take it as the truth. .. . Thus, when evidence is presented in this format, it becomes
'not only believable, but virtually unassailable."') (citing Lynn Feinerman, New Season for
Video Law, 16 BARRISTER 15, 16 (1989)).
103. Roberts, supra note 91, at 263.
104. Id.
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data, to vouch for its accuracy and completeness, and to review the
computer program for deficiencies or flaws.05
The use of computer animation in criminal trials raises additional
issues. Some commentators believe that even with the decreased cost of
preparing an animation, the cost favors the prosecution." 6 These, critics
feel that defendants with limited resources cannot combat this type of evi-
dence. 7 Indeed, Michael Kennedy, counsel for the defense in People v.
Mitchell, has called the animation proffered in that case "a slick, sophisti-
cated commercial promoting the prosecutors' product: murder conviction
at all costs."'0 8 In Mitchell, an animation was proffered in a murder trial
involving the shooting death of the defendant's younger brother, Artie
Mitchell. 9 The prosecution used the animation to prove that the killing
was deliberate and premeditated."0 The judge admitted the animation in
evidence and the jury found the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaugh-
ter."' The defense has appealed the verdict, contending that the body
movements of the figure representing Artie Mitchell, as portrayed in the
animation, violate the California law prohibiting an expert witness from
speculating."'
The animation used in the Mitchell case was created by a ballistics
specialist."' The ballistics specialist used photographs of the scene,
information from the autopsy, laboratory reports, and physical data based on
examination of the scene by one of the prosecution's experts to create the
animation." 4 The degree of speculation used to create the video, if any,
is unknown.
Other commentators argue that allowing computer animations into
criminal trials is extremely prejudicial because human gestures, essential for
a jury to determine intent, motive, and malice, cannot be recreated
accurately.' These opponents, however, do not object to animations
depicting machines, such as cars and airplanes, because machines, unlike
105. Id.
106. Dilworth, supra note 7, at 26.
107. Id. (citing Michael Kennedy, Videos Pose Danger as Insidious Form of Hypnotic
TV, CAL. ST. B. BULL., Mar. 1992, at 1).
108. Dilworth, supra note 7, at 26 (citing Mitchell, No. 12,462).
109. Id. (citing Mitchell, No. 12,462).
110. Sherman, supra note 6, at 32.
111. Id.
112. Dilworth, supra note 7, at 26.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Sherman, supra note 6, at 32.
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humans, move in predictable and measurable ways. 116 Thus, computer
animations, like all forms of evidence, have both advantages and disad-
vantages.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF STATE V PIERCE
117
On June 23, 1992, at approximately 9:00 p.m., a truck collided with
three children in a residential neighborhood of Dania, Florida." 8 As a
result, one child died and the others were seriously injured. According to
witnesses, minutes earlier the same vehicle that struck the children collided
with a trash can on the same street. The vehicle fled both scenes without
stopping to provide information or render aid. Eyewitnesses to both
accidents stated that the truck veered off the road. Approximately seven
minutes after striking the garbage can, additional witnesses observed a truck
of the same description strike the group of children who were walking
home." 9 Six-year-old Nicole Walker, who later died as a result of head
trauma, was being carried by one of the older children. 2
The police discovered a portion of an automobile grille at the scene.
From this discovery, they were able to deduce that the vehicle involved was
a 1980 Chevrolet Silverado truck.' Paint fragments recovered from the
children's clothing indicated that the truck was blue. In addition, the
autopsy showed that Nicole suffered head injuries, thus indicating that the
truck might have a dent on it from the impact of Nicole's head.' This
evidence, coupled with statements from various witnesses and anonymous
tips, directed police to a truck driven by Mr. Kenneth Pierce.'23 After
extensive investigation regarding the truck, Mr. Pierce was arrested and
charged with vehicular homicide and four additional counts.'24 The other
charges included leaving the scene of an accident, driving while having a
116. Id.
117. No. 92-19316CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., 1992), appeal docketed, No. 93-01302
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 4, 1993). While there were several issues appealed, the focus
of the discussion of this case will be on whether the computer animation proffered by the
State was admissible.
118. Notice of Intent to Offer Computer-Animated Diagram Evidence at 1, State v.
Pierce, No. 92-19316CF1OA (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1992) [hereinafter Notice of Intent]; Record
at 2218.
119. Notice of Intent at 1, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2218.
120. Appellant's Brief at 4, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
121. Notice of Intent at 2, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2219.
122. Appellant's Brief at 6, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id. at 2, 7-9.
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suspended or revoked license, and two counts of tampering with physical
evidence.'
On November 20, 1992, the state attorney's office, in accordance with
section 90.956 of the Florida Statutes, informed the court of its intent to use
a computer animation to reenact the accident.'26 In addition, on December
4, 1992, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Offer Computer- Animated
Diagram Evidence.'27 On January 8, 1993, a pretrial hearing was held
whereby expert witnesses for the State testified regarding the preparation of
the computer animation. 2' On February 5, 1993, another pretrial hearing
was held and the defense called one of the State's expert witnesses to testify
regarding the computer animation.'29 On March 31, 1993, Judge Speiser
entered an order allowing the State to present the computer animation as
demonstrative evidence. 3 ' The order analogized the computer animation
to a chart or diagram and found that it was sufficiently explanatory and
illustrative of relevant testimony."
Mr. Pierce was tried by jury on March 9, 1993.132 During the trial,
the computer animation proffered by the State was admitted in evidence and
published to the jury.'33 The animation was used to help the jury visualize
and comprehend the testimony of Detective Bruce Babcock, a traffic
homicide investigator with the Broward County Sheriff's Office, and the
lead investigator assigned to the case. 34 The jury returned a guilty verdict
on each offense charged. Judge Speiser entered judgment in accordance
with the verdict. 135 Mr. Pierce was sentenced to sixty years in prison on
all counts. 36  Thirty years of the total sentence related to the vehicular
homicide count.'37 The Notice of Appeal from the Judgment and Sen-
125. Id. at 2.
126. Notice Pursuant to Florida Statute 90.956 at 1, State v. Pierce, No. 92-19316CF1OA
(Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1992) [hereinafter Notice 90.956]; Record at 2216.
127. Notice of Intent at 8, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2325.
128. Supplemental Record on Appeal at 3, State v. Pierce, No. 92-19316CFIOA (Fla.
17th Cir. Ct. 1992), appeal docketed, No 93-01302 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1993)
[hereinafter Supplemental Record].
129. Id. at 176-267.
130. Order on Computer Animation at6, Pierce(No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2342.
131. Order on Computer Animation at 4, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2340.
132. Appellant's Brief at 2, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
133. Id. at 10.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id. at 3.
137. Appellant's Brief at 3, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
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tence was filed on April 22, 1993,13' and the case is presently pending
before the Fourth District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida.'39
A. The State's Arguments for Allowing the Computer Animation
On December 4, 1992, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Offer
Computer-Animated Diagram Evidence. 40  At that time, it also filed a
memorandum of law to assist the court in determining the admissibility of
the animation. 4' The State argued that the animation would provide a
visualization of Detective Babcock's testimony regarding the accident. 42
The State proffered that the detective was a qualified accident reconstruction
expert. Moreover, the State declared that the factual basis for the testimony
was physical evidence found at the scene, physical evidence from the
defendant's truck, physical evidence found during the autopsy of Nicole
Walker, and evidence gathered from testimony of the witnesses and the
victims.143
In addition to the State's argument that the computer animation was a
visualization of Detective Babcock's testimony, the State also attempted to
proffer the computer animation as real evidence. 4 4 In its memorandum
of law, the State cited the case of Straight v. State 45 to support its
contention that a photograph may be admissible as illustrating the testimony
of a witness, or as having independent value. 46  In Straight, the state
introduced photographs depicting the victim's body recovered from a river
twenty days after the victim was stabbed to death. 47  The trial judge
admitted the photographs over defendant's objections that they were not
138. Id.
139. Notice of Appeal at 1, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2390.
140. Notice of Intent at 1-2, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2218-19.
141. Notice of Intent at 3-8, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2220-25. The
State proffered an animation, not a simulation. Because the State offered the animation as
demonstrative evidence, in order to have the animation admitted into evidence, the State had
to show that the animation was relevant, that it would assist the trier of fact, and that it was
not unfairly prejudicial. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.401-.403 (1993).
142. Notice of Intent at 2, 6-7, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF1OA); Record at 2219, 2223-24.
143. Notice of Intent at 2, 6-7, Pierce(No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2219, 2223-24.
144. Notice of Intent at 7, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFI0A); Record at 2224.
145. Notice of Intent at 3, Pierce(No. 92-19316CFlI OA); Record at 2220 (citing Straight
v. State, 397 So. 2d 903, 907 (Fla.) (holding photographs admissible when relevant either
independently or as corroborative of the testimony of witnesses)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1022
(1981)).
146. Notice of Intent at 3, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2220.
147. Straight, 397 So. 2d at 906-07.
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relevant and were too gruesome because of decomposition of the body. 41
The Florida Supreme Court held that the photographs were relevant, either
independently or as corroboration of the testimony of witnesses, and
therefore were properly admitted.
49
In further support of its proposition that the animation could be
admitted as both demonstrative and substantive evidence, the State cited
Hannewacker v. City of Jacksonville Beach.' The State used Hanne-
wacker to analogize the computer animation to photographs, so that the
animation could be admitted to illustrate the testimony of a witness, or be
admitted as having independent value.'' In Hannewacker, the Florida
Supreme Court delineated two separate theories concerning the admissibility
and use of photographs as evidence: the pictorial testimony theory and the
silent witness theory.'52 The court stated that under the pictorial testimony
theory, a photograph is admissible as a way of expressing a witness's
testimony.'53 Under the silent witness theory, the court stated that once
a photograph was properly authenticated, it could have independent
evidentiary value and could speak for itself. 4 The Hannewacker court
stated that "because of present technology, photographs can often demon-
strate, preserve, and transmit a message far better than any human witness
.... Admissibility, however, is a question for the trial judge."'55
The State then presented the case of Adams v. State5 6 to show that
Florida courts have admitted a map, diagram, or picture in evidence,
provided it is verified as a true representation of the subject of the witness's
testimony.'57 The State also presented a series of cases to support its
contention that since Adams, Florida courts have traditionally admitted new
148. Id.
149. Id. at 907.
150. Notice of Intent at 3-4, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2220-21 (citing
Hannewacker v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 419 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1982) (stating
photographs can be admitted into evidence either under pictorial testimony theory or under
silent witness theory)). The State incorrectly referred to this case as Hannewackerv. State.
151. Notice of Intent at 3-4, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2220-21.
152. Hannewacker, 419 So. 2d at 310.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 311.
156. Notice of Intent at4, Pierce(No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at2221 (citing Adams
v. State, 10 So. 106, 113 (Fla. 1891) (holding a map, diagram, or picture, verified as a
correct representation, is admissible into evidence to assist a witness in explaining the case
to the jury)).
157. Notice of Intent at 4, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2221.
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ideas and techniques in evidence.'58 The most persuasive among these
were Grant v. State' s9 and Baker v. State.
60
In Grant, Daniel Grant was charged with murder for the strangulation
of his former employer. 61 During an interview with police officers, Grant
confessed and allowed pictures to be taken of his reenactment of the
crime. 62  He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death. 63  On
appeal, the defendant sought reversal, claiming, among other things, that it
was error to admit a color motion picture film and several still photographs
portraying a reenactment of the murder. 64 The defense conceded that the
motion picture and photographs were admissible if they tended to illustrate
or explain the testimony of a witness.'65 However, the defense claimed
that this evidence was merely cumulative and added nothing to the
confession. 66 The Supreme Court of Florida stated that the admissibility
of a motion picture showing a reenactment of a crime was a case of first
impression. 67  The court held that the motion picture was admissible to
supplement and explain the defendant's confession. 18 The court reasoned
that posed photographs were previously held admissible in criminal trials,
the use of motion pictures in civil controversies had been approved, and the
same rules regarding the admissibility of photographs apply to the admis-
sibility of motion pictures. 169  The court stated where a motion picture
involves a reenactment, it is subject to objection on the basis of its
accuracy. 7 Because the defendant had voluntarily acted out the crime at
158. Notice of Intent at 4, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2221 (citing e.g.,
Johnson v. State, 442 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 (1984), and af'd
on other grounds, 593 So. 2d 206 (Fla.), and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 119 (1992); Baker v.
State, 241 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1970); Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1014 (1966)).
159. Notice of Intent at 4, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF 10A); Record at 2221 (citing Grant,
171 So. 2d at 365 (holding a motion picture reenactment was admissible)).
160. Notice of Intent at 4, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF1OA); Record at 2221 (citing Baker,
241 So. 2d at 686 (finding a motion picture reenactment admissible as demonstrative
evidence)).
161. Grant, 171 So. 2d at 361-62.
162. Id. at 362.
163. Id. at 361.
164. Id. at 363.
165. Id.
166. Grant, 171 So. 2d at 363.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 363.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 364.
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the scene, the danger of inaccuracy was minimized, and the court allowed
the motion picture.'
The State also cited Baker v. State72 in its memorandum of law. In
Baker, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction of
Bernard Baker, who robbed and beat an elderly man to death with a
hammer.'73 The court held that it was not reversible error to admit a
filmed reenactment of the crime that was published to the jury but not given
to them after they retired for deliberations. 7 4 Using this case law, the
State in Pierce persuasively showed the admissibility of motion picture
reenactments in Florida courts. 75
In addition, the State cited several cases which showed that Florida
courts have traditionally admitted unique scientific evidence to aid the trier
of fact.'76  Among these were Correll v. State'7 7 and Andrews v.
State.'78 In Correll, the jury convicted the defendant of four counts of
first degree murder.' The defendant appealed the conviction on numer-
ous grounds, one of which was an attack on the testimony of a forensic
serology expert. 8 ' At the trial, the expert opined that, based on the
results of blood electrophoresis, certain blood found at the murder scene
could have been that of the defendant. 8' The expert also stated that the
blood could not have been from any of the victims or other suspects.'
The defendant contended that it was error to admit the results of the blood
tests because the general scientific reliability of electrophoresis had not been
proven by the state. 3  The court stated that the electrophoresis process
171. Grant, 171 So. 2d at 364.
172. 241 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1970).
173. Id. at 685-86.
174. Id. at 686.
175. Order on Computer Animation at 3, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF1OA); Record at 2339.
176. Notice of Intent at 4, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2221 (citing e.g.,
Correll v. State, 523 So. 2d 562 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988) and habeas corpus
denied sub nom. Correll v. Dugger, 588 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1990); Baker, 241 So. 2d at 683;
Grant, 171 So. 2d at 361).
177. Notice of Intent at4, Pierce(No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2221 (citing Correll,
523 So. 2d at 566-67 (holding results of blood electrophoresis testing admissible)).
178. Notice of Intent at 4, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2221 (citing
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850-51 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (finding DNA
"genetic fingerprinting" evidence admissible)).
179. Correll, 523 So. 2d at 564.
180. Id. at 566.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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was not a new method of testing blood and similar testimony had been
admitted throughout the state. It concluded that it was not error to admit the
expert's testimony.
84
In Andrews, the Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed the admissi-
bility of a new scientific technique.8 5  The defendant was convicted of
aggravated battery, sexual battery, and armed burglary of a dwelling. 86
Samples of the victim's blood, the defendant's blood, and semen found in
the victim's vagina were analyzed and compared for their DNA composi-
tion.'87 The trial court admitted the DNA identification evidence which
linked the defendant to the crime and ultimately led to his conviction.8
On appeal, the defense claimed that the trial court erred in admitting this
evidence because the tests were unreliable. 9 The appellate court re-
viewed the novel procedure using the Frye approach and decided that the
DNA evidence was based on accepted scientific principles. 9 In addition,
it determined that the evidence would be helpful to the jury, and that its
probative value outweighed its potential prejudicial effects. 9 ' According-
ly, the court held that the DNA'-test results were admissible.'92
In further support of its position that the animation should be admitted
as demonstrative evidence in Pierce, the State cited Wade v. State."' In
Wade, the court admitted a master brake cylinder in evidence that was
similar to, but not the same as, the one used to commit a murder.
94
Restating the supreme court's holding in Alston v. Shriver,'9 5 the court
held demonstrative evidence is admissible when it is relevant and when it
is a reasonably exact replica of the object involved.' Therefore, the trial
184. Correll, 523 So. 2d at 566-67.
185. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 843.
186. Id. at 842.
187. Id. at 843.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 849.
190. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 843-51.
191. Id. at 849.
192. Id. at 850.
193. Notice of Intent at 5, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF I OA); Record at 2222 (citing Wade
v. State, 204 So. 2d 235, 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (admitting master brake cylinder
even though it was not the identical one used in the perpetration of the crime)).
194. Wade, 204 So. 2d at 238-39.
195. 105 So. 2d 785, 791 (Fla. 1958) (holding demonstrative evidence admissible when
it is relevant and when it is a reasonably accurate replica of the object used during the
commission of the crime).
196. Wade, 204 So. 2d at 239 (citing Alston, 105 So. 2d at 791).
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court did not err in admitting the brake cylinder as demonstrative evi-
dence.' 97
To lend additional support, the State cited the more recent case of
Brown v. State,9 8 in which the First District Court of Appeal admitted a
styrofoam head and knife as demonstrative evidence.'99 In Brown, the
styrofoam head and knife were used during the victim's testimony and also
by the prosecutor during closing argument to demonstrate how the defendant
stabbed the victim three times in the head.2"0 The jury acquitted the
defendant of the attempted murder charge and convicted him of aggravated
battery.20' The court concluded that the knife and the styrofoam head
were admissible as demonstrative evidence because both were sufficiently
accurate replicas and were relevant to the issues in the case.20 2 Thus, the
court affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible error by the trial
court.
20 3
To strengthen its contention that the computer animation be admitted
against Pierce, the State brought the case of Davis v. State to the court's
attention. In that case, the State used a videotape during a medical
examiner's testimony to depict the victim's wounds, to explain how the
wounds were inflicted, and to show that two different knives were used.205
The tape was also used to refute the defendant's claim of self-defense.20 6
The Florida Supreme Court determined that the videotape was relevant and
thus was admissible.27 Based on the aforementioned case law, the State
in Pierce presented a persuasive argument, predicated on prior Florida case
197. Id.
198. Notice of Intent at 5, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2222 (citing Brown
v. State, 550 So. 2d 527, 528-29 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing use of a styrofoam
head and knife used by the victim and the prosecutor during closing argument to demonstrate
how the defendant stabbed the victim in the head)), review denied, 560 So. 2d 232 (Fla.
1990).
199. Brown, 550 So. 2d at 528.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 529.
202. Id. at 528-29.
203. Id. at 529.
204. Notice of Intent at 5, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2222 (citing Davis
v. State, 586 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1991) (allowing a videotape showing the murder
victim's wounds and the crime scene to show how two different types of knives were used
and to disprove the defendant's claim of self defense), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3021 (1992)), and
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1205 (1994).
205. Davis, 586 So. 2d at 1041.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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law, to show that the courts have allowed new ideas and techniques in
evidence in order to aid the trier of fact in the decision making process.
Nevertheless, the State persisted in its attempt to convince the court that the
animation was an indispensable piece of evidence--one that the court should
admit.
In order to further persuade the court to admit the animation in
evidence, the State cited cases from other jurisdictions that have admitted
such evidence.2"8 In Starr v. Campos, 9 an Arizona case, the plaintiffs
son was killed when his car collided with a truck which had crossed into his
path.2"0 The trial court admitted a computer simulation proffered by the
defendant, which showed how the accident occurred.21' It entered judg-
ment in favor of the truck driver and plaintiffs appealed, contending that it
was error to admit the computerized analysis of the accident.212 Although
the court of appeals reversed the case on other grounds, it determined that,
should the procedure achieve general acceptance among scientists in the
relevant fields, the simulation would be admitted.2 3
The State in Pierce also presented the highly persuasive case of People
v. McHugh.214 In McHugh, a New York court approved the use of a
computer reenactment of a fatal car crash proffered by the defendant.2 5
The court stated that "[w]hile this appears to be the first time such a graphic
computer presentation has been offered at a criminal trial, every new
development is eligible for a first day in court.' '2 6 The court determined
that the one and one-half minute graphic presentation was admissible
because it was more akin to a chart or diagram than to a scientific
device.2 7 The McHugh court went on to say that:
208. Notice of Intent at 5-6, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2222-23.
209. 655 P.2d 794 (Ariz. 2d Ct. App. 1982). The court stated computer simulation
could be admitted "if it is derived from principles and procedures that have achieved general
acceptance in the scientific field to which they belong." Id. at 797.
210. Id. at 795.
211. Id. at 796-97.
212. Id. at 795-96.
213. Starr, 655 P.2d at 797.
214. Notice of Intent at 6, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2223 (citing
McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 722 (holding computer animation proffered by the defense
admissible in criminal trial for vehicular homicide)). Although the record stated the case as
People v. New York, the correct name of the case is People v. McHugh.
215. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
216. Id. at 722.
217. Id.
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A computer is not a gimmick and the court should not be shy about its
use, when proper. Computers are simply mechanical tools-receiving
information and acting on instructions at lightning speed. When the
results are useful, they should be accepted, when confusing, they should
be rejected. What is important is that the presentation be relevant to a
possible defense, that it fairly and accurately reflect the oral testimony
offered and that it be an aid to the jury's understanding of the is-
sue.
2 18
Thus, based on Florida case law and case law from other jurisdictions,
the State in Pierce argued that the animation should be admitted as
evidence." 9 Even though the State proffered the animation as a visualiza-
tion of Detective Babcock's verbal testimony,22° it contended that the
computer animation should also be admitted as real evidence, as was the
motion picture in Grant.221 In addition, the State explained that the
animation was clearly relevant to the issues in the case222 and argued that
its use should not be barred simply because a computer animation had not
been offered in previous Florida criminal cases.223
B. The Pretrial Hearings
At an extensive pretrial hearing, the State presented several witnesses
who testified regarding the collection and the input of data used to prepare
the animation, as well as the computer program used to create the anima-
tion.224  Among the witnesses who testified on January 8, 1993, was
Deputy Deborah Bjorndalen-Hull.225 The court declared Deputy Bjorndal-
en-Hull an expert in accident reconstruction.226 She testified that she
created a geographic diagram of the homicide scene on a computer using the
AutoCAD (computeraided design) program.227 The deputy testified that
the AutoCAD program is accepted in the engineering and scientific fields
218. Id. at 722-23.
219. Notice of Intent at 5-6, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2222-23.
220. Notice of Intent at 7, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2224.
221. Notice of Intent at 7, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF1OA); Record at 2224; see also
Grant, 171 So. 2d at 364-65.
222. Notice of Intent at 7, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF1OA); Record at 7.
223. Notice of Intent at 7, Pierce (No. 92-19316CFIOA); Record at 2224.
224. See generally Supplemental Record, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
225. Id. at 16.
226. Id. at 19.
227. Id. at 21-26.
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as one of the leading computer-aided design programs in the world.22
She took all measurements used to create the diagram according to methods
accepted by accident reconstructionists in the field.229 The only informa-
tion she used that was not of her own personal knowledge was the position
of the victims and the location of physical evidence collected by Detective
Babcock.23° When her measurements were transferred to the firm that
prepared the animation, they were transferred from computer to comput-
er."' Since no data was entered into the computer by humans, there was
no possibility of data entry error.232 Moreover, in her opinion, the anima-
tion presented an accurate representation of the geographic area and was a
fair and accurate depiction of the scene.233
Detective Babcock, the lead investigator in the case, also testified.234
He, too, was declared an expert in accident reconstruction. 235 He testified
that he responded to the scene of the accident, and while there, he collected
evidence and interviewed witnesses.236 In addition, Detective Babcock
collected information about the victims and the vehicle involved in the
accident.237 He submitted all the information gathered to the animation
firm.238 Detective Babcock stated that he supervised and oversaw every
aspect of the production of the animation.239 He further testified that the
animation fairly and accurately reflected his opinions as to how the accident
occurred, 240 and that it was a visualization that would aid in explaining his
opinion to the jury.24" ' During the hearing, Detective Babcock was
questioned regarding the color of the vehicle.242  He admitted that the
color of the vehicle depicted in the animation was not completely identical
to that of Mr. Pierce's truck.243 He elaborated further, stating that while
228. Id. at 26.
229. Supplemental Record at 23-24, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
230. Id. at 36-38.
231. Id. at 27.
232. Id. at 27-28.
233. Id. at 25-26, 30-31.
234. Supplemental Record at 63, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
235. Id. at 67.
236. Id. at 68-71.
237. Id. at 78-80.
238. Id. at 79.
239. Supplemental Record at 81, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
240. Id. at 82, 135-36.
241. Id. at 82-84, 135-36.
242. Id. at 103, 110-12, 119-21, 140-41.
243. Id. at 103.
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it was not identical, the color of the truck depicted in the animation was
accurate.244 In addition, Detective Babcock stated that the animation did
not contain every minute detail because its purpose was to show how the
accident occurred.245 Detective Babcock was also questioned about how
the speed of the vehicle was calculated.246 He testified that in creating the
animation, the posted speed limit of thirty miles per hour was used.247 In
addition, he stated that this was consistent with witness testimony and might
be a bit conservative. 24  Detective Babcock also responded to numerous
questions regarding the size of the puddle depicted in the animation and
whether it extended into the street.249 He stated that he had interviewed
numerous witnesses and had used their testimony to calculate the dimensions
of the puddle depicted in the animation. 2 ' As to the position of the
bodies,25 Detective Babcock stated that after the accident, the children
were lying face down in the puddle and witnesses had moved them to
prevent them from drowning.252 He used the testimony of numerous
witnesses to calculate the position of the children at the time of the
impact.253
The State also presented testimony from John Suchocki, the president
of the firm used to prepare the animation.2" 4 Mr. Suchocki was declared
an expert in forensic animation. 255  He testified regarding the computer
hardware and software used by his company in preparing the animation,256
and stated that the software used was one of the most accurate avail-
able.257 He also testified as to the input of the geographic diagram created
by Deputy Hull2 8 and to the source of all other data used to create the
animation.25' He stated that the data and information used to prepare the
244. Supplemental Record at 103-06, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
245. Id. at 103-04.
246. Id. at 86-87, 106-07.
247. Id. at 87, 106-07.
248. Id. at 87, 107.
249. Supplemental Record at 116-18, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
250. Id. at 116-17.
251. Id. at 98-100, 123-24, 134-35.
252. Id. at 185.
253. Id. at 123-24, 136-37.
254. Supplemental Record at 148, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
255. Id. at 149.
256. Id. at 152-54.
257. Id. at 153.
258. Id. at 156-59.
259. Supplemental Record at 159-63, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
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animation was the type of information that was relied upon by experts in the
field of forensic animation.26 Mr. Suchocki testified that the animation
was a fair and accurate representation and that the animation was extremely
accurate.26'
At the pretrial hearing on February 5, 1993, the defense did not present
expert testimony, but instead chose to question Detective Babcock, one of
the State's experts.262 During the questioning, the defense examined
Detective Babcock on the issue of whether the size of the puddle depicted
in the animation was accurate and whether the puddle extended into the
street.263 Detective Babcock restated that the dimensions of the puddle
shown in the animation were based on testimony taken from witnesses.2 4
Asked how the vehicle left the roadway and struck the children,265 as well
as how the point of impact was calculated,266 he testified that he had
interviewed numerous witnesses regarding these issues. In his opinion, the
animation fairly and accurately depicted the manner in which the vehicle
struck the children as well as the position of the bodies at the time of the
impact.267 Moreover, Detective Babcock testified that several of the
eyewitnesses who viewed the animation felt it was a fair .and accurate
depiction of what happened that night.26' Detective Babcock was also
questioned regarding the lighting269 and weather conditions at the time of
the accident.270 He stated that there was disagreement among the witness-
es as to the lighting conditions at the time of the accident.27' Although
the accident occurred at approximately 9:00 p.m. in mid-June, just as it
began to get dark, the animation portrayed lighted conditions so that the jury
would be able to see it.272
At the conclusion of testimony, the State presented its arguments for
admitting the animation in evidence. Counsel argued that the animation
260. Id. at 163.
261. Id. at 165.
262. Id. at 165.
263. Id. at 206, 209-15, 223-25.
264. Supplemental Record at 206, 223-24, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
265. Id. at 212-14, 216, 225.
266. Id. at 185, 212-17, 225.
267. Id. at 216-17.
268. Id.
269. Supplemental Record at 192-93, 219, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
270. Id. at 183-84, 200.
271. Id. at 218-19.
272. Id. at 244.
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should be admitted both as demonstrative evidence and real evidence.273
The State's primary arguments for admitting the animation as demonstrative
evidence were that it visually portrayed the opinion of an expert (Detective
Babcock)274 and that it would aid the trier of fact in understanding the
expert's testimony.275 In arguing that the animation should be admitted
as real evidence, the State analogized the animation to a series of compiled
photographs.276 The State argued that a photograph can be admitted as
real evidence if an expert testifies that it fairly and accurately depicts
something of relevance.277 Moreover, the State argued that the tape
should be admitted as real evidence because it was a non-verbal mode of
expressing Detective Babcock's opinion.27 In anticipation of an objec-
tion, the State stressed that the discrepancies regarding the accuracy of the
animation, such as the lighting and weather conditions, are directed to the
weight of the evidence, not the admissibility.279 The State asked that the
court admit the animation and allow the jury to determine its credibility.2 °
In addition, based on section 90.956 of the Florida Statutes,"8 ' the State
argued that because the case involved voluminous writings, recordings, and
photographs, the case could be presented in the form of a chart, summary,
or calculation.282 In support of this contention, the State explained that it
had provided notice of this method to the defense283 and had made
available to them all information used to create the animation.2 4
The defense argued that the animation was inaccurate, misleading, and
therefore should not be admitted in evidence.285 The defense cited the
273. Id. 227-29.
274. Supplemental Record at 227-29, 238, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
275. Id. at 229.
276. Id. at 230, 232-33.
277. Id. at 229.
278. Id at 240.
279. Supplemental Record at 227-28, 236, 243-44, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
280. Id. at 227-28, 243-44.
281. FLA. STAT. § 90.956 (1993). "When it is not convenient to examine in court the
contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs, a party may present them in the
form of a chart, summary, or calculation by calling a qualified witness." Id. A party who
intends to do this must give timely notice in writing of his intention and must make the
summary and its supporting data available to the court and to the other parties. Id.
282. Supplemental Record at 230-31, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
283. Id. at 231.
284. Id. at 231-32.
285. Id. at 247-48, 254-55.
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case of Manning v. Lake Superior86 to support its contention that recon-
struction attempts must be excluded from evidence based on relevance,
unless they are sufficiently similar to the accident. Counsel for the defense
stated that if the facts are not similar, the relevance, not the weight of the
evidence is affected;287 if the evidence is not relevant, it should not be
admitted.288 The defense stated that the animation proffered by the
prosecution was inaccurate in the depiction of the puddle size and
shape,289 the location of the bodies,29 the lighting conditions,29' the
weather conditions,292 and the color of the truck.293 The defense at-
tacked the animation as being so misleading that it did not accurately
portray what occurred and argued that it should be excluded.294
C. The Court's Ruling
On February 9, 1993, Judge Speiser issued a verbal opinion regarding
the admissibility of the computer animation.295 The court issued an Order
on the Use of Computer Animation Evidence at Trial on March 31, 1993,
which was filed on April 12, 1993.96 In the order, Judge Speiser stated
that since there were no reported decisions involving the use of computer
animation in the State of Florida, the court must consider decisions from
other states that have addressed this issue. He cited the case of People v.
McHugh,2 97 and stated that this was the only reported opinion involving
the use of computer animation in a criminal case. Judge Speiser noted that
in McHugh, the court allowed the computer animation as substantive
286. Id. at 245 (citing Manning v. Lake Superior & Ishpeming R.R., 144 N.W.2d 831,
833 (Mich. 3d Ct. App. 1966) (holding that film showing reenactment of railroad accident
was inadmissible because it depicted conditions substantially different than those present at
the time of the accident)).
287. Supplemental Record at 24546, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 24648.
290. Id. at 247.
291. Id. at 248-50.
292. Supplemental Record at 248-50, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
293. Id. at 251-54.
294. Id. at 254. The defense could have argued that the animation was flawed because
eyewitness testimony is flawed, and the animation was based on eyewitness testimony.
295. Id. at 268-84.
296. Order on Computer Animation at 1, Pierce(No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at2337.
297. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
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evidence.298 Next, the judge referred to several articles discussing unpub-
lished trial decisions. Among those discussed were People v. Mitchell,299
Arizona v. Phillips,"' and State v. Spath.301 In addition, Judge Speiser
referred to several Florida cases involving similarly unique evidentiary
issues:302  Baker v. State,30 3 Johnson v. State,30 4 and Brown v.
State.30
5
Judge Speiser further stated that the computer animation was simply a
new method of expressing the conclusions and opinions of an expert.0 6
He analogized the relevancy of such evidence to that of a chart or a diagram
and stated that it should not be rejected because of its novelty. He
announced that the original source data upon which the animation was based
was reasonably trustworthy and reliable. Judge Speiser also stated that the
accuracy of additional data used by the experts to prepare the animation had
been verified by their testimony. The court found the animation sufficiently
explanatory and illustrative of relevant testimony, and the subject matter of
the tape relevant to the case. Hence, Judge Speiser concluded that the
animation could be used by the State as demonstrative evidence, but not as
substantive evidence. The court found the animation was not scientific or
experimental in nature and therefore distinguished it from DNA test results
or blood spattering analysis.0 7 Thus, the animation was not subject to the
test outlined in Frye v. United States."' Judge Speiser addressed the
defense's argument that the tape was prejudicial by reminding counsel that
all evidence introduced at a trial is prejudicial. He found that the computer
animation was not so confusing or biased as to be deemed misleading.319
Despite strenuous objection by the defense,310 the computer animation
was introduced as evidence and was shown to the jury.31' The jury
298. Order on Computer Animation at2, Pierce(No. 92-19316CF1OA); Record at 2338
(citing McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 721).
299. No. 12,462.
300. No. 87-365.
301. No. SGJ263908 (N.J. Bergan County Super. Ct. 1990).
302. Order on Computer Animation at3, Pierce(No. 92-19316CF1OA); Record at 2339.
303. Baker, 241 So. 2d at 683.
304. 442 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1983).
305. Brown, 550 So. 2d at 527.
306. Order on Computer Animation at3, Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2339.
307. Order on Computer Animation at6,Pierce (No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2342.
308. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
309. Order on Computer Animation at6,Pierce(No. 92-19316CF10A); Record at 2342.
310. Appellant's Brief at 10, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
311. Id.
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returned its verdicts, finding Mr. Pierce guilty of each offense charged.31 2
Mr. Pierce was adjudged guilty in accordance with the verdicts and was
sentenced to a total of sixty years in prison." 3 His sentence for the
vehicular homicide count was thirty years. 1 4 The defense filed its Notice
of Appeal from the Judgment and Sentence on April 22, 1993. 315
D. Pierce's Arguments on Appeal
On appeal, Mr. Pierce contends that the computer animation was
improperly admitted because the State never established that the procedure
utilized to create the animation was accepted in the scientific communi-
ty.316 In addition, he contends that the animation was misleading because
the facts underlying the depiction were not consistent with the witnesses'
testimony.31 7 Consequently, the animation represented the State's theory
of what occurred, not what actually did occur.31 8 Furthermore, Mr. Pierce
argues that the animation was inadmissible hearsay because it illustrated
statements made by witnesses who did not testify at trial.319
Mr. Pierce first argues that the trial court erred in admitting the
animation because the State failed to establish that the procedures used to
prepare the animation were accepted in the scientific community.320 He
contends that the State presented no testimony as to the scientific reliability
of the computer program or of its general acceptance in the scientific
community.32' Moreover, he asserts that such evidence is required in
Florida in order to conform with the test outlined in Frye322 and the
admission of the animation in evidence was therefore improper.
323
In his second argument, Mr. Pierce asserts that the information used to
prepare the animation was not consistent with the testimony of the
321witnesses.  In particular, he asserts that the size of the puddle, the color
312. Id. at 2.
313. Id. at 2-3.
314. Id.
315. Appellant's Brief at 3, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
316. Id. at 12, 15, 16.
317. Id. at 12, 16-23.
318. Id. at 12, 19.
319. Id.
320. Appellant's Brief at 12, 19, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
321. Id. at 15.
322. Id. at 15-16 (citing Frye, 293 F. at 1013); Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828.
323. Appellant's Brief at 12, 16, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
324. Id. at 12, 16-23.
Vol. 19
399
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
1994]
of the truck, and the lighting and weather conditions portrayed in the
animation were inconsistent with the testimony of witnesses.325 Mr. Pierce
argues, based on Brown v. State,326 that demonstrative exhibits can only
be admitted in evidence when they are accurate and reasonable reproduc-
tions.327 He contends that the inaccurate depiction of the size of the
puddle and of the lighting and weather conditions precluded the jury from
considering his defenses that the vehicle involved was not his, or alterna-
tively, that the vehicle was not operated in a reckless manner.328 Mr.
Pierce thus contends it was error to admit the animation given the above
discrepancies.329
Regarding the puddle, Mr. Pierce asserts that the shape of the puddle
and its dimensions were not accurately depicted in the animation.33' The
basis of this argument is that the puddle depicted in the animation did not
coincide with the photographs taken the night of the accident, nor with
diagrams drawn by the police shortly after the accident occurred.33' Mr.
Pierce states that both the photographs and the diagrams showed that the
puddle extended at least partially into the street.332 In support of this
contention, he relies on the testimony of one witness who viewed the
animation and stated the puddle was slightly bigger than that depicted,333
and the fact that Detective Babcock did not interview the witnesses
regarding the size of the puddle until approximately six months after the
accident.334 Mr. Pierce's secondary defense is that the puddle extended
into the street, and the accident was the unavoidable result of a sudden loss
of control upon entering the puddle.335
Mr. Pierce also argues that the color of the truck shown in the anima-
tion was not consistent with the testimony of the witnesses.336 He states
that all witnesses testified that the truck was green or dark, but the truck
shown in the animation was blue.337 Therefore, he believes that the image
325. Id. at 17-23.
326. Id. at 17 (citing Brown, 550 So. 2d at 527).
327. Id.
328. Appellant's Brief at 18-23, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
329. Id. at 12, 16-23.
330. Id. at 17-19, 22-23.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Appellant's Brief at 18, Pierce (No. 93-01302)
334. Id. at 18, 22.
335. Id. at 22.
336. Id. at 18-19.
337. Id. at 18.
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of the truck used in the animation was drawn to conform to the truck the
police took into custody.33 He contends that his primary defense, that he
was not the driver and that his was not the truck involved in the accident,
was debunked by the graphic depiction of his exact vehicle in the anima-
tion.339
Next, Mr. Pierce argues that the lighting and weather conditions were
not accurately reflected in the animation.340 He contends that both were
enhanced so that the jury could see the animation more clearly, and thus the
animation was not consistent with witness testimony.34" ' In addition, he
asserts that the lighting and weather conditions on the night of the accident
were dark and rainy.342 He argues that under such inclement conditions,
the children would have been invisible to all until a vehicle was right upon
them,343 a fact that would have been relevant in determining whether the
truck was operated recklessly.3" Therefore, Mr. Pierce contends that the
jury was shown a portrayal of the accident from a better perspective than he
had, and his defense against the element of recklessness was not given due
consideration.345
Mr. Pierce's third argument is grounded upon the hearsay rule. He
contends that the animation was created using the testimony of seven
witnesses. 3" However, only two of those individuals testified at trial.34 7
Hence, he contends that allowing the jury to see the illustration of what
other witnesses described to the police amounted to hearsay.348 Moreover,
he claims that this denied him the opportunity to cross-examine these
witnesses, a fundamental Sixth Amendment right.349 Mr. Pierce argues
that the animation should have been excluded on this ground.350
338. Appellant's Brief at 18-19, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
339. Id. at 21-22.
340. Id. at 19.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 22.
343. Appellant's Brief at 22, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
344. Id. at 22.
345. Id. at 22-23.
346. Id. at 24.
347. Id.
348. Appellant's Brief at 24, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
349. Id. at 24.
350. Id. at 12, 24.
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E. Appellee 's Arguments
In response to Appellant's Initial Brief, Appellee filed its Answer Brief
on July 27, 1994."s' Appellee first argues that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting the animation because the State established that
the procedures used to create the animation were accepted in the scientific
community.3 2 Appellee states that Mr. Pierce did not preserve his argu-
ment that the procedure utilized to create the animation was not accepted in
the scientific community.353 Appellee bases its argument on the fact that
Mr. Pierce never objected to the animation on this ground." 4 However,
Appellee also argues that because the tape was used to illustrate an expert's
opinion of how the incident occurred, Frye was not applicable.355 To
support its contention, Appellee cites McHugh56 to show that another
court previously determined that an animation is more like a chart or
diagram, rather than a scientific device.357 In addition, Appellee cites
various other Florida cases in support of its position.35 Nevertheless,
Appellee contends that the State did meet the Frye test because all of the
experts testified that the methods utilized were of the type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field and were reliable.359 Therefore, even if there
was error, it was harmless error.36
Appellee's second argument in response is that the information in the
animation was consistent with the testimony of the witnesses and the
physical evidence.36" ' Appellee contends that the animation was used to
illustrate Detective Babcock's opinion of how the accident occurred and that
351. Answer Brief of Appellee at 50, State v. Pierce, No. 92-19316CFIOA (Fla. 17th
Cir. Ct. 1992), appeal docketed, No. 93-01302 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1993)
[hereinafter Appellee's Brief].
352. Id. at 27.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 27.
356. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 722-23.
357. Appellee's Brief at 27-28, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
358. Id. In his Brief, Appellee cites Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1984), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1109 (1986), Baker, 241 So. 2d at 683, and Grant, 171 So. 2d at 361, to
suggest that Frye is inapplicable to the Pierce case and that the motion picture reenactment
should be admissible since it explains the testimony of a witness. Appellee's Brief at 27-28,
Pierce (No. 93-01302).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 29.
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Mr. Pierce was allowed full cross-examination of Detective Babcock. Mr.
Pierce had ample opportunity to challenge the accuracy of Detective
Babcock's opinion.362 Appellee argues that the puddle portrayed in the
animation was accurate because several of the witnesses who were present
at the scene viewed the animation and attested to the accuracy of the size
and shape of the puddle depicted.363 Appellee further argues that the
photographs depicting the puddle, which were taken after the accident, did
not accurately depict the size and shape of the puddle because there was a
hard rain shortly after the accident.364 Moreover, Appellee argues that Mr.
Pierce provided no evidence to support his argument that the puddle
depicted in the animation was different from the sketch prepared by the
police.365 This sketch was prepared by a road patrol officer and not by an
accident reconstructionist. 366  Furthermore, Appellee notes that the size
and shape of the puddle changed because of additional rain and the fact that
people present at the scene were walking through it.36
7
Appellee's next argument is that the color of the truck portrayed in the
animation was accurate. 368  Appellee contends that the artificial yellow
light at the scene made the blue truck appear green.369 In addition, the six
layer paint fragments recovered from the clothing of one of the injured
children matched the paint chips taken from Mr. Pierce's truck.37°
Appellee argues that the damage to Mr. Pierce's truck was fresh, that the
dent in the truck's hood was consistent with Nicole's head injury, and that
the plastic fragments found at the scene matched the factory installed tum
signal lens still intact on the left side of the truck.3 7' Appellee also notes
that a piece of the front grille found at the scene was from the same make
and model as Mr. Pierce's truck, and Mr. Pierce had the grille of his truck
replaced after the accident.372 Thus, Appellee contends there is no doubt
that Mr. Pierce's truck was the truck involved in the accident.373
362. Appellee's Brief at 29, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
363. Id.
364. Id. at 29.
365. Id. at 30.
366. Id. at 31.
367. Appellee's Brief at 31, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 31-32.
372. Appellee's Brief at 32, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
373. Id.
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Appellee also notes that the State informed the jury that the video did
not attempt to reconstruct the lighting conditions at the time of the
accident.374 It would be impossible to produce accurate lighting unless a
photographer had been present at the time of the accident.375 Appellee
contends that if the court accepted Mr. Pierce's argument that the animation
was inadmissible because the lighting was not accurately portrayed,
photographs of an incident that occurred at night would never be admissi-
ble.376 Hence, Appellee argues, based on United States v. Clayton, 7
that the deficiencies in lighting should go to the weight of the evidence, not
the admissibility.378
Next, Appellee addresses Mr. Pierce's argument that the video was
misleading because it contained an overhead view, providing the jury with
a better perspective than Mr. Pierce had at the time of the collision.379
Appellee contends that Mr. Pierce did not preserve this claim because he
made no objection regarding the different perspectives.38 In addition,
Appellee notes that the State used aerial photographs at trial to describe the
scene and the path of the truck without objection from Mr. Pierce.38'
Furthermore, the animation was not misleading because it offered three
different perspectives of the accident, none of which were misleading.382
Appellee rebuts Mr. Pierce's secondary defense, that the accident was
caused by a sudden loss of control upon entering the puddle, by pointing out
that Mr. Pierce did not provide evidence to support his defense.383 The
testimony presented showed the truck left the road completely before
entering the puddle and hitting the children384 and thus, Appellee contends
that the animation accurately portrayed the events.385
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 32-33.
377. 643 F.2d 1071, 1074(5th Cir. 1981) (stating that deficiencies in measurements and
lighting in photographs depicting a model wearing the defendant's clothes went to weight,
not admissibility).
378. Appellee's Brief at 33, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 33-34.
381. Id. at 33.
382. The State offered one view from overhead, one from Pierce's perspective, and one
from the children's perspective. Id. at 33-34.
383. Appellee's Brief at 34, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
384. Id.
385. Id.
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Appellee also notes that the animation did not include things that could
have prejudiced the jury because it did not contain sound, did not show any
blood, and used mannequins to portray the children." 6 Likewise, the
animation depicted Mr. Pierce's vehicle traveling at the posted speed limit,
even though testimony from witnesses showed that he was traveling up to
twice the speed limit. 87 Moreover, a gap or blank space was intentionally
included in the animation because of a lack of testimony to show what Mr.
Pierce was doing at that time.388 Hence, Appellee contends that the
animation was supported by testimony and physical evidence, and was thus
not misleading. 9
Appellee points out that the trial court has wide discretion concerning
the admissibility of evidence, and that deficiencies go to the weight of the
evidence, not to the admissibility.39 Therefore, Appellee contends that
even if there was error, it was harmless.39
Appellee's final argument concerning admissibility is that the animation
is not hearsay.392 The animation was offered as demonstrative evidence
to illustrate Detective Babcock's opinion of how the accident occurred.393
Because the animation was not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, it was not hearsay.
394
Among the cases cited by Appellee in support of its position was
Bender v. State. 95 Appellee notes the Bender court's finding that if an
expert bases his opinion on facts or data that are of the type experts in the
field would reasonably rely upon, then the facts or data do not have to be
admitted as evidence.3 96 Because the expert testimony was based in part
on records, data, and opinions of others, and was the type of evidence
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, Appellee contends that the
hearsay rule poses no obstacle to the animation.397
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Appellee's Brief at 34, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
389. Id. at 35.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 36.
393. Appellee's Brief at 36, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
394. Id. at 36.
395. 472 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
396. Appellee's Brief at 36, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
397. Id.
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F. Appellant's Reply
In response to Appellee's Answer Brief, Mr. Pierce filed his Reply
Brief on September 26, 1994.39g Mr. Pierce reiterated his argument that
the State failed to establish that the procedures used to prepare the animation
were accepted in the scientific community. 99 In addition, he argues that
the animation was not an accurate reflection of what actually occurred; he
states that it conformed to the State's theory of the case.4"' Mr. Pierce
argues that depicting the truck as blue was inaccurate because none of the
witnesses testified that it was blue.4 1' He contends that Appellee's Answer
Brief cites only to testimony that supports its arguments and discounts
testimony that contradicts them.40 2 He further argues that the multiple
perspectives used in the animation, especially the view of what the children
saw, were misleading.4 3 Mr. Pierce contends that none of the children
saw the grille of the truck as shown in the video. Thus, he contends that the
perspective depicting what the children saw was false.40 4
Mr. Pierce rebuts Appellee's argument that there was no evidence
presented to support his defense of loss of control of the vehicle. He claims
evidence presented by the State showed the truck was traveling down the
middle of the road, or on the wrong side of the road just prior to the
accident.4 5 This evidence, he contends, was consistent with his secondary
defense that he hit the puddle and lost control of the vehicle as he was
returning to the right side of the road.406
Mr. Pierce also rebuts Appellee's argument that the animation was not
hearsay.407 He argues that if witness testimony is the type of evidence
reasonably relied upon by experts, then a police officer qualified as an
expert could testify regarding any reports given to him, even witness
398. Reply Brief ofAppellant at 18, State v. Pierce, No. 92-19316CFIOA (Fla. 17th Cir.
CL 1992), appeal docketed, No. 93-01302 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1993) [hereinafter
Reply Brief].
399. Id. at 3.
400, Id. at 4.
401. Id. at 3.
402. Id.
403. Reply Brief at 4, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
404. Id. at 4.
405. Id. at 5.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 6.
1994)
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statements that claim the defendant was guilty. °8 Mr. Pierce distinguished
the cases cited by Appellee to show the animation was not hearsay, by
stating that the underlying data used in those cases was of a scientific or a
record keeping nature, and was the kind of evidence reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field.4"9 He states that because the animation was based
on statements of non-testifying witnesses, the jury should have determined
the credibility of the witnesses, not the police.410 Mr. Pierce concludes
that it was error to admit the animation because it was inadmissible
hearsay.41'
G. Comments
Mr. Pierce is correct in stating that in order to have evidence admitted
as substantive evidence in Florida, there must be testimony as to the general
acceptance in the scientific community.4"2 However, in accordance with
Judge Speiser's order, the computer animation in this case was admitted
solely as demonstrative evidence.4"3 The animation was used to visualize
Detective Babcock's testimony and aid the trier of fact in understanding his
opinion of how the accident occurred. Indeed, Mr. Pierce's second
argument in his Initial Brief refers to the fact that the animation served as
an illustration of Detective Babcock's testimony. Mr. Pierce's argument is
thus weak. The animation was used solely as demonstrative evidence.
There was no need to present testimony as to the scientific reliability of the
computer program or its general acceptance within the scientific community.
It follows that Mr. Pierce's first argument should fail because it lacks merit.
Assuming arguendo that the animation had been used as substantive
evidence, the testimony offered by the State's three expert witnesses, Deputy
Bjordalen-Hull, Detective Babcock, and John Suchocki, would have met the
requirements for admission of substantive evidence in Florida, as outlined
in Frye.414 To meet the general acceptance criteria, the State would have
had to show that the computer program utilized to create the animation had
achieved general acceptance within the relevant scientific community." 5
Mr. Suchocki, the computer animator, was declared by the court to be an
408. Reply Brief at 6, Pierce (No. 93-01302).
409. Id. at 7-8.
410. Id. at 8.
411. Id. at 6.
412. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
413. Order on Computer Animation at 6, Pierce(No. 92-19316CF1OA); Record at2342.
414. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
415. See id.
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expert in forensic animation. His testimony included an authentication of
the computer hardware and software. In addition, Mr. Suchocki testified as
to the accuracy and reliability of the computer program utilized to create the
animation. Moreover, all three of the State's experts verified the accuracy
of the input data. Thus, Mr. Suchocki's testimony, in conjunction with that
of Detective Babcock and Deputy Bjordalen-Hull, would have overcome the
hurdles set out in Frye.4" 6
Mr. Pierce's second argument, that the animation did not accurately
portray various aspects of the.scene, also lacks merit. While this argument
may be his most persuasive, it does not support the contention that it was
error for the trial court to admit the animation. First, it must be recognized
that the animation was offered as demonstrative evidence to illustrate the
opinion of Detective Babcock, an expert in accident reconstruction. Indeed,
Detective Babcock testified that the animation fairly and accurately
represented his opinion of how the accident occurred. Second, three
separate experts testified as to how the input data was collected and entered
into the computer. The data was entered from computer to computer, with
no human contact, and the chance for human error in data entry was
therefore eliminated. In addition, it must be acknowledged that Mr.
Suchocki, the State's expert in forensic animation, testified as to the
accuracy of the computer program used to create the animation. Therefore,
it could be deduced that the animation accurately depicted the testimony
presented and fairly represented the scene in question. Demonstrative
evidence is admissible if it is relevant and will assist the trier of fact.
4 17
In order for a court to exclude relevant evidence, its prejudicial effects must
outweigh its probative value.418 Variations in testimony or questions of
accuracy go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Thus,
because the animation was relevant and would assist the trier of fact in
understanding Detective Babcock's testimony, Judge Speiser correctly
admitted it as demonstrative evidence and allowed the jury to decide its
credibility.
Although Mr. Pierce contended that the color of the truck was not
consistent with witness testimony, the State's evidence contradicted his
contention. The State presented scientific evidence, via a paint expert, to
prove that the paint fragments recovered from the injured child's clothing
were composed of six distinct layers. The expert proved that the six layers
of paint matched the paint on the defendant's truck. Even though many of
416. Ia
417. FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1993).
418. Id. § 90.403.
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the witnesses were only able to testify that the color of the vehicle that hit
the children was dark, the expert testimony of the paint expert shows that
Mr. Pierce's truck was involved in the accident. As Appellee argued, the
yellow light at the scene would make a blue vehicle appear green. It
follows that it was not error to depict the truck as blue in the animation.
Furthermore, the color of the truck depicted in the animation is almost
irrelevant. The purpose of the animation was to illustrate Detective
Babcock's opinion of how the accident occurred, not to display every
minute detail of the scene.
Mr. Pierce's argument that the lighting and weather conditions were not
presented accurately requires consideration of the reason for showing the
jury the animation in the first place. The animation was used to illustrate
the expert opinion of Detective Babcock. Hence, if the animation had been
made dark, its purpose would have been defeated; the jury would not have
been able to see it. Although the animation may have presented the jury
with a slightly better perspective than Mr. Pierce had the night of the
accident, Judge Speiser did not view the animation as being prejudicial. He
allowed the jury to hear testimony from the defense regarding the discrepan-
cies in lighting and weather conditions. Consequently, Judge Speiser
correctly admitted the animation and let the jury decide its credibility.
In response to Mr. Pierce's argument that the puddle was not accurately
depicted in the animation, it must be recognized that the depiction of the
size and shape of the puddle in the animation was based upon testimony
from witnesses who were present at the scene of the accident before rescue
personnel arrived. Even though this information was not collected until
approximately six months after the accident, there is no indication that it
was not accurate. Indeed, several witnesses who were present at the scene
of the accident viewed the animation and testified that it was a fair and
accurate representation of the scene and of what occurred. Mr. Pierce's
argument is based in part on the testimony of one witness who viewed the
video and stated that the puddle was larger than that shown. This kind of
variation in testimony would go to the weight of the evidence, rather than
its admissibility. Therefore the animation was properly admitted.
Mr. Pierce's argument is also based on the fact that the size and shape
of the puddle shown in the animation conflicts with the puddle as depicted
in a rough sketch made by a police officer who was present at the scene of
the accident. However, on the night of the accident, there were numerous
rescue and police vehicles present. Between the time of the accident and the
time the police officer made the sketch, the size and shape of the puddle
could have been altered if any vehicles drove through it, or if people walked
through it. In addition, on the night of the accident, it rained off and on.
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Therefore, depending on the time the sketch was made, the size and shape
of the puddle could have been altered for a variety of reasons.
Mr. Pierce's third argument, that the animation was created using the
testimony of witnesses that did not testify at trial and thus constituted
hearsay, can be negated by looking at Florida's definition of hearsay.
According to section 90.801(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes, hearsay is "[a]
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter assert-
ed."419 Demonstrative evidence does not qualify as hearsay because it is
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Its function is to
illustrate expert testimony. It follows that because the computer animation
was used solely as demonstrative evidence (to illustrate the testimony of
Detective Babcock), it is not subject to the hearsay rule.
If the animation had been admitted as substantive evidence, Appellant's
argument might have some merit. However, based on section 90.704 of the
Florida Statutes, when an expert bases his opinion on facts or data which
are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field to support such
an opinion, the facts or data need not be admitted in evidence.420 Because
all three of the State's expert witnesses testified that the data they used to
create the animation was the type that would be reasonably relied upon by
experts in the field, the hearsay problem probably would have been avoided.
VI. CONCLUSION
We live in a visual society, where graphics are rapidly becoming the
modem way to communicate. This is evidenced by the growth of both
television and video, and can be seen in everyday life in such things as
pictorial informational signs in public places. The use of computers is
another growing trend. Computer technology has revolutionized many
professions, from banking to the medical field. Every day new advances in
the computer industry are made. Computer technology is clearly the "wave
of the future." Even though some are hesitant and fearful of accepting the
computer and its capabilities, the trend is growing so rapidly that those who
are unfamiliar with its capabilities and uses will be unprepared to cope with
the future. The judicial system is experiencing this growth first-hand.
Courts all over the country are being forced to determine whether evidence
generated by a computer is admissible. Although the movement of
419. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c) (1993).
420. Id. § 90.704.
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computer technology into the courtroom has primarily been in civil
litigation, it has now infiltrated the criminal courtroom.
Florida courts have not previously decided the issue of whether
computer animations are admissible in criminal cases. Authority from other
jurisdictions is not overwhelming, but does support the admission of such
evidence. For example in McHugh,42 a criminal case, a New York court
admitted a computer animation of a car accident proffered by the defense,
analogizing it to a chart or diagram." 2 The McHugh court established
criteria for the admission of the animation as demonstrative evidence.423
The criteria stated that the animation had to be relevant to the case, had to
fairly and accurately reflect the testimony, and had to assist the trier of fact
in understanding the issues.424 In essence, this is the same criteria re-
quired by the Florida Statutes for the admission of all demonstrative
evidence. Indeed, it appears to be the criteria that Judge Speiser applied in
deciding to allow the animation in Pierce as demonstrative evidence.
If the Fourth District Court of Appeal agrees with this criteria, it most
likely will decide that it was not reversible error for the trial court to allow
the animation as evidence. Affirming Pierce on this ground will provide
Florida jurors with a more meaningful tool with which to decide cases. In
addition, attorneys will enjoy the benefit of having the jurors remember and
understand more of the information presented.
Deleterious results may occur nevertheless. First and foremost, the
evidence being presented could be erroneous, misleading, or unreliable.
Second, indigent defendants or those defendants with limited resources may
not be able to fight against such evidence. Thus, a balance must be struck
between the positive and potentially negative effects of admitting such
evidence. This balance can be achieved through imposing and enforcing
strict standards regarding the foundation that must be laid for the admission
of such evidence.
This issue is squarely before the Fourth District Court of Appeal at this
time. The court's ruling will create a precedent that may control how such
evidence will be treated in the future. Until the Supreme Court of Florida
or the Florida Legislature speaks on this issue, the Fourth District's ruling
will be the leading authority. By affirming Pierce, Florida may pave the
way for computer animations to become the legal tool of the next decade.
421. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
422. Id. at 722.
423. Id. at 723.
424. Id.
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Florida courts and computer technology can then march hand in hand
toward the future.
Jennifer Robinson Boyle
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He Who Seeks Equity Must Find the Court Which Does
Equity-The Current Jurisdictional Conflict
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Constitution, through article V, vests the circuit courts with
exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings in equity.' This exclusive
1. Article V is the judiciary article of the Constitution of the State of Florida, as revised
in 1968; it replaced article V of the Constitution of 1885. Section 20(c)(3) provides:
Circuit courts shall havejurisdiction of appeals from county courts and munici-
pal courts, except those appeals which may be taken directly to the supreme
court; and they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all actions at law not
cognizable by the county courts; of proceedings relating to the settlement of the
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grant of jurisdiction to the circuit courts is also codified in section 26.012
of the Florida Statutes, which states that the circuit courts have "exclusive
original jurisdiction . . . in all cases in equity."2  Section 26.012 also
contains a provision granting the circuit courts exclusive original jurisdiction
in all actions "involving the title and boundaries of real property."3
Foreclosure actions have been considered to be within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the circuit courts because they are in equity4 and involve title
to real property.'
estate of decedents and minors, the granting of letters testamentary, guardianship,
involuntary hospitalization, the determination of incompetency, and other
jurisdiction usually pertaining to courts of probate; in all cases in equity
including all cases relating to juveniles; of all felonies and of all misdemeanors
arising out of the same circumstances as a felony which is also charged; in all
cases involving legality of any tax assessment or toll; in the action of ejectment;
and in all actions involving the titles or boundaries or right of possession of real
property. The circuit court may issue injunctions.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 20(c)(3) (emphasis added).
Section 20, which took effect on January 1, 1973, was intended to operate as the
jurisdictional law until such time as the legislature incorporated the provisions into general
statutory law. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 20(b)-(c). The legislature has since incorporated
the constitutional provisions in § 26.012 of the Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 26.012
(1993). Section 26.012(2)(c) continues to vest the circuit courts with exclusive original
jurisdiction "in all cases in equity." Id. § 26.012(2)(c). See generally 22 FLA. JUR. 2D
Equity § 7 (1992).
2. FLA. STAT. § 26.012(2)(c) (1993).
3. Id. § 26.012(2)(g).
4. See FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1993) (entitled, "Foreclosure of Mortgages, Agreements for
Deeds, and Statutory Liens," providing that all such actions shall be in equity); see also 22
FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 9 (1992).
5. Foreclosure is an action in equity because it involves the title to property. See 22
FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 31 (1992). Although a lien by itself is only a claim or charge on
property, an action to foreclose a lien seeks to collect on that claim or charge by judicial sale
of the subject property, which results in the debtor losing his title to the property. Black's
Law Dictionary defines foreclosure as follows:
The process by which a mortgagor of real or personal property, or other owner
of property subject to a lien, is deprived of his interest therein. A proceeding
in equity whereby a mortgagee either takes title to or forces the sale of the
mortgagor's property in satisfaction of a debt.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 646 (6th ed. 1990).
Foreclosure of liens derives from the historical evolution of title theory mortgages in
which the lender took title to the borrower's property, in fee simple subject to condition
subsequent, as collateral for a loan. The borrower kept a right of re-entry. The condition
subsequent was paying off the loan by a specified date, called "law day." If the loan was not
paid off by law day, then the condition subsequent would not be satisfied and the borrower
would lose his right of re-entry. Because it was inequitable for a borrower to lose his rights
Vol. 19
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In 1990, however, the Florida Legislature amended section 34.01 of the
Florida Statutes to vest the county courts with increased subject matter
jurisdiction.6 The amendment provided for an increase in the monetary
jurisdiction of the county courts to $15,000 after July 1, 1992.' In addition,
pursuant to the amended version of section 34.01, the county courts now
"may hear all matters in equity involved in any case within the jurisdictional
amount of the county court, except as otherwise restricted by the State
Constitution or the laws of Florida."'  The legislature failed to simulta-
neously amend section 26.012, as well as several other statutory sections, to
reflect the changes in section 34.01. As a result, section 34.01 is seeming-
ly in conflict with the jurisdictional provisions in article V of the Florida
Constitution,"° as well as with section 26.012."
The apparent conflict between circuit court and county court subject
matter jurisdiction in equity created great uncertainty among Florida
practitioners, particularly in the foreclosure area.'" Any judgment resulting
from an action filed in a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void. 3
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a defense which can be raised at any
to the land by failing to meet the law day deadline even when the borrower had a good
excuse, the court of equity afforded borrowers the equity of redemption. Borrowers could
attempt to redeem their property after law day by paying the entire amount of the loan.
Because lenders needed to dispose of the collateral property in order to recuperate their loan,
equity afforded lenders the right to foreclose the borrower's equity of redemption. Thus,
foreclosure involves title to property, and the action has persisted, from its application in title
theory mortgages to its adaptation in lien theory mortgages, and consequently to liens in
general. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 669-72 (3d ed. 1993).
6. Act of Oct. 1, 1990, ch. 90-269, § 1, 1990 Fla. Laws 1971, 1972 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 34.01(4) (1990)).
7. FLA. STAT. § 34.01(l)(c)4 (1993).
8. Id. § 34.01(4).
9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 55.10(8) (1993) (providing that a party claiming an interest
in property with a lien can seek equitable relief in the circuit court to protect his or her inter-
est); id. § 702.07 (providing that circuit courts have jurisdiction to rescind, vacate, and set
aside foreclosure decrees); id. § 713.31(1) (providing that circuit courts have jurisdiction in
chancery to issue injunctions and grant other relief in cases of fraud or collusion involving
liens); id. § 222.09 (providing that the circuit court in equity can enjoin sales of property
protected by homestead rights).
10. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 20(c)(3).
1I. See FLA. STAT. § 26.012(2)(c) (1993) (stating that the circuit courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases in equity). Therefore, § 34.01(4), which grants the county
courts original jurisdiction in equity, directly conflicts with the above mentioned provisions.
12. Interview with Louis Nicholas, Counsel, Ocean Bank Legal Department, in Miami,
FL (May 20, 1994).
13. See generally 13 FLA. JUR. 2D Courts and Judges § 26 (1992).
1994]
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time in litigation; it can even be raised for the first time on appeal. 4
Attorneys began to use the jurisdictional conflict as a defense to challenge
the validity of foreclosures of liens, including mortgages. 5 Courts dis-
missed several cases on these grounds, resulting in delays in determining in
which court to file. 6 The validity of foreclosures under $15,000, decided
since 1990, was questioned, resulting in obvious instability of land titles.
The uncertainty was so great that most prudent title insurers issued notices,
advising their clients that they would not insure titles obtained through
foreclosures involving less than $15,000, the current jurisdictional amount
limit for county courts. 7
A few lien foreclosure cases dealing with this issue were decided on
questionable grounds in the district courts of appeal."8 Two of these cases
were appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. 9 In Nachon Enterprises Inc.
v. Alexdex Corp.,2" the Third District Court of Appeal held that the county
courts were courts of competent jurisdiction to decide lien foreclosures
involving $15,000 or less.2' In Blackton, Inc. v. Young,22 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal held that the amended section 34.01 superseded the
state constitution,23 a surprising statement at first glance.24 Both cases
held not only that county courts had jurisdiction to hear foreclosures within
their jurisdictional amount, but further that the circuit courts did not have
jurisdiction.25 On September 1, 1994, the Florida Supreme Court released
its decision in the Nachon case, ruling that the county and circuit courts
have concurrent jurisdiction in equity for cases within the county courts'
14. 13 id.
15. See infra part I1l.B; see also Edwards v. Jerome M. Novey, P.A., 638 So. 2d 623
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
16. See infra part III.
17. See infra part IV.
18. See infra part III.
19. See infra parts Ill.B, D.
20. 615 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 626 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1993),
and approved, 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
21. Nachon, 615 So. 2d at 247.
22. 629 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 639 So. 2d 976 (Fla.
1994).
23. Id. at 940.
24. Although it may sound erroneous to say that a statute supersedes the constitution,
in this case the constitutional provision expressly allowed for future general law to supersede
it. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 20(b).
25. In effect, these holdings have stripped the circuit courts of some of their
constitutional jurisdiction and have construed § 34.01(4) to be a grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to the county courts for equitable cases within the jurisdictional amount.
Vol. 19
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monetary limits.26 However, the court's reasoning is questionable, and
leaves important issues unresolved, which may produce further litigation on
the question of jurisdiction with respect to mortgage foreclosures.
The legislature proposed several bills to resolve the problem in various
ways, the most drastic of which called for the abolition of the county courts
altogether.27 All of the proposed changes died in the judiciary commit-
tee,28 apparently due to the passage of the bill creating the Article Five
Task Force, which is conducting a complete review of the Florida Judiciary
and will recommend the necessary changes in a report to be submitted by
December 1, 1994.29 One of the alternatives that the task force will study
is the creation of a single tier trial level court.3
The. purpose of this note is to inform Florida practitioners of the
conflict which currently exists regarding equitable subject matter jurisdiction
between the county and circuit courts. Following this Introduction, Part II
will discuss the legislative evolution of equity jurisdiction in Florida's trial
level courts, and the changes made to section 34.01 of the Florida Statutes
to grant increased subject matter jurisdiction to the county courts. Part III
will discuss the courts' recent decisions applying and interpreting the county
and circuit court jurisdictional statutes and the arguments for and against
equitable subject matter jurisdiction in the county courts. Part IV will
discuss the impact that the uncertainty regarding which court has equity
jurisdiction has had on the practice of real estate law. Part V will discuss
the various alternatives proposed by the litigants, the Bar, and the legislature
for resolving the conflict as well as the Florida Supreme Court's decision
in Nachon, holding that the two courts have concurrent jurisdiction.
I. TRADITIONAL EQUITY JURISDICTION IN FLORIDA'S
TRIAL COURTS
A. Florida's Current Court System
The 1973 revision of the judiciary article of the Florida Constitution
provides that the judicial power of the state is vested in the supreme court,
26. Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enters., Inc., 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
27. See Fla. S.J. Res. 422, 13th Leg., 2d Sess. (1994) (proposed amendments to FLA.
CONST. art V, §§ 1, 2, 5-8, 10-12, 16, 20); see also infra part V.C.
28. FLA. LEGIs., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 38, SB 78; id. at 47, SB 218; id. at 61, S.J. Res. 422; id.,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 242, HB 409; id. at 381, HB 2547.
29. Act of May 11, 1994, ch. 94-138, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 867, 869.
30. Id. at 868.
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district courts of appeal, circuit courts, and county courts."' No other
courts may be established by the state, by any political subdivision, or by
any municipality.32 The Florida judicial system, in which all courts are
created by the constitution, is distinguishable from the federal system, in that
all federal courts are statutory, except the United States Supreme Court.33
This distinction is important because the Florida Legislature does not have
the power to create or abolish any of the constitutionally mandated courts
without amending the constitution.34 This greater separation of powers
between the legislature and the judiciary in Florida implies that the
legislature cannot tinker with the courts' jurisdiction in a way that would
effectively strip any of these courts of their power.3" Because of this
principle, the granting of jurisdiction in equity to the county courts, for
actions within their jurisdictional amounts, may be unconstitutional because
it strips the circuit courts of their exclusive jurisdiction in equity.36
The jurisdiction of each of the courts created in article V is stated
within the article, 7 and is codified in the Florida Statutes.38 Florida
currently operates under a two-tier trial court system which is comprised of
county and circuit courts.39 Article V, section 6 of the Florida Constitution
provides that "county courts shall exercise the jurisdiction prescribed by
general law" which "shall be uniform throughout the state."40 Additional-
ly, article V, section 20(4) states that the county courts have original
jurisdiction in the following areas:
31. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
32. Id. See generally 13 FLA. JUR. 2D Courts and Judges §§ 8, 71-76 (1992) (discussing
prior existence of inferior courts, which were abolished).
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
34. Compare 13 FLA. JUR. 2D Courts and Judges § 8 (1992) with JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.2, at 11-12 (2d ed. 1993).
35. See 13 FLA. JUR. 2D Courts and Judges § 32 (1992).
36. See 13 id.
37. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 20 (prescribing each court's subject matter jurisdiction).
38. See FLA. STAT. §§ 26.012, 34.01 (1993) (codifying circuit court and county court
jurisdiction, respectively); cf 13 id. §§ 26, 28 (discussing the necessity ofjurisdiction). See
generally 13 FLA. JUR. 2D Courts and Judges § 22 (1992) (defining jurisdiction as "the
power conferred on a court by the sovereign, vis-a-vis constitutional or statutory provisions,
to take cognizance of the subject matter of a litigation and the parties brought before it and
to hear and determine the issues and render judgment upon the issues joined").
39. This was not always the case. See 13 FLA. JUR. 2D Courts and Judges §§ 71-76
(1992) (discussing the former County Judges' Courts, Civil Claims Courts, Small Claims
Courts, Small Claims Magistrates' Courts, Magistrates' Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts,
and courts of chartered counties).
40. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 6(2)(b).
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[A]II criminal misdemeanor cases not cognizable by the circuit courts,
of all violations of municipal and county ordinances, and of all actions
at law in which the matter in controversy does not exceed the sum of
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) exclusive of interest and
costs, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit
courts. 4 '
Similarly, article V, section 5, states that the circuit courts have
"original jurisdiction not vested in the county courts,"'42 and article V,
section 20(3) provides that the circuit courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction "in all cases in equity including all cases relating to juve-
niles." '43 As explicitly stated above, the Florida Constitution, as revised in
1968, states that the circuit court is the trial court empowered to act in
equity.
44
At this point it should be recalled that equity was historically separate
from law; there was a separate court of equity, also known as the chancery
court, in which a petitioner could seek relief it he had clean hands and no
41. Id. § 20(4); see also Amended Brief ofAmicus Curiae for the Real Property, Probate
and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar at 6, Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enters., Inc., 641
So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994) (No. 81,765) [hereinafter Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae (Florida
Bar)] (explaining the usage of article V, § 20).
Section 20 was included in the 1968 revised Constitution of Florida as ajurisdictional
schedule and temporary transition provision for governance ofjurisdiction until the legislature
changed the statutes regarding jurisdiction of circuit courts and county courts. Since then,
§§ 26.012 and 34.01 have been enacted, which basically are the statutory counterparts to §
20. Section 34.01 prescribes county court subject matter jurisdiction and § 26.012 prescribes
circuit court subject matter jurisdiction. Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae (Florida Bar) at
6, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
The jurisdictional amount of the county courts increased in 1980 from $2500 to $5000.
See Act of July 1, 1980, ch. 80-165, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 533, 533 (codified as amended at
FLA. STAT. § 34.01(1) (1980)).
42. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b). Section 5(b) also states:
The circuit courts shall have . . . jurisdiction of appeals when provided by
general law. They shall have the power to issue writs of mandamus, quo war-
ranto, certiorari, prohibition and habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper
to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the circuit court
shall be uniform throughout the state. They shall have the power of direct
review of administrative action prescribed by general law.
Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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adequate remedy at law. 5 With the advent of the rules of civil procedure,
equity and law merged,46 although the distinction between the two forms
of relief still exists and is important to maintain. 7 "Strictly speaking, there
is no such tribunal in the judicial system of Florida known as the 'chancery
court,' though the circuit court of the state, when exercising its equity
jurisdiction, is frequently spoken of as a chancery court."48
45. See 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity §§ 3, 20 (1992). See generally RONALD B. BROWN,
FUTURE INTERESTS AND REAL ESTATES 83 (1988).
46. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.040; see also 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 3 (1992).
47. For example, the distinction still exists when determining if there is a right to ajury
trial. See 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity §§ 4-5 (1992).
48. See 13 id. Courts and Judges § 8 (1992) (citing Beebe v. Richardson, 23 So. 2d 718
(Fla. 1945)).
Jurisdiction is different from the inherent powers of the courts in that "jurisdiction is
conferred by constitutional and statutory authorization, whereas inherent powers do not
depend upon express constitutional grant or on legislative will." 13 id. § 14 (1992). A
court's power to act in equity has sometimes been regarded as inherent. See 22 id. Equity
§ 7. Nevertheless, equity does have a subject matter jurisdictional component because in
some cases only courts of general jurisdiction have inherent powers. 13 id. Courts and
Judges § 15. For example, the power to appoint a receiver, or to relieve a tenant from the
forfeiture of his estate for failing to pay rent as required by his lease, although usually
considered to be within the realm of equity, are inherent powers of a court unless otherwise
controlled by statute. 13 FLA. JUR. 2D Courts and Judges § 15 (1992).
[However,] prior to the 1972 amendment of the Florida Constitution changing
the jurisdiction of the County Courts, and the statutory changes effectuating this
amendment, it was held that County Courts did not have inherent power to
relieve a tenant from the forfeiture of his estate for failure to pay rent as
required by his lease.
13 id. (footnote omitted). Courts of general jurisdiction are usually the ones considered to
have certain inherent powers, which include equitable powers. 13 id. Following the
tautology, the circuit courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, have inherent powers. The
power to grant equitable relief is sometimes considered an inherent power. 22 id. Equity §
7. Therefore, the circuit courts are the courts with the power to grant equitable relief See
22 id.
As the Florida trial level courts, the circuit and county courts are sometimes
distinguished as courts of general and specific jurisdiction; the circuit court is the court of
general jurisdiction, with powers that may not be curtailed by the legislature. 13 FLA. JUR.
2D Courts and Judges § 63 (1992); see also 13 id. § 29 (stating that a presumption may be
invoked in favor of the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction; on the other hand,
presumptions as to jurisdiction may not be invoked with regard to courts of limited jurisdic-
tion). The facts on which jurisdiction for courts of limited jurisdiction rest must appear in
the record.
The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is general in that it has original jurisdiction
of cases in equity and at law not cognizable by an inferior court. In other
words, its jurisdiction is'primarily residual. The jurisdiction of the courts
Vol. 19
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The legislature has codified the county courts' subject matter juris-
diction in section 34.01 of the Florida Statutes, in accordance with the
constitution.49  The subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit courts is
inferior to it is carved out of that given to the Circuit Court, so that its original
jurisdiction is limited only at lower levels, and remains otherwise general and
unlimited.
The circuit courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, are the highest trial
courts in the State.
The fact that a court is one of general jurisdiction does not necessarily
mean that it cannot be made a court of special and limited jurisdiction in certain
cases. On the contrary, a court of general jurisdiction may have additional
powers conferred on it by statute. In the exercise of such statutory powers, a
court of general jurisdiction will be regarded and treated as a court of limited
and special jurisdiction.
13 id. § 63 (footnotes omitted).
49. FLA. STAT. § 34.01 (1993). The statute provides, in relevant part:
(1) County courts shall have original jurisdiction:
(a) In all misdemeanor cases not cognizable by the circuit courts;
(b) Of all violations of municipal and county ordinances; and
(c) As to causes of action accruing:
1. Before July 1, 1980, of all actions at law in which the matter in controver-
sy does not exceed the sum of $2,500, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney's
fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit courts.
2. On or after July 1, 1980, of all actions at law in which the matter in
controversy does not exceed the sum of $5,000, exclusive of interest, costs, and
attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit
courts.
3. On or after July 1, 1990, of actions at law in which the matter in contro-
versy does not exceed the sum of $10,000, exclusive of interest, costs, and
attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit
courts.
4. On or after July 1, 1992, of actions at law in which the matter in contro-
versy does not exceed the sum of $15,000, exclusive of interest, costs, and
attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit
courts....
(2) The county courts shall have jurisdiction previously exercised by county
judges' courts other than that vested in the circuit court by s. 26.012, except that
county court judges may hear matters involving dissolution of marriage under
the simplified dissolution procedure pursuant to Rule 1.611 (c), Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure or may issue a final order for dissolution in cases where the
matter is uncontested, and the jurisdiction previously exercised by county courts,
the claims court, small claims courts, small claims magistrates courts, magistrates
courts, justice of the peace courts, municipal courts, and courts of chartered
counties, including but not limited to the countries referred to in ss 9, 10, 11,
and 24 of Art. VIII of the State Constitution, 1885.
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similarly codified in section 26.012.5" Because of this exclusive original
jurisdiction in equity, all foreclosures, large and small, whether involving
mortgages or other liens, were brought in circuit court.5' This exclusive
grant of jurisdiction in equity also meant that a county court case, in which
a party raised an equitable defense, had to be transferred to the circuit court,
resulting in delays. 2 This problem was dealt with in 1980 when the
(3) Judges of county courts shall be committing magistrates. Judges of county
courts shall be coroners unless otherwise provided by law or by rule of the
Supreme Court.
(4)Judges of county courts may hear all matters in equity involved in any case
within the jurisdictional amount of the county court, except as otherwise
restricted by the State Constitution or the laws of Florida.
Id.; see also id. § 34.011 (1993) (stating that county courts "have concurrent [jurisdiction]
with the circuit court to consider landlord and tenant cases involving claims in amounts which
are within its jurisdictional limitations," including the power to issue injunctions, and that the
county courts have exclusive jurisdiction within their monetary limits in cases involving
possession of real property).
50. Id. § 26.012. The statute provides, in relevant part:
(1) Circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of appeals from county courts except
appeals of county court orders or judgments declaring invalid a state statute or
a provision of the State Constitution and except orders ofjudgments of a county
court which are certified by the county court to the district court of appeal to be
of great public importance and which are accepted by the district court of appeal
for review. Circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of appeals from final
administrative orders of local government code enforcement boards.
(2) They shall have exclusive original jurisdiction:
(a) In all actions at law not cognizable by the county courts;
(b) Of proceedings relating to the settlement of the estates of decedents and
minors, the granting of letters testamentary, guardianship, involuntary hospi-
talization, the determination of incompetency, and other jurisdiction usually per-
taining to courts of probate;
(c) In all cases in equity including all cases relating to juveniles except traffic
offenses as provided in chapters 39 and 316;
(d) Of all felonies and of all misdemeanors arising out of the same circum-
stances as a felony which is also charged;
(e) In all cases involving the legality of any tax assessment or toll or denial of
refund, except as provided in s. 72.011;
(f) In actions of ejectment; and
(g) In all actions involving the title and boundaries of real property.
Id.
51. See 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 7 (1992).
52. See Hollywood Food Ct., Inc. v. Hollowell, 588 So. 2d 243, 243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (per curiam) (involving Rule 1.1700) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires transfer from county court to circuit court if any counterclaims or cross-claims
to an action are outside the county court's jurisdiction). But see Kugeares v. Casino, Inc.,
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legislature amended section 34.01(1)(c)(2) to permit the county courts to
hear equitable defenses raised in cases at law within their jurisdiction.53
In 1990, the legislature made further changes in the jurisdiction of county
courts.
B. The 1990 Legislative Changes to County Court Jurisdiction
In 1990, the Florida Legislature enacted law 90-269,14 which greatly
expanded the subject matter jurisdiction of the county courts. This law,
which became effective on October 1, 1990, increased the monetary
jurisdiction of the county courts to the present limit of $15,000." 5 In
addition, the law provided that "judges of county courts may hear all matters
in equity involved in any case within the jurisdictional amount of the county
court, except as otherwise restricted by the State Constitution or the laws of
Florida.156 Law 90-269 also deleted the sentence from section 34.01(1)-
(c)(2) which stated, "[a]ll equitable defenses in a case properly before a
county court may be tried in the same proceeding."57  This deletion is
crucial in attempting to understand what the legislature intended to
accomplish through Law 90-269. The Staff Analysis and Economic Impact
Report on 90-269 of the House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary makes the following comment:
Arguably, small damage suits would move more quickly in the county
court system resulting in time savings for the litigants. In addition,
cases involving small amounts of damages that also involve equitable
claims, defenses or remedies would now be able to remain in the county
court rather than being transferred to circuit court which would appear
to be a more efficient way to handle these cases .... There is a
question as to whether granting jurisdiction to the county court to hear
all matters in equity would require a constitutional amendment,
372 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that county court had
jurisdiction to consider equity defenses in suits in which the landlord seeks to regain
possession of leased premises).
53. Act of July 1, 1980, ch. 80-165, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 533, 533.
54. Act of Oct. 1, 1990, ch. 90-269, § 1, 1990 Fla. Laws 1971, 1971.
55. Id. at 1972 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 34.01(l)(c)(4) (1993)).
56. Id. at 1973. Note also that chapter 90-269 amended § 86.011 to authorize county
courts to render declaratory judgments. Id. § 3, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1973. The precise
wording of the law seems to evidence the legislature's intent, and will later be shown to
support the argument that there is actually no conflict, and that the law may have been
misinterpreted.
57. Id. at 1972.
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however, the Florida Constitution provides that county courts "shall
exercise jurisdiction as prescribed by general law.. ." (Art. V, s. 6., Fla.
Const.), and that circuit courts "shall have original jurisdiction not
vested in the county courts . . ."(Art. V, s. 5., Fla. Const.)' s
The Staff Analysis Report also explains that section 86.011 of the
Florida Statutes, relating to the issuance of declaratory judgments, was
amended to conform with the provision in the law "that grants equity
jurisdiction to the county court," and that the grant of equity jurisdiction
does not apply to divorce cases.5 9
The question is whether the legislature intended to expand or limit the
county courts' powers in equity when it replaced the provision that "all
equitable defenses in a case properly before a county court may be tried in
the same proceeding" '6 with "j]udges of county courts may hear all
matters in equity involved in any case within the jurisdictional amount of
the county court, except as otherwise restricted by the State Constitution or
the laws of Florida."'" The county courts were already able to decide
equitable defenses raised in actions clearly within their jurisdiction without
having to transfer such cases to the circuit court." The new phrase, "all
matters in equity involved in any case within the jurisdictional amount of
the county court"63 seems to be merely a rephrasing of the prior provision,
with "matters" implying not only equitable defenses, but also equitable
counterclaims and other equitable remedies which are not defenses. The
new phrasing still states, however, that the county court "may" hear such
equitable matters which are "involved in any case within the jurisdictional
amount of the county court."64  This seems to imply that the equitable
matters which can be considered must be within a legal "case," and that the
"case" itself cannot be purely equitable. In other words, if a legal case
clearly within the jurisdiction of the county court raises an issue in equity,
the county court can decide that issue, but this does not mean that a county
court can hear a purely equitable matter not involved within a legal case.
This interpretation is entirely consistent with the Judiciary Committee's Staff
Analysis Report, which states that "cases involving small amounts of
58. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, CS for HB 1061 (1990) Staff Analysis
3-4 (1990) [hereinafter Staff Analysis] (on file with comm.).
59. Id.
60. Ch. 80-165, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws at 533.
61. Ch. 90-269, § 1, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1973.
62. See ch. 80-165, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws at 533.
63. Ch. 90-269, § 1, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1973 (emphasis added).
64. Id.
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damages that also involve equitable claims, defenses or remedies would now
be able to remain in the county court rather than being transferred to circuit
court which would appear to be a more efficient way to handle these
cases."65 Clearly an action for money damages is an action at law, and
there is no broad grant of equitable jurisdiction without the above mentioned
qualifications in either the actual law or the Staff Analysis Report.66 The
preamble of chapter 90-269, however, does seem to imply a broader grant
of equitable jurisdiction; it states that the Act provides "a county court may
hear all matters in equity that are within jurisdictional amount."6 7 Howev-
er, the new provision granting equitable power to county courts is expressly
restricted by the phrase "except as otherwise restricted by the State
Constitution or the laws of Florida."" This exception seems to refer to
section 26.012(2)(c) which grants the circuit courts exclusive original
jurisdiction in "all cases in equity," which is different from saying "all
matters in equity involved in any case within the jurisdictional amount of
the county court, except as otherwise restricted. ,, " It seems, therefore,
that the limited grant of equity jurisdiction in 90-269 was intended only to
increase trial court efficiency by eliminating the needless delay which results
in cases which are properly brought in county courts but must be transferred
to circuit courts.70
The legislature failed, however, to make its intention clear in the
wording of section 34.01(4), especially in light of the conflicting provision
in section 26.012(2)(c). 7' As a result, there has been significant confusion
and debate as to the proper construction of the two jurisdictional statutes.72
Guided by the apparent legislative intent to increase the responsibility of the
county courts and to lighten the burden of the circuit courts, as signified by
the considerable increases in monetary limits of the county courts, some
practitioners have construed section 34.01(4) to give the county courts
65. Staff Analysis, supra note 58, at 3.
66. In fact, if the legislature wanted to grant the county courts full powers in equity
within their jurisdictional amounts, it could have merely changed sections 34.01(I)(c)3-4 of
the Florida Statutes to read "actions at law and in equity." It did not do so.
67. Ch. 90-269, §1, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1972. See generally 49 FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes
§§ 62-90 (1992) (discussing the constitutional requirements for titles and legislation).
68. Ch. 90-269, § 1, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1973.
69. See id. (emphasis added).
70. See Staff Analysis, supra note 58, at 3.
71. The conflicting provision provides that the circuit courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction in "all cases in equity." See FLA. STAT. § 26.012(2)(c) (1993).
72. See infra part IV.
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jurisdiction to hear small foreclosures.73 However, this interpretation
conflicts not only with section 26.012(2)(c), but also with section
26.012(2)(g) which provides that the circuit courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases "involving the title and boundaries of real proper-
ty."'  Foreclosures of liens on real property, including mortgages, are
usually understood to involve title to real property because the product of
a foreclosure is a sale and accompanying transfer of ownership.75 There-
fore, if there was any doubt that foreclosure was under the jurisdiction of
the circuit courts because of the new equitable jurisdiction provision of
34.01(4), then this "title and boundaries" provision seems to ensure that at
least all foreclosures of real property are within the circuit courts' jurisdic-
tion.76 The practitioners who have construed section 34.01(4) to grant the
county courts jurisdiction to hear foreclosures not exceeding $15,000 have
been forced to argue that section 26.012(2)(c) is not a law that restricts the
application of section 34.01(4) and that their foreclosure action does not
involve title and boundaries to real property.77
III. LITIGATION INVOLVING THE 1990 CHANGES
A. Spradley v. Doe
The first case to raise the issue of the county courts' increased subject
matter jurisdiction in equity was Spradley v. Doe.78 The plaintiff, Spradley,
73. Because foreclosure is an action strictly and completely in equity, prior to the 1990
amendment to § 34.01(4) it had been considered to be within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the circuit courts and could not be heard in county courts. See 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity
§ 9 (1992) (citing Sivort Co. v. State, 186 So. 671 (Fla. 1939)).
74. FLA. STAT. § 26.012(2)(g) (1993); see Corbin Well Pump & Supply, Inc. v. Koon,
482 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a lien foreclosure brought
in county court was void, because only circuit courts could hear such actions); see also 1
FLA. JUR. 2D Adjoining Landowners § 46 (1992) (boundary disputes are not really equitable
quiet title actions) (footnote omitted).
75. See 34 FLA. JUR. 2D Liens § 1 (1992).
76. 34 id. But see Paul L. Wean, Condominium, Cooperative and Homeowner Associa-
tion Law: 1993 Leading Cases and Significant Developments in Florida Law, 18 NOVA L.
REV. 499, 502-03 (1993) (discussing changes in lien foreclosure procedures, relating to
condominium assessment liens). The Condominium Act provides that liens for unpaid
assessments are foreclosed "in the manner a mortgage of real property is foreclosed." FLA.
STAT. § 718.116(6)(a) (1993). Although a lien by itself does not involve title to property,
it is questionable to assert that the foreclosure of a lien does not necessarily involve the title
of the subject property.
77. See infra part III.B.
78. 612 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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appealed the Circuit Court of Leon County's dismissal of his civil rights
action, in which he sought a declaratory judgment and damages in the
amount of $950."9 Spradley argued on appeal that the circuit court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, and that the action, which requested both
equitable relief and money damages, was within the jurisdictional amount
of the county courts.8" The First District Court of Appeal agreed,
reversing the circuit court's dismissal, and transferring the action to the
county court.8
The First District Court of Appeal acknowledged that "matters in
equity" have historically been heard only in circuit courts, citing section
26.012(2)(c). 2 The court then addressed the 1990 amendment to sections
34.01 and 86.011, which it construed to be a full grant of equity jurisdiction
to the county courts for cases within their jurisdictional amounts.8" The
court stated:
Unfortunately, the legislature failed to amend section 26.012 by
deleting the provisions therein, which stated that the circuit courts have
exclusive equitable jurisdiction. Thus, because the grant of equity
jurisdiction to county courts in section 34.01(4) is restricted by section
26.012(2)(c), vesting equitable matters exclusively in the circuit courts,
an irreconcilable inconsistency exists between the two statutes.
Under circumstances in which statutory provisions are inconsistent
and cannot be harmonized, a court must reach a construction that will
give effect to the purpose of the statute and the legislative intent. 49
Fla. Jur. 2d Statutes s. 181 (1984). One important maxim of statutory
construction is that the last expression of the legislature prevails.
The clear intent of the legislature was to expand county court
jurisdiction over certain specified equitable matters. This intent is
reflected not only by the express language employed in section 34.01(4),
but as well by the title to Chapter 90-269 [the act provides "that a
county court may hear all matters in equity that are within jurisdictional
amount," instead of referring to "all matters in equity involved in any
case.. . ."]. Section 34.01(4) is clearly consistent with the expressed
legislative purpose, and, because it is the last expression of legislative
will, it should prevail. We therefore construe section 34.01(4) as
granting equitable jurisdiction to county courts over matters within those
79. Id. at 723.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 724.
82. Id. at 723.
83. Spradley, 612 So. 2d at 723-24.
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courts' jurisdictional amounts, despite the existence of the patent
inconsistency in section 26.012(2)(c).84
Although Spradley involved a civil rights action by a pro se prisoner
seeking a declaratory judgment,85 it established a precedent for interpreting
section 34.01(4) as requiring actions in equity not exceeding $15,000 to be
brought in the county courts.86 Section 34.01(4) was now construed to
deny the circuit courts subject matter jurisdiction in equity when the case
involves $15,000 or less.87 The court did not address the fact that section
34.01(4) does not mandate that such actions be brought only in the county
courts; the wording only states that county courts "may" hear such matters
involved in a case within their jurisdictional amount.88 The case was not
appealed.
B. Nachon Enterprises Inc. v. Alexdex Corp.
Shortly after the decision in Spradley, the Third District Court of
Appeal decided a case which caused great concern in the area of real
property. It involved the foreclosure of a construction lien in the amount
of $4,140.44.89 Nachon Enterprises filed a notice of lis pendens to
establish and foreclose its lien in the County Court of Dade County.90 The
defendant responded by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court in Dade
County (Eleventh Judicial Circuit) to show cause and to discharge the lien,
pursuant to section 713.21(4) of the Florida Statutes.9 Section 713.21(4)
specifies that complaints to show cause why a lien should not be discharged
must be filed in the circuit court, not the county court. 92 Nachon filed a
84. Id. (citatibns omitted)
85. Id.
86. Id. at 724.
87. Id.
88. The meanings of the words "may" and "shall" differ greatly. See 49 FLA. JUR. 2D
Statutes § 18 (1992).
89. Nachon, 615 So. 2d at 246.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 247.
92. FLA. STAT. § 713.21(4) (1993). If county courts were now empowered to hear lien
foreclosure cases, this section should have also been amended to conform to § 34.01(4).
Richard Burton, counsel for Alexdex, used this argument in his brief to the Third District
Court of Appeal:
Chapter 713.21(4) is specific that all actions in response to a Rule to Show
Cause must be brought in Circuit Court. This specific jurisdictional requirement
has been readopted during the Legislature's reexamination of the Mechanic Lien
430 Vol. 19
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motion to dismiss the defendant's complaint in the circuit court, based upon
the pendency of the foreclosure filed in the county court.93 The circuit
court denied Nachon's motion to dismiss and discharged Nachon's lien.
The court held that the foreclosure pending in the county court did not
satisfy the statutory requirement that an action to enforce a lien must
commence in a court of competent jurisdiction within one year of recording
a claim of lien.94 The holding implied that the county court was not a
court of competent jurisdiction to hear lien foreclosures, even when they
involve amounts within the county court's monetary jurisdiction.95
Nachon appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal, arguing that the
foreclosure action filed in county court was a valid action, complying with
the one year statute of limitations under section 713.22(1) for enforcing
construction liens.96 The district court agreed and, without referring to
Spradley, stated:
Pursuant to this section [34.01(4)], a "court of competent jurisdiction"
to hear foreclosure actions, which are equitable in nature, now includes
the County Court. Unlike an action to quiet title, which is within the
exclusive jurisdiction ofthe Circuit Court, see s. 26.012(2)(g), Fla. Stat.
(1991), the foreclosure action at issue here is not an action "involving
the title and boundaries of real property." Thus, construction lien
foreclosure actions are to be filed in the County Court if the amount
involved does not exceed the jurisdictional limit of that court.97
Statute and specifically the granting of the jurisdiction in the Circuit Court
overrides any general jurisdictional grant through section 34.01 of Florida
Statutes, as amended.
Appellee's Reply Brief at 1, Nachon Enters. Inc. v. Alexdex Corp., 615 So. 2d 245, 246 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App.) (No. 92-01456), review granted, 626 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1993), and
approved, 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
93. Nachon, 615 So. 2d at 246. In Nachon's reply brief, it stated that Nachon did
attempt to transfer the county court lien foreclosure action to the circuit court, but the motion
was denied by administrative judge order, finding no basis for the transfer, Nachon used this
to argue that the lien foreclosure action had been properly brought in the county court.
Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, Nachon Enters. Inc. v. Alexdex Corp., 615 So. 2d 245, 246
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (No. 92-01456), review granted, 626 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1993), and
approved, 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
94. Nachon, 615 So. 2d at 246.
95. Id.
96. Appellant's Initial Brief at 5, Nachon Enters. Inc. v. Alexdex Corp., 615 So. 2d 245
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (No. 92-01456), review granted, 626 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1993), and
approved, 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
97. Nachon, 615 So. 2d at 246-47 (citations omitted).
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Thus, the district court construed section 34.01(4) as denying the circuit
courts jurisdiction in equity cases not exceeding $15,000, including
construction lien foreclosures, because they do not involve title and
boundaries to real property.9
The Third District Court of Appeal's reasoning in its decision is
troubling. The court never acknowledged any inconsistency between
sections 34.01(4) and 26.012(2)(c). 99  First, it equated the phrase in
34.01(4), "all matters in equity involved in any case," with actions solely in
equity.' 0 Second, the court construed the exception in section 34.01(4)
["except as otherwise restricted by the State Constitution or the laws of
Florida"] as referring only to section 26.012(2)(g), which provides that
circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in all actions "involving
title and boundaries to real property."' 10 ' The court did not attempt to
explain how the circuit courts could have exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases in equity and yet not have exclusive original jurisdiction when the
amount in controversy is under $15,000. If the restriction in section
34.01(4) was intended to refer only to section 26.012(2)(g), the use of
language as encompassing as "the State Constitution or the laws of Florida"
was unnecessary.
Even if the restriction in section 34.01(4) referred only to section
26.012(2)(g) (that the county courts' equity jurisdiction is restricted only in
the area of actions involving title and boundaries to real property), as the
Third District Court of Appeal suggests, a construction lien foreclosure such
as Nachon's would necessarily involve title to real property.0 2 Neverthe-
less, the Nachon court stated that construction lien foreclosures do not
involve title and boundaries to real property.'0 3 In making this assertion,
the court stated that the provision in section 26.012(2)(g) concerning actions
"involving title and boundaries to real property" meant only actions to quiet
title.' O4 In support of its position, the court cited several landlord-tenant
and unlawful detainer cases to demonstrate that there are actions which deal
with real property but do not involve title or boundaries.' The cases
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 5.
103. Nachon, 615 So. 2d at 246-47.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Spector v. Old Town Key West Dev., Ltd., 567 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (declaratory relief and appointment of a receiver); Kugeares, 372 So.
2d at 1132 (landlord-tenant possession action); Williams v. Gund, 334 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 2d
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cited referred only to the power of a county court hearing such cases to hear
equitable defenses."0 6 Landlord-tenant cases involve disputes over the
possession and not the title to real property and have historically been within
the jurisdiction of the county courts.' °7  Lien foreclosures are quite
different from possessory actions. 08
An action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, like an action to foreclose a
mortgage on land, is an action seeking to judicially convert a lien
interest (an equitable interest) against a land title to a legal title to the
land and in such an action the result sought by the action requires the
trial court to act directly on the title to the real property.0 9
Lien foreclosures are usually considered to be in rem or quasi in rem
actions. 1 Condemnation actions, partition actions, ejectment actions, and
quiet title actions are other examples of in rem actions where the res is real
property."' With this in mind, it would seem that the phrase "involving
title and boundaries to real property" may be referring not only to quiet title
actions, but also to any actions where the res is real property. More
importantly, a foreclosure action in enforcement of a construction lien or a
mortgage does necessarily fall into the category represented by section
26.012(2)(g).' 2
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (action for damages and for unlawful detainer)). The cases were closely
scrutinized by the Florida Bar's Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section in their amicus
brief filed in the Nachon supreme court appeal. Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae (Florida
Bar) at 6, 15, 16, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
106. See supra note 105.
107. See FLA. STAT. § 34.011 (1993).
108. Possessory actions usually do not involve disputes over title, only possession.
Usually someone who has title seeks to oust someone who does not, as is the case with
landlord-tenant situations. Lien foreclosures, on the other hand, seek to force a sale of a
property, with the accompanying transfer of title, in order to satisfy an unpaid debt. The
claimant's main interest is usually to be reimbursed and not to take possession of the
property.
109. Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Cheesbro Roofing, Inc., 502 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1987). Alexdex made this argument before the Florida Supreme Court. See
injra note 168.
110. Publix, 502 So. 2d at 486-87. "A suit to foreclose a mortgage is to a certain extent
and for certain purposes a proceeding in rem, since it is primarily directed against the mort-
gaged property, but it is more accurately termed 'quasi in rem.' Id. at 487.
111. Id. at 486.
112. Cf Appellee's Reply Brief at 3, Nachon (No. 81,765) (citing Scott v. Premium
Dev., Inc., 328 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1976) for its discussion of the drastic
effect a mechanic's lien has on the use and alienation of real property); see also supra note
19941
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Alexdex Corporation appealed to the Florida Supreme Court." 3 Oral
arguments were heard in January 1994."' Nine months later, the supreme
court issued its per curiam decision, holding that county and circuit courts
have concurrent jurisdiction, partially affirming the Third District Court of
Appeal's decision." 5 The substance of the parties' arguments, several
amicus curiae briefs filed in the case, and the court's decision will be
discussed in part V to elucidate the factors that may have influenced the
court's decision.
C. Brooks v. Ocean Village Condominium Ass'n
Brooks v. Ocean Village Condominium Ass'n..6 was the second case
decided by the Third District Court of Appeal regarding the jurisdiction of
county courts to decide foreclosures. Brooks involved a condominium
assessment lien foreclosure, which the condominium association had brought
in circuit court." 7 The court held that condominium assessment lien
foreclosures not exceeding $15,000 are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the county courts." 8 In a short opinion, which was based upon its prior
holding in Nachon, the court did express recognition of the developing
controversy, stating that, in holding that the county court had jurisdiction in
Nachon, it was agreeing with the rationale in Spradley."'9 Additionally,
in a footnote to the opinion, the court stated: "We urge the legislature to
take action to correct the conflict now existing between paragraph 26.012-
(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1991), and subsection 34.01(4), Florida Statutes
(1991). In our view the statutes prescribing the jurisdiction of the county
and circuit courts should be clear and unequivocal."' 2 ° The court here
recognized the clear conflict, which it ignored in Nachon, with respect to
sections 26.012(2)(c) and 34.01(4), and seemed to retreat from its interpreta-
tion of section 26.012(2)(g) in Nachon, holding that lien foreclosures do not
involve title and boundaries to real property.'
5.
113. Alexdex, 641 So. 2d at 858.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 860.
116. 625 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 112 n.2 (citation omitted).
121. Brooks, 625 So. 2d at 112 n.2.; see inra part V. As urged by ARDA in its amicus
brief in the Nachon supreme court appeal, this case can be used as an example of the proper
Vol. 19
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D. Blackton, Inc. v. Young
The most recent case dealing with this issue in the context of lien
foreclosures is Blackton, Inc. v. Young.' Relying on Nachon, the Fifth
District Court of Appeal held that the circuit court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the foreclosure of the $757.05 lien involved in the
case.' The court used the exact reasoning employed by the Third
District in Nachon-that foreclosures do not "involv[e] . .. title and
boundaries ... [t]o real property."' 24  The Blackton court, however, was
more thorough in its explanation:
There are several constitutional provisions which restrict the county
courts' jurisdiction. Specifically, Article V, Section 6(b), Florida Con-
stitution provides that county courts shall exercise the jurisdiction
prescribed by general law. Additionally, Article V, Section 20(c)(3),
Florida Constitution provides that circuit courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction in all actions at law not cognizable by county
courts, in all cases in equity and in all actions involving the titles or
boundaries or right of possession of real property (emphasis supplied).
Article V is effective from January 1, 1973 until changed be general
law. FLA. CONST. art. V ss 20(c), (j).
Notably, there is an inconsistency between Article V, Section
20(c)(3), Florida Constitution which vests circuit courts with exclusive
original jurisdiction in all actions involving the titles or boundaries of
real property [and in all equity actions] and section 26.012(2)(g),
Florida Statutes (1991) which vests circuit courts with exclusive original
jurisdiction in all actions involving title and boundaries of real property
(emphasis supplied). However, Article V, Sections 20(c) and (j),
Florida Constitution specifically provide that Article V is effective from
January 1, 1973 until changed by general law. In 1974, the legislature
changed the language in section 26.012(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1973)
giving circuit courts jurisdiction in "all actions involving the title,
method of asserting the amount in controversy. Ocean Village sought to foreclose its claim
of lien for condominium assessments of $3984.44. Knowing that the real property value of
the condominium was approximately $50,000, the court concluded that the county court had
proper jurisdiction because the plaintiff's good faith amount in controversy was below the
$15,000 county court jurisdictional amount. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Resort
Development Association at 16, Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enters., Inc., 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla.
1994) (No. 81,765) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief (ARDA)].
122. 629 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 639 So. 2d 976
(Fla. 1994).
123. Id. at 941.
124. Id. at 940.
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boundaries, or right of possession of real property". . . . See s
26.012(2)(g), Fla. Stat. (1974 Supp). Additionally, section 34.01(4),
Florida Statutes (1991), which expands the circuit courts' equity
jurisdiction to include county courts, became effective October 1, 1990.
These provisions thereby supersede the constitutional provision.'25
The court seemed to place the inconsistency in the wrong part of the
statute. First, the court need not have referred to section 26.012(2)(g),
stating that circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction "in all actions
involving title and boundaries of real property." Presumably, if we accept
the court's reasoning that lien foreclosures are not actions involving title and
boundaries to real property, then this section does not apply.' 26 Therefore,
the conflict as to which court can hear lien foreclosures was due only to the
changes in section 34.01(4), which refer to "matters in equity involved
within any case. ' 127 The court did not attempt to resolve the patent
conflict between section 34.01(4) and 26.012(2)(c), stating only that the
circuit court's equity jurisdiction is now expanded to include the county
courts. 28 This statement is contradictory; how can a court expand its own
jurisdiction by giving part of it away to another court? This statement could
be interpreted to mean that the circuit court had not given up any of its
equity jurisdiction to the county court, meaning that the circuit and county
courts have concurrent jurisdiction. But this interpretation conflicts with the
outcome of the case, which affirmed the circuit court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 2 9 Furthermore, section 34.01(4) is limited by
the phrase "except as otherwise restricted by the Constitution or the laws of
Florida."'30 Section 26.012(2)(c), which fits this description, states that
125. Id.
126. Cf Appellant's Reply Brief at 6, Blackton, Inc. v. Young, 629 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 93-2214), review granted, 639 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1994) (referring
to Florida's Marketable Record Title Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 712.01-10 (1993)). Section
712.01(3) defines "title transaction" as "any recorded instrument or court proceeding which
affects title to any estate or interest in land and which describes the land sufficiently to
identify its location and boundaries." Lien foreclosures fall under that definition, urged
counsel for Blackton, Inc. The appellant's counsel also used the fact that the property owner
is an indispensable party, that a foreclosure action not seeking a deficiency decree is purely
in rem, and that the legal description must be in the foreclosure complaint, to support the
assertion that foreclosures do involve title and boundaries. See Appellant's Reply Brief at
7-8, Blackton (No. 93-2214).
127. FLA. STAT. § 34.01(4) (1993).
128. Blackton, 629 So. 2d at 940.
129. Id. at 941.
130. FLA. STAT. § 34.01(4) (1993).
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circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in equity.13'
Blackton appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, and the court accepted
jurisdiction on May 3, 1994, in light of the Nachon appeal.'32
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE UNCERTAINTY
Nachon and its progeny generated considerable discussion and debate
in the real estate industry. Although the cases decided involved foreclosures
of construction liens and condominium assessment liens, most practitioners
believed that mortgage foreclosures would be treated similarly.'
Several major title insurers, who know all too well how foreclosures
"involve title and boundaries" of real property, issued bulletins to policy
issuing agents and lenders. The bulletins stated that because of the current
conflict, the insurability of title coming through foreclosures not exceeding
$15,000 was being curtailed.'34 Some companies refused to insure such
131. Id. § 26.012(2)(c).
132. Blackton, Inc. v. Young, 639 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1994).
133. Interview with Louis Nicholas, Counsel, Ocean Bank Legal Department, in Miami,
FL (May 20, 1994).
134. See, e.g., Memorandum from Patricia P. Jones, Underwriting Manager, Attorneys'
Title Insurance Fund, to All Fund Agents (June 7, 1993) (on file with author), which advises:
As many of you are aware, uncertainty currently exists on the issue of
whether the circuit or county court is the proper court to hear foreclosure
amounts involving liens of 15,000 or less. In many of Florida's judicial circuits,
foreclosure actions involving these types of liens are being transferred from
circuit court to county court. See, 1990 and 1992 amendments to Ch. 34, F.S.,
giving county courts jurisdiction to hear matters in equity and increasing the
jurisdictional "amount in controversy" threshold to $15,000. The recent case of
Nachon Enterprisesv. Alexdex Corporation, 18 FLW D678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993),
upholding the validity of foreclosure actions brought in county court, has added
momentum to this process.
The Nachon, supra, case is being appealed, and if it is reversed, all
foreclosure actions decided in county court since October 1, 1990, may be void
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, Art. V, See. 20 Fla. Const. 1968 (as
amended), and sec. 26.012, F.S. which provide that exclusive jurisdiction to hear
matters involving title and boundaries to real property is vested in the circuit
courts.
On the other hand, the recent case of Spradley v. Doe, 612 So. 2d 722
(Fla. 1 st DCA 1993) has cast doubt on the validity of small lien foreclosures in
circuit court, by holding that circuit courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to
hear matters in equity when the amount in controversy is within the jurisdic-
tional limit of the county court.
Until the Supreme Court of Florida detects the question of the proper court
to hear these types of foreclosure actions, The Fund will not authorize the
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titles regardless of the court in which the foreclosure judgment was
obtained.'35 An additional indication of the impact that the uncertainty has
had on real estate law is the fact that the Attorney's Title Insurance Fund
discussed the Nachon and Brooks cases in their Annual Fund Assembly
Seminar in Orlando, Florida held on May 12-14, 1994.36
Several amici curiae,' who filed briefs in the Nachon supreme court
appeal, effectively described the worst case scenario: Title through
foreclosure is declared void because of a judgment entered by a court
lacking subject matter jurisdiction.'38 One group of amici curiae, com-
prised of title insurers and one lender, expressed its views about the
implications of the confusion in the following manner:
A person purchases vacant land at a foreclosure sale, or buys the
property from the successful bidder. The new purchaser builds his or
her dream home on the land. Since the underlying judgment would be
void, and the title defective, a title pirate could buy the foreclosed
owner's interest for a nominal sum, and then hold the title for ransom
at the expense of the innocent buyer or the title insurance company
which insured the title out of foreclosure.
This is not the stuff of mere speculation, but a harsh reality were
the Florida Bar's interpretation of the statutes and Constitution followed
issuance of policies insuring title coming through foreclosures where the amount
of the lien foreclosed is $15,000 or less, regardless of whether the suit was
brought in circuit court or county court.
Id.; see also Bulletin No. 93-020 from American Pioneer Title Insurance Company to All
Florida Offices (May 20, 1993) (on file with the author) (stating that company will continue
to insure only foreclosures decided in circuit court, and only as long as the jurisdictional issue
is not raised as a defense in the proceedings); Underwriting Bulletin from Commonwealth
Title Insurance Company to Florida Agents (May 17, 1993) (on file with the author)
(advising that "Commonwealth will not insure any transaction in which a certificate of title
has been issued in a foreclosure action filed after October 1, 1990, where the amount to be
recovered was less than $15,000.00 (exclusive of costs and attorneys fees)").
135. See supra note 131.
136. Annual Fund Assembly Seminar, Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund, in Orlando, FL
(May 12-14, 1994).
137. The amici included The Florida Bar's Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
Section, Stewart Title Guaranty Corp., Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund, First American Title
Insurance Company, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Corp., The Florida Land Title
Association, Old Republic National Title Insurance Company, Avatar Properties, Inc., and
the American Resort Development Association.
138. See supra note 136.
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by this court. It is this Court's duty to search out an interpretation
which would avoid this precise result.'39
Another organization whose interests were affected by the uncertainty
regarding in which court to file small foreclosures is the American Resort
Development Association ("ARDA"). 4 ° The amicus curiae brief ex-
plained:
Each year ARDA's members file large number of mortgage or
claim of lien foreclosure actions in amounts below $15,000.00.
Subsequent to retaking title to a timeshare interest by foreclosure,
ARDA's members offer to sell these timeshare interests to the general
public. However, title insurance companies are unwilling to issue title
insurance until the court has made a determination as to the proper court
to hear foreclosure matters. Without title insurance, a timeshare interest
is virtually unsalable.'
ARDA described its own version of the worst case scenario:
There are approximately 780,810 timeshare unit weeks in Florida.
In Lee County alone there are 60,000 timeshare unit weeks. All Lee
County foreclosure actions with an Amount in Controversy below
$15,000 must be filed in county court. If only one percent of the
60,200 timeshare unit weeks went into foreclosure over the last three
years, over 600 void judgments would result if the circuit courts are
held to have exclusive jurisdiction.'42
139. Amicus Curiae Brief for Stewart Title Guaranty Corp., et al. at 10, Alexdex Corp.
v. Nachon Enters., Inc., 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994) (No. 81,765) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae
Brief (Stewart)]. The amici further noted that:
Title insurance is usually issued for the purchase price. In the example, the
owner would lose the value of the property to the extent it exceeded his
purchase price. Even if fully insured at the time of purchase, the owner would
lose any increase in value in the months or years before the foreclosed owner
or his assignee appeared.
Id. at 10 n.4.
140. Amicus Curiae Brief (ARDA) at 1, Alexdex (No. 81,765). The Association
describes itself as follows: ARDA is a trade association representing the resort and vacation
ownership industry. Our 800 members include roughly all the timeshare developers
nationwide. ARDA is dedicated to the resort industry and educating its members, the public,
and state and federal legislatures, by promoting responsible and effective timeshare
regulation. Id.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 6.
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The confusion also impacted the courts. The circuit courts began
issuing administrative orders requiring lien foreclosures not exceeding
$15,000 to be brought in county courts.'43 For example, "Lee and Collier
County Circuit Courts, in Administrative Order Number 1.7, require that 'all
mortgage and lien foreclosure actions filed within the Twentieth Judicial
Circuit shall come within the jurisdiction of the County court if the amount
in controversy does not exceed Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) Dol-
lars. '"44
V. SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY THE LITIGANTS, THE BAR, THE
LEGISLATURE, AND THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
A. The Litigants'Arguments to the Florida Supreme Court
Alexdex Corporation appealed the Third District Court of Appeal's
decision to the Florida Supreme Court. 145 The supreme court heard oral
arguments in January of this year and released its decision on September 1,
1994. The court held that county and circuit courts have concurrent
jurisdiction in equity, partially affirming the district courts decision.'46
Interestingly, the construction lien involved in the Nachon case was
transferred to bond before the supreme court appeal was filed. 47  This
would seem to have made the claim strictly monetary because title to
property was no longer at stake. 48  However, the issue of whether the
county court had jurisdiction was still relevant in Nachon. If it had been
decided that the county courts lacked jurisdiction to hear lien foreclosures,
Nachon's lien would have been discharged because Nachon did not file its
143. Amicus Curiae Brief (Stewart) at 9, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
144. Id.
145. Alexdex, 641 So. 2d at 858.
146. Id. at 860.
147. Telephone Interview with Luis Consuegra, General Counsel, Ocean Bank, in
Miami, FL (June 7, 1994). Mr. Consuegra advised that Ocean Bank, in its underwriting of
a loan to be secured by the property involved in Nachon, required that Nachon's lien be
transferred to bond to clear the title on the subject property. Id.; see also Appellant's Initial
Brief at 3, Alexdex (No. 81,765). The brief stated that on July 30, 1992, prior to the Third
District Court of Appeal's decision, the Clerk of the Circuit and County Courts in and for
Dade County, Florida filed its certificate of a cash bond filed by Alexdex transferring
Nachon's lien to security. The issue presented by the lien being transferred to bond was
whether the action was converted into a purely monetary action, no longer involving real
property.
148. See 34 FLA. JUR. 2D Liens § 32 (1992).
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suit in a "court of competent jurisdiction" within the specified time.'49
The supreme court appeal garnered great publicity, having been
reported in the Florida Bar Journal.5 The legislature seems to have
been waiting for the decision to give it guidance on how to proceed.'
As mentioned earlier, title insurance companies discussed the case in
seminars, and issued notices regarding the Third District Court of Appeal's
decision.' Several amicus curiae briefs were submitted, including one
by the Florida Bar Real Property, Probate and Trust Section, arguing that
foreclosures should be kept under the jurisdiction of the circuit courts.'
On appeal the litigants were primarily concerned with prevailing in their
immediate action; concerns about how the decision would affect the practice
of real estate law were given much less attention. Nachon argued in its
supreme court brief that a distinction exists between actions which "involve"
title to real property and actions which "affect" title, and that lien foreclo-
sures affect title but do not involve title.'54 Nachon stated that an action
to foreclose a construction lien is not an example of an action involving title
to land.' Its counsel reasoned:
A construction lien foreclosure action is a statutory action created
by the legislature which allows a lienor even without privity with the
owner to encumber the real property improved by the services, labor
and/or materials of said lienor in order to secure the payment to lienor
of said services, labor and/or materials. Therefore, a construction lien
foreclosure action is not different from an action to collect monies for
149. See FLA. STAT. § 713.21(4) (1993).
150. Ronald D. Waller, Annual Report Sections and Divisions of the Florida Bar, Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law, FLA. B.J., June 1994, at 19, 41.
151. See Bill Will Establish Art. V Study Panel, FLA. B. NEWs, Apr. 15, 1994, at 5.
152. See supra note 134.
153. See infra note 173.
154. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 4, Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enters., Inc., 641
So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994) (No. 81,765) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. The definition of
"affect" is: "To act upon; influence; change; enlarge or abridge; often used in the sense of
acting injuriously upon persons and things. To lay hold of or attack (as a disease does); to
act, or produce an effect or result upon; to impress or influence (the mind or feelings); to
touch." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 57 (6th ed. 1990). The definition of "involve" is: "to
enfold or envelop; to make intricate or complicated; to entangle in difficulty, danger, etc.;
implicate; to draw or hold within itself; include or entail; to relate to or affect."
WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICrnONARY 396 (2d ed. 1975).
155. Respondent's Brief at 4, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
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services rendered and/or goods sold and delivered which does not
involve title to land.
56
Nachon argued that because a lien foreclosure judgment can be satisfied
by the payment of money, it does not necessarily involve the judicial
determination of rights to the title of property.'57 Nachon further stated:
"The legislature in enacting § 26.012(2)(6) did not intend to vest original
exclusive jurisdiction in the circuit court in all actions affecting real
property, but in all actions involving the title and boundaries of real proper-
ty."'  This statement is true but irrelevant. It is true that the circuit court
does not have jurisdiction in all actions "affecting" real property; it lacks
jurisdiction to hear a landlord-tenant action which "involves" possession and
is one "affecting" real property.'5 9 However, as discussed previously, it
seems illogical to argue that a foreclosure action does not "involve" and
"affect" title to real property. 6 Nachon further argued in its answer brief
on jurisdiction, that if a lien foreclosure involves title to real property, then
any action seeking a judgment for money damages could be considered an
action involving title to real property because the money "judgment obtained
becomes a lien against the real property of the judgment-debtor which
execution seeks a judicial sale of said real property and therefore directly
affects the title to said property."'' This conclusion seemed to implicitly
admit that the lien foreclosure stated in his hypothetical was an action
involving title to real property.
The petitioner, Alexdex, in its supreme court reply brief, stressed the
distinction between the creation of a lien and its foreclosure in determining
156. Id.
157. Id. at 6 (citing McMullen v. McMullen, 122 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1960). But see supra note 108 (lien foreclosures require the court to act directly on the title
to the property).
158. Respondent's Brief at 7, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
159. See, e.g., EMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Community Health Related Servs., Inc., 615
So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that county court had exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction over the right of possession).
160. In fact, one of the cases Nachon cited, In re Estate of Weiss, 106 So. 2d 411 (Fla.
1958), seemed to contradict rather than support Nachon's argument:
An action involves title to real estate only where the necessary result of the
decree or judgment is that one party gains or the other loses an interest in the
real estate, or where the title is so put in issue by the pleadings that the decision
of the case necessarily involves the judicial determination of such rights.
Id.; Respondent's Brief at 7, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
161. Respondent's Answer Brief on Jurisdiction at 5, Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enters.,
Inc., 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994) (No. 81,765).
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whether a lien foreclosure involves title to real property.'62 Counsel for
Alexdex argued:
There is a major difference between the establishment of a lien and the
foreclosure of it. Once a lien is to be foreclosed, then under the
operative statutes and case law, the title to the property is dealt with
directly and conclusively within the final judgment, and it is an action
which should be exclusively within the province of the circuit court. 63
Counsel for Alexdex recognized that reversing the Third District Court
of Appeal's decision could invalidate numerous foreclosure actions which
have been completed in county court, but argued that:
That result can be obviated by this Court through the application of the
"de facto judge" theory to those cases which are complete, by the
requirement that all pending property foreclosure cases of all types be
forthwith administratively transferred to circuit court, and by the
requirement that henceforth all filings be taken only in the circuit
court. 164
Counsel for Alexdex also mentioned the fact that all actions that are in rem
or quasi-in rem by definition involve title to real property, and cited cases
which discuss the local action rule. 6  Alexdex argued:
Although county courts were given equitable jurisdiction (a coercive, in
personam, type of jurisdiction) they were not given in rem jurisdiction
over realty. As a result, the jurisdiction statutes can be reconciled in the
foreclosure context.
The courts have consistently held that a court cannot cause its own
judgment to effect a title transfer unless that court has in rem juris-
diction. 66
162. Petitioner's Reply Brief at I, Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enters., Inc., 641 So. 2d
858 (Fla. 1994) (No. 81,765).
163. Id. Counsel for Alexdex did not seem to recognize Nachon's argued distinction
between "involve" and "affect;" Alexdex repeatedly equated the two, and substituted affect
for involve, claiming that Nachon was arguing that foreclosure does not affect title, when
Nachon was arguing was that it does affect title, but does not involve it. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 3.
166. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3, Alexdex (No. 81,765) (citing Greene v. A.G.B.B.
Hotels, Inc., 505 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a suit was
converted from in rem to in personam once a mechanic's lien was transferred to bond)).
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Alexdex noted that section 45.031(5), which prescribes the procedures for
judicial sales, "states that the certificate of title recorded in furtherance of
a judicial sale - the object of a foreclosure action - transfers title without the
necessity of any further proceedings or instruments... and directly proves
that the action effects the boundaries and title to property. . . ."' In its
brief, Alexdex noted that the supreme court also approved a form foreclo-
sure judgment forms:
The last, and to Petitioner's mind most convincing, is that the form
foreclosure judgment approved by this Court as an appendage to the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and by the legislature in Chapter 45,
sets forth that a particular parcel of property to which the lien had
attached, described by legal description, will be sold by the Court at a
date certain. That is not a judgment for payment of money. The
payment may stop the sale, it may redeem the title, but the judgment
orders the sale. The judgment, and its attendant certificate of title,
effects a transfer of title without the intervention of the party or further
court proceedings. 6
8
Alexdex urged the court to hold that the circuit courts have exclusive
jurisdiction in foreclosure actions, and that the de facto judge theory be
applied to resolve the problem of the potential invalidity of foreclosure cases
decided in the interim period in county courts. 169 Although de facto judge
167. Id. at 4.
168. Id. at 5; see also Petitioner's Main Brief at 7, Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enters.,
Inc., 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994) (No. 81,765) which provides:
In the typical lien foreclosure complaint, where the lien has not been trans-
ferred to bond, the complaint, as is true herein, seeks a judicial sale of the
underlying realty. Thus, lien foreclosure actions are one class of actions which
directly involve title to property since one party stands to lose an interest in real
estate by virtue of the judicial act taken - a forced sale. Absent payment or
redemption, a certificate of title is issued from the clerk of the court to a
successful buyer. Common sense tells us that nothing could effect [sic] title
more than a direct judicial sale of the underlying parcel.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
169. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5-6, Alexdex (No. 81,765) states:
This Court has, in appropriate cases, found that a judge improperly assigned,
acting under color of authority and without objection could be found to be a "de
facto judge" so as to validate questionable judicial acts. But for an order of
temporary assignment to circuit court, these judges would have been capable of
hearing the foreclosure proceedings. The clerks office is shared between the
county and circuit courts.
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theory is frequently used in the criminal division of the circuit court because
of the overwhelming volume of cases, its use is less common in the civil
division. 7 It should not be transformed from an emergency measure into
a means of increasing the jurisdiction of the county court.
Alexdex further argued against distinguishing liens by individual value,
with liens of $15,000 heard in the circuit court.' It would be more
efficient if one court heard all foreclosure cases involving a particular piece
of land. A county court sitting in equity might hear a small lien foreclosure
case in which a senior lienor intervenes. Would it be fair for a county
court, which is only empowered to hear cases not exceeding $15,000, to
decide the rights of all lienors to a property, when the combined amount of
all liens exceeds $15,000? The answer is probably no, but the issue is
illusory because such a case would likely be transferred to the circuit
court. 7 2 Even if not, the county and circuit courts use the same clerk. 73
As such, a lis pendens. filed with respect to an action in county court imparts
notice just as much as a lis pendens filed with respect to an action in circuit
court. Furthermore, if the county courts were vested with powers in equity,
they should be able to balance the equities regardless of the amount in
controversy. Equity is usually not related to money, and equitable relief is
Id. (citations omitted); see also FLA. STAT. § 26.57 (1993) (providing for temporary
designation of county court judges to preside over circuit court cases).
170. Interview with Edward Iturralde, Assistant State Attorney, Office of The State
Attorney, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in Miami, FL (June 14, 1994).
171. Petitioner's Main Brief at 9-10, Alexdex (No. 81,765). Alexdex, the petitioner,
argued that for the sake of consistency, one court should hear all liens filed against one
parcel:
[I]t does not seem likely that the intent of permitting equitable jurisdiction was
to place into the hands of county courts the ability to sell unlimited values of
property all because of small liens. Until our two tier system of trial courts is
totally abrogated, demarcation must be based upon the total value of the issues
being handled, not just the individual components of the lawsuits in question.
Id.; see also Petitioner's Amended Brief on Jurisdiction at 6, Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon
Enters., Inc., 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994) (No. 81,765): "Although to some degree the lines
between county and circuit courts are blurring, they still remain district [sic] in that the
circuit court is still the only court with constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to transfer
title to real property from one party to another." Id. Alexdex also argued that by allowing
foreclosure in both courts, foreclosure sales of the same property could be conducted in two
courts. Id. at 6-7.
172. Where the holder of a small lien seeks to foreclose, the larger lienors usually
intervene, foreclosing their own liens, and moving to transfer the case to the circuit court
because the amount in controversy is over $15,000.
173. See FLA. STAT. § 34.031 (1993) (providing that the "clerk of the circuit court shall
be the clerk of the county court unless otherwise provided by law").
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granted in cases involving land, not because the parties may lose money, but
because they may lose land, which is unique. 74
B. The Amicus Curiae Briefs-Bar and Real Estate Industry
Proposals
Three briefs were filed by amicus curiae, which included The Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar, Attorney's Title
Insurance Fund, and the Florida Land Title Association among several
others.'75 The Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The
Florida Bar argued that the Third District Court of Appeal's decision "has
unequivocally cast doubt on the jurisdiction of courts to hear lien foreclo-
sure cases and adversely impacts the stability of land titles coming through
foreclosure,"' 76 and stressed that section 26.012(2)(g) restricts the applica-
tion of section 34.01(4).' The Bar argued:
[L]egislative intent, which is the primary factor in construing statutes,
must be resolved from the language of the statute. Simply stated, a
statute is to be construed and applied in the manner enacted. Further,
all statutes are presumed to be consistent with each other and enacted
with knowledge of existing statutes. 78
The use of the words "shall" and "exclusive" in section 26.012(2)(g) and
"title and boundaries to real property," if presumed to be consistent with
section 34.01(4), could only support this interpretation, according to the
Bar.
179
The Bar argued that Spradley was inapplicable because it was an action
for declaratory judgment, which does not involve title or boundaries to real
property, whereas foreclosures do. 8 Also noted was the inconsistency of
section 34.01(4) with section 702.07, concerning the "[p]owers of courts and
judges to set aside foreclosure decrees."'' Section 702.07 expressly
provides that only the circuit courts have the power to set aside decrees. 182
174. See 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 30 (1992).
175. See supra note 137.
176. Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae (Florida Bar) at 1, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
177. Id. at 2.
178. Id. at 2-3; see also 49 FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 180 (1992).
179. Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae (Florida Bar) at 3, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
180. Id. at 9.
181. Id. at 11.
182. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 702.09 (1993).
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The Bar then went on to explain the definitions of "exclusive," and "title
and boundaries of real property," referring also to the Marketable Record
Title Act.'83 The Bar argued that foreclosure involved title to real proper-
ty because the owners are necessary and indispensable parties to the
action,"' and it also mentioned possible problems in valuating lien
foreclosures for jurisdictional purposes.'85
A second brief, filed on behalf of several title insurers and one
lender,'86 argued that the circuit court should have concurrent jurisdiction
with the county courts over foreclosures under $15,000, to preserve the
validity of foreclosures completed since 1990. s' While the title insurers
agreed with the Bar's statement that the Third District Court of Appeal's
decisions in Nachon and Brooks had cast doubt on titles coming through
foreclosures not in excess of $15,000,88 the insurers disagreed that~the
circuit courts had exclusive jurisdiction in equity, section 26.012(2)(c)
notwithstanding:
The Amici do not disagree with the Florida Bar that a rule of
exclusive jurisdiction in the circuit courts prospectively has tremendous
appeal. Certainly, such a result would avoid amount in controversy
questions, and preserve in the circuit courts their traditional role of
having exclusive jurisdiction over lien foreclosures, regardless of the
amount in controversy. However, the Florida Bar has studiously
ignored what has happened, and is happening every day: the filing,
prosecution, and termination of lien foreclosures in the county courts
throughout the State." 9
183. Exclusive means: "Appertaining to the subject alone, not including, admitting, or
pertaining to any others. Sole. Shutting out; debarring from interference or participation;
vested in one person alone. Apart from all others, without the admission of others to
participation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (6th ed. 1990). The definition of"exclusive"
reinforces and substantiates the conclusion that actions involving the title and boundaries of
real property lie within the sole jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts.
184. Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae (Florida Bar) at 13, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
185. Id. at 17.
186. These include Stewart Title Guaranty Corp., Attorney's Title Insurance Fund, First
American Title Insurance Co., Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Corp., The Florida Land
Title Ass'n, Old Republic National Title Insurance Co., and Avatar Properties, Inc.
187. Amicus Curiae Brief (Stewart) at 7-8, Alexdex(No 81,765). The amici contended
that interpreting the statutes and constitution to provide the circuit courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over lien foreclosures would throw the real estate business into hopeless
confusion or uncertainty, and must be rejected in favor of concurrent jurisdiction between the
circuit and county courts. Id. at 7.
188. Id. at 8-9.
189. Id. at 8.
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The title insurers also disagreed with the Florida Bar that the amount
in controversy was a problem, stating that jurisdiction is determined by the
amount claimed and put into controversy in good faith.19 They argued
that the only acceptable interpretation would be to consider the circuit and
county courts as having concurrent jurisdiction, thereby preserving the
validity of past foreclosure judgments:
The circuit and county courts of this State have concurrent
equitable jurisdiction to hear and determine lien foreclosures within the
jurisdictional limits of the county courts, because any other interpreta-
tion runs contrary to established principles of constitutional and
statutory construction, is inconsistent with case law from this Court
favoring concurrent jurisdiction, and would be productive of much
litigation and insecurity which a reasonable construction of the Constitu-
tion and statutes can avoid 91
In this manner, the plaintiff may select his or her forum in those
actions falling within the jurisdictional limits of the county courts. 92 The
190. Id. at 8 n.2 (citing Williams v. Gund, 334 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(arguing that "the amount claimed to be due under the lien sought to be foreclosed would
control")).
191. Amicus Curiae Brief (Stewart) at 2, Alexdex(No. 81,765); see also id. at 16 (citing
to 49 FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 183 (1984) ("[A] court should be astute in avoiding a
construction which may be productive of much litigation and insecurity, or which would
throw the meaning or administration of the law, or the forms of business, into hopeless
confusion or uncertainty.")). The amici continued:
First and foremost, a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution and
statutes involved compels the conclusion that the Legislature intended for the
circuit and county courts to have concurrent jurisdiction of foreclosures where
the amount in controversy is less than fifteen thousand (15,000.00) dollars. This
is so, because § 26.012 Fla. Stat. (1991) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the circuit
courts to hear all cases in equity, and actions involving the title and boundaries
of real property. In the same vein, the Legislature has seen fit in § 34.01(4)
(1990) to grant the judges of the county courts permissive jurisdiction to hear
"all matters in equity." Since a clear conflict exists, the latest expression of the
legislative will should govern. Moreover, since the Legislature used the word
"may" in section 34.01(4) to describe the scope of the county courts' equitable
jurisdiction, and as concurrent jurisdiction is the norm rather than the exception,
the jurisdiction of the courts involved should be concurrent.
Id. at 2-3. The amici also cited to State v. Butt, 5 So. 597 (Fla. 1889), in support of the
proposition that the legislature can grant one court additional jurisdiction, but in doing so,
cannot diminish the constitutional jurisdiction of another court. Such a grant of additional
jurisdiction must be concurrent. Id. at 15.
192. Id. at 15.
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insurers, apparently mindful of their duty to defend the titles they may have
insured which could be invalidated by a decision either way, struggled to
find the only acceptable solution for their interests:
If section 34.01 is viewed as a whole, the Legislature's choice to restrict
the equity jurisdiction of the county courts by reference to the "laws of
Florida" appears not to be directed towards § 26.012(2)(g), Fla. Stat.
(1991), which gives circuit courts [exclusive] jurisdiction over lawsuits
involving both title and boundary disputes. Rather, the Legislature must
have intended to refer to other laws of general application, which vest
exclusive jurisdiction in the circuit courts over certain types of
claims.' 93
The amici disagreed that foreclosures necessarily involve title and
boundaries of real property, and argued that it is not necessary to resort to
subsection 2(g) of section 26.012 of the Florida Statutes to resolve the
dispute: 94
Florida is a lien theory state. Section 697.02, Fla. Stat. (1927) provides
that a "mortgage shall be held to be a specific lien on the property
therein described, and not a conveyance of the legal title or of the right
of possession."
A suit to foreclose a mortgage is most accurately viewed as a quasi
in rem proceeding with its principal object being to secure repayment
of the underlying debt, and its incidental object being to convert the lien
interest by foreclosure and sale of the security for that debt post-
judgment. . . . Certainly, the vast majority of foreclosures do not
193. Amicus Curiae Brief (Stewart) at 3-4, Alexdex (No. 81,765) (failing to note that
one of these "certain types of claims" is expressly stated to be "cases in equity").
194. Id. at 18-20. The amici contended:
First, § 26.012(2)(g) does not appear to be a "law of the State of Florida" within
the contemplation of the Legislature. ... [I]n setting limitations on the county
courts' jurisdiction, the Legislature has historically either used the language
"except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court", or made
specific reference to 26.012. See, e.g., section 34.01(c) 1.; § 34.01(2). It would
have been a simple matter for the Legislature to employ the same conventions
were it intending to limit the jurisdiction of the county courts in equity actions
by reference to § 26.012(g). It chose not to do so.
Id. at 19. "[A] mortgagee does not have an estate or interest in mortgaged lands, by virtue
of his mortgage, but is merely the owner of a chose in action creating a lien on the property."
Id. at 20 (citing Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954)).
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involve [both] title and boundaries of real property, giving full effect
to the copulative "and" expressly provided by the statute.19
Showing apparent uncertainty as to the soundness of their position, the amici
alternately argued that if the court decided that the circuit courts have
exclusive jurisdiction in equity, the court "must craft appropriate protections
to safeguard the validity ofjudgments arising out of foreclosures which have
been prosecuted in the county courts since the effective date of section
34.01(4) Fla. Stat. (1990).,', 96 The insurers urged:
Pursuant to Art. V, § 2(b), Fla. Const. (1972), the Chief Judge of this
Court has the power to assign any judge who is qualified to so act, to
temporary duty as an acting circuit court judge. Rule 2.050(a), Fla. R.
Jud. Admin. specifically preserves this power: a power which this
Court has previously recognized. This Court should accordingly issue
an order signed by the Chief Juitice of this Court assigning those county
court judges who have presided over lien foreclosures to the temporary
duty as acting circuit court judges, nunc pro tunc to the effective date
of § 34.01(4) Fla. Stat. (1990), in those cases which have already gone
to judgment.' 97
Still another amici brief, filed by ARDA, argued that the proper
interpretation was to grant the county and circuit courts concurrent
jurisdiction in lien foreclosures not exceeding $15,000.19 While agreeing
with Nachon's reasoning that foreclosure is not an action involving title,' 99
ARDA argued alternatively that a final judgment entered by a court later
found to have conflicting subject matter jurisdiction would not be void:
However, the situation presented by this case is not that the statutes fail
to provide jurisdiction, but instead the statutes provide conflicting
195. Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).
196. Amicus Curiae Brief (Stewart) at 4, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
197. Id. at 4-5; see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(b):
The chief justice of the supreme court shall be chosen by a majority of the
members of the court. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the judicial
system. He shall have the power to assign justices or judges, including
consenting retired justices or judges, to temporary duty in any court for which
the judge is qualified and to delegate to a chief judge of a judicial circuit the
power to assign judges for duty in his respective circuit.
Id.
198. Amicus Curiae Brief (ARDA) at 3, Alexdex (No. 81,765).
199. Id. at 10.
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jurisdiction. This being the case, assuming arguendo that jurisdiction
is found to lie with either court exclusively, decisions by the other court
could be perceived as an "erroneous exercise of subject matter jurisdic-
tion", rather than void, as not having jurisdiction....
Judgments based on mere "erroneous exercise of jurisdiction" are not
void, but are subject to res judicata and are reversible on appeal." 0
ARDA also argued that for subject matter jurisdictional purposes in
foreclosure actions, the amount in controversy should be the principal and
accrued interest amount of the foreclosing mortgage or claim of lien.2"'
C. Legislative Proposals
The legislature proposed various solutions in the Regular Session to
resolve the jurisdictional conflict.20 2 Senate Bill 218 would have amended
section 34.01(4) to include the wording "except foreclosures," thereby
removing foreclosure actions from the jurisdiction of the county courts.20 3
The bill would have preserved the validity of all foreclosure judgments
entered in county courts in the interim period since the 1990 changes to
section 34.01(4).204 Another bill, Senate Bill 78, proposed basically the
200. Id. at 13. ARDA elaborated:
The United States District Court has distinguished a void judgment from a
judgment based on an erroneous exercise ofjurisdiction. Hobbs v. United States
Office of Personnel Management, 485 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla. 1980).... In
Hobbs, the court held: A void judgment is one which from the beginning was
a complete nullity and without any legal effect.... However a void judgment
must be distinguished from a judgment based on an erroneous exercise of
jurisdiction. A court has the power to determine the extent of its own jurisdic-
tion and only when there is a clear usurpation of power will the decision be
considered void.... A judgment which is not void, even though it may be
based on an erroneous exercise ofjurisdiction, is subject to res judicata and can
be reviewed only by direct appeal.
Id. at 13-14 (citing Hobbs, 485 F. Supp. at 458).
201. Id. at 15.
202. The legislature also proposed changes in 1992 and 1993, but the bills were
unsuccessful and died in committee. The bill proposed in 1992 was S.B. 1480, which would
have amended section 26.012(2)(c) to remove the "exclusive" provision. This was
unsuccessful because it would have required a constitutional amendment. In 1993, H.B. 1557
would have given the county and circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction in equity, and S.B.
1564 would have amended the constitution to abolish the county courts.
203. See Fla. S. 218, 13th Leg., 2d Sess. (1994).
204. Id.
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same changes, but the wording was slightly different, adding "except
foreclosures on equitable mortgages" to section 34.01(4).205 Still another
Senate proposal, Joint Resolution 422, would have, by constitutional
amendment, abolished the county courts and transferred jurisdiction and
judges of the county courts to the circuit courts.2 6 The House of Repre-
sentatives proposed House Bill 2547, which would have amended section
34.01(4) to include the phrase "except foreclosures on real property" to deny
county courts jurisdiction and prevent disputes over whether foreclosures
affect or involve title and/or boundaries of real property.2 7
All of these legislative proposals died in committee, due to the passage
of chapter 94-138, an act creating the Article Five Task Force, which will
conduct a complete review of the judicial branch.208 One of the possibili-
ties the task force will study is "whether a single-tier trial court would better
meet the needs of the state.""2 9 The Act became law on May 11, 1994,
and the task force is expected to submit a report with recommendations to
the legislature by December 1, 1994.1
The creation of the Article Five Task Force seems to have stifled other
legislative action regarding the jurisdictional conflict.2 ' The legislature
seemed to be waiting for the court to decide Nachon, but the court, with the
recent pending changes in membership due to the departures of Justices
Barkett and McDonald, had not been issuing a large number of opinions.
D. The Florida Supreme Court's Decision
In a short, per curiam decision, the court sided with the amici title
insurers and held "that circuit courts, and county courts within their
statutorily set monetary limit, have concurrent jurisdiction in matters of
equity.'' 112 In doing so, the effect on the litigants was that Nachon's
205. See Fla. S. 78, 13th Leg., 2d Sess. (1994).
206. See Fla. S.J. Res. 422, 13th Leg., 2d Sess. (1994) (proposed amendments to FLA.
CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 2, 5-8, 10-12, 16, 20, 21).
207. See Fla. H.R. 2547, 13th Leg., 2d Sess. (1994). The bill would have also revised
§ 26.012(2)(g) by creating two subsections, one "involving boundaries of real property," and
one "involving the title to real. property, including lien foreclosures." Id.
208. Ch. 94-138, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws at 867.
209. Id. at 868.
210. Id. at 869.
211. All of the other proposals died in committee after Chapter 94-138 passed in the
legislature on March 31, 1994. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION,
1994 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 10, SB 78; see also id. at 22, SB 218;
id. at 42, SJR 422; id. HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 40, HB 409; id. at 272, HB 2547.
212. Alexdex, 641 So. 2d at 860.
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county court lien foreclosure action, involving approximately $4000, was
finally validated. The decision should also have the effect of reversing the
dismissal in Blackton, which had also been appealed. More importantly,
however, the decision preserved the validity of prior small foreclosures
brought in county court. The court was apparently concerned about pre-
serving the stability of land titles, although it makes no mention of this
concern in its opinion. Title insurers undoubtedly appreciate the decision,
regardless of whether the benefit was intentional or incidental. However,
the court's decision may not have completely resolved all of the issues.
Although the holding states that equity jurisdiction is concurrent
between county and circuit courts in cases involving $15,000 or less, the
court stated that "in construction lien foreclosures, the central focus is on the
actual debt owed and not the underlying securing property. Therefore, the
monetary restrictions in section 34.01(c)1-4. shall apply to the amount of the
lien without consideration to the value of the securing property."2 3 In so
holding, the court has put a monetary amount classification on equitable
relief, which seems to be antithetical to equity. Prior to the statutory chang-
es in 1990, foreclosures, actions in equity, were brought exclusively in
circuit courts. The amount in controversy was not a relevant factor. The
property owner's right to redeem his interest, which most likely is worth
much more than the county court limit of $15,000, is what is being
foreclosed. The court's approach now makes the amount in controversy
relevant in determining equity jurisdiction, at least with respect to con-
struction lien foreclosures. It is unclear whether the court intended to limit
the application of this controversy valuation rule to construction lien
foreclosures; the relevant portion of the opinion refers only to construction
lien foreclosures and not to foreclosures in general.21 4 This uncertainty
may become a source of future litigation. Regardless of the scope of
application of the court's valuation rule, it would seem more logical to
determine the jurisdictional amount in controversy by evaluating the
property owner's equity of redemption instead of the value of the obligation
which the plaintiff seeks to collect; unlike an action at law to collect on a
debt, a foreclosure action puts title to real property in controversy. This
approach is consistent with the court's additional ruling in Nachon that lien
foreclosures (not limiting its reference to construction liens) do involve title
and boundaries to real property, reversing that portion of the Third District
213. Id. at 862.
214. Id.
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Court of Appeal's decision." 5 The court's approach to the valuation of
the amount in controversy creates additional uncertainty in that it is not clear
now whether the county courts can hear other equitable actions, such as
equitable defenses and counterclaims, without regard to monetary value.
Prior to the decision, it was understood that county courts had jurisdiction
to hear equitable defenses and counterclaims which arose within actions at
law within the county court's monetary limits. Now that construction lien
foreclosures are valued at the amount of debt owed, it remains to be
interpreted whether other equitable actions such as specific performance,
rescission, or even declaratory judgments must be similarly valuated.
Additionally, the court's assertion that foreclosures do involve title and
boundaries of real property creates uncertainty as to whether a quiet title
action can be heard in county court. Here again, the court's valuation
approach will likely cause further litigation; it is not certain whether the
court's statement that the value of the property is not a factor in determining
whether the action falls within the county court's monetary restriction
applies to quiet title actions. If so, then how would a quiet title action be
valued for jurisdiction purposes? Section 34.01(2)(g) states that actions in-
volving title and boundaries of real property, which is understood to include
quiet title actions, are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts; the court's decision only adds to the contradiction.
It is most likely apparent to the practitioner who reads sections 34.01
and 26.012 that the court, in reaching its decision, performed more than just
plastic surgery on the statutes; implant surgery is a more accurate analogy
to describe the court's interpretation. The court analyzed the two statutory
sections, stating that it found a conflict only when the sections are taken
together, but that separately, the two sections are "clear, precise, and their
meanings understandable., 216 The court then concluded that section 34.01,
which grants exclusive equity jurisdiction to the circuit courts, could not
logically be interpreted as restricting the more recent legislative action in
section 26.012. The court stated: "A contrary holding would ignore the
latest legislative expression on the subject and run counter to our principle
• . . that a statute should not be interpreted in a manner that would deem
legislative action useless. 21 7 The court found no constitutional infirmity
in section 26.012 and did not ask the legislature to modify the jurisdictional
statutes to make their meaning more clear and unequivocal. The court
215. Id. at 860-61.
216. Id. at 861.
217. Alexdex, 641 So. 2d at 862.
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seemed mindful of the strict separation of powers and the legislature's action
in creating the Article Five Task Force; the decision is probably the most
neutral solution, in light of the anticipated recommendations expected from
the task force by the end of the year.
E. Final Analysis
The court's interpretation seems to go beyond what the legislature
intended; if the legislature had intended to grant the county courts concur-
rent jurisdiction in equity, it could have easily done so in simple and
unequivocal terms. Such action would have been well publicized as a
notable change in Florida law. This was not the case, however. The author
suggests that a close reading of the two statutes seems to indicate the true
intent of the legislature, as expressed in the Staff Report of Chapter 90-269:
Namely, that circuit courts should still have exclusive jurisdiction in cases
in equity, while the county courts may hear matters involving equity within
a case, such as defenses or counterclaims, and do not have to transfer cases
clearly within county court jurisdiction over to the circuit courts just because
an equitable matter arises. A lien foreclosure is not an equitable matter
within a case; it is purely and completely an equitable case. There lies the
distinction. This interpretation leads to the conclusion that there is no
conflict between the statutes, although there may, as the staff analysis report
states, be a conflict with the constitution.2"' Additionally, this inter-
pretation would have had the detrimental effect feared by the amici in
Nachon, which could have invalidated foreclosure actions brought in county
courts. However, this problem could have been resolved in several ways.
The court could have expressly validated all foreclosure judgments entered
in the county courts since the 1990 changes to section 34.01(4) by making
its decision effective prospectively." 9 Alternately, the court could have
applied the de facto judge theory as urged by counsel for Alexdex; after all,
the qualifications required to become a county court judge are the same as
those for becoming a circuit court judge.2 Even if the court's decision
218. Staff Analysis, supra note 58, at 4.
219. Although this opinion is in theory not available when the issue involved is subject
matter jurisdiction, if the court holds that the county courts do not have jurisdiction in equity
to hear foreclosures, then prior judgments are void. Therefore, the court should find a way
of holding both that the county courts did have jurisdiction in the prior foreclosures and then
rule either way on whether each jurisdiction should continue.
220. See FLA. STAT. § 34.021(l) (1993) (except for judges in counties with populations
under 40,000, all county judges must have been member of the bar in good standing for five
years); accordFLA. CONST. art. V, § 8 (which prescribes the same five year requirement for
1994]
453
: Nova Law Review 19, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
is seen as the best possible solution, the court should probably have admitted
the inconsistency in the statutes and requested that the legislature take steps
to correct their wording. That the court chose not to do so is an indication
that it expects these matters to be resolved once and for all by the task
force.22' It will be interesting to see what the Article Five Task Force
recommends.
Furthermore, looking beyond the immediate issue at hand, it may be
time to begin considering the possibility of merging the circuit and county
courts into a single tier trial level court. The judges in both courts must
meet the same qualifications,222 and both courts use the same clerk, the
223clerk of the county and circuit courts. County court judges can and
often do act as temporary (and not so temporary) circuit court judges.224
Both courts are divided into various divisions according to areas of law and
types of cases, 225 and both courts usually have several branches throughout
the county or counties comprising a circuit.226 It does not seem that much
disruption would result, except for possible disruptions resulting from the
necessary changes in building names and letterheads. With the recent
increases in monetary limits in the county court, the oft stated rationale that
the county courts are not equipped to handle complex cases seems to be
weakening. The constitution would have to be amended, but it is to be
revised in 1998.227 An amended article V could have one trial level court,
the circuit court, with several divisions according to complexity of cases.
This would eliminate the problem of a case being dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; the case could be transferred to the appropriate
division if necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
This author believes that there may be no actual conflict between the
circuit and county court jurisdictional statutes, so that the circuit courts
circuit court judges).
221. See FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 20(c)(3).
222. See supra note 220.
223. See FLA. STAT. § 34.031 (1993) (providing that "[t]he clerk of the circuit court
shall be the clerk of the county court unless otherwise provided by law").
224. Interview with Edward Iturralde, Assistant State Attorney, Office of the State
Attorney, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in Miami, FL (June 14, 1994).
225. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 7.
226. Id. § 20(c)(9).
227. See Jim Smith, So You Want To Amend The Florida Constitution? A Guide to
Initiative Petitions, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1509, 1510 (1994).
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should still have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases in equity,
including foreclosures of all amounts. The court seems to have been
influenced by the title insurers' reality based arguments concerning the
stability of land titles, and a desire to defer to the legislature in anticipation
of the Article Five Task Force's pending report. The wording used by the
legislature in its 1990 change of section 34.01(4) has caused so much
confusion that it may be impracticable to return to the past allocation of
equitable jurisdiction. This legislative malpractice may have the effect of
precipitating the merger of the county and circuit courts. Maybe the time
has come.
Manuel 1? Valcarcel
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